“The Education Code provides that student records are ordinarily not available to the general public. (Rim of the World Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1396.) “‘A school district is not authorized to permit access to pupil records to any person without written parental consent or under judicial order’ except in certain situations not relevant here.” (Id.) “California law defines ‘pupil records’ as ‘any item of information directly related to an identifiable pupil, other than directory information, which is maintained by a school district....’” (BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 752.)
“As with California law, the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) provides for the privacy of education records.(Rim of the World Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.)
‘Education records’ are defined as documents which ‘contain information directly related to a student’ or ‘are maintained by an educational agency or institution....’” (Id.)
In addition to the right of privacy reflected in these statutes, the right of privacy set forth in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution also protects a person’s educational records. (Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 832.) As a result, plaintiff’ right of privacy protects disclosure of her high school records. (Id.)
“When the right to discovery conflicts with a privileged right, the court is required to carefully balance the right of privacy with the need for discovery.” (Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665.) “The proponent of discovery of constitutionally protected material has the burden of making a threshold showing that the evidence sought is ‘directly relevant’ to the claim or defense.” (Id.)
The right to privacy is expressly guaranteed by Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution and, as interpreted by the courts, extends to various types of personal information. See, John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198 (a litigant may invoke the constitutional right to privacy as justification for refusing to disclose personal information). Privacy protections are also provided by Education Code Sections 49076 and 49077, which require written consent or a court order before school administrators can disclose student information. Here, Tyler has asserted his privacy rights with regard to his school records, including all related medical records, psychological records, and disciplinary records. In their separate motion, Fourmy and Granziera have asserted their right to privacy with regard to the same records. The parents contend that any discussions they had with school administrators regarding Tyler’s “behavior, conduct, performance, discipline, attendance, and truancy,” and any “parent/teacher conference records and reports” directly implicate their privacy rights.
California law defines “pupil records” as “any item of information directly related to an identifiable pupil, other than directory information, which is maintained by a school district....” (Ed.Code, Sec. 49061(b).) FERPA defines “education records” in nearly identical terms. (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1232g (a)(4)(A).)
Implementing regulations promulgated by the state Department of Education further explain the term: “ ‘Pupil Record’ means information relative to an individual pupil gathered within or without the school system and maintained within the school system, regardless of the physical form in which it is maintained. Essential in this definition is the idea that any information which is maintained for the purpose of second party review is considered a pupil record.” (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 5, § 430, subd. (d).)”
“(a) A school district shall not permit access to pupil records to a person without written parental consent or under judicial order except as set forth in this section and as permitted by Part 99 (commencing with Section 99.1) of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations.”
Evidence Code § 49076 (c) provides:
“(c)(1) A person or party who is not permitted access to pupil records pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) may request access to pupil records as provided for in paragraph (2).
(2) A local educational agency or other person or party who has received pupil records, or information from pupil records, may release the records or information to a person or party identified in paragraph (1) without the consent of the pupil's parent or guardian pursuant to Section 99.31(b) of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations, if the records or information are deidentified, which requires the removal of all personally identifiable information, if the disclosing local educational agency or other person or party has made a reasonable determination that a pupil's identity is not personally identifiable, whether through single or multiple releases, and has taken into account other pertinent reasonably available information.”
In BRV, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742 the court considered whether the documents constituted “pupil records” under the statute, and observed:
California law defines “pupil records” as “any item of information directly related to an identifiable pupil, other than directory information, which is maintained by a school district....”
(Id. at 752 citing Ed. Code, Sec. 49061(b) and stating FERPA defines “education records” in nearly identical terms. (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1232g,(a)(4)(A).).
The court of appeal concluded that the investigator’s report did not fit within the cases construing “pupil records” stating in relevant part:
“Certainly the language of the statute, though broadly written, does not encompass every document that relates to a student in any way and is kept by the school in any fashion. (Id. at 754.) “A pupil record is one that ‘directly relates’ to a student and is ‘maintained’ by the school.” Id. “We agree with the Supreme Court that the statute was directed at institutional records maintained in the normal course of business by a single, central custodian of the school. Typical of such records would be registration forms, class schedules, grade transcripts, discipline reports, and the like.”
(Id.)
“For all of the above reasons, we conclude the Davis report and its accompanying summaries were not pupil records within the meaning of Education Code sections 49061 and 49076.” (BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 754-755.)
Union High School Dist. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 720, 725.) As to the June 25, 2018 review, the context in which the comments were made make clear that these assertions reflect a subjective evaluation of Plaintiff based on the anonymous poster’s own experience.
Dec 15, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1066, 1086-87.) As such, sustaining the demurrer does not deprive Plaintiffs of the ability to pursue a general negligence claim by proof of negligence per se and if Plaintiffs really are alleging negligence, Plaintiffs must properly allege all the elements.
Dec 14, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
Los Angeles County, CA
California School of Culinary Arts, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 35, 41.)
Dec 10, 2020
Riverside County, CA
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym violates the public’s First Amendment Right to disclosure and access, and that should Plaintiff have any legitimate concerns about her privacy, she should have filed her SAC under seal. Defendants do not substantiate either argument.
Dec 10, 2020
Other
Intellectual Property
Los Angeles County, CA
The court makes the following findings of facts that establish the requirements set forth in CRC Rule 2.550(d): (1) There exists an overriding interest in protecting the privacy of plaintiff, a minor sexual abuse victim, the privacy of other TUSD children on the school’s premises, and sensitive law enforcement records that were produced for the investigation of those acts of childhood sexual assault.
Dec 08, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
Los Angeles County, CA
The California Supreme Court “established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.
Dec 07, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
However, privacy protections are not absolute, and in each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery, and may order disclosure if a “compelling public interest” would be served by doing so. (Id. at Section 8:294, citing Britt v. Superior Court, supra, and John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1199.)
Dec 04, 2020
Orange County, CA
Kamer accepted responsibility for violations of Section VII (Z) (Violations of the University of California Privacy Policy)/Recordings, photographs, or media streams and Section VII (Z) (Violations of the University of California Privacy Policy)/Looking into a private location. AR 73.
Dec 01, 2020
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. The moving defendants have filed a special motion to strike pursuant to CCP § 425.16.
Nov 30, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. The moving defendants have filed a special motion to strike pursuant to CCP § 425.16.
Nov 30, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. Defendant challenges the allegations in paragraphs 28, 42, 45, 47, 59-61, 67, 71, 75-78, 80, 103 of the Complaint.
Nov 30, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. The moving defendants have filed a special motion to strike pursuant to CCP § 425.16.
Nov 30, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. The moving defendants have filed a special motion to strike pursuant to CCP § 425.16.
Nov 30, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. Defendant challenges the allegations in paragraphs 28, 42, 45, 47, 59-61, 67, 71, 75-78, 80, 103 of the Complaint.
Nov 30, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
Petitioner asserts that she made this false statement off duty and in order to protect her son’s privacy. As discussed, although Petitioner made the statement off duty, she did so when reporting Department-related business to a supervisor (execution of a search warrant at an APD officer’s home.)
Nov 24, 2020
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
Furthermore, defendant fails to show that she and B.K. have an overriding privacy interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record, or that supports sealing the entirety of the Complaint, and the proposed sealing of the entire Complaint is not narrowly tailored. (California Rules of Court, Rule 2.550. The Court GRANTS plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice as to Exhibits D, I, and O pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d).
Nov 20, 2020
Orange County, CA
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff EC, then a 9-year old special needs student, was sexually assaulted in Defendant’s school bathroom by another student on at least four occasions. Plaintiff seeks the performance evaluations within the past 5 years of Jeff Fullerton (Plaintiff’s teacher) and any aids. The constitutional right of privacy is not absolute; it may be abridged when there is a compelling state interest.
Nov 17, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
Lori Ann Fournier or Olivia Rosales
Los Angeles County, CA
“We conclude that the litigation privilege applies even to a constitutionally based privacy cause of action.” “Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 961.” See Rusheen v.
Nov 17, 2020
Business
Intellectual Property
H. Jay Ford
Los Angeles County, CA
This request seeks information that is protected from disclosure by the Constitutional Right to Privacy of third parties, who have not consented to the disclosure of their privileged information. This interrogatory requires Plaintiff to adopt Defendant’s position that Plaintiff was required to communicate his preference.
Nov 12, 2020
Employment
Other Employment
Los Angeles County, CA
He presents no evidence of “highly offensive” representations sufficient to support defamation or invasion of privacy claims. Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264. Finally, plaintiff presents no evidence defendants’ conduct was “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society,” as required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 160.
Nov 05, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 468-469). A claim has “minimal merit” if it is “both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the [nonmoving party] is credited.” (Gruber v. Gruber (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 529, 537, citation omitted.)
Nov 04, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Motion to Strike Punitive Damages: Moot Pseudonym: Denied without Prejudice The parties both agree that the use of the use of pseudonyms derives from the protection of privacy interests.
Nov 03, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
Los Angeles County, CA
(Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-49.) No. 4: OVERRULED. Relevant. Goes to weight. Permissible opinion of counsel. The lack of authentication or foundation may be remedied before trial. (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-49.) No. 5: OVERRULED. Best Evidence Rule was repealed in 1998. Hearsay exception—authorized admission of party opponent. Permissible opinion of counsel. No. 6: OVERRULED.
Nov 03, 2020
Employment
Other Employment
Los Angeles County, CA
Plaintiff J.E. was allegedly placed in a foster home with foster parent Betty Bourdland (“Bourdland”) from approximately May 13, 2015 through March 15, 2017, where he allegedly was kept at home without any registration or school attendance for over 8 months and allegedly suffered abuse, including sexual molestation and deprivation of adequate nutrition and heat. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 30, 54.
Oct 30, 2020
Employment
Discrimination/Harass
Los Angeles County, CA
Plaintiff alleged his issue is solely with the Department’s not taking steps to provide facilities for both genders in order to protect his privacy and the privacy of other firefighters. (SAC ¶26.) Plaintiff alleged he was released back to work on May 2, 2017, and by doctor’s orders was restricted from working at Station 103.
Oct 29, 2020
Employment
Other Employment
Los Angeles County, CA
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