Privacy Policy Requirements in California

Although companies have some measure of privacy protection, the right of privacy arising from the California Constitution applies to individuals, not to companies, (Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, §8:297). Determining the discoverability of company documents that have some privacy protection requires the court to balance the need for privacy with the relevance of the information sought. (Id., §8:297.5).

Issues Presented The following issues are presented by way of the motion: · Is the settlement agreement entitled to privacy protection? · Is the settlement discoverable under Evidence Code §1152? · Is the settlement discoverable as an admission by party opponent? · Is the settlement discoverable per CCP §877? · Is the settlement discoverable as potential impeachment evidence? d. Analysis i. Is the Settlement Agreement Entitled to Privacy Protection?

To the extent that defendants objections are based on Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act, they are overruled. As noted in Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 741: "We find nothing in the Insurance Code provisions cited by defendants which would require a restrictive interpretation of the Civil Discovery Act of 1986. Defendants point to the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act. (Ins.Code, § 791 et seq.)

Defendant has a legitimate privacy concern as to its employees' information. Plaintiff relies on Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 for support that the privacy objections are without merit. "The contact information for [Defendant's] current and former employees deserves privacy protection." (Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 561.)

Plaintiff have shown that the information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and that any privacy protection should yield in favor of disclosure. If no hearing is requested, this tentative ruling is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1312 or further notice is required.

Confidential personnel files at a person's place of employment are within a zone of privacy. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528-530. Unlike privilege, privacy protection afforded is qualified, not absolute. In each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery.

"California accords privacy the constitutional status of an 'inalienable right, on par with defending life and possessing property" and the "privacy protection ... embraces sexual relations." Vinson v. Super. Ct., 43 Cal. 3d 833, 842 (1987). Asking Flood – a minor at the time – about her personal sexual and dating relations is protected and probably not even relevant to the issues in this case. Also, questions regarding a third party's sexual relationships (Ambrose) are also protected privacy.

Defendant Stephenson also objects on grounds of privacy protection. The Court finds that the training and vehicle policies/training come within privacy protection, but are discoverable as there is no less intrusive means or alternative means to obtain such information other than from defendant Stephenson or defendant Marina Landscape.

This is Annie's privacy protection. However, the information may be disclosed at the request of the owner or in response to a valid court order or subpoena. Section 4857(a)(3). Plaintiff cites Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc. which involved drug testing of college athletes with reduced expectations of privacy.

Former employee contact information requires privacy protection. The demand for information about other lawsuits is overbroad.

Document production beyond what Tilt has agreed to provide in response to this request is overbroad in light of the peripheral relevancy of Tilt's financial condition and the fact that nonpublic financial information has privacy protection. Tilt's financial condition doesn't excuse nonpayment legally. Tilt doesn't try to claim that its financial condition does excuse nonpayment legally. Hearing required as to O'Melveny's request for compliance.

The Insurance Information Privacy Protection Act (Ins. Code §791.01, et seq.) prohibits an insurance institution, agent, or insurance-support organization from disclosing any personal or privileged information about an individual collected or received in connection with an insurance transaction unless the disclosure is in response to a facially valid administrative or judicial order, including a search warrant or subpoena. (Ins. Code §791.13(h.)

The circumstances do not support privacy protection over the records at issue. Even if the CID and Condo Services had protectible privacy interests in the requested information, moving parties fail to establish that those interests justify denial of relevant discovery. First, moving parties rely on outdated case law requiring a compelling interest when a privacy objection was raised. As stated in Williams v. Supr.

Confidential personnel files at a person's place of employment are within a zone of privacy. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528-530. Unlike privilege, privacy protection afforded is qualified, not absolute. In each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery.

CCP section 1985.6 provides that privacy protection to employees. If the subpoenas are permitted, then Plaintiffs will be given access to employee's private contact information and payroll records. "The contact information for [Defendant's] current and former employees deserves privacy protection." (Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 561.)

Unlike privilege, privacy protection afforded is qualified, not absolute. In each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery. The showing required to overcome the protection depends on the nature of the privacy right asserted; in some cases, a simple balancing test is sufficient, while in others, a compelling interest must be shown. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 34-35.)

A person’s work history (e.g., names of employers, dates of employment, job titles, full or part-time) is protected by a right of privacy. (Alch v. Sup.Ct. (Time Warner Entertainment Co.) (2008) 165 CA4th 1412, 1426-1427.) Unlike privilege, the privacy protection afforded is qualified, not absolute. In each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery. (In re Clergy Cases I (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1235.)

A confidential settlement agreement is entitled to privacy protection, similar to the privacy interests in bank account or tax information. Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 241, 242. Generally, confidential financial information is protected by the right to privacy set forth in the California Constitution. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656; Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-81; Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.

Medical records are protected by the right of privacy. (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 119.) A plaintiff partially waives this privacy protection by filing a lawsuit, but the scope of such waiver must be narrowly construed to prevent deterrence from instituting lawsuits. (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal. 3 833, 840.)

Insurance company files regarding an insured or claimant are protected by statute (“Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act”; Ins. C. § 791.01 et seq.). Disclosure of “any personal or privileged information gathered or received in connection with an insurance transaction” is restricted. [Ins.

As to the unrelated deposits /withdraws, JJW argues that they are protected by privacy. JJW is incorrect that privacy is a “privilege”. Unlike privilege, the protection afforded is qualified, not absolute. In each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery.

Here, Defendants fail to demonstrate any "good cause" for failing to raise their "Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act" objection, their objection based on attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product protection, their "not reasonably particularized" objection, and their "privacy rights" objections in their Moving Brief. As a result, to the extent Defendants are asserting their own rights through these objections, they have waived those rights by failing to timely assert them.

Defendant also argues that the subpoena to Miller improperly seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, and the Insurance and Privacy Protection Act. A party opposing a motion to quash must show good cause for having sought the production in the first place. ( See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Thiem Industries, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223-224.)

App. 4th 733, 741, the Court stated:"We find nothing in the Insurance Code provisions cited by defendants which would require a restrictive interpretation of the Civil Discovery Act of 1986. Defendants point to the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act. (Ins.Code, § 791 et seq.) That act is part of this state's regulation of the business of insurance.

Likewise, accepting defendant Ashjian’s own contention about the nature of plaintiff’s claim here, the court must protect, not ignore, plaintiff’s right to associational privacy. Defendant Ashjian also cites to a federal district court case, Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Association v. California Department of Education (E.D. Cal. 2016) 2016 WL 4375015, as support for piercing the privacy protection here.

Because P is entitled to privacy of medical records (John B. v. Superior Court [2006] 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198); and even in this personal injury case, P is still entitled to privacy of physical or mental conditions unrelated to the injuries sued upon. Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 854. While D opines other unstated conditions may be medically related to P's fall, mere speculation is inadequate to overcome the privacy protection and should not make D the arbiter of that determination.

Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 241 [confidential settlement agreements entitled to privacy protection: plaintiffs did not make a sufficient showing of compelling need for the information to be entitled to invade that protection].)

Employment records are within the scope of the privacy protection provided by the state and federal Constitutions. See Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 9-10; Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 530. This privacy interest is recognized by CCP §1985.6, which requires advance warning and a specific warning to employees when employment records are sought by subpoena. The constitutional right of privacy also applies to a party's medical records.

Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1097 (“personnel records and employment history are within the scope of the protection provided by the state and federal Constitutions”).) Where privacy protection applies, the protection is qualified, not absolute. (Britt v. Sup.Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.) “When the right to discovery conflicts with a privileged right, the court is required to carefully balance the right of privacy with the need for discovery.

Employment records are within the scope of the privacy protection provided by the state and federal Constitutions. See Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 9-10; Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 530. This privacy interest is recognized by CCP §1985.6, which requires advance warning and a specific warning to employees when employment records are sought by subpoena. "The right to privacy, however, is not absolute.

State Farm further objects based on the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act ("IPPA"), which restricts the release of insureds' information. IPPA appears to adopt a mandatory consent requirement for release of information, while plaintiff argues for implied consent by failure to object. For the latter point, plaintiff relies on a non-insurance decision not involving IPPA. More importantly, State Farm relies upon State Farm v.

ANALYSIS Generally, “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. . . . The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.

The privacy concerns can be ameliorated through appropriate redaction of the customer names and other private information. As for trade secret protection, defendants have not established an identifiable and protected trade secret. Civ. Code §3426.1(d) Defendants only argue that the Track Day Sponsorship Agreements effect FMSD's sale prices and resultant profits.

Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 741 [The Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act applies to, and restricts, information gathering practices and disclosures of information by insurers. It does not purport to create a privilege against discovery by an insured party who is a party to a lawsuit.

While Insurance Code § 791.02(v) provides a definition of "privileged information" for purposes of the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act, Plaintiff offers no authority as to the scope of protection afforded to the information Defendants seek via these subpoenas. The case Plaintiff relies on, Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

App. 4th 233, 241 [confidential settlement agreements entitled to privacy protection: plaintiffs did not make a sufficient showing of compelling need for the information to be entitled to invade that protection].) Discovery will not be ordered if the information sought is available from other sources or through less intrusive means. (Rutter, CPBT at §8:321, citing Allen v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal. App. 3d 447, 449, and Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal. 3d at 856.)

The constitutional right of privacy applies to a party's medical records. John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198. Unlike certain of the statutory privileges, privacy protection is not absolute. "On occasion [a party's] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent's right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery." Vinson v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - August 10, 2023 EVENT DATE: 08/11/2023 EVENT TIME: 10:30:00 AM DEPT.: C-68 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Richard S.

A person has a constitutional right to privacy in their estate planning documents. See Estate of Gallio (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 592, 598 (“The trial court properly concluded that stepmother’s will and testamentary papers fell within the privacy protection set forth in article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution.”). A person also has a right to sexual privacy. See Boler v. Superior Court (1987) 201 Cal.App.3d 467, 473.

The right to privacy set forth in the California Constitution extends to one’s financial records. (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656.) The right to privacy may be abridged only when there is a compelling and opposing state interest. (Garstang v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 526, 532.) One such compelling public need lies in facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal claims. (Id.)

The Hinshaw Court found a private settlement agreement is entitled to at least as much privacy protection as a bank account or tax information, and held that the moving party failed to make a sufficient showing of compelling need for the information in the settlement agreements to be entitled to invade that protection on the basis of public policy favoring settlements, the parties expressed desire for confidentiality, and the speculative nature of measuring damages by the amounts awarded in settlements.

Privacy Protection Defendant has established that the financial records sought by Plaintiff (nos. 1-17, 22-23, 26) encompass confidential records not only of itself but of its clients. (Phillips Decl., ¶¶ 6, 8.) Plaintiff’s request for loan applications by Defendant and its agents manifestly includes financial information (no. 29). The right of privacy contained in the California Constitution (Art. 1, § 1) does not apply to corporations.

ANALYSIS Generally, “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. . . . The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.

The California Supreme Court “established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.

Unlike privilege, privacy protection afforded is qualified, not absolute. In each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery. The showing required to overcome the protection depends on the nature of the privacy right asserted; in some cases, a simple balancing test is sufficient, while in others, a compelling interest must be shown. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 34-35.

That information is afforded privacy protection and is different from requesting general witness identification information. (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1200 [the intrusion upon sexual privacy may only be done on the basis of practical necessity (internal quotations omitted)].) California has codified a persons unalienable right to privacy in its Constitution. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)

The motion is therefore DENIED as to the 1st cause of action. 2nd cause of action for violation of privacy “To state a claim for violation of the constitutional right of privacy, a party must establish (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances; and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest. Four distinct kinds of activities have been found to violate this privacy protection and give rise to tort liability.

Discovery regarding the former employer has probative value to overcome plaintiff's privacy interest. Current Employers (Avema Pharm Development, LLC): Motion to quash GRANTED except for limited information regarding plaintiff's salary and benefits. The employment information is to be provided to plaintiff's counsel, who will produce records regarding salary and benefits. Medical information. Motion to Quash DENIED with respect to emotional distress. Privacy protection extends to medical records.

But that is not the case where the person or persons whose privacy rights are at stake is not the responding party. “The privacy protection extends to the unknown, unnamed female partners of Boler who have neither executed a waiver nor are even necessarily aware their privacy interests are endangered by the deposition question.

When it comes to making a determination concerning the privacy protection, the burden is on the party seeking discovery, who must show a “particularized need for the confidential information sought.” (Id. at 859-862.) The court must be convinced that the information is directly relevant to a cause of action or defense … i.e., that it is essential to determining the truth of the matters in dispute. (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 859-86; Harris v. Sup.Ct. (Smets) (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665.)

Further, the information provided in an insurance file would include information protected by the right of privacy. See Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 59, 68; see also Insurance Code §§ 680 et.seq. (“Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act”). This could include personal data such as dates of birth, social security numbers etc.

Further, the information provided in an insurance file would include information protected by the right of privacy. See Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 59, 68; see also Insurance Code §§ 680 et.seq. (“Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act”). This could include personal data such as dates of birth, social security numbers etc.

Further, the information provided in an insurance file would include information protected by the right of privacy. See Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 59, 68; see also Insurance Code §§ 680 et.seq. (“Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act”). This could include personal data such as dates of birth, social security numbers etc.

Further, the information provided in an insurance file would include information protected by the right of privacy. See Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 59, 68; see also Insurance Code §§ 680 et.seq. (“Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act”). This could include personal data such as dates of birth, social security numbers etc.

Further, the information provided in an insurance file would include information protected by the right of privacy. See Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 59, 68; see also Insurance Code §§ 680 et.seq. (“Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act”). This could include personal data such as dates of birth, social security numbers etc.

Further, the information provided in an insurance file would include information protected by the right of privacy. See Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 59, 68; see also Insurance Code §§ 680 et.seq. (“Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act”). This could include personal data such as dates of birth, social security numbers etc.

Plaintiff asserts the subpoena seeks information protected under the Insurance Information and Privacy Act, Insurance Code section 791.01 et seq, information protected by Ramirezs constitutional right of privacy, and information irrelevant to the litigation.

SCE argues that the confidentiality of the Settlement Agreement should be upheld based on the privacy protection afforded to settlements (See e.g. Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 241 [The privacy of a settlement is generally understood and accepted in our legal system] disapproved of on other grounds by Williams v.

(Fairbairn Depo., 29:16) Private financial information is worthy of protection in discovery. (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656–657.) The need for such discovery is balanced against the need for privacy protection in resolving such disputes. When seeking to discover such material, the proponent must make a higher showing of relevance and materiality than would be necessary for less sensitive material. (Id. at 657.)

The right to privacy tort was recognized in 1890 based on the trend in tort law to extend protection to " 'the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent [a person's] thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.' " (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 23, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.) In other words, the tort protects "a 'right "to be let alone." ' " (Ibid.) In 1972, the right to privacy was added to the California Constitution by initiative.

Moreover, Plaintiff argues that any potential privacy concerns can be addressed through redaction or a protective order. The court agrees. The interrogatories seek relevant information that does not evoke strong privacy protection, and any potential privacy concerns are adequately addressable via a protective order. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is granted as to special interrogatories nos. 13-16, 19-21, and 23-24.

Everlink responded with boilerplate objections, including relevancy, overbreadth, attorney-client privilege, work product protection, privacy, trade secret, etc. and refused to produce documents. The parties dispute relevancy of the documents.

When it comes to making a determination concerning the privacy protection, the burden is on the party seeking discovery, who must show a “particularized need for the confidential information sought.” (Britt v. Sup. Ct., supra, 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-862.)

The California Supreme Court in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 addressed similar privacy concerns. "The contact information for [Defendant's] current and former employees deserves privacy protection." (Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 561.) The court in Belaire-West endorsed a notice procedure whereby employees could opt out of having their contact information disclosed. (Id. at 561-562.)

The question, which Plaintiff must answer, is whether the terms of a “confidential” settlement are entitled to any protection against civil discovery, and if so, whether that protection is absolute or qualified. In California, discovery is purposefully broad.

Privacy Protection Defendants’ other concern is financial privacy. Even highly relevant, nonprivileged information may be shielded from discovery if its disclosure would impair a person’s inalienable right of privacy provided by the California Constitution, Article I, section I. (Britt v. Sup. Ct. (San Diego Unified Port. Dist.)(1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.) Personal financial information is within the “zone of privacy.” (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Sup. Ct. (Barkett) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657; John B. v.

The information sought appears to include confidential information contained in employees’ personnel file and as such, are subject to privacy protection. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention that he seeks the identity and contact information of “percipient witnesses” which is not subject to privacy protection, the persons whose information are sought are not “percipient witnesses” of alleged discriminatory conduct against Plaintiff, but are persons who are believed to have suffered similar injuries.

When it comes to making a determination concerning the privacy protection, the burden is on the party seeking discovery, who must show a “particularized need for the confidential information sought.” (Britt v. Sup. Ct., supra, 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-862.) Defendants have articulated a particularized need for medical records relating to conditions placed at issue by Plaintiff. On balance, Defendants are entitled to medical and psychological information in order to properly prepare for trial.

Privacy The right of privacy in the California Constitution (art. I, § 1), “protects the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” ( Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250 [italics in original]; See Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [“In Hill, we established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy.

Article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution explicitly recognizes a right to privacy and California courts have recognized the right as supplying a qualified privilege to a discovery demand. “[T]he right to privacy protects the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370.)

Article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution explicitly recognizes a right to privacy and California courts have recognized the right as supplying a qualified privilege to a discovery demand. “[T]he right to privacy protects the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370.)

Article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution explicitly recognizes a right to privacy and California courts have recognized the right as supplying a qualified privilege to a discovery demand. “[T]he right to privacy protects the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370.)

However, [e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege[,] [including] the right to privacy . . . . ( Board of Nursing, supra , 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right to privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. . . .

Regarding factor one. a settlement agreement is entitled to "at least as much privacy protection as a bank account or tax information." (Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still (1996) 51 Cal. App. 4th 233, 241, disapproved of on other grounds by Williams v. Sup.Ct. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531.) Neither party disputes that this is a settlement agreement at issue in the disputed discovery.

Generally, [t]he state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. . . . The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.

The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.

Generally, “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. . . . The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.

Confidential settlement agreements such as this one are to be afforded privacy protection, which serves the public interest favoring settlement, and the parties’ desire that the agreement be confidential. That interest supports sealing the minor’s compromise here, and would be thwarted if the record is not sealed. The parties’ interest in keeping the terms of this minor’s compromise confidential overrides the public interest in access.

Graton Fire Protection District Defendant Graton Fire Protection District’s motion to compel further document production is GRANTED. Defendant has not requested sanctions; therefore, none will be imposed. (See CCP § 2023.040.) Defendant’s counsel shall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule 3.1312. I. Governing Law “California law provides parties with expansive discovery rights.” (Lopez v.

.) ¶ The “informational privacy” protection is qualified and requires that a court balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery. (Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 564.) “There must be a compelling and opposing state interest justifying the discovery. [Citation.]

The party asserting a privacy right “must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” The party seeking information “may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves.” Then, the party seeking protection may “identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.”

Individuals have a right to privacy in medical information under the California constitution. (Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 679.) Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, no legal authority suggests that the identities of treatment providers are somehow excluded from the privacy protection afforded by the California Constitution.

Generally, “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. . . . The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.

Plaintiff argues that the subpoenas violate his right to privacy because his medical records are entitled to privacy protection, except as to those conditions that Plaintiff has directly placed at issue. Plaintiff’s action is largely based on disability discrimination.

Protection Act ¿ because ¿ the Act prohibits the release of insurance documents, data, recorded statements, and any other information relating to or evidencing communications between an insurer, the insured, and other third parties, which relate to a claim for insurance benefits of a civil or criminal proceeding and is collected ¿ in connection with or in reasonable anticipation of a claim for insurance benefits, a civil proceeding, or a criminal proceeding.¿ (Insurance ¿ Code § 791.02, ¿ subd .

Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, 791, 796-797 [the constitutional right of privacy does not apply to corporations].) In addition, the court in Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 741, held that the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act “applies to, and restricts, information gathering practices and disclosures of information by insurers. it does not purport to create a privilege against discovery by an insured party who is a party to a lawsuit.”

A person has a constitutional right to privacy in their estate planning documents. See Estate of Gallio (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 592, 598 (“The trial court properly concluded that stepmother’s will and testamentary papers fell within the privacy protection set forth in article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution.”). Further, a person’s “confidential financial affairs as well as to the details of [his] personal life” are likewise protected from public disclosure by the California Constitution.

Such information is generally discoverable, subject to privacy protection for the putative class members. Pioneer, 40 Cal.4 th at 373. To protect the class members’ privacy, they should be given the right to object to (“opt-out” of) disclosure of their identities and contact information. A written notice approved by the court accomplishes this purpose (called, not surprisingly, a “Belaire-West Notice”). Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at 373.

Finally, even if there were still some privacy protection over decedent’s call records, the records are directly relevant to the identification of potential percipient witnesses, not just of events leading up to decedent’s death, but decedent’s quality of life, which is material to any claim of damages as a result of his untimely death. The privacy right at issue here is also not fundamental to personal autonomy, and Defendants are not required to establish a compelling interest to justify production.

The right of privacy is not an absolute privilege, and the decision whether to allow discovery as to records subject to the right or privacy requires either a balancing test, or a showing of a compelling interest, depending upon the nature of the privacy interest. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 34-35. Generally, the privacy rights of third parties are given more protection than those of litigants.

This information is sensitive and subject to constitutional privacy protection. The court finds that there is an overriding interest in the privacy of these sensitive records that overcomes the right of public access to these records. The court finds that the overriding interest in protecting the privacy of this sensitive information supports sealing the records.

Defendant lays sufficient evidentiary foundation to assert absolute work product protection. CCP §2018.030(a). Plaintiffs fail to submit any argument or evidence that would overcome application of absolute work product protection.

Unlike privilege, privacy protection afforded is qualified, not absolute. In each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery. The showing required to overcome the protection depends on the nature of the privacy right asserted; in some cases, a simple balancing test is sufficient, while in others, a compelling interest must be shown. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 34-35.

The right of privacy is protected by Article I, section I of the California Constitution. However, the right to privacy is not absolute and even private information can be disclosed in some circumstances. The court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need of discovery. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.)

The right to privacy tort was recognized in 1890 based on the trend in tort law to extend protection to " 'the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent [a person's] thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.' " (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 23, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.) In other words, the tort protects "a 'right "to be let alone." ' " (Ibid.) In 1972, the right to privacy was added to the California Constitution by initiative.

In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. Confidential personnel files at a person's place of employment are within a zone of privacy. (Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Sup.Ct. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528-530.) However, even where privacy protection applies, the protection is qualified, not absolute.

The Court sees no meaningful distinction as between the privacy protection afforded to the address and telephone number of each patient. Communications with Class Members Neither party will be permitted to contact any absent class member during the notice period.

Even if there is little to no privacy protection over Plaintiff HP’s records, Defendants/Cross-Defendants fail to establish grounds to find the tax return privilege waived or inapplicable. The tax return privilege is a separate and distinct basis to withhold disclosure of tax returns from privacy. See Fortunato , supra , 114 Cal.App.4 th at 479-482. Document Request No. 4 is quashed. 5.