Personal Taxes in California

Because the definition of “tax” applied by SB Taxpayers was understood at the time of the adoption of Proposition 218 and because Proposition 218 did not appear to change that definition, this Court concluded that the SB Taxpayers definition of tax applied to Proposition 218, as it was originally adopted, and consequently the franchise fee at issue in this action was not a “tax” within the meaning of article XIII C as it was originally adopted.

” (2) Application of Proposition 218 to Franchise Fees Before Proposition 26 Plaintiffs’ FAC was filed in 2011 and seeks remedies for the violation of articles XIII C and XIII D (i.e., Proposition 218) at times both before and after the enactment of Proposition 26. Plaintiffs argue that Proposition 218 applies to the Recovery Fee regardless of Proposition 26. It is therefore appropriate for the court to consider the effect of article XIII C before its amendment in 2010.

Section 2, subdivision (c) was originally enacted as part of Proposition 218 to provide a buffer for existing general taxes. It is arguable that the “effective date of this article” applied anew when, as here, Proposition 26 caused governmental charges previously not determined to be “taxes” to fall under the requirements of Proposition 218. Proposition 26 became effective on November 3, 2010. This action was filed on December 2, 2011.

In this action, Petitioner alleges that the UUT is a general tax imposed as “an incident of property ownership” which is barred by article XIII D, section 3, subdivision (a), which is part of California’s Proposition 218, known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act.”

Proposition 26 Proposition 26 redefined the taxes that required voter approval under Proposition 218 to include “any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government,” except for specific exceptions. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, §1, subd. (e).) Proposition 26 also requires a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to approve laws increasing taxes on any taxpayers and shifts the burden to the state or local government to demonstrate that any charge, levy or assessment is not a tax. (Schmeer v.

Proposition 26 Proposition 26 redefined the taxes that required voter approval under Proposition 218 to include “any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government,” except for specific exceptions. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, §1, subd. (e).) Proposition 26 also requires a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to approve laws increasing taxes on any taxpayers and shifts the burden to the state or local government to demonstrate that any charge, levy or assessment is not a tax. (Schmeer v.

Proposition 26 Proposition 26 redefined the taxes that required voter approval under Proposition 218 to include “any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government,” except for specific exceptions. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, §1, subd. (e).)

Petitioner sought a declaration that the District’s water rate structure violated Proposition 218, California Constitution, Article XIIID, restitution of all fees and charges collected in violation of Proposition 218, a permanent injunction prohibiting the billing and collection of water charges or fees which were imposed in violation of Proposition 218, and a writ of mandate ordering the District to abandon its current rate structure, and to create a new rate structure which conformed with Proposition 218.

Against this background, state voters approved Proposition 218, known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” in 1996. (Jacks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 259.) Among other things, Proposition 218 added Article XIII D to the Constitution, which “allows only four types of local property taxes: (1) an ad valorem tax (i.e., a tax based on the assessed value of an item, such as real estate or personal property) (2) a special tax, (3) an assessment, and (4) a property- related fee. (Art. XIII D, § 3, subd. (a).)”

in violation of Proposition 218, and (4) a writ of mandate requiring the District to abandon its current rate structure, and to create a new rate structure which conforms with Proposition 218.

Proposition 26 The third challenge to the ground water charge is that the charge is a “tax” and therefore subject to the provisions of Proposition 26. Proposition 218 added article XIII C to the California Constitution. Article XIII C generally requires that general and special local taxes must be approved by the electorate. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 2.)

The writ of mandate was denied, after which he dismissed the causes of action related to it, and amended to allege a cause of action for violation of Proposition 218. All that remains in it are a cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, a cause of action for violation of the Public Records Act, and the cause of action for violation of Proposition 218. He then filed Case 1415836 as a class action, to pursue the Proposition 218 claim on behalf of all non-agricultural rate customers of MWD.

In 1996, voters approved Proposition 218 known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” which added Articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution. (Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830, 837; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of Fresno (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 914, 918.) “Proposition 218 allows only four types of local property taxes: (1) an ad valorem property tax; (2) a special tax; (3) an assessment; and (4) a fee or charge.”

(3) Proposition 26 The third challenge to the ground water charge is that the charge is a “tax” and therefore subject to the provisions of Proposition 26. Proposition 218 added article XIII C to the California Constitution. Article XIII C generally requires that general and special local taxes must be approved by the electorate. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 2.)

In the section discussing constitutional limitations, it provides that Proposition 218 applies to City and City “expects that any future water rate increases will comply with Proposition 218’s procedural and substantive requirements to the extent applicable thereto.” (AR 1386.)

City 14 of San Jose, Santa Clara County Superior Court No. 2014-1-CV-258879 (consolidated 15 with case no. 2016-1-CV-294032); 16 (3) The text of Proposition 218, which is now Article XIII D of the California State 17 Constitution; 18 (4) Excerpts from the November 5, 1996, California Ballot Pamphlet prepared by the 19 California Secretary of State, which includes the text of Proposition 218 and ballot 20 materials that were presented to voters on Proposition 218; and 21 (5) The Court’s Statement of Decision

This court has yet to hear plaintiff’s claims and evidence regarding Proposition 218, contrary to defendant’s contentions. Fourth, the court’s ruling denying the petition is not a bar to the requested relief, because the court did not address Proposition 218 in its ruling. The ruling on the writ petition does not support defendant’s claim that it is res judicata on the proportionality argument. The ruling never discusses Proposition 218 or the Constitutional requirement.

(GC§ 56020.7) Proposition 218: California voters adopted Proposition 218, known as the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, which added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution. (Beutz v. County of Riverside (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1520.)

December 2015 Notice With its opposition to the instant motion, Respondent submits a Proposition 218 notice dated December 2015. (See Oppo. 2-3; Carvalho Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. 2.) In December 2015, LADWP sent a written Proposition 218 notice (“Notice”) to all of its customers that the Los Angeles City Council would consider passing a new water rate ordinance (“Ordinance”) at a hearing in February 2016.

Nonetheless, fees predicated on consumption are within the constitutional limitations of Proposition 218. (Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 216-217.) Thus, rates, when adopted, must be shown to comply with Proposition 218 based upon the information available at the time the rates are adopted.

Plaintiffs were not required to participate in the Proposition 218 hearing. The class period shall be one year prior to Patz filing his administrative claim. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion is granted.

The court has previously noted that this below-cost pricing does not violate Proposition 218 because Proposition 218 prohibits above-cost pricing and MWD may exercise its discretion as a matter of policy to subsidize agricultural rates, provided that the cost of the subsidy is not included in costs charged to other customers for services within the scope of Proposition 218.

We therefore conclude that the groundwater charge authorized by Water Code section 75522 is not a charge for a ‘property-related service’ that falls within the scope of Proposition 218.” (Id. at pp. 1208–1209.) The United Water court then addressed the application of Proposition 26. Being bound by Amrhein, this trial court had determined that Proposition 218 applied and because charges subject to Proposition 218 were exempt from Proposition 26’s definition of a “tax” (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd.

Proposition 218 Issues As discussed above in the context of plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication, the second and ninth causes of action challenge the Ordinance under the substantive requirements of Proposition 218. MWD also moves for summary adjudication of these causes of action.

In some cases, the rates fail to comply with Proposition 218 because the agency fails to support the cost differences of service at different tiers. (See, e.g., Capistrano Taxpayers Association, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1516 [above-cost-of-service pricing for tiers of water service is not allowed by Proposition 218]; City of Palmdale v.

218 by adopting Ordinance No. 90; (10) whether MWD violated Proposition 218 in the proceedings leading up to its adoption of Ordinance No. 90; (11) whether MWD’s efforts to impose Ordinance No. 90 and the MWD Increased Water Rates violated and continue to violate Proposition 218; and (12) whether the tiered rate structure is unconstitutional because various tiers exceed the cost of delivery of water to MWD’s customers.

As noted above, Silicon Valley interpreted the California constitution to require the trial court to render its decision in a Proposition 218 case by independently weighing the evidence in the administrative record de novo. It did not invite the trial courts to conduct hearings or trials de novo in Proposition 218 cases.

However, it also appears that the questions to be litigated in this action are whether the WaterFix Authorization contains disguised taxes that were not subject to constitutional voting requirements (see 1AC, ¶¶ 23, 50, 51): Significantly, Proposition 218 did not define the term “tax.” That definition was provided 14 years later, with the passage of Proposition 26 in November 2010.

(San Diego Gas & 13 In a footnote, Permittees state they will discuss the impact of Proposition 26 on this case. (Opening at 13, fn.4.) They fail to meaningfully do so. On pages 17 and 18 of the opening brief, they state Sinclair Paint was “largely superseded” by, or “limited” by, Proposition 26, but they do not explain or discuss what Proposition 26 actually did or said, or how it effects this case.

City of Riverside, RIC 1818642), 14 (the settlement in Parada), 18-19 (portions of the Riverside city charter), and 21-23 (ballot materials relating to Proposition 218), sustain the objection to the remaining requests. Appearances requested to argue the merits of the petition and what remedy, if any, is appropriate.

As enacted by the voters, Proposition 218 contained two additional provisions governing its construction. First, Proposition 218 made findings: “The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that Proposition 13 was intended to provide effective tax relief and to require voter approval of tax increases.

(1) Demurrer of Defendant to Complaint (2) Motion of Defendant to Strike Portions of Complaint Ruling: (1) For the reasons set forth herein, the demurrer of defendant City of Santa Barbara is sustained, with leave to amend, as to the second cause of action (violation of Proposition 218), and is overruled as to the first cause of action.

The motions raise a complex combination of Proposition 218, the “Home Rule” of charter cities, the constitutional franchise from the California Constitution as it existed in 1911, the Broughton Act of 1905, and the Franchise Act of 1937, all as they respect the amount and nature of utility franchise fees. Working through these motions will take more time; I need to continue the matters; since next Tuesday (2/12) is a court holiday the matter is continued, sua sponte, to the law and motion calendar of 2/19.

The complaint and judicially noticeable materials do not show that Proposition Q violates Proposition 218, section 17041.5 or the single subject rule nor has plaintiff shown that it can allege sufficient facts to do so. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests.

The complaint and judicially noticeable materials do not show that Proposition Q violates Proposition 218, section 17041.5 or the single subject rule nor has plaintiff shown that it can allege sufficient facts to state cognizable claims on these matters. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests.

The complaint and judicially noticeable materials do not show that Proposition Q violates Proposition 218, section 17041.5 or the single subject rule nor has plaintiff shown that it can allege sufficient facts to state cognizable claims on these matters. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests.

Proposition 218 did not define “tax.” That omission was cured when article XIII C, section 1, was amended by the passage of Proposition 26 in 2010. Proposition 26 added subdivision (e) to that section. Subdivision (e) broadly defines “‘tax’ to mean any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e).) However, the definition goes on to state seven exceptions. A charge that satisfies an exception is, by definition, not a tax.

218.

If defendant is referring to Article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c), then it would appear that allegations relating to Proposition 218 may be irrelevant and improper as “sewer, water, and refuse collection services” are exempted from the voting requirement. (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (c) [“Voter Approval for New or Increased Fees and Charges.

The complaint and the judicially noticeable materials do not show that Proposition Q violated Proposition 218 or section 17041.5. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests.

[I]n Proposition 218 challenges to agency action, the agency had to bear the burden of proof of demonstrating compliance with Proposition 218, and both trial and reviewing courts are to apply an independent review standard, not the traditional, deferential standards usually applicable in challenges to governmental action&. [I]t is not enough that the agency have substantial evidence to support its action. That substantial evidence must itself be able to withstand independent review.

In the present case, Petitioners similarly question the constitutionality of the District’s method of rate calculation, how increased revenues would be spent (related to Petitioners’ stewardship claims), whether Respondents’ Proposition 218 Notice provided adequate notice to the public and whether the rate increase violated Government Code section 66013.

In the present case, Petitioners similarly question the constitutionality of the District’s method of rate calculation, how increased revenues would be spent (related to Petitioners’ stewardship claims), whether Respondents’ Proposition 218 Notice provided adequate notice to the public and whether the rate increase violated Government Code section 66013.

In the present case, Petitioners similarly question the constitutionality of the District’s method of rate calculation, how increased revenues would be spent (related to Petitioners’ stewardship claims), whether Respondents’ Proposition 218 Notice provided adequate notice to the public and whether the rate increase violated Government Code section 66013.

In the present case, Petitioners similarly question the constitutionality of the District’s method of rate calculation, how increased revenues would be spent (related to Petitioners’ stewardship claims), whether Respondents’ Proposition 218 Notice provided adequate notice to the public and whether the rate increase violated Government Code section 66013.

In the present case, Petitioners similarly question the constitutionality of the District’s method of rate calculation, how increased revenues would be spent (related to Petitioners’ stewardship claims), whether Respondents’ Proposition 218 Notice provided adequate notice to the public and whether the rate increase violated Government Code section 66013.

In the present case, Petitioners similarly question the constitutionality of the District’s method of rate calculation, how increased revenues would be spent (related to Petitioners’ stewardship claims), whether Respondents’ Proposition 218 Notice provided adequate notice to the public and whether the rate increase violated Government Code section 66013.

In the present case, Petitioners similarly question the constitutionality of the District’s method of rate calculation, how increased revenues would be spent (related to Petitioners’ stewardship claims), whether Respondents’ Proposition 218 Notice provided adequate notice to the public and whether the rate increase violated Government Code section 66013.

The City’s additional evidence is material only if the resolution of the City’s Proposition 218 challenge depends upon that additional evidence. If, without considering the City’s additional evidence, the rates are found to violate Proposition 218, or if, even considering City’s additional evidence, the rates are not found to violate Proposition 218, the City’s additional evidence would be immaterial to the resolution of the merits.

Before Proposition 218 became law, special assessment laws were generally statutory, and the constitutional separation of powers doctrine served as a foundation for a more deferential standard of review by the courts. But after Proposition 218 passed, an assessment's validity, including the substantive requirements, is now a constitutional question. Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority, 44 Cal.4th 431, 448 (2008).

Plaintiffs allege that the water rates established by Ordinance No. 90 violate the substantive requirements of Proposition 218, set forth in article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (b), of the California Constitution.

The only portion of Plaintiffs’ claims on which 16 they achieved any measure of success concerned Defendant’s tiered rates, which the Court found 17 were in violation of Proposition 218. (Statement of Decision and Judgment (“SOD”), p. 51:19- 18 22.) Even with regard to the tiered rates, however, the Court did not award any relief and, in 19 fact, decertified the class.

Article XIII C of the constitution was modified by proposition 26; it expanded the definition of tax to include “levy, charge, or exaction of any kind.” City of San Buenaventura, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 1209. Certain charges were exempted from this definition under Article XIII C, § 1(e) of the California Constitution, including certain fees.

In 1997, Proposition 218 took effect as Articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution. Proposition 218 required that the defendant "conduct a public hearing upon the proposed fee or charge" after providing notice of the proposed change. Cal. Const. Art. XIII D § 6(a)(2).

The Court cannot conclude that as a matter of law the initiative process and Proposition 218, which empowers voters to approve any rate increases, controls over a city's obligations under Government Code § 54515. Resolution of the City's Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief requires factual determinations which cannot be made from the allegations on the face of the pleading or from matters judicially noticeable. The issue as identified is whether Measure M sets the rates too low.

Plaintiffs argued that this reclassification violated plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights and failed to comply with the notice provisions of Proposition 218 (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(1)). On June 28, 2011, this Court adopted its ruling rejecting these challenges to Ordinance 90 and denying plaintiffs’ requested writ relief.

218, the California Constitution, and California statutes, codes, and other applicable law."

Plaintiffs allege the user fee, Resolution and Ordinance are invalid because they constitute an illegal special tax under Proposition 218 and they impose a user fee on car rental customers who will not use the Chula Vista parking structure. Discussion 1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Adjudication Plaintiffs seek summary adjudication of the reverse validation claim which challenges the legality of Resolution 2018-065 and Ordinance 2030.

Item 31 is described as an email exchange between the Mayor, City Manager, Assistant City Manager, Director of the Department of Public Utilities and Director of the Planning and Development Department relating to the use of funds under Proposition 218 and whether it creates policy for future cases, and includes a legal opinion.

The District argues that Ruskey lacks standing, that the District gave notice as authorized by Government Code section 53755, and that the District in any event substantially complied with the notice requirements of Proposition 218. Ruskey opposes the demurrer, arguing that Ruskey has standing to prosecute this action, that the District’s interpretation of the notice requirements is erroneous, and that the District did not substantially comply with the notice requirements of Proposition 218.

For example, the minutes for an April 16, 2019 Board of Directors hearing reflects that members of the public spoke and there was a discussion involving “fee proportionality and compliance with Proposition 218,” The minutes further reflect that the Board directed staff to bring to the next meeting, among other things, different options regarding adjustments to the CMF. (Dunn Decl, Ex. Z.)

218, the California Constitution, and California statutes, codes, and other applicable law."

Defendant argues that in both cases the plaintiffs assert claims challenging the same legislative act: Defendant’s proposal to levy a third assessment on homeowners on Broad Beach in Malibu to fund replenishment of their eroding beach, to protect their homes from sea rise, pursuant to Proposition 218.

Judicial actions or proceedings to attack, review, set aside, void, raise Proposition 218 issues or annul an ordinance, resolution or motion fixing or changing rates or charges such as a resolution setting a district's water rates generally are subject to the 120-day statute of limitations (Public Utilities Code, § 14402; see also California Constitution, Article XIII D, § 6 (b)). The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety, WITHOUT leave to amend.

In summary, she stated: “CVWD has not met its burden as to either prong of a Proposition 26 analysis. Accordingly, CVWD has not shown that the RAC rates comply with Proposition 26.” (Ibid.) In short, the Court found not only that the allocation is invalid, but that the aggregate costs of the charge are invalid. Therefore, the remedy to be fashioned is not limited to one that will fix an invalid allocation of costs between the various AOBs.

Pinedale contends that the reimbursement/ cost sharing agreement it entered into with Fresno is an unlawful contracting away of its police power to set sewer rates that satisfy Proposition 218 and/or other legal requirements. This argument goes to a claim relating to the rates and charges for the services Fresno is providing. It is not a claim that renders the judgment Fresno is attempting to collect invalid on its face.

Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge the Long Beach Vacant Lot Monitoring Fee (the fee) reflected in Chapter 18.29 of the Long Beach Municipal Code, arguing that it is unconstitutional under Proposition 218 of the California Constitution, Article XIII D. The City argues that Article XIII D does not apply to the fee. Both parties move for summary judgment. The Court grants Defendants motion and denies Plaintiffs motion.

This is a reverse validation action challenging rates set by Defendant Sacramento Municipal Utility District ("SMUD") as unauthorized special taxes in violation of Article XIII C of the California Constitution ("Proposition 26"). SMUD now moves for an order assigning this matter to a prerogative writ department.

218, the California Constitution, and California statutes, codes, and other applicable law."

218, the California Constitution, and California statutes, codes, and other applicable law."

Plaintiff contends the Proposition 26 claim had merit. Defendants do not dispute this point, noting that SDOG survived Demurrer, and the parties disputed novel Proposition 26 issues in this action. Reasonable Attempt to Settle. In order to prevail using the catalyst theory, Plaintiff "must first reasonably attempt to settle the matter short of litigation." Id. at 577.

In City of Palmdale, the court held that the adoption of a new water rate structure by the Palmdale Water District violated the constitutional requirements of Proposition 218. (Id. at p. 928.) In response to the decision in City of Palmdale, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint to add a ninth cause of action for “Violation of California Constitution, Art. XIII D (Proposition 218).” (First Amended Complaint [“FAC”], p. 34.)

Plaintiffs allege the user fee, Resolution and Ordinance are invalid because they constitute an illegal special tax under Proposition 218 and they impose a user fee on car rental customers who will not use the Chula Vista parking structure. Discussion 1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Adjudication Plaintiffs seek summary adjudication of the reverse validation claim which challenges the legality of Resolution 2018-065 and Ordinance 2030.

Legal Opinions Regarding Compliance with Proposition 26 Respondents obtained two legal opinions from outside law firms, which opined that the Fixed Meter Charge complies with Proposition 26. (Oppo. 2; see AR 2015-2020, 2064-2070.) Both legal opinions were based on Raftelis’s Rate Study dated May 22, 2019, not the final June 20, 2019, Rate Study. It appears Raftelis may have added some analysis to the final Rate Study in response to these opinions. (See AR 2239-40 [final study]; cf.

Petitioner argues a 3.9 multiplier is appropriate because counsel took the matter on a contingent basis, and the “issues raised in this case are complex and required attorneys with substantial expertise in Proposition 218 matters.” (MPAs, p. 19.) Respondent argues the case was neither novel or complex and was decided as a “single motion on briefs and oral argument.” (Oppo, p. 17.) Respondent further argues the contingent risk was low, unlike the class-action matters Petitioner cites.

Under Proposition 218, all valid assessments must both clear the substantive hurdles in article XIIID, section 4, subdivision (a) and be approved by a weighted majority of owners under section 4, subdivisions (c), (d), and (e).” Id. at 449 (emphasis added and citation omitted). See also Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n. v.

S.) e Resolution No. 5798, adopted on April 30, 2019, by the Sausalito City Council: o Increased sewer charges are approved for the purpose of funding essential sewer upgrades and maintaining and improving the Sausalito sewer system (subject to procedures required under Proposition 218). (Defendants’ RIN Exh.

S.) e Resolution No. 5798, adopted on April 30, 2019, by the Sausalito City Council: o Increased sewer charges are approved for the purpose of funding essential sewer upgrades and maintaining and improving the Sausalito sewer system (subject to procedures required under Proposition 218). (Defendants’ RIN Exh.

S.) e Resolution No. 5798, adopted on April 30, 2019, by the Sausalito City Council: o Increased sewer charges are approved for the purpose of funding essential sewer upgrades and maintaining and improving the Sausalito sewer system (subject to procedures required under Proposition 218). (Defendants’ RIN Exh.

S.) e Resolution No. 5798, adopted on April 30, 2019, by the Sausalito City Council: o Increased sewer charges are approved for the purpose of funding essential sewer upgrades and maintaining and improving the Sausalito sewer system (subject to procedures required under Proposition 218). (Defendants’ RIN Exh.

S.) e Resolution No. 5798, adopted on April 30, 2019, by the Sausalito City Council: o Increased sewer charges are approved for the purpose of funding essential sewer upgrades and maintaining and improving the Sausalito sewer system (subject to procedures required under Proposition 218). (Defendants’ RIN Exh.

S.) e Resolution No. 5798, adopted on April 30, 2019, by the Sausalito City Council: o Increased sewer charges are approved for the purpose of funding essential sewer upgrades and maintaining and improving the Sausalito sewer system (subject to procedures required under Proposition 218). (Defendants’ RIN Exh.

S.) e Resolution No. 5798, adopted on April 30, 2019, by the Sausalito City Council: o Increased sewer charges are approved for the purpose of funding essential sewer upgrades and maintaining and improving the Sausalito sewer system (subject to procedures required under Proposition 218). (Defendants’ RIN Exh.

Petitioners allege that respondent has abused its discretion by discriminating against them; arbitrarily creating a class of one by passing Ordinance No. 90; misclassifying the property under its own definition; acting contrary to the expressly stated purposes of Ordinance No. 90; and violating Proposition 218 in that fees charged exceed the proportional cost for the services, revenue from the fees exceeds the funds required to provide service to the property, and the fees charged are not used solely for the

Proposition 26 defined the term "tax" to include "any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by the State" except for certain enumerated exceptions.

Petitioners argue that the Board’s assessment of the fee violates Proposition 26 of the California Constitution, codified at article XIII A, § 3, subd. (a). Proposition 26 changed the definition of “tax” to be any “levy, charge or exaction of any kinds imposed by the State,” except in five specific circumstances.

Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence showing that the requested hourly rates of $550, $490, and $440 are comparable to other attorneys litigating Proposition 218 cases in San Diego County with just 8, 5, and 4 years of experience, respectively. The one Proposition 218 matter cited by plaintiff is from Orange County. (See Hensley Decl., ¶ 17(G).) And while Mr. Houchin, Ms. Halperin, and Ms.

In Plata, the plaintiffs filed a Proposition 218 challenge to San Jose’s municipal water rates. In their pre-filing claim and in their complaint, they alleged San Jose improperly diverted a portion of the rates recovered to the city’s general fund, which had the effect of forcing ratepayers to pay more than the cost of service to cover the diverted funds.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.

On April 13, 2022, while the appeal was pending, the parties successfully mediated the case and reached an agreement in 1 In 1996, Proposition 218, also known as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” passed, adding articles to Article XIII C and XIII D. Proposition 218 prohibited local governments from imposing, extending, or increasing taxes without voter approval. (Art. XIII C, §2, subds. (b) and (d).) However, it did not define “tax”.