Paid Leave and Parental Leave in California

Defendant contends the failure to do so was the result of its attorney’s failure to communicate about the need for an extension of time to respond in light of Defense Counsel’s paternity leave. Plaintiff, in reply, contends Defendant has improperly included objections with the discovery even though objections have been waived. Plaintiff argues sanctions should be imposed due to the ongoing failure to serve compliant responses.

Defendants further contend that Defendants never told him he was not eligible for parental leave or made any attempt to determine whether Plaintiffs wifes condition qualified as a disability under the FEHA. Plaintiffs contentions are not supported by the record. Plaintiff alleged in the Complaint that he took time off following the birth of his child.

Second Cause of Action: FMLA/Paternity Leave Discrimination Defendant demurs on grounds that FEHA does not provide a cause of action for discrimination for requesting paternity leave under the FMLA, and Plaintiff has not asserted a cause of action under the California Family Rights Act or the California Parent Leave Act.

Plaintiff’s counsel, however, informed Leeway that he would be on paternity leave at that time, and would not return to work until July 2, 2018. (Hottinger Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.) Discussing the matter, Leeway’s counsel and Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed the deposition should not go forward until after the paternity leave ended.

The Court finds good cause for continuance based on the stipulation and the fact that defendant's counsel is unavailable for the trial date due to paternity leave. The October 19, 2015 MSC and the December 1, 2015 trial dates are vacated. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the MSC is set for March 14, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. and trial is set for April 26, 2016.

Defendant seeks a continuance on the grounds that its counsel Deputy Attorney General Kevin Hosn will be out on paternity leave from July 22 to August 22 and that given the December 5 trial date the last day to file a summary judgment motion is August 19, during counsel's leave.

In this regard, plaintiff argues that defendants refused to provide a “reasonable extension” of 30 days to respond and that the attorney handling the matter has been out on paternity leave. OPP (Form Interrogatories) 3:28-4:4; Post Decl. (Form Interrogatories) ¶ 3. These would appear to support a finding of substantial justification on their face.

DISCUSSION Plaintiffs argue there is good cause to grant their requested continuances pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subdivision (c)(3), because Plaintiffs’ counsel will be on a pre-paid vacation and on paternity leave during the May 22, 2019 trial date. (Motion, pp. 2:13-2:16; 6:16-6:19; Bulone Decl., ¶ 2.)

Further, defense counsel has until recently been unavailable because of paternity leave. Moreover, both parties wish to allow time to complete discovery and to attempt informal settlement negotiations and possible mediation prior to expert designations and trial. The motion is GRANTED because moving party has shown good cause. CRC Rule 3.1332. The court orders that trial is continued from March 8, 2019 to August 8, 2019, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 4.

The Court is sympathetic to counsels parental leave. However, this is a 2019 case, approaching five years old. Trial has been continued repeatedly, over several years. The motion contains no information about trial readiness, or about efforts to settle. The Court will not countenance further delay in bringing this case to resolution. The Court will grant a brief continuance.

Second, in reply to the opposition, Defense Counsel declares his partner is expected to have a baby in February of 2017, and he intends to take paternity leave thereafter. In light of both of the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds the requested six-month continuance is reasonable. Defendant requests a trial date of 6/12/17. The personal injury courts do not set trial dates on Mondays, and therefore the Court sets at trial date of 6/13/16.

As such, ENH has had significant notice of the date of trial, and ENH indicates that the expert informed them in July 2023, while destructive testing was taking place, that he would be on paternity leave in early October 2023. ENH does not outline any responsive steps it took in response to this information, nor does it offer a justification for why it did not inquire about the availability of its expert at any point prior.

Defendant argues that moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that he was entitled to Paid Family Leave, this is a benefit offered by the State of California, not his employer. Defendant asserts that accordingly, there is no way for it to deny him this benefit. Defendant contends that additionally, the program provides only for wage replacement; it does not offer the job protection of the FMLA and CFRA.

In any event, the Court finds Defense Counsel’s impending paternity leave constitutes “good cause” to grant the motion to continue the trial date, and the motion is granted. The 4/30/19 trial date is advanced to today’s date and continued to Tuesday, 10/29/19 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3 of the Spring Street Court. The 4/16/19 FSC is advanced to today’s date and continued to Tuesday, 10/15/19 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 3. All discovery cut-off dates are continued to reflect the new trial date.

Defendants have provided evidence that part of the reasons the motion for summary adjudication was not filed sooner was due to Defendants' counsel's paternity leave in August and September of this year. Defendants have provided evidence they attempted to resolve the scheduling issues surrounding the motion for summary adjudication informally with Plaintiffs, but they were unsuccessful in doing so.

Counsel avers that he will be unavailable for at least two months before the present trial date due to paternity leave. Counsel further avers that the parties have stipulated to the proposed continuance. (Declaration of Todd Vigus, ¶¶ 3-4, Exhibit A.) The Court finds that Defendant has shown good cause for a trial continuance pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332.

DePaoli further explains that defense counsel previously requested a continuance until April to accommodate his paternity leave, but because Ms. DePaoli was also pregnant and due in April, she requested a continuance until summer. (Id. ¶6.) However, they did not ultimately stipulate to a continuance. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for a continuance. While the unavailability of an expert can constitute good cause, here, Plaintiff has failed to explain (1) why Dr.

Counsel avers that he will be unavailable for at least two months before the present trial date due to paternity leave. Counsel further avers that the parties have stipulated to the proposed continuance. (Declaration of Todd Vigus, ¶¶ 3-4, Exhibit A.) The Court finds that Defendant has shown good cause for a trial continuance pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332.

DISCUSSION City asks the Court to continue the trial and related dates because (1) Plaintiffs counsel will be taking paternity leave starting July 2023 and will be unavailable for trial, (2), despite the parties diligence in conducting discovery, the case is not ready for trial, (3) on May 23, 2023, deposition proceedings were interrupted due to a medical emergency, (4) at her deposition on May 23, 2023, Plaintiff reported she is still receiving treatment for her injuries.

Defendant contends that defense counsel will be on paternity leave and will be unavailable from September through mid-November. Further, the parties will be attempting mediation in November or December 2018, after an IME is conducted. The parties have agreed and stipulated to the continuance. The motion is GRANTED because moving party has shown good cause. The court orders that trial is continued from November 4, 2018 to February 11, 2019, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 4.

Moreover, Defendants lead co-trial counsel is expected to be on paternity leave beginning on or about January 14, 2023. (Motion, 5:7-13.) Defendant requests a 6-month continuance of the trial date and related dates to accomplish the completion of discovery, avoid the trial conflict, and permit co-counsel to take paternity leave. Good cause to grant the motion is demonstrated.

In January 2022, Plaintiff’s wife gave birth and Plaintiff took paternity leave from January 12, 2022 through February 2, 2022. On or around February 28, 2022, Plaintiff’s wife began to experience compilations and needed additional assistance with their newborn child. Plaintiff requested his remaining paternity leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. After requesting this additional time off, Defendant’s attitude towards Plaintiff changed.

Plaintiff contends there is good cause to continue the trial date because Plaintiffs counsel has just welcomed his first newborn and will be taking paternity leave. Further, Plaintiff provides that Plaintiffs counsel has been forced to take significant time off to care for his mother-in-law, who was in a serious car accident, and Plaintiff represents the matter is not ready to proceed to trial.

Plaintiff’s meet and confer effort consisted of a single e-mail to Attorney Brian Yasuzawa (Yasuzawa),the partner on the matter, on 5/2/23, while Yasuzawa was out on paternity leave. Yasuzawa’s e-mail had an auto-reply stating he was out of the office from 4/26/23 through 5/13/23 and was checking e-mails sporadically. The reply provided the attorney’s cell phone number and advised senders if they needed an immediate response.

From April 2013 to October 2013, father took paternity leave and was then on unemployment, so he watched Ben during the day; few months after he returned to work, mother, father and Ben went to a local Mexican restaurant and the waitress came up and addressed one-year-old Ben by name; when mother questioned father about how the waitress would have known Ben, he told her that while he had been on paternity leave he took Ben to local bars several times per week; she was shocked; he had given her detailed daily

Defense counsel cannot “reliably promise” the deposition of Im prior to January 27, 2020 because he is on paternity leave. Plaintiff’s counsel states that he is in trial on January 27, 2020. Counsel are to meet and confer as to a date in February 2021. The motion is thus MOOT. Plaintiffs are ordered to serve notice of this ruling.

Walmart’s HR told Plaintiff she had until 4/17/21 to enroll in family leave or return to work. (Ibid.) Plaintiff informed HR she had already applied for family leave, which was in process. (Ibid.) In early April, Plaintiff received a letter of termination dated 3/31/23 for her failure to return to work. (Ibid.)

Thereafter, defense counsel represents he went out on paternity leave from June 14, 2023 to August 14, 2023 after his wife gave birth prematurely to their son. The Court finds defense counsel meets his burden to show he did not counsel discovery abuse. Accordingly, sanctions are imposed against Defendant only in the amount of $1,050 representing 3 hours at Plaintiffs; counsels hourly rate. IV. CONCLUSION The motions are moot.

Kahl, will be on paternity leave during the currently-scheduled trial date. (Kahl Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) The parties have stipulated to a 6-month continuance and request a trial date in July 2023. The Court finds good cause for a continuance. The month of July does not have any trial slots available and the earliest trial date available after July 2023 is August 14, 2023. IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs unopposed motion is GRANTED.

leave and unavailable until September of 2018.

Plaintiff requests that the trial date be continued to complete depositions, participate in an MSC, and accommodate counsels family leave. Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.

However, given that Carcamo was on parental leave, Woodbury was not his usual place of business at the time. Substitute service can only be rendered at defendants dwelling house (usual place of abode), usual place of business or usual mailing address. (CCP §415.20(b).) Shugart testifies that she was no longer employed at Woodbury when service was rendered. Woodbury was therefore not her usual place of business under CCP §415.20(b).

All of this occurred prior to the date on which Plaintiff asked for information regarding a family leave of absence. Plaintiff maintains that the illegal retaliation stems from his March 4, 2021 inquiry into the availability of family leave.

FUNDS DEPOSITED INTO ACCOUNT ARE EXEMPT: FAMILY LEAVE ACT, SOCIAL SECURITY AND STATE DISABILITY. =(302/CWW)

Among other things Plaintiff attaches various state and federal acts contending that employers are required to provide up to 10 days paid leave for employees unable to work or are teleworking because of specific circumstances caused by the CORONA virus. Plaintiff recorded telephone conversations with various health clinics to play for Defendant to establish how difficult it was to find a physician in a pandemic that could examine him.

Since Plaintiffs hiring in October of 2017 Plaintiff experienced discrimination and humiliation by managers D/Chen and D/Dang for being taking paternity leave and for being Taiwanese. On December 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint and later on December 24, 2020 a First Amended Complaint (FAC).

Claimant’s wages have been reduced from $5427.30/mo. to $4539.52/mo., presumably related to her medical/family leave issue. Her expenses appear reasonable. Respondent to give notice.

Roths parental leave and the events in the personal life of Plaintiffs counsel delayed the filing of this motion (Motion), as Plaintiffs counsel deemed it improper to seek to amend the operative complaint while Defendants primary attorney was on parental leave. (Pl. Mot. p.3-4.)

Counsel Mark Lim from Shegerian & Associates, Inc. is unavailable for trial due to scheduled paternity leave. (Lim Decl., ¶ 4.) Mr. Lim has taken a substantial role in completing discovery and has been the primary handling attorney for this action. (Lim Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Ciarimboli Decl., ¶ 3.) Further, both counsel for the remaining law firm have a conflict with another matter entitled Ridge v. Alameda Health System (the “Ridge action”). (Ciarimboli Decl., ¶ 2.)

Among other facts, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that [d]uring the months of June, July, and August of 2021, after [Plaintiffs] wife gave birth to their child, he opted to take a protected leave for baby bonding; (2) that Plaintiff returned to work from his protected leave on September 1, 2021 and that [p]rior to his paternity leave he had been working the night shift from 4:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m., which was best for his childcare situation; (3) that [o]n his second day back to work, [Plaintiff] was abruptly advised

Among other facts, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that [d]uring the months of June, July, and August of 2021, after [Plaintiffs] wife gave birth to their child, he opted to take a protected leave for baby bonding; (2) that Plaintiff returned to work from his protected leave on September 1, 2021 and that [p]rior to his paternity leave he had been working the night shift from 4:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m., which was best for his childcare situation; (3) that [o]n his second day back to work, [Plaintiff] was abruptly advised

Plaintiff does not plead whether she requested leave, what type of family leave she requested, and whether Tyco refused to grant her request. In fact, she states that she was terminated after returning from an authorized family leave. [FAC ¶ 15] Plaintiff says that her termination after she took family leave “constituted a violation of her statutory right to freedom from denial of her right to family leave, or from interference with that right.”

On June 18, 2020, Petitioner John Doe was placed on involuntary paid leave by the University of California, Santa Cruz ("UCSC") pending an investigation of allegations of sexual misconduct by three current or former students.

Defendants counsel states that he intend[s] to be on paternity leave from mid-February 2024 to mid-April 2024. (Waneis Decl., ¶ 13.) In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Plaintiff has had his deposition taken as [sic] is prepared to go to trial on the merits. Any delay in the case, would lead to prejudice, since it would be a delay to his day in court.

However, Defendant’s counsel will be on family leave starting on or about April 23, 2018. Therefore, Defendant will likely require additional time to complete Plaintiff’s deposition and to prepare a motion for summary judgment. No previous continuance has been requested or granted by any party, and no party submits that they will suffer any prejudice as a result of a trial continuance. Therefore, the Court finds good cause to grant the trial continuance.

Booser; in 9/2017 the trial date was continued by stipulation and Court order to 2/5/19 to accommodate defense trial counsel because he had paternity leave the last week of November of 2018 and the first week of December 2018; the MSC date was not changed; no settlement was reached on 10/12/18; almost a month later, the request for a second IME was made in a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel on 11/9/18 [the parties had stipulated and the Court had ordered that all expert witness exchange and all expert discovery

Second Cause of Action for Harassment: The Complaint contains a single factual allegation against Hernandez: Human Resources manager Irene contacted Michele and told her she had until April 17, 2021, to either enroll in family leave or return to work. To which Michele responded she had already applied for family leave and was in the process.

During the relevant time, (1) Core transitioned to a work at home policy on 3-12-20; (2) Vitela went on paternity leave and was not present in the office from 4-11-20 through 5-1-20; and (3) on 7-10-20, Core did not allow anyone to come into the office due to COVID. See Supplemental Dec. of J. Thatcher, ¶¶4-8. Thatcher’s testimony on these issues corroborates Vitela’s assertion that he was working from home more intensely than ever before is corroborated.

Even when an employee resigned years after the maternity or paternity leave at issue, it is possible that Lambert could have perceived them as distracted by SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG19036830: Nelson VS The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. A Corporation 12/08/2023 Hearing on Motion to Compel .; filed by Jennifer Anne Nelson (Plaintiff) in Department 520 their parental duties.

During his employment, Plaintiff notified his Performance Management Leader, Alia Pallera, that he would be taking paternity leave on March 3, 2023 in anticipation of the birth of his child. On February 15, 2023, Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with KPMG. On August 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants, KPMG, Alia Pallera, Richard Ho, and Joseph Roppo, alleging causes of action for: (1) Pregnancy Paternal Discrimination (Cal. Govt.

Petitioner seeks to stay the operation of a July 14, 2020 decision by The Regents of the University of California's Committee on Privilege & Tenure to deny Petitioner's grievance of his involuntary paid leave pending an investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct with three of Petitioner's former students. The statutory basis for Petitioner's request is Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5(g).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND On 12/21/18, TWU filed this case, asserting that SWA’s sick leave and family leave policies for California based flight attendants violate California Labor Code 233 and 234, Oakland Municipal Code Chapter 5.92, and Los Angeles Municipal Code 187.04.

In opposition, plaintiff contends evidence of the circumstances of Kara Keister's employment and her termination when she was on parental leave is admissible to show discriminatory intent. Plaintiff is persuasive on the present record. The Court sees no necessity for a 402 hearing at this time. See discussion regarding Plaintiff's Motion in Limine #4. Motion #2 to exclude evidence of confidential settlement between defendant and Kara Keister The motion is granted.

Young shows that the Regents wanted to terminate her employment for "job abandonment" or for taking family leave even though Ms. Young submitted the leave paperwork in a timely fashion and the leave was ultimately approved. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests.

DEFENDANT WAS OBLIGATED TO PLACE PLAINTIFF ON LEAVE IN RESPONSE TO HER DOCTOR'S NOTES AND PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PROVIDED A BASIS THAT SHE WAS ENTITLED TO PAID LEAVE. THE COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION ARE DUPLICATIVE BUT ARE NOT BARRED BY FEHA. WORKER'S COMPENSATION DOES NOT BAR THE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION CLAIM BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME NATURE OF THE DIRECTOR'S CONDUCT. DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 AND 7 ARE OVERRULED.

The invoices were also issued during a time that [he] was preparing to go out on paternity leave, as [he] had communicated to JAMS, the arbitrator and Plaintiffs counsel on multiple occasions prior to July 2022. (Felton Decl., p. 3.) Accordingly, while the invoice may have been sent , it appears Defense Counsel may have not received the invoice, which is tacitly required by CCP section 1281.98 subdivision (2). All in all, even as noted in other decisions such as DeLeon v.

Some delay has been due to plaintiffs counsels paternity leave, and the unavailability of witnesses before that leave occurred. [Valenzuela Decl., paras. 33].

.: 23STCV30211 MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS ADMITTED MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Sophia Henry RESPONDING PARTY : No opposition On December 16, 2023, Plaintiff, Sophia Henry, filed this action against Defendant Rob Bonta, acting as California Attorney General for the State of (Bonta) , among other defendants, arising from the denial of Plaintiffs Paid Family Leave claim.

Reimbursement of paid leave salary required upon conviction of crime involving office or position On or after January 1, 2012, any contract executed or renewed between a local agency and an officer or employee of a local agency that provides paid leave salary offered by the local agency to the officer or employee pending an investigation shall require that any salary provided for that purpose be fully reimbursed if the officer or employee is convicted of a crime involving an abuse of his or her office or position

Therein, the FAC asserts six causes of action against Defendants based on allegations that Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from her position as Senior Manager/Talent Management & People Development with Western Digital after she submitted complaints regarding discrimination, interference with parental leave, and unequal pay. The FAC states that Plaintiff was informed of her termination on March 27, 2019.

Instead, in February 2017, Plaintiff misrepresented that he was taking paternity leave, sought psychiatric treatment, and failed to return before the end of the academic year. In March 2018, approximately nine months after the residency program ended, Plaintiff requested a transfer to a different residency in a different facility, and to switch to a different medical specialty. When Defendant refused, Plaintiff filed this action.

While FEHA harassment and discrimination are distinct from CFRA family leave, P has collapsed the two public policies in both COAs and identified the same adverse action (termination) for both COAs. As a result, the 5th and 6th COAs are duplicative as drafted. However, the Court percieves no useful purpose in compelling Plaintiff to revise these claims where no confusion exists as to the applicable grounds. The demurrer to the 6th COA is overruled.

Motion to Continue Lead defense attorney cites death in the family, bereavement, and family leave for reasons to request a trial continuance. This appears to be the first trial continuance in this case. Good cause appearing and no prejudice to opposing counsel shown, motion is granted.

On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff Princess Obienu (Plaintiff) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services (Defendant), alleging: (1) race/national origin discrimination; (2) disability discrimination; (3) failure to accommodate disability; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process; (5) violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA); (6) violation of the CFRA Interference with Family Leave Rights; (7) violation of CFRA retaliation; (8) failure to prevent/correct discrimination

On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff Princess Obienu (Plaintiff) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services (Defendant), alleging: (1) race/national origin discrimination; (2) disability discrimination; (3) failure to accommodate disability; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process; (5) violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA); (6) violation of the CFRA Interference with Family Leave Rights; (7) violation of CFRA retaliation; (8) failure to prevent/correct discrimination

Re: Cross-Defendant filed a malicious and fraudulent Paid Family Leave claim to the EDD on July 1, 2017. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Espino indicates that his EDD claim for family leave benefits was granted in the amount of $1,338.00. Espino Declaration, ¶ 6; Exh. 3.Defendant/Cross-Complainant does not submit any evidence to rebut this assert by Espino. As such, there was no favorable termination which could accrue to Cross-Complainant because Cross-Defendant actually obtained family leave benefits.

On top of all of this, Plaintiff's trial and lead counsel is currently on family leave because he and his wife are expecting their first child and Plaintiff’s counsel had an unexpected medical issue. Plaintiff’s lead counsel is not in a position to oppose the MSJ or be ready for the current trial date.

On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff Princess Obienu (Plaintiff) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services (Defendant), alleging: (1) race/national origin discrimination; (2) disability discrimination; (3) failure to accommodate disability; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process; (5) violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA); (6) violation of the CFRA Interference with Family Leave Rights; (7) violation of CFRA retaliation; (8) failure to prevent/correct discrimination

Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed when she requested family leave/compliance with FMLA. (FAC ¶4.) Defendant DOMINICK SANCHEZ demurs to Plaintiff’s second and ninth causes of action; and Defendant WAL-MART STORES, INC. demurs to Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action. Second Cause of Action – Wrongful Termination GC §12940(a). (As to Defendant Sanchez ONLY) Individuals who did not themselves qualify as employers cannot be sued for alleged discriminatory acts.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed a complaint arising from her alleged wrongful termination, alleging causes of action against Defendants for: (1) violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”); (2) violation of the CFRA—interference with exercise of family leave rights; (3) violation of the CFRA—retaliation; (4) disability discrimination in violation of California Government Code, Section 12940 et seq.; (5) failure to accommodate; (6) failure to engage in the interactive process; (7) retaliation in violation

Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed when she requested family leave/compliance with FMLA. (Complaint, Par. 4.)

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that HR provided false information about his FMLA leave with the intent of Plaintiff retracting his leave request and denying Plaintiff his family leave rights under California law, that Defendant fraudulently documented Plaintiff as a no-call/no-show on the day of his child’s birth and other facts with the intent to frame Plaintiff, Defendant refused to provide accommodation after he provided a doctor’s note, and the CEO terminated him for prioritizing his family over work.

Under Labor Code section 246, subdivision (l)(3), paid sick time for exempt employees is calculated in the same manner as the employer calculates wages for other forms of paid leave time, and there is no dispute that defendant followed this formula. Defendant therefore argues that the statute is unambiguous and requires no interpretation by reference to other sources.

In opposition, Plaintiff does not identify with legal authority how the facts regarding his parental leave amount to a tort and acknowledge the cause of action is unrelated to an adverse employment action involving discrimination. (Opp., at p. 10:21-28.) Thus, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Conclusion For these reasons, the demurrer to the first through fifth causes of action are SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

All paid leave benefits were exhausted by 2001. Martin was relying upon Workers’ Compensation benefits which were delayed, causing Martin to file for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy on March 22, 2001. The property was released from the stay. Payments were then made on the property up until August 4, 2004. The property was sold in a Foreclosure Sale on April 6, 2005. Martin was evicted on June 4, 2005. · Martin claims ETS failed to inform her of the surplus sale proceeds after the sale of the property.

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to add information about how Osler assisted other nurses with filing complaints, especially Sara Scheesley, and Osler’s use of family leave. Osler has generally alleged she was retaliated against based on her use of family care or medical leave. (Complaint, ¶ 51.) However, no facts were provided about her use of family care or how it relates to this retaliation claim.

On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff Princess Obienu (Plaintiff) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services (Defendant), alleging: (1) race/national origin discrimination; (2) disability discrimination; (3) failure to accommodate disability; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process; (5) violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA); (6) violation of the CFRA Interference with Family Leave Rights; (7) violation of CFRA retaliation; (8) failure to prevent/correct discrimination

Plaintiff Tiffani Emerson's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleges eight causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Declaratory Relief, (3) Discrimination Based on Sex/Gender, (4) Discrimination Based on Disability, (5) Harassment, (6) Failure to Accommodate, (7) Denial of Family Leave, and (8) Retaliation.

The Third Cause of Action addresses discrimination based on age, disability, and medical/family leave. (See FAC, ¶ 20.) The court, however, cannot tell from the allegations whether Plaintiffs age, disability or taking of medical/family leave played any role in his termination. Rather, as alleged, Plaintiff was terminated roughly a month after reporting Chacons violation of company policy.

She filed her complaint April 27, 2017, alleging claims for age discrimination, harassment, wrongful termination, retaliation, and interference with family leave rights. Defendants California Credit Union and North Island Financial Credit Union (defendants) demurred to counts 5-7 that plead California Family Right Act (CFRA) claims, all of which are dependent (according to defendants) on whether plaintiff has adequately pled exhaustion of her administrative remedies. ROA 9-11.

MRT seeks attorney’s fees for four additional attorneys – two of which stepped in to handle the matter when two of the senior attorneys took parental leave and two others who were real estate and land-use specialists. (Richardson Decl. ¶ 23.) The Court concludes that the billing rates were reasonable. MRT claims a total of 2,047.39 hours incurred after it filed its cross-complaint on February 1, 2018 up until August 11, 2020, just slightly over two and a half years.

Plaintiff must clarify whether she was receiving paid leave for any portion of her work absence or what “PFL” was meant to refer to. · Plaintiff’s evidence remains insufficient to establish that she suffered $400,000 in emotional distress damages.

Family Leave Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action The fourth through seventh causes of action are asserted based upon Plaintiffs use of family medical leave.

Summary adjudication of issue 8 is denied as there are triable issues of fact as to whether plaintiff’s husband’s disability was a substantial factor in the decision to terminate her, as there is evidence that plaintiff took leave in order to care for her husband, that the branch did not work as well in the absence of a manager, that she had to extend her leave from three to six months, that defendants’ policy was not to terminate employees during family leave, that plaintiff was terminated and that the decision

Plaintiff alleges she was retaliated against and terminated from her position as a hand therapist for taking protected family leave. For further background, the court incorporates part 1 of the minutes from January 13, 2023. ROA 262. On that day, the court ruled on the sixth and seventh discovery motions to be brought in this case. See ROA 262, 201, 140, 95. Apparently, more discovery disputes require judicial intervention. One is the subject of a motion to compel scheduled for today. ROA 264, 267-271.

Plaintiff must clarify whether she was receiving paid leave for any portion of her work absence or what PFL was meant to refer to. · Plaintiffs evidence remains insufficient to establish that she suffered $400,000 in emotional distress damages. Unless Plaintiff has additional evidence to corroborate her emotional distress damages, this sum should be removed from future judgment totals.

The injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in paragraphs 56, 69, and 81 are of four kinds: First, an order changing the Citys characterization of Plaintiffs time on leave, beginning in April or May 2022, from unpaid leave to paid leave; second, an order awarding back pay for the duration of this leave; third, an order restoring to Plaintiff the leave that he exhausted during this period; and fourth, an injunction prohibiting Defendant from promoting any employee whose conduct has ever resulted in a jury verdict

Family leave to care for and bond with a newborn child is certainly an excusable circumstance as far as this Court is concerned. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts, without authority, that the motion should be denied because it is based on anticipated events. The Court is not persuaded by a conclusory assertion in a one-page opposition. Nor is the Court persuaded by the similarly conclusory arguments that Mr.

(See, Junaid Declaration and exhibits thereto; Schapiro Declaration and exhibits thereto) In any event, the March 7, 2017 amended complaint alleging for the first time that plaintiff was denied a good faith interactive process and denied reasonable accommodations based on medical leave does not relate back to the earlier complaints that alleged discrimination based on retaliation, age, national origin, race, religion and having taken family leave. (See, Rodriquez v.

Resulting from this allegation, (1) Palacios sent Plaintiff home on paid leave pending his investigation; (2) Defendants Chad Gray and Jeri Vincent met with Plaintiff and his family to discuss each others intent and stated that the parties agreed to disregard the at will employment in the L4L handbook; (3) a Confirmation of Conversation form regarding violation of the personal space of a student was signed allegedly to avoid immediate discharge; and (4) Palacios told Plaintiff he was to ignore the student from

McCord used family leave as a cover for finding a new job and voluntarily terminating his work for Santa Barbara County.” (RJN, Ex. A, p. 5.) Based on the foregoing, the court will sustain defendant’s demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. The court’s prior adjudication has already determined the issues raised in plaintiff’s Section 12940 claims.

In addition, they lost two attorneys to family leave. This led to some falling through the cracks; like the instant matter. (Id.) Relief is mandatory when an attorney files the required affidavit, even if the attorney's neglect was inexcusable. (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 393, 401 (setting aside a default entered when the attorney failed to file an answer).)

The court notes that this email was in the context of Stinson saying, “If I take the additional 12 weeks family leave my return date will be around the second week in December. . . . I will try to let you know as soon as possible what decision we come to so you can plan accordingly.” (Ibid.) In fact, Stinson took the additional 12 weeks family leave, and returned in December 2013. As of the September 6, 2013 date, Pepperdine had not denied Stinson part-time work.

Plaintiff now seeks to file a First Supplemental Complaint to reflect this change, including, in substantive part the allegation that: On or about December 2, 2021, MARTINEZ was forced to quit/retire as a result of DGSs failure to properly accommodate his disability and retaliatory conduct against MARTINEZ, as alleged herein, as he had run out of paid leave and could not afford to take further unpaid leave. (See Proposed FSC ¶ 33.).

Specifically, we will judicially notice the declarations of Pang and her sister, excerpts of Pang's deposition testimony, and her separate statement of undisputed fact, to the extent they bear on her need for family leave. As our discussion below makes clear, these items constitute judicial admissions and concessions that are fatal to Pang's CalFRA claim.” Pang, at 989-990.

Leave in Violation of the CFRA, and (13) Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Govt Code §§ 12940 et. seq.

On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff Princess Obienu (Plaintiff) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services (Defendant), alleging: (1) race/national origin discrimination; (2) disability discrimination; (3) failure to accommodate disability; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process; (5) violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA); (6) violation of the CFRA – Interference with Family Leave Rights; (7) violation of CFRA – retaliation; (8) failure to prevent/correct

Plaintiff claims that TE denied her request, despite the fact that she was entitled by law to unpaid family leave. (SAC, ¶18.) By her own admission, however, plaintiff did not file her complaint with the DFEH alleging a CFRA violation until May 4, 2012, more than a year later. (SAC, ¶19.) The seventh cause of action for violation of CFRA therefore fails as plaintiff failed to meet her statutory deadline.