Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle in California

Plaintiff’s complaint includes a sole cause of action for motor vehicle negligence, and seeks to hold Defendant liable for (a) operation of a motor vehicle, (b) employment of persons (c) operating the vehicle, (d) ownership of the vehicle, (e) entrustment of the vehicle, and (f) “other reasons.” At this time, LACMTA seeks to strike the allegations concerning entrustment of the vehicle and “other reasons.” LACMTA argues it cannot be held liable for negligent entrustment.

Plaintiff contends that Vehicle Code § 17150 creates liability for Papazian regardless of whether the Driver was Papazian’s employee and regardless of any negligent entrustment. Thus, determination of the issues of negligent entrustment, respondeat superior, and whether Papazian engaged in tortious employment practices does not dispose of either the motor vehicle or general negligence causes of action.

In its fourth cause of action for negligent entrustment, the First Amended Cross-Complaint states: Cross-Complainants allege upon information and belief that the subject vehicle involved in this incident was registered to IGNACIO ROSARIO POMPA and the rightful legal owner was of the vehicle was IGNACIO ROSARIO POMPA, who knowingly allowed Plaintiff Dulce Mora to drive and operate the motor vehicle knowing she did not have a valid drivers license.

The Diaz Court found that if a plaintiff is asserting theories of both respondeat superior and negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention, and the employer admits vicarious liability for any negligent driving by its employee, the plaintiff cannot pursue the negligent entrustment claim. (Id. at 1152.)

Vehicle Code § 17150 states that “[e]very owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.”

Therefore, the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition argues that the third cause of action states a claim pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17150.

motor vehicle, Defendant Envoy Air negligently entrusted their vehicle to Defendant Diusa and negligently permitted him to drive the motor vehicle; (4) that as a result of Defendant Envoy Air negligently entrusting Defendant Diusa with the operation of the subject motor vehicle, Defendant Diusa operated the vehicle in a negligent manner resulting in injuries to Plaintiffs Employee, which in turn required Plaintiff to make workers compensation payments of over $15,000.00.

As to Leduc, however, the cause of action alleges negligent entrustment of the vehicle driven by Milauskas. Essential to liability on a negligent entrustment theory is that the defendant was aware that the driver was unfit, but still gave the driver permission to drive the vehicle. (Barcus v. Campbell (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 768, 773.) The demurrer to this cause of action is overruled as the Complaint sufficiently pleads general negligence/negligent entrustment with respect to Leduc.

As to Leduc, however, the cause of action alleges negligent entrustment of the vehicle driven by Milauskas. Essential to liability on a negligent entrustment theory is that the defendant was aware that the driver was unfit, but still gave the driver permission to drive the vehicle. (Barcus v. Campbell (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 768, 773.) The demurrer to this cause of action is overruled as the Complaint sufficiently pleads general negligence/negligent entrustment with respect to Leduc.

As to Leduc, however, the cause of action alleges negligent entrustment of the vehicle driven by Milauskas. Essential to liability on a negligent entrustment theory is that the defendant was aware that the driver was unfit, but still gave the driver permission to drive the vehicle. (Barcus v. Campbell (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 768, 773.) The demurrer to this cause of action is overruled as the Complaint sufficiently pleads general negligence/negligent entrustment with respect to Leduc.

Demurrer by Defendant Golden Star Logistics, Inc. to Plaintiffs Complaint and to the First Cause of Action for Motor Vehicle, Second Cause of Action for General Negligence, Third Cause of Action for Negligent Entrustment, Fourth Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium contained therein.

Demurrer by Defendant Golden Star Logistics, Inc. to Plaintiffs Complaint and to the First Cause of Action for Motor Vehicle, Second Cause of Action for General Negligence, Third Cause of Action for Negligent Entrustment, Fourth Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium contained therein.

The complaint does not allege any facts to support the claim for negligent entrustment. Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion that Defendants, including the moving party, negligently entrusted the motor vehicle. Complaint ¶ 9. Defendant has established that the complaint is preempted by the Graves Amendment.

The common law claim for negligent entrustment rests "on a demonstration of knowing entrustment to an incompetent or dangerous driver with actual or constructive knowledge of his incompetence. ( Dodge Center v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 332, 338 .) The parallel statute for negligent entrustment provides that a person shall not knowingly permit or authorize any person to drive a motor vehicle owned by him or under his or her control unless that person is appropriately licensed. ( Veh.

On January 24, 2023, Banuelos Fierro and Banuelos filed a complaint against Olmas Industries, Marin Petatan, Ly, the Alvarezes, and Does 1-100, alleging the following causes of action: (1) motor vehicle negligence, (2) general negligence, (3) negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, and (4) loss of consortium.

Background: Plaintiff Judith Banuelos alleges in her complaint that she was injured and suffered property damage in a motor vehicle accident occurring on April 18, 2016. (Complaint, ¶¶ 11, MV-1.) The complaint alleges that the defendant who owned the motor vehicle and who entrusted the motor vehicle is defendant Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles, LLC (erroneously named in the complaint as Enterprise Rent-A-Car) (Enterprise). Banuelos filed her complaint on April 18, 2018.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on January 20, 2011, alleging causes of action against defendants for motor vehicle liability and general negligence. The motor vehicle liability claim contains three counts. Count one (MV-2.a.) is asserted against Yasinsac and is based on his negligent operation of a motor vehicle.

Section 10(f) of the motor vehicle cause of action also states “Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle.” On May 14, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their form complaint for motor vehicle and general negligence. On July 16, 2019, the court overruled the demurrer of Electro Adapter, Inc. and Ray Fish. On July 22, 2019, defendants answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution, declaratory relief, and apportionment of fault.

In the complaint, Plaintiff Evangelina Alvarenga de Cabrera claims she was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by Defendant Kelly Ann Lewis Bortman (“Kelly Bortman”).

It accordingly appears that Vehicle Code section 17150 imposes liability on it as the “owner of a motor vehicle.” Defendant EAN argues that notwithstanding the claims based on ownership and negligent entrustment, federal statutes preempt Vehicle Code section 17130 and make clear that a rental car company, or an affiliate, who is an owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases said vehicle cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of its renters.

Regarding negligent entrustment, the Motion is DENIED. Negligent entrustment requires only standard pleading only. In order to survive a motion to strike punitive damages, the Plaintiff must plead ultimate facts to show it is entitled to such relief. Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166. Conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful, and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of “oppression, fraud, or malice” within the meaning of §3294.

As stated above, on the information the court properly considers for this demurrer EAN is simply the owner of a motor vehicle and permitted GEHRING to use that motor vehicle. Therefore Vehicle Code section 17150 operates to impose liability on EAN, the owner of a motor vehicle, for injury to persons resulting from GEHRING’s operation of EAN’s vehicle with its permission. Leave to Amend. Leave to amend should be allowed when a defect is capable of cure. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)

Negligent Entrustment Plaintiff alleges Enterprise was negligent in renting a vehicle to Kim because Enterprise knew or should have known Kim was a reckless and incompetent driver. Liability for negligent entrustment arises where an automobile is entrusted to a driver whose incompetence, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known to the owner.

Likewise, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “negligently . . . entrusted . . . a motor vehicle . . . .” (Complaint, p. 5.) As Defendant is a governmental entity, it cannot be liable for common law negligent entrustment. Therefore, the motion to strike is granted. Conclusion and Order Defendant’s motion to strike references to negligent entrustment is granted without leave to amend. Defendant shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.

Section 10(f) of the motor vehicle cause of action also states “Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle.” On May 14, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their form complaint for motor vehicle and general negligence. On July 16, 2019, the court overruled the demurrer of Electro Adapter, Inc. and Ray Fish. On July 22, 2019, defendants answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution, declaratory relief, and apportionment of fault.

Discussion Defendant moves for summary adjudication on the grounds that Plaintiffs claim for negligent entrustment fails Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner. (Vehicle Code, section 17150.)

Negligent Entrustment, Training and Supervision “A person injured by someone driving a car in the course of employment may sue not only the driver but that driver's employer. The employer can be sued on two legal theories based on tort principles: respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. Respondeat superior, a form of vicarious liability, makes an employer liable, irrespective of fault, for negligent driving by its employee in the scope of employment.

Section 10(f) of the motor vehicle cause of action also states “Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle.” On May 14, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their form complaint for motor vehicle and general negligence. On July 16, 2019, the court overruled the demurrer of Electro Adapter, Inc. and Ray Fish. On July 22, 2019, defendants answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution, declaratory relief, and apportionment of fault.

Section 10(f) of the motor vehicle cause of action also states “Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle.” On May 14, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their form complaint for motor vehicle and general negligence. On July 16, 2019, the court overruled the demurrer of Electro Adapter, Inc. and Ray Fish. On July 22, 2019, defendants answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution, declaratory relief, and apportionment of fault.

Here, the complaint alleges that (1) the defendants were negligent in operating their motor vehicle (Complaint ¶¶ 6 and 11); (2) that the defendants (including Moving Defendants) owned the motor vehicle (Id.); (3) the defendants (including Moving Defendants) knew that the driver of the motor vehicle was unfit to operate the vehicle because of youth, inexperience, a poor safety or accident record and an unreasonable amount of motor vehicle violations.

Background Facts Plaintiff, Rogelio Lucero Jimenez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants, Kevin Justin Foster (“Kevin”), Sheila Sherie Foster (“Sheila”) and Jeffrey Edward Foster (“Jeffrey”) for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident. The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) motor vehicle negligence, (2) general negligence, and (3) negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle.

Plaintiffs alleged Enterprise owned the motor vehicle, which was operated with their permission. (FAC, pg. 4.) Plaintiffs alleged Eliasyan caused the motor vehicle accident in which Plaintiffs sustained injuries. (FAC, pg. 5.)

The complaint alleges one cause of action for motor vehicle negligence and a second cause of action for general negligence. There is no separate cause of action for negligent entrustment as Defendants contend. Page 4 of the complaint that includes the first cause of action has been corrected by a Notice of Errata filed by Plaintiff on 6/7/19. That page alleges that Defendant, Miguel Vitela, operated the motor vehicle, that he was employed by Ray Fish and Electro Adapter, Inc.

Every bailee of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the bailee or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the bailee. Here, the Court finds that the FAC sufficiently alleges a cause of action for motor vehicle negligence against Pablo Cervantes Ruacho based Vehicle Code section 17154.

Defendant Avis also argues that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on any claim of negligent entrustment. As an initial matter, the court notes that there is no allegation of negligent entrustment in the Complaint.

Liability for negligent entrustment will be imposed on a motor vehicle owner, who knowingly entrusts his vehicle to an “incompetent or dangerous driver” with actual or constructive knowledge of his incompetence. Dodge Center v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 332, 338. It requires evidence that the motor vehicle owner knew or should have known of the driver’s “incapacitating condition.”

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER Defendant ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR COMPANY OF LOS ANGELES, LLC’s Demurrer is SUSTANIED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the general negligence cause of action, and SUSTAINED WITH POSSIBLE LEAVE TO AMEND as to the negligent entrustment cause of action. The Court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply. BACKGROUND This is a motor vehicle accident case.

The complaint alleges that VRIDE was the legal registered owner and operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. See Form Complaint, first cause of action, MV-2(a), (c).

There are no triable issues of material fact as to Vojdaniheris Plaintiffs allegations in the First Cause of Action- Motor Vehicle, MV 2a that Doe Defendants 1 to 5 operated a motor vehicle. 3.

Here, the Complaint does not adequately allege sufficient facts to support a claim for negligent entrustment. All that plaintiff has alleged in a conclusory fashion is that “defendants and each of them, negligently, recklessly and without due care, owned, rented, leased, entrusted, operated and/or controlled the motor vehicle and/or otherwise is legally responsible for causing plaintiffs to sustain insured and damages for which the plaintiffs is seeking compensation herein.” Complaint, page 5.

Demurrer to the fifth cause of action for "Negligent Entrustment, General Negligence, Motor Vehicle Negligence, and Respondeat Superior Liability" The Cross-Defendant argues that this cause of action fails to state sufficient facts to constitute any cause of action against the Cross-Defendant. Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (e).

.: BC596918 Hearing Date: June 18, 2019 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: motion to trifurcate BACKGROUND Plaintiff Soo Yen Oh (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendants Hector Campos and Francisco Javier Campos (collectively, “Defendants”) based on injuries Plaintiff sustained in a motor vehicle collision. Defendants move to trifurcate trial into three phases: a determination on the issue of negligent entrustment; a determination on liability; and a determination of damages. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

BACKGROUND This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident. On July 09, 2020, Plaintiffs Victor Quinones and Yolanda Hernandez(“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, a public entity and Does 1-25 for (1) motor vehicle negligence, (2) negligent entrustment, and (3) violation of CCP § 2100.

The allegation that Defendant negligently entrusted the motor vehicle is essential to Plaintiff’s claim of negligence. Though Defendant concedes that its employee was working in the course and scope of employment at the time of accident, Defendant should bring the proper dispositive motion to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claim for negligent entrustment.

Third Cause of Action: Negligent Entrustment Moving Defendants contend that the complaint fails to adequately plead facts to constitute a cause of action for negligent entrustment. Moving Defendants argue that except for conclusory allegations, the complaint lacks facts that establish that John Luis Kalivas knew that Sheila Rae Kalivas was unfit or incompetent to drive a motor vehicle.

Conclusion The motion for leave to file an amended complaint for negligent entrustment against Herb Dow is granted. The motion for leave to file an amended complaint against Mark Dow for negligent operation of the motor vehicle is denied. Plaintiff is ordered not to file the amended complaint attached as an exhibit to the motion.

The complaint asserts a single cause of action for negligence against all defendants, based on the following separate theories of liability: (1) negligent operation of a motor vehicle; (2) respondeat superior based on an employment relationship between the driver and defendants; (3) ownership liability; (4) negligent entrustment; (5) respondeat superior based on an agency relationship between the driver and defendants.

First Cause of Action: Motor Vehicle Negligence Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner. (Veh. Code, § 17150.)

Analysis re: Negligent Entrustment Further, to the extent that Plaintiff argues a cause of action for negligent entrustment is being asserted against Jreij, the court finds otherwise. The FAC alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence only. However, Plaintiff asserts that the second cause of action against Jreij is for negligent entrustment.

(NCC) and Jesus Mejia (Mejia) for motor vehicle. On January 20, 2022, Defendants filed separate answers. On August 12, 2022, Defendants filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendant Ignacio Rosario Pompa (Pompa) for indemnity, apportionment of fault, contribution and negligent entrustment. On April 13, 2023, Pompa filed a Demurrer to be heard on May 9, 2023. On April 26, 2023, Defendants filed an opposition. On May 2, 2023, Pompa filed a reply. Trial is scheduled for September 21, 2023.

DISCUSSION Negligent Entrustment Defendants argue Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff has no evidence that either Andres or Gianmar knew or should have known that Alfredo was unfit or incompetent to drive a motor vehicle. “[T]o impose liability for negligent entrustment, the lending owner must know, or from facts known to him should know, that the entrustee driver was intoxicated, incompetent, or reckless.” (Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.

DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s first cause of action for Motor Vehicle is devoid of any facts beyond the date and street of the alleged accident. Plaintiff fails to identify any allegation supporting a claim of negligent entrustment against Defendant. In fact, Defendant, as Doe 1, is identified as a defendant who operated a motor vehicle. Plaintiff’s second cause of action for General Negligence is also devoid of any facts showing that Defendant was negligent.

The Court finds that Defendant has met her burden of proof as to the negligent operation of a motor vehicle but not as to the negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle. The Court notes that after Defendant filed her instant Motion, Plaintiff filed an amendment to his Complaint, naming Defendants husband and the driver, Erlan Calilung, as defendant Doe 1. Plaintiffs actions for negligence, which includes negligent entrustment, was alleged against Defendant and Does 1 to 20.

On opposition, plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently stated a cause of action for negligence based on Enterprise’s alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle, and that there is an absence of binding precedent supporting the applicability of the Graves Amendment in California.  Negligent Entrustment To plead a claim for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, a plaintiff must allege: “1. That [the driver] was negligent in operating the vehicle; 2.

[3] Defendant did not set forth any facts regarding the motor vehicle or negligence claims.

In Diaz, the Supreme Court held that when an employer admits that its employee was negligent, this bars claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention against the employer. (Id. at 1158.) Diaz involved a motor vehicle accident where the defendant was driving during the scope of his employment. The employer offered to admit vicarious liability if its employee was found negligent, which would bar claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention.

(2) Owner --The term owner means a person who is-- (A) a record or beneficial owner, holder of title, lessor, or lessee of a motor vehicle; (B) entitled to the use and possession of a motor vehicle subject to a security interest in another person; or (C) a lessor, lessee, or a bailee of a motor vehicle, in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, having the use or possession thereof, under a lease, bailment, or otherwise.

Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner." (Ghezavat v. Harris (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 555, 559 [cleaned up].) CACI No. 724 lists the requisite elements for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle as follows: "1.

Further, Plaintiffs first cause of action does allege negligent entrustment. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Defendants demurrer to the FAC is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part. The demurrer is overruled as to the first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence, but sustained with 30 days leave to amend as to the second cause of action for negligence.

[iii] “Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to persons or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.”

Negligent/Reckless Operation of Motor Vehicle Resulting in Wrongful Death and Personal Injury; 2. Negligent/Reckless Entrustment of Motor Vehicle to Minor Resulting in Wrongful Death and Personal Injury A Status Conference is set for 9/11/17. Case No. BC611815 Plaintiffs claim that a roadway design defect and unsafe roadway conditions caused/contributed to the Subject Accident.

Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to allege a cause of action for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle. "Liability for negligent entrustment is determined by applying general principles of negligence, and ordinarily it is for the jury to determine whether the owner has exercised the required degree of care." (Allen v. Toledo (1980) 109 Cal. App. 3d 415, 421.) Defendant raises questions of fact that are not the proper subject of a demurrer.

However, with respect to Plaintiffs’ theory that Enterprise negligently operated the motor vehicle, the Court finds that this allegation is sufficient to apprise Enterprise of its liability. The Court cannot sustain Enterprise’s demurrer on this count. Conclusion Enterprise’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ theories of liability based on Negligent Entrustment and Negligent Ownership is sustained with leave to amend. Enterprise’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s theory of liability for Negligent Operation is overruled.

The Graves Amendment precludes vicarious liability against the owner of a motor vehicle that rents a vehicle to a person who then harms another person unless there is independent negligence on the part of the owner. 49 USCS § 30106. Under the Graves Amendment, states may not impose judgments against rental car companies based on the negligence of their lessees.

Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant consists of two theories: (1) liability based on permissive user statute as against the owner of the vehicle involved in the collision; and (2) negligent entrustment.

A vehicle owner has at a minimum statutory liability for a motor vehicle accident caused by a permissive user (in the present case, ANTONIN STAUD, “STAUD”), even absent any negligent entrustment on the owner’s part in granting permissive use to that user. Vehicle Code §17150. Those statutory damages absent other grounds for liability are up to $15,000, per Vehicle Code §17151(a). Ordinarily, the owner of the vehicle is the person in whose name title is registered.

A vehicle owner has at a minimum statutory liability for a motor vehicle accident caused by a permissive user (in the present case, ANTONIN STAUD, “STAUD”), even absent any negligent entrustment on the owner’s part in granting permissive use to that user. Vehicle Code §17150. Those statutory damages absent other grounds for liability are up to $15,000, per Vehicle Code §17151(a). Ordinarily, the owner of the vehicle is the person in whose name title is registered.

A vehicle owner has at a minimum statutory liability for a motor vehicle accident caused by a permissive user (in the present case, ANTONIN STAUD, “STAUD”), even absent any negligent entrustment on the owner’s part in granting permissive use to that user. Vehicle Code §17150. Those statutory damages absent other grounds for liability are up to $15,000, per Vehicle Code §17151(a). Ordinarily, the owner of the vehicle is the person in whose name title is registered.

Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint for Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Negligent Entrustment, Negligent Supervision, and Survival Action on January 3, 2022. On February 2, 2022, the court entered the stipulation of the parties to file the second amended complaint. Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint for Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Negligent Entrustment, Negligent Supervision, and Survival Action on February 16, 2022.

(SNC) (collectively, Defendants) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The complaint alleges that Abdisalan was acting within the scope of his employment with SNC at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs assert causes of action for (1) negligence motor vehicle, (2) negligence general, (3) negligence vicarious liability, and (4) loss of consortium. Defendants, at this time, move to strike portions of complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and Defendants filed a reply.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants negligently entrusted the motor vehicle, supporting an independent act of negligence. Complaint, page 4. Such negligence does not arise out of the relationship between the driver and owner of an automobile, “but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known to the owner.'

Therefore, there is no triable issue of material fact on a negligent entrustment theory. Instead, the dispute centers on the viability of Plaintiff’s claim against Hertz under California Vehicle Code § 17150. See Form Complaint, third cause of action. Vehicle Code § 17150 provides that the owner of a motor vehicle is liable for the death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent operation of the vehicle. Vehicle Code § 17151 limits such liability to $15,000.

Section 10(f) of the motor vehicle cause of action also states “Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle.” On May 14, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their form complaint for motor vehicle and general negligence. On July 16, 2019, the court overruled the demurrer of Electro Adapter, Inc. and Ray Fish. On July 22, 2019, defendants answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution, declaratory relief, and apportionment of fault.

Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support the claim for negligent entrustment. Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion that Defendants negligently entrusted the motor vehicle. Complaint, ¶ MV 2. Defendant has established that the complaint is preempted by the Graves Amendment.

Plaintiff asserts causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence, alleging that he sustained injuries in a vehicle collision with Sermeno, who was a driver for UPS. Now, UPS moves to strike Plaintiff’s allegations of negligent entrustment and negligent hiring. The Court deems the motion to strike as a motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s claims for negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, and grants the motion.

LACMTA fails to address why Plaintiff’s referral to Vehicle Code section 17001 is insufficient to serve as a statutory basis of liability when the code section clearly states that “a public entity is liable” for its employees’ negligent or wrongful acts or omissions in operating any motor vehicle within the scope of their employment. LACMTA’s demurrer to the third cause of action for negligent entrustment on this ground is OVERRULED.

Here, the conclusory allegation that the defendants negligently entrusted a motor vehicle are insufficient to state a claim for negligent entrustment. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Moving Party’s demurrer to the first cause of action with twenty days’ leave to amend. c.

At most, the complaint alleges that Riegert, EAN, and Enterprise employed Navarrette and permitted her to use the vehicle, which was involved in the subject motor vehicle accident with Plaintiff. EAN argues that the allegations are devoid of facts showing how the subject vehicle was entrusted to Navarrette and how this entrustment caused the accident. According to the Statement of Information for EAN, EANs business type is listed as MOTOR VEHICLE RENTAL AND RELATED SERVICE.

Bae's negligence, i.e., consumption of alcohol and drugs that caused and contributed to his negligent driving causing another motor vehicle collision.” The Court finds that Plaintiff has the better argument. Defendants have not demonstrated that trial of Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim against Grace separately from the negligence claim against Abraham would result in efficiencies and promote judicial economy.

The form complaint contains boilerplate allegation that each defendant was negligent in their use, operation, control, entrustment, management, maintenance, inspection and repair of the vehicle. The form complaint alleges more specifically that Defendant is liable because it “owned the motor vehicle which was operated with its permission” and “entrusted the motor vehicle” to the other defendant.

There is no statutory basis for a cause of action for negligent entrustment against a public entity in relation to alleged negligent operation of a vehicle. Thus, plaintiff cannot maintain such a cause of action against defendant. See de Villers v. City of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 238, 252-53 (“We find no relevant case law approving a claim for direct liability based on a public entity’s allegedly negligent hiring and supervision practices. Instead, the court in Munoz v.

A negligent entrustment cause of action can be tried together with the underlying motor vehicle action. The court does not find that there was undue delay in seeking leave to amend, or that there is any prejudice will result to Nicholas Bagby. The court does believe, however, that due process will require a short continuance of the trial to allow Douglas Bagby to prepare for trial and is prepared to continue the trial on its own motion for a period of 90 days.

CACI No. 724 outlines the elements of the tort of negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle: ¶ 1. That [name of driver] was negligent in operating the vehicle; ¶ 2. That [name of defendant] [owned the vehicle operated by [name of driver]/had possession of the vehicle operated by [name of driver] with the owner's permission]; ¶ 3. That [name of defendant] knew, or should have known, that [name of driver] was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; ¶ 4.

In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they were injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligence of an unnamed driver employed by Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“LACMTA”). Plaintiffs allege that they were passengers in another vehicle that was rear-ended by the LACMTA bus. Plaintiffs seek to hold LACMTA vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence and also assert a claim for negligent entrustment.

See Vehicle Code § 17001 (“A public entity is liable for death or injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity acting within the scope of his employment.”). Plaintiff argues that the allegation defendant requests the court strike includes the allegation regarding defendant’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle.

Barrera, and Enterprise Rent-A-Car for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and intentional tort based on an incident that occurred on May 23, 2014, on I-5 northbound, 150’ south of SR-134. On August 31, 2016, plaintiff filed a FAC for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and intentional tort. Plaintiff was a rear seat passenger in a child’s car seat, when Barrera rear-ended plaintiff’s father’s vehicle.

Plaintiff’s complaint arises from the motor vehicle negligence of James Wong and Defendant. The Complaint alleges that on March 19, 2014, James Wong negligently operated a motor vehicle and caused Plaintiff’s damages. (Compl. ¶¶ MV-1—MV-2.) The Complaint also alleges that Defendant, as Doe 1, negligently operated the motor vehicle, employed the person who operated the motor vehicle, owned the motor vehicle, entrusted the motor vehicle, and were the agents and employees of the other defendants.

Defendants Retal Auto Sales and Rentals, LLC and Retal Group, LLC (Doe 46) (collectively, “Retal”) move for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication on grounds Plaintiff cannot show Retal negligently entrusted a motor vehicle to an unfit or incompetent person. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Retal Group, a licensed motor vehicle dealer, owns and operates Retal Auto Sales, a motor vehicle dealership in Long Beach, California. (Undisputed Material Fact “UMF” No. 1.)

There do not appear to be California authorities on whether negligence, as defined in the Graves Amendment, encompasses negligent entrustment, which itself is a form of vicarious liability. The Court finds Carton v. General Motors Acceptance Corp . (8th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 451 to be instructive.

CACI No. 724 outlines the elements of the tort of negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle: ¶ 1. That [name of driver] was negligent in operating the vehicle; ¶ 2. That [name of defendant] [owned the vehicle operated by [name of driver]/had possession of the vehicle operated by [name of driver] with the owner's permission]; ¶ 3. That [name of defendant] knew, or should have known, that [name of driver] was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; ¶ 4.

Code § 17150 provides, Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.

Vehicle Code § 17150 provides that [e]very owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle & by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.

Fourth Cause of Action: Negligent Entrustment Defendants Enterprise and EAN also demur to the fourth cause of action for negligent entrustment on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. CCP § 430.10(e). Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer and assert that the FAC sufficiently alleges facts to state a cause of action for negligent entrustment against Enterprise and EAN. To prove a claim for negligent entrustment, the plaintiff must prove all of the following: “1.

Viramontes alleges causes of action for: 1) motor vehicle negligence; 2) negligent maintenance; 3) negligent entrustment; 4) reckless misconduct/gross negligence; 5) strict products liability; and 6) negligence. Ryder now moves for summary judgment against Viramontes.

The Complaint alleges the following four causes of action against Defendant: (1) Motor vehicle negligence; (2) General negligence (3) Negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle; and (4) Negligence per se. Negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle. To establish a cause of action for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, “the plaintiff must prove all of the following: “1. That [name of driver] was negligent in operating the vehicle; [¶] 2.

Discussion Evidentiary Objections Plaintiff Sustained: none Overruled: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Defendant Sustained: none Overruled: 1, 2, 3, 4 Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs bring general and motor vehicle negligence claims against Defendant Juanita H. or G. Massie. The claims sound in negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle. The parties agree that Defendant David Massie was operating the subject motor vehicle.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT; MOTION DENIED On March 1, 2016, Plaintiff David Schonhardt (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants David Haupt (“David”) and Shan Alexander Haupt (“Shan”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for motor vehicle negligence relating to a March 7, 2014 automobile accident.

With respect to the first argument, the Court finds the allegations concerning Williams’ use of controlled substances are insufficient to support a claim for negligent entrustment against Robertson for two reasons. First, the allegations are found in the cause of action for “general negligence” and not in the cause of action for motor vehicle negligence – negligent entrustment.