What Is Negligence Per Se in California?

Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (1) Negligence, and (2) “Negligence Per Se.” Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for “Negligence Per Se,” arguing that there is no such cause of action. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. DISCUSSION “[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action[.]” (Millard v. Biosources, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1353, fn. 2.)

Notwithstanding the fact that negligence per se is technically not a cause of action but only an evidentiary principle, many reported cases contain both causes of action or speak as though negligence per se is a cause of action. (See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1066, 1086-1087 (both negligence and negligence per se alleged); Estuary Owners Assn. v.

The unopposed demurrer filed by defendant Sahibzada Maseehuddin Ah Mirza to the Third Cause of Action for negligence per se in plaintiff’s complaint is sustained without leave to amend. Negligence per se is a rebuttable presumption pertinent to a negligence claim, but it is not a cause of action in and of itself. (See Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc. v.

Second Cause of Action for Negligence Per Se Defendant demurs to the Second Cause of Action for negligence per se on grounds that negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, and that the Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to establish negligence per se. Plaintiff argues that negligence per se is an alternative form of the negligence cause of action, and that a claim for negligence per se has been properly plead in the Complaint.

NEGLIGENCE PER SE 11. VIOLATION OF RETALIATORY EVICTION AND ANTI-HARASSMENT ORDINANCE 12. TERMINATION OF ESTATE, CIVIL CODE § 789.3. MP Positions Moving parties request an order sustaining a demurrer to the Complaints claim for Negligence Per Se, on grounds including the following: · Negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. Johnson v.

Plaintiff asserts causes of action for Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Statutory Liability, and Negligent Entrustment. Demurrer Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth causes of action for Negligence Per Se, Statutory Liability, and Negligent Entrustment. With respect to Plaintiff’s cause of action for Negligence Per Se, the Court finds that Negligence Per Se is an evidentiary doctrine and is not a separate cause of action from Plaintiff’s first cause of action for Negligence.

Negligence Per Se Defendants demur to the cause of action for negligence per se, contending (a) negligence per se is not an independent cause of action, and (b) the various allegations re: negligence per se are insufficient to show negligence per se as a matter of law. Defendants first contention is that negligence per se is not an independent cause of action. Defendants are correct. Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code §669.

(1) Demurrer to Complaint (2) Motion to Strike Tentative Ruling: (1) Defendants’ demurrer to the first COA (negligence per se) and second COA (intentional infliction of emotional distress) is SUSTAINED WITH 10-DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendants’ demurrer to the third COA (negligent infliction of emotional distress) is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The parties agree there is no separate cause of action for negligence per se.

Third Cause of Action for Negligence Per Se On its own motion, the Court also strike Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for negligence per se for failure to conform the law and for being duplicative of the second cause of action for negligence. The third cause of action for negligence per se asserts that Defendants violated Evid. Code § 669. “‘Section 669 of the Evidence Code sets forth the doctrine commonly called negligence per se.

Negligence Per Se Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for negligence per se on grounds that Plaintiff fails to state how Defendant violated Vehicle Code sections 23152(f) and 21453(a). However, Plaintiff’s second cause of action fails for a more fundamental reason: there is no separate cause of action for negligence per se.

The complaint includes causes of action for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and negligence per se. 2. Demurrer Defendant demurs to the negligence per se cause of action, contending it is duplicative of the negligence cause of action. “Negligence per se” is an evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code §669.

Plaintiffs argue the purported cause of action for negligence per se is not actually a cause of action, but instead is a count. It is not, however, pled as a count within a cause of action. It is pled as a separate cause of action. The demurrer to the negligence per se cause of action is sustained. Leave to amend the cause of action is denied, as an independent cause of action for negligence per se cannot properly be stated.

Bondi (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 346, 349 [“In order for a claim of negligence per se to succeed, all four elements must be met.”].) Here, Defendant demurs on the basis that negligence per se is not legally cognizable cause of action. The demurrer to the third cause of action is overruled. Although negligence per se is not strictly a separate cause of action, Plaintiff’s allegations could otherwise be restated under the second cause of action, and the essential character of the Complaint would not change.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION – NEGLIGENCE PER SE “‘Negligence per se’ is an evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code section 669.

Negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, and Plaintiff cannot obtain damages for both negligence and negligence per se arising out of the same accident. Rather, negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine whereby negligence may be presumed if the evidentiary requirements are met. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285. “[T]he doctrine of negligence per se does not establish tort liability.

Second Cause of Action: Negligence Per Se Mr. and Ms. Schwartz contend that Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for negligence per se because negligence per se is not an independent cause of action. Plaintiffs oppose on the ground that negligence per se is properly alleged as a separate cause of action. Negligence per se claim is not a separate cause of action (see Johnson v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave.

Second Cause of Action: Negligence Per Se Mr. and Ms. Schwartz contend that Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for negligence per se because negligence per se is not an independent cause of action. Plaintiffs oppose on the ground that negligence per se is properly alleged as a separate cause of action. Negligence per se claim is not a separate cause of action (see Johnson v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave.

However, negligence per se is not a separate cause of action. It is simply another way of proving the elements of duty and breach. Quiroz v. Seventh Avenue Center, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285-86. Here, the Hoffmans have asserted claims for negligence and negligence per se against Maese for negligently maintaining a fire.

As such, sustaining the demurrer does not deprive Plaintiff the ability to pursue a general negligence claim by proof of negligence per se. Here, Plaintiff alleges negligence per se as his third cause of action. Negligence per se is not a cause of action; it cannot establish tort liability. In Opposition, Plaintiff fails to cite to any law or authority to maintain a separate cause of action for negligence per se. The demurrer to third cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend with respect to the second cause of action (for negligence per se). Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim is not an independent cause of action. (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285-1286 (“Accordingly, to apply negligence per se is not to state an independent cause of action. The doctrine does not provide a private right of action for violation of a statute.

DISCUSSION Defendant argues that negligence per se is not a cause of action. Negligence per se is an evidentiary presumption. (Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 534 [noting “that ‘the doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.’”], quoting Mallard v.

Code § 669 for negligence per se. (Id., ¶¶ 24-31.) Alireza contends that negligence per se is a presumption affecting the burden of proof in a cause of action for negligence and not an independent cause of action. (Motion, p. 4.) Accordingly, Alireza seeks to strike Plaintiff’s second cause of action as a matter of law. (Id., p. 3.) The Court finds that Cal. Evid. Code § 669 does not give rise to an independent cause of action for negligence per se. Cal. Evid.

The demurrer to the third cause of action for negligence per se is overruled. The Court acknowledges Defendant's citation to authorities that explain that the doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action. Defendant acknowledges that a case may be tried on negligence and negligence per se theories but Defendant fails to explain the benefit to considering the issue at this time on demurrer.

Negligence Per Se Defendant Lotus Property Services, Inc. moves to strike the cause of action for negligence per se on the grounds that negligence per se is not a recognized cause of action. In Johnson v. Honeywell Intern. Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555, the court held that “the doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but [it] creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.”

Plaintiff, Ree Bebetu, moves to amend the operative complaint to add a cause of action for negligence per se. Defendants oppose the motion. Defendants argue there is no independent cause of action for negligence per se, and hence the proposed amendment is not proper. Plaintiff disagrees. Several recent cases affirm the proposition that the doctrine of negligence per se does not establish a cause of action independent of negligence.

Accordingly, the second and third causes of action do not state claims for negligence per se against the City. (Note: Because negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine and this demurrer is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings, nothing herein addresses the extent, if any, that the doctrine of negligence per se may be used to establish a negligent act or omission under section 835.)

As such, the demurrer is sustained as to the third cause of action for negligence per se.

Thus, the negligence per se claim at issue is not invalid, it is simply formatted in such a way as to break down one cause of action (negligence) into two separately alleged theories (negligence and negligence per se). ln the circumstances of this case, sustaining the demurrer would simply force plaintiff to re-allege the facts supporting its "negligence per se" claim in one cause of action entitled "negligence." However, "[t]he law neither does nor requires idle acts." (Civil Code § 3532.)

However, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s negligence per se materialized from violations of Welfare and Institutions Code and California Code of Regulations. (SAC, ¶¶ 37-39, 41-42, 44.) The Court finds the negligence per se cause of action to be merely a separate section of factual allegations Plaintiffs allege to amount to Defendant’s negligence. As Defendant correctly argues, negligence per se is not a cause of action at all.

The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se (Cal. Vehicle Code § 21760), (3) negligence per se (Cal. Vehicle Code § 22450), and (4) negligence per se (Cal. Vehicle Code § 22107). Defendant now demurs to the second, third, and fourth causes of action for negligence per se on the ground these claims do not constitute separate causes of action or provide a private right of action. 2.

Negligence Per Se Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for negligence pre se on grounds there is no separate cause of action for negligence per se. It is true negligence per se is not a separate tort cause of action and Plaintiff cannot obtain damages for both negligence and negligence per se arising out of the same accident. Rather, it is an evidentiary doctrine whereby negligence may be presumed if the evidentiary requirements are met. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave.

Specifically, cross-defendant demurs to the second cause of action for Negligence Per Se and the third cause of action for Gross Negligence. Negligence per se is not an independent cause of action. As stated in Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1285, “‘Negligence per se’ is an evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code section 669.

Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285–1286 [“negligence per se is not to state an independent cause of action. The doctrine does not provide a private right of action for violation of a statute”].) Here, Plaintiff has asserted a cause of action for Negligence Per Se. (Complaint, § 10.f, p. 3.) But as both Jones and Quiroz courts hold, a cause of action for negligence per se is not cognizable.

DISCUSSION Defendants demur to the second cause of action arguing that negligence per se is an evidentiary presumption and not a separate cause of action. Negligence per se is not a separate tort cause of action, but an evidentiary doctrine through which negligence may be presumed if requirements are met. ( Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285) Accordingly, to apply negligence per se is not to state an independent cause of action.

Bondi (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 346, 349 [“In order for a claim of negligence per se to succeed, all four elements must be met.”].) Here, Defendant demurs on the basis that negligence per se is not a legally cognizable cause of action. The Court agrees, and further finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to base maintain a negligence per se claim. The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained with 15 days leave to amend.

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is for Negligence Per Se – Vehicle Code §22350. Plaintiffs’ third cause of action is for Negligence Per Se – Vehicle Code § 27103. The court finds that negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but is a separate theory of negligence upon which recovery may be based. (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave.

Negligence Per Se The third cause of action is for negligence per se. Negligence per se is not a separate tort cause of action, and Plaintiffs cannot obtain damages for both negligence and negligence per se arising out of the same accident. Rather, it is an evidentiary doctrine whereby negligence may be presumed if the evidentiary requirements are met. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285 [“the doctrine of negligence per se does not establish tort liability.

PARTYS REQUESTS Plaintiff requests leave to amend the pleading to add a cause of action for negligence per se. Pizza requests the Court deny leave on the basis that negligence per se is not a separate cause of action.

However, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish negligence based on the negligence per se theory.

Negligence Per Se Defendant argues this cause of action fails because negligence per se is a rebuttable evidentiary presumption and not an independent cause of action. Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code section 669.

At this time, FedEx moves to strike the foregoing allegations, contending (a) negligence per se allegations cannot properly be included in a complaint, and (b) if such a claim is proper, the allegations are insufficient to state a claim for negligence per se. Defendant’s first argument is that negligence per se is an evidentiary burden to be employed at trial, but cannot be pled in the complaint itself. “Negligence per se” is an evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code §669.

The Demurrer of Southern California Electric Cmpany to the 2nd Cause of Action (Negligence Per Se) is sustained without leave to amend. Negligence per se is not a cause of action. It presumes negligence from the violation of a statute or regulation.

Negligence Per Se Defendant repeats its immunity argument in connection with its demurrer to the sixth cause of action for negligence per se, another common law claim. In response, Plaintiffs argue that their negligence per se claim is based on alleged violations of CEQA and the County's Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance.

Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 534 [finding that, although negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, the court, in ruling upon a demurrer considered a negligence cause of action and a negligence per se cause of action as together alleging a single cause of action for negligence].)

The first cause of action is entitled “Negligence per se” but negligence per se is not a cause of action but an evidentiary presumption.

Second Cause of Action: Negligence Per Se Moving Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for negligence per se because negligence per se is not an independent cause of action. Moving Defendants further argue that even if negligence per se is a cause of action, Plaintiff has failed to allege the specific statute which the defendants supposedly violated.

Zalihic seeks to add two new claims which she has entitled "Negligence Per Se - Common Carrier." Both new claims are based on the same facts as her existing claims entitled "Negligence." Negligence per se is not a separate cause of action from a negligence cause of action, but merely one way that a negligence cause of action can be proved. Even if negligence per se was a separate cause of action from negligence, Ms.

Demurrer: Negligence Per Se Defendants demur to the second cause of action for negligence per se. Negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but a separate theory or basis of liability. It is an evidentiary doctrine that creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. (Johnson v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555; Millard v. Biosources, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1353 n.2; see also Cal. Evid.

Negligence per se requires a violation of a statute, and not the violation of a warrant or some other court order issued pursuant to statute. Accordingly, Penal Code section 1546.1 cannot form the basis for negligence per se. 4.

The court initially notes that Plaintiff’s separate causes of action for negligence and negligence per se are treated as under the same cause of action for negligence. This is because there is no separate cause of action for negligence per se. Rather, Plaintiff’s negligence per se cause of action is a theory upon which Plaintiff may demonstrate Defendants are liable to Plaintiff under his negligence cause of action.

Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Cross-Complainant Michael Harry Gilfenbain’s cross-complaint alleges a negligence per se cause of action in addition to the negligence claim that is also alleged. (Compl., pp. 13:19-18:10.) A negligence per se cause of action is not a cause of action independent from negligence.

Negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but an evidentiary presumption affecting the standard of care for a negligence cause of action. (Id.). Here, Plaintiff has agreed that to dismiss the negligence cause of action as duplicative of the negligence per se causes of action. Defendant contends that the negligence per se/ negligence causes of action fail as there is no allegation of proximate cause.

The Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the fifth and sixth issues for adjudication because the doctrine of negligence per se does not apply to building code violations unless the defendants were involved in the design or construction of the property, which is not alleged in this case. Negligence per se is an evidentiary presumption and not an independent cause of action or right of action. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285-86.)

Application to Facts Demurrer 2 nd cause of action for negligence per se Prime Wheel contends the demurrer should be sustained because “negligence per se is not a separate cause of action.” (Demurrer, p. 3, quoting Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4 th 727, 737.) The Court agrees.

Sustain with leave as to 1st (negligence per se) and 4th (statutory violation) causes of action. Barham v. SCE is controlling on the eminent domain cause of action. Negligence per se and statutory violation are not separate causes of action. They are part and parcel of negligence, and can be repleaded as part of a negligence cause of action. HJW.

Notice Of Motion Ndm Otion For Leave To File Amended Complaint To Add Punitive Damages Claim And Negligence Per Se Allegations Matter on Calendar for Tuesday, October 15, 2013, Line 13, PLAINTIFF GREGORY SANDRITTER'S Notice Of Motion And Motion For Leave To File Amended Complaint To Add Punitive Damages Claim And Negligence Per Se Allegations Continued to December 10, 2013 at 9:30 am in Department 302 per agreement of the parties. =(302/LCN)

PART Y ’ S REQUEST Defendant ask s the Court to sustain its demurrer to Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence per se because negligence per se is not a recognized cause of action .

Although both are based on the same theory of liabilitynegligencePlaintiff alleges that Defendants negligence per se materialized from violations of Cal. Civ. Code §3342. (Complaint ¶¶32-39.) The Court finds the negligence per se cause of action to be merely a separate section of factual allegations Plaintiff alleges to amount to Defendants negligence. However, as Defendants correctly argue, negligence per se is not a cause of action at all.

App.5th 516, 534 [finding that, although negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, the court, in ruling upon a demurrer considered a negligence cause of action and a negligence per se cause of action as together alleging a single cause of action for negligence].)

On October 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint for Violation of The Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution, Article I, Section 7(A) & Article IV Section 16(A); 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment); Negligence; and, Negligence Per Se.

Demurrer to Third Cause of Action for Negligence Per Se Uber demurs to this cause of action on the grounds that negligence per se is not a proper standalone cause of action and merely is an evidentiary presumption. However, as Plaintiff points out in opposition, negligence per se as an independent cause of action has been routinely recognized by the courts and well-respected treatises. See, e.g., Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2016), ¶ 6.129.1; Randi W. v.

Since negligence per se is not an independent cause of action, and since the first cause of action already pleads negligence, the Court finds that the third cause of action for negligence per se is improper. Thus, the demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED. The Court however notes that while negligence per se is not an independent cause of action, Plaintiff may still assert negligence per se as a part of the first cause of action for negligence.

Negligence Per Se Defendant argues this cause of action fails because negligence per se is a rebuttable evidentiary presumption and not an independent cause of action. Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code section 669.

The only situation in which the Negligence Per Se theory will remain useful is if Plaintiff is unable to show that she was bitten while in a public place or while lawfully present in a private place, as required by Civil Code 3342 (a). In Opposition, Plaintiff seems to confuse the cause of action for Negligence Per Se with the evidentiary doctrine of Negligence Per Se. Defendants argue correctly that Plaintiff cannot purport to allege a cause of action for Negligence Per Se because Johnson v.

.)¿ ¿ To the extent that the Complaint alleges negligence per se as a separate cause of action, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer with leave to amend to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to include its negligence per se allegations to in it s T hird C ause of A ction for negli g ence .¿ IV. CONCLUSION Kaisers demurrer as to the fourth and fifth causes of action for negligence per se is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for Negligence Per Se against AMI as the third cause of action in the complaint. Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine, rather than an independent cause of action. It can be applied generally to establish a breach of due care under any negligence-related cause of action. Therefore, the doctrine of negligence per se is within the scope of pleadings that allege general negligence, as proof of a breach of duty is not limited to common law standards of care.

Tentative: Grant as to 11th cause of action for "negligence per se" without leave to amend; deny in all other resects Negligence Per Se. Plaintiff alleged both a cause of action for negligence and negligence per se, which is an evidentiary presumption for establishing negligence and not a separate cause of action. (Evid. Code § 669.)

“Negligence per se” is an evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code §669. See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1285-1286. The doctrine of negligence per se is an evidentiary presumption rather than an independent right of action. As such, plaintiff has the ability to pursue a general negligence claim by proof of negligence per se. The court finds that this cause of action is not an independent right of action.

RBUSD Defendants argue that negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine and not a cause of action, and that the third count of negligence fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. While RBUSD Defendants are generally correct in that negligence per se is not a cause of action, the court finds that Education Code § 44807 is not the kind of statute that establishes an inflexible standard of due care, the violation of which establishes negligence per se.

The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to allege negligence per se allegations consistent with the foregoing authorities, but in addition, any amendment to the Complaint to add negligence per se allegations regarding Ordinance No. 2012-12 should also allege facts that show why the ordinance applies to the Campos property under the circumstances, allegations which do not appear in the current proposed version

The Complaint alleges causes of action for negligence and negligence per se. On August 28, 2018, Defendant filed the motion now before the court, a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication. I. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of the second cause of action [negligence per se] is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s second cause of action is for negligence per se.

Although negligence per se falls under the umbrella of a tort claim for negligence, it is still a valid cause of action. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at J 6:129.1, p. 6-43.) Plaintiffs have simply formatted it in a way as to break down one cause of action for negligence into two separately alleged theories (simple negligence and negligence per se).

Although negligence per se falls under the umbrella of a tort claim for negligence, it is still a valid cause of action. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at J 6:129.1, p. 6-43.) Plaintiffs have simply formatted it in a way as to break down one cause of action for negligence into two separately alleged theories (simple negligence and negligence per se).

Although negligence per se falls under the umbrella of a tort claim for negligence, it is still a valid cause of action. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at J 6:129.1, p. 6-43.) Plaintiffs have simply formatted it in a way as to break down one cause of action for negligence into two separately alleged theories (simple negligence and negligence per se).

Although negligence per se falls under the umbrella of a tort claim for negligence, it is still a valid cause of action. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at J 6:129.1, p. 6-43.) Plaintiffs have simply formatted it in a way as to break down one cause of action for negligence into two separately alleged theories (simple negligence and negligence per se).

Although negligence per se falls under the umbrella of a tort claim for negligence, it is still a valid cause of action. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at J 6:129.1, p. 6-43.) Plaintiffs have simply formatted it in a way as to break down one cause of action for negligence into two separately alleged theories (simple negligence and negligence per se).

Although negligence per se falls under the umbrella of a tort claim for negligence, it is still a valid cause of action. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at J 6:129.1, p. 6-43.) Plaintiffs have simply formatted it in a way as to break down one cause of action for negligence into two separately alleged theories (simple negligence and negligence per se).

Although negligence per se falls under the umbrella of a tort claim for negligence, it is still a valid cause of action. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at J 6:129.1, p. 6-43.) Plaintiffs have simply formatted it in a way as to break down one cause of action for negligence into two separately alleged theories (simple negligence and negligence per se).

(e) #30 on page 6, lines 16 and 17 (From Second Cause of Action - Negligence Per Se- Against All Defendants by Plaintiffs) (f) #33 on page 6 and 7, lines 26 to 8 (From Second Cause of Action - Negligence Per Se- Against All Defendants by Plaintiffs): "Moreover, Defendants' conduct constitutes gross negligence per se and willful misconduct per se, as Defendants' actions and omissions were willful pursuant to CA Penal Code §7(1)."

Second Cause of Action (i.e., Negligence Per Se) [T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. ( Johnson v. Honeywell Internat. Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555 [quotations and citation omitted]; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4 th 1256, 1285 [Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code section 669].)

Demurrer to the 2nd cause of action for negligence per se is OVERRULED. Defendant is correct that negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine creating a presumption of negligence, as opposed to a separate cause of action. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1285. However, the fact that Plaintiff alleged negligence per se as a separate claim does not make the complaint fatally defective or uncertain.

The demurrer to the third cause of action for negligence per se is overruled. This version of the complaint contains the statutes allegedly violated and the allegation the defendant was convicted of the crimes set forth in Penal Code §§ 69 and 148(a)(1). As such, the duty is defined and the allegations support a claim the duty was breached. The court notes defendant is correct in his assertion a claim for negligence per se is not a recognized “cause of action.”

Negligence Per Se Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for negligence pre se on grounds there is no separate cause of action for negligence per se. Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine whereby negligence may be presumed if the evidentiary requirements are met. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285.) “Accordingly, to apply negligence per se is not to state an independent cause of action.

To the extent that Plaintiffs are attempting to impose direct liability on Defendants for negligence per se, the court finds Plaintiffs have failed to allege a viable direct liability cause of action for negligence per se because Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that Defendants violated a statute or regulation. However, Plaintiff may plead a negligence per se claim if they properly plead vicarious liability against Defendants.

On June 26, 2018, defendant Janeth Gonzalez Fimbres dba Burgarin Produce (“Moving Party”) demurred to the second cause of action for negligence per se. Plaintiff failed to file an opposition. II. LEGAL STANDARD

Strictly speaking Negligence Per Se is merely an evidentiary doctrine, so technically there is no such thing as a cause of action for Negligence Per Se. As a general rule, the cause of action must be pled as negligence. “[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.” (Johnson v.

May 7, 2018 The Demurrer to the First and Third Causes of Action for Negligence Per Se and Negligent Entrustment is SUSTAINED with fifteen days’ leave to amend. Regarding Negligence Per Se, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the first cause of action to include allegations of Negligence Per Se. The Motion to Strike is GRANTED in entirety.

The doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. (Johnson v. Honeywell International Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555, quotation marks and brackets omitted.) In order to allege a cause of action under Government Code Section 835 with a negligence per se theory of liability, Plaintiff must refer to a specific statute creating such liability.

Proof Positive, by and through its employees and agents, breached their duties of care in a manner constituting negligence per se.” Complaint ¶ 55. Such allegations are sufficient to constitute a cause of action for negligence based upon a violation of statute. Thus, the demurrer to the 6th Cause of Action for Negligence Per Se is Overruled.

Plaintiff argues the second cause of action for negligence per se is properly pled under Montebello Municipal Code section 12.04.480. Reply Arguments On reply, City argues that its demurrer should be sustained because negligence per se is not a separate cause of action. Legal Standard A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Negligence per se is not a separate tort cause of action and Plaintiff cannot obtain damages for both negligence and negligence per se arising out of the same accident. Rather, negligence per set is an evidentiary doctrine whereby negligence may be presumed if the evidentiary requirements are met. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285 [“the doctrine of negligence per se does not establish tort liability.

The Court further finds that that any failure to instruct on the negligence per se did not prejudice the Plaintiff. Based upon the foregoing, the motion for new trial is denied.

The Court intends to OVERRULE Defendants Mike Ehlert, Torban Ehlert, and Birgit Ehlert's demurrer to the fourth cause of action for negligence per se in the complaint. (C.C.P. § 430.10(e).) Defendants are correct to point out that the doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. (E.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Intern. Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.)

The FAC alleges causes of action for (1) Battery, (2) Sexual Battery, (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (4) Negligence, Including General Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention, Premises Liability, and Negligence Per Se, (5) Negligence Per Se (Pen. Code, § 261), (6) Negligence Per Se (Pen. Code, § 261.5), (7) Negligence Per Se (Pen. Code, § 286), and (8) Negligence Per Se (Pen. Code, § 287).

Second Cause of Action for Wrongful Death Based on Negligence Per Se & Seventh Cause of Action for Negligence Per Se (Survival Action) Tri-Counties Defendants demur to the second cause of action for wrongful death based on negligence per se and seventh cause of action for negligence per se (survival action). Preliminarily, there is no cause of action for negligence per se: "Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine, rather than an independent cause of action. [Citation.]

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not alleging negligence per se as a separate and independent cause of action, rather negligence per se is alleged as a part of the motor vehicle negligence claim. Thus, Pourmoradi’s concern about negligence per se as an independent claim is unwarranted.

On May 31, 2018, the Stipulation and Order to Dismiss Punitive Damages Claim against Defendant Yana Barance was filed. 3rd C/A—Negligence Per Se The Court declines to strike the Third Cause of Action for Negligence Per Se. “[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.” (Johnson v. Honeywell Internat.

Plaintiff contends that his cause of action for negligence per se against Demurring Defendant is sufficiently pled.