Negligence in California

Instead, it is directed at Plaintiff’s claims for (1) general negligence, (2) motor vehicle negligence, and (3) products liability—none of which identify a statutory basis for liability against the City. Furthermore, with respect to motor vehicle negligence, there is no allegation to support agency or employee liability against the City. The Complaint is bereft of detail with respect to Plaintiff’s theory of liability against the City for her motor vehicle accident.

Plaintiffs seek to hold ABI liable in both strict liability and negligence.

Defendant City And County Of San Francisco'S Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings On Plaintiff'S General Negligence And Products Liability Causes Of Action Set for hearing on Monday, September 20, 2010, line 11. Defendant City And County Of San Francisco's Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings On Plaintiff's General Negligence And Products Liability Causes Of Action. Motion granted without leave to amend as to general negligence and products liability causes of action.

Plaintiff alleges that he has raised an independent theory of negligence against the district. The cases on which Defendants rely involve circumstances where the Plaintiff alleged alternative theories: employer’s vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, and direct negligence for negligent entrustment/hiring. c. Reply filed 8/9/21 Defendants argue that Plaintiff confirms that Plaintiff’s theory of liability is vicarious only.

The alleged negligence in this case does rise to the level of gross negligence. The difference between regular negligence and gross negligence is significant because an agreement made in the context of recreational programs and services is unenforceable "to the extent it purports to release liability for future gross negligence."

Plaintiff alleges City is liable for negligence under Government Code, sections 815.2, 815.4, 815.6, 820, 830.8, 835, and 840.2. (Complaint, p. 5.) However, these code sections do not establish liability of a public entity for negligence. Likewise, City cannot be held liable for premises liability because the elements for premises liability are the same as those for negligence.

PARTY’S REQUEST Defendant requests that the Court strike Prem.L-2 Count One – Negligence and Prem.L-3 Count Two – Willful Failure to Warn from the complaint because these theories of liability are based on the common law, which Defendant cannot be liable for. DISCUSSION Plaintiff has filed a non-opposition to Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s first count and second count of liability under the premises liability cause of action.

Defendant has properly noticed its request for summary adjudication as to two issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s negligence-based causes of action are barred by the express release of liability in Plaintiff’s Membership Agreement; and (2) whether 24 Hour Fitness’s Tenth Affirmative Defense based on the assumption of risk and liability release in Plaintiff’s Membership Agreement applies to defeat Plaintiff’s claims for ordinary negligence against 24 Hour Fitness.

As noted above, general negligence and premises liability are both forms of negligence. (Brooks, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at 1619 [premises liability is a form of negligence].) Here, the negligence cause of action and the premises liability theory appear to be based on the same exact negligent act—the slip and fall incident. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-15.) Thus, if the Complaint were to state the theories as separate causes of action, those causes would be duplicative.

The Negligence Product Liability count contains new allegations which do provide an additional quantum of factual matter, discussed below. Products Liability Negligence As with an action asserted under a strict liability theory, under a negligence theory the plaintiff must prove a defect caused injury. However, [u]nder a negligence theory, plaintiff must also prove an additional element, namely, that the defect in the product was due to negligence of the defendant. ( Chavez v.

The negligence cause of action and the premises liability cause of action are based on the same theory of liability (negligence) and the same facts (Defendants failed to use adequate flooring that was safe for aerial yoga and safety mats). (Compl., ¶¶ 29, 31, 43, 45-47.)

Nestle necessarily implies that public entity tort liability must be measured by judicially declared modifications in the statute. We thus conclude that the rule of Li v. Yellow Cab Co. applies to government tort liability founded in negligence. Hence, the public entity may not rely upon the defense of contributory negligence as a total bar to liability. (Levine v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d 481, 487-488.)

Plaintiff asserts that negligence cause and strict products liability are separate and distinct bases for liability that do not collapse into each other. Plaintiff therefore argues that the negligence causes are the same between the complaints. Plaintiff further contends that the negligence products liability claim is well stated based on the allegations that Defendant negligently manufactured the ice bag.

On that form, she has checked the boxes for general negligence and for premises liability. Attached to that form she has included attachments for her specific claims, which, again, consist of general negligence and premises liability. On the attachment form for premises liability, Plaintiff checks boxes for three variations of premises liability: (1) negligence, (2) willful failure to warn, and (3) dangerous condition of public property. Defendant demurs to the first cause of action for general negligence.

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges 5 causes of action for: 1) negligence, 2) negligence per se, 3) vicarious governmental liability (Gov. Code §§815.2 and 820), 4) vicarious governmental liability- contractor (Gov. Code §815.4), and 5) dangerous condition of public property (Gov. Code §835.2).

or strict liability.

In the premises liability claim, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that a dangerous condition existed on the property where the accident occurred and that the City created the dangerous condition and/or had actual or constructive notice of the condition. The City demurs to the motor vehicle liability and negligence causes of action. The demurrer does not address the premises liability claim.

the employee's negligence [to the extent such negligence is established]).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for premises liability is duplicative of her claim for negligence because they are indistinguishable from each other. (Demurrer, p. 7:11-7:12.) Plaintiff does not contest this argument in Plaintiff’s opposition. The Court agrees with Defendant. Plaintiff’s causes of action for negligence and premises liability are both predicated on the same theory of liability – Defendant’s negligence. (Compl., ¶¶ 7, 12, 13.)

Whether the clause limiting liability applies if Eaglelift’s negligence was active. The limitation of damages provision here does not mention the word “negligence.” California courts hold that clauses excluding liability (i.e., exculpatory clauses) do not exclude liability for active negligence unless they specifically mention negligence. (Celli v. Sports Car Club, Inc. (1972) 29 Cal.

There is no common law tort liability for public entities in California, including negligence. (McCarty v. State of California Dept. of Transp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 955, 975.) Here, Plaintiffs claim for negligence cannot be sustained because City is a public entity and there is no common law negligence liability for public entities in California. Accordingly, Citys demurrer is sustained as to Plaintiffs cause of action for negligence.

The complaint alleges causes of action for professional negligence and products liability. The latter cause of action asserts three theories of liability: (a) strict liability against Keystone and Coastal Oral; (b) negligence against Coastal Oral; and (c) breach of implied warranty against Keystone and Coastal Oral. Currently on calendar is Goldberg and Coastal Oral’s demurrer to the second cause of action for products liability.

In City of Santa Barbara, the California Supreme Court considered whether an agreement releasing the city and its employees from all claims of liability for “any negligent act or omission ... or otherwise” while participating in the city's summer program precluded liability for gross negligence. The Supreme Court acknowledged that an agreement made in the contexts of recreational programs and services, which releases liability for future negligence, is enforceable.

Consistent with Parth s guidance, the Court reaches the same conclusion: the third cause of action for Negligence-Premises Liability is duplicative of the second cause of action for Negligence.

The Court sustained the demurrer to the negligence cause of action with leave to amend on the ground that it failed to allege a statutory basis and was pled against a public entity. The Court deemed Defendant’s motion to strike moot in light of the ruling on the demurrer. 3. Amended Complaint On 5/02/19, Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint. The FAC includes causes of action for negligence, products liability, and premises liability against Defendant.

The FAC fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action for strict products liability/failure to warn and the FAC is uncertain. 2nd Cause of Action for Strict Products Liability-Negligence-Manufacturing Once again, the FAC pleads a lot on conclusory allegations but fails to articulate any clear factual basis for a proper manufacturing defect claim. Plaintiff again conflates the elements of a negligence claim with those of a product liability claim.

Plaintiff’s complaint includes causes of action for premises liability and general negligence. 2.

Plaintiff’s complaint includes causes of action for premises liability and general negligence. 2.

The Demurrer filed by Defendant Westwood Open MRI LLC, RAD Alliance Inc., and Michael Whitney is overruled as to the 2nd Cause of Action (General Negligence) and sustained with leave to amend as to the 3rd Cause of Action (Products Liability).Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice is granted.As to the general negligence claim, it is sufficiently alleged.As to the products liability claim, the Defendants are medical providers and are not liable under this theory of relief for products used in connection with

In particular, the City focuses on Count One – Negligence under the Premises Liability cause of action.

s demurrer to the premises liability count is sustained, with leave to amend. Although the 2d cause of action for premises liability is based on negligence, more must be pled to state a cause of action based on this tort.

Palmdale has one section titled PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION DOES NOT ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO OVERCOME THE CITYS GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. The Court reads this to apply as to the Second Cause of Action (Negligence). Palmdales next argument is labeled PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE AND PREMISES LIABILITY CAUSES OF ACTION ARE REDUNDANT. This is less clear.

The first cause of action for negligence references Civil Code section 3479. Civil Code section 3479 defines nuisance, which is already pled as the second cause of action. Civil Code section 3479 does not provide a basis for statutory liability for negligence. Plaintiff does not identify any other statute specifically providing for Defendants liability. Plaintiff has thus failed to sufficiently plead the negligence cause of action against Defendant.

It asserts causes of action against the 10 individuals believed to have started the fire for (1) gross negligence, (2) negligence, and (3) statutory liability under H&SC § 13007. As against the property owner, plaintiffs asserts causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) nuisance), (3) statutory liability under H&SC § 13007, and (4) premises liability. DEMURRER: The demurrer was filed by defendant Natalie Maese, one of the 10 persons alleged to have unintentionally started the Tea Fire.

Causes of Action for Negligence and Premises Liability Defendant moves for summary adjudication of the claims for negligence and premises liability on the basis that Plaintiff signed a waiver. Express assumption of the risk applies when a plaintiff has executed a written waiver of liability. ( Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1467.)

Premises Liability/Negligence “A landowner owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain his or her property in such a manner as to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of injury.” Barnes v. Black (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 1473, 1478. When a landowner fails to exercise this level of care, it is considered negligence. Id.

First Cause of Action, General Negligence Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for general negligence. Pursuant to Gov Code §815(a), all liability against a public entity must be grounded in statute. A claim for general negligence is not grounded in statute, and therefore the demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained. b.

[Citation] Active negligence involves affirmative misconduct, knowledge or acquiescence in negligent conduct, or the failure to perform a specific duty. [Citation] The distinction is essential here because contracts that attempt to release liability for active or affirmative negligence must expressly and unequivocally preclude such liability. Without such language, they can only bar liability for passive negligence while leaving the release open to unlimited liability for active negligence.”

Plaintiff’s complaint includes three causes of action: (1) negligence/vicarious liability; (2) premises liability; and (3) public nuisance. The City has demurred to all causes of action for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (CCP §431.10(e)).

In Diaz , the deciding factor as to whether an admission of vicarious liability should bar additional causes of action was not limited to whether a cause of action imposed vicarious or direct liability on the defendant employer. Instead, it was based upon whether the cause of action could have been brought if not for the defendant drivers own negligence, intertwining the two under Prop 51.

The elements of a negligence claim are: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) that the breach caused, and (4) damages from the injury (5) within the scope of liability. Restatement of Torts 3d: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 7. Plaintiff brings this action for negligence alleging a dangerous condition on public property.

Wrongful Death Negligence (v. GWFG and 4441 Downey) 2. Wrongful Death Premises Liability (v. GWFG and 4441 Downey) 3. Strict Liability Design Defect (v. Linde and Messer) 4. Strict Liability Mfg Defect (v. Linde and Messer) 5. Strict Liability Failure to Warn (v. Linde and Messer) 6. Negligence Products Liability (v. Linde and Messer) 7. Negligence - Failure to Warn (v. Linde and Messer) 8.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that, as to both the negligence and the negligent hiring claims, there is no basis for direct liability against Defendant, and any vicarious liability would be barred by the Privette doctrine.

The motion is granted as to the cause of action for strict liability. Defendant's motion also asserts there is no triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant's actions constituted gross negligence. Whether or not any of the releases of liability are enforceable, Defendant cannot be released from liability for gross negligence. (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747.) However, Plaintiff does not include a separate cause of action for gross negligence in her complaint.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants are liable for Plaintiff’s negligence, negligence, strict liability (products liability), and negligence (products liability) claims after Defendants’ employee held the door open Plaintiff, let it go, forcibly and quickly closed on Plaintiff’s foot before Plaintiff entered the restroom completely. On February 3, 2021, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff. Defendant J Groethe filed an opposition on May 20, 2021.

Schwartz”) and Does 1 to 50 alleging causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se, (3) public nuisance and (4) governmental tort liability. On May 17, 2018, the Court sustained Mr. and Ms. Schwartz’s demurrer to the second and third causes of action with leave to amend. On June 13, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleging causes of action for negligence and public nuisance against Mr. and Ms. Schwartz and governmental tort liability against City.

Defendants previously moved for summary judgment because Plaintiff had signed a waiver of liability. The Court found that there is a triable issue whether Defendants acted with no negligence, ordinary negligence, or gross negligence in terms of how their employee responded to problems with the horse during the ride. Because the waiver of liability does not apply if Defendants acted with gross negligence, the Court denied the motion.

Therefore, the undisputed facts show that the Plaintiff cannot establish her first cause of action for negligence. 2. Second Cause of action for Products Liability - Strict Liability and Third Cause of Action for Products Liability - Negligence The Plaintiffs alleges in these causes of action that the Defendant is liable for her injury because there was a design defect in the elevator.

There are no facts to show a causal link between defendants' alleged negligence and plaintiff's injuries. Leave to amend is granted to allege facts to support the elements for negligence and may include facts to support each element for negligence per se. The Demurer to the 4th cause of action for premises liability is sustained, with leave to amend for the same reasons. (See, Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619; CACI 1000) Paragraph 12 is stricken as irrelevant.

City further argues that the liability of a public entity for injury caused by the dangerous condition of public properly is exclusively governed by Government Code Section 835, which Plaintiff has already alleged in her first cause of action for premises liability. City correctly argues that Plaintiff’s premises liability cause of action alleges liability based on the dangerous condition of public property.

Plaintiff may pursue a strict products liability claim on companion theories of negligence (second cause of action) and breach of warranty (third cause of action). (Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 547, 561 (“[a] plaintiff may pursue strict products liability on companion theories of negligence or breach of warranty”).) And the allegations are sufficient to support a breach of warranty claim. (FAC ¶¶44 and 46.)

However, Plaintiff has not explained how she seeks to maintain a cause of action for general negligence against City, as opposed to her separate cause of action for premises liability. Thus, the demurrer to the 2nd cause of action for general negligence is sustained.

BACKGROUND On August 22, 2018, Plaintiff Jared Katz (“Plaintiff’) filed a Complaint against Defendants Equinox and Related Companies, L.P. for (1) negligence, (2) premises liability, (3) product liability, (4) strict product liability, and (5) negligence per se. Trial is set for February 24, 2020. PARTY’S REQUEST Defendant Equinox Fitness Santa Monica, Inc. erroneously sued as Equinox and Related Companies, L.P.

Defendants Bonnie Adams and TROTT USA move for summary judgment or adjudication to the causes of action for negligence and strict liability in the Original Complaint filed on 5/23/17 by Plaintiff Bria Hebert. A. Summary Judgment The motion for summary judgment is summarily DENIED. Even if Defendants were to prevail, their notice of motion is procedurally defective because it challenges only the negligence and strict liability claims.

There is a common law version of “strict” liability for injuries caused by animals with known dangerous propensities. This common law rule has nothing to do with the statutory strict liability rule. They are distinct. Because this common law rule still requires proof that the animal in question had dangerous propensities and that the owner knew about it, this common law rule is sort of a hybrid between ordinary negligence and statutory strict liability.

The Complaint alleges a “count” of general negligence under the premises liability claim, and a cause of action for general negligence. (Compl. pp. 4-5.) These claims are based on the same facts and harm. (Ibid.) Both causes offer a theory of liability apparently based on general negligence, rather than a statutory basis of liability as with the other counts. (Compl. ¶¶ Prem.L-1 – Prem.L-4.)

Therefore, the demurrer to the negligence claim is sustained with leave to amend. Negligence is included as its own cause of action and also as count in the premises liability cause of action. The Court’s ruling on the sufficiency of the negligence allegations applies to both instances where negligence is alleged. As to the premises liability claim, Plaintiffs identified section 835 as the applicable statute. (See Comp. p.4 PremL-1.) Section 835 applies to dangerous conditions on public property.

The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) negligence and (2) premises liability against Defendant. The premises liability claim includes a count for negligence and dangerous condition of public property. Defendant now demurs to the complaint arguing the negligence cause of action fails as a matter of law because Defendant as a public entity cannot be sued for negligence.

Defendants have demonstrated that there is no basis for liability against them as owners of the vehicle as such liability is precluded under the Graves Amendment, and there is no evidence of independent negligence on their part. The Graves Amendment precludes vicarious liability against the owner of a motor vehicle that rents a vehicle to a person who then harms another person unless there is independent negligence on the part of the owner. 49 USCS § 30106. 49 USCS § 30106.

It has long been held that “[p]remises liability is a form of negligence....” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp., (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 1611, 1619). “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. Premises liability ‘ “is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises”.) (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108; CACI 1000.)

. _____________________________________________ The court's tentative ruling is as follows: Sustain demurrer to C/As 1 and 2 (negligence and strict products liability respectively) without leave to amend. P has not and cannot state a claim for damages to his person or other property within the meaning of negligence and products liability law. Property rights for purposes of due process analysis have nothing to do with the tort of negligence or products liability.

Negligence Cause of Action Defendant argues that since liability can not be imposed on the State absent a statutory basis, the Civil Code can not provide a basis for a negligence cause of action against a public entity.

While SBCH objected to that testimony, it acted to defeat the motion for summary judgment, if for no other reason than that it showed a material dispute as to SBCH’s contention that plaintiffs possessed no information regarding the negligence of its nursing staff. Because it is clear to the Court that plaintiff’s professional negligence claims against SBCH extend beyond any claims of liability based upon Elam v. College Park Hospital (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 332, and include negligence in assisting Dr.

DISCUSSION Public entities cannot be liable for common law theories of general negligence. ( Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [“section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities”].) “Ordinarily, negligence may be pleaded in general terms and the plaintiff need not specify the precise act or omission alleged to constitute the breach of duty. [Citation].

Demurrer to First & Second Causes of Action – Negligence & Premises Liability Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action for Negligence and Premises Liability, respectively, on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain. (CCP § 430.10(e), (f).) The elements for negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. County of Santa Clara v.

Second Cause of Action, Negligence For reasons that are not clear, the opposition and reply argue about the pleading concerning the second cause of action for negligence. Defendant demurred to the first cause of action for strict liability ONLY. The Court is not considering any arguments about the second cause of action for negligence, which remains in the complaint as pled. c.

Plaintiff's only claim is for negligence, but negligence cannot be asserted against the City. The liability of the public entity is only statutory and cannot rest on a theory of common law negligence. (Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park etc.

TENTATIVE RULING: CROSS-DEFENDANT AMAZON.COM LLC'S DEMURRER TO FOURTH AND FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTION FOR STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE IN SECOND AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT ("SACC") is SUSTAINED. Cross-Defendant Amazon.com, LLC asserts ("Amazon") the fourth and fifth causes of action (Strict Products Liability and Products Liability - Negligence) of the SACC by Defendants/Cross-Complainants JAIME MARTINEZ, JR, and AMY MARTINEZ ("Cross-Complainants") are insufficiently pled.

On May 7, 2018, Plaintiff Silva Ghazarian filed a Complaint against Defendant Walmart, Inc., alleging premises liability and general negligence. Proof of service was filed on October 5, 2018. As part of Plaintiff’s cause of action for premises liability, she alleged 3 counts - Negligence, Willful Failure to Warn, and Dangerous Condition of a Public Property.

Product Liability – Negligence Both Plaintiff and Defendants incorrectly cite to authority regarding strict products liability. The FAC only alleges negligence-based products liability. Such an action can be maintained against a supplier of the product. Restatement Second of Torts § 388; CACI 1220. The FAC properly alleges that Plaintiff was injured by the filler products used by Defendants and that those injuries were caused by Defendant’s negligence.

“[I]n California all government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or ‘enactment’, and to state a cause of action every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.) The first cause of action is entitled “Negligence per se” but negligence per se is not a cause of action but an evidentiary presumption.

Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1152 which held that if a Plaintiff pursues two theories of recovery against an employer of direct negligence and vicarious liability, and the employer admits vicarious liability for the negligent driving of its employee, then the Plaintiff is barred from pursuing the claim for independent negligence. Id at 1152 and 1161.

The premises liability claim is adequately pled. The premises liability claim is more specific than the general negligence claim in that the basis for a duty arises from the Defendant’s ownership or control of the property. Premises liability is a form of negligence, which involves the duty of a premises owner to exercise ordinary care in the management of the premises to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. Brooks v.

Defendant demurs to the Second Cause of Action: Premises Liability on the basis that it fails to state sufficient facts to support a claim for premises liability and that the second cause of action is duplicative of the first cause of action for negligence. The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 994, 998.)

Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging causes of action for negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty. Plaintiff’s opposition papers indicate that she is abandoning her negligence claim. (Opp. at 2:12- 13.) As for the strict liability and warranty claims, they are barred by prevailing California law as stated in Mexicali Rose v. Super. Ct. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 617 (“Mexicali Rose”). In that case, our Supreme Court revisited the “foreign-natural” rule first announced in Mix v.

Therefore, the operative claims are: (1) negligence as to Park; (2) battery as to Gallegos; and (3) negligence, premises liability, and battery as to Barrio. (FAC ¶¶ 7-10, 23.) Gallegos and Barrio have not appeared. Frayre suspects that Barrio is Park’s agent. (Opposition p. 2 at fn. 1.) Trial is set for October 16, 2019.

Plaintiff asserts causes of action for Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Statutory Liability, and Negligent Entrustment. Demurrer Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth causes of action for Negligence Per Se, Statutory Liability, and Negligent Entrustment. With respect to Plaintiff’s cause of action for Negligence Per Se, the Court finds that Negligence Per Se is an evidentiary doctrine and is not a separate cause of action from Plaintiff’s first cause of action for Negligence.

Although the release bars plaintiff’s claims for ordinary negligence and premises liability, plaintiff has also alleged gross negligence in his first cause of action for premises liability and his third cause of action for negligence. (FAC, ¶¶ 7, 14.) Issue No. 2: There are no triable issues of material fact as to plaintiff’s causes of action for negligence and premises liability based on the primary assumption of risk doctrine.

The Court finds the negligence cause of action, as currently pled, is duplicative of the premises liability cause of action. Both causes of action are predicated on the same theory of liability – Defendant’s negligence in maintaining the station platform. Similarly, Plaintiff’s causes of action for negligence and premises liability are both predicated on the same facts – Defendant allowed and failed to warn of a slippery substance on Defendant’s premises, which constituted a dangerous condition.

The Graves Amendment also applies to preclude liability if there are no independent acts of negligence on the part of the owner. Section 30106(a)(2). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants negligently entrusted the motor vehicle, supporting an independent act of negligence. Complaint, page 4.

The complaint alleges causes of action for professional negligence and products liability. The latter cause of action asserts three theories of liability: (a) strict liability against Keystone and Coastal Oral; (b) negligence against Coastal Oral; and (c) breach of implied warranty against Keystone and Coastal Oral.

Thus, under either a negligence or a strict liability theory of products liability, to recover from a manufacturer, a plaintiff must prove that a defect caused injury. ( Merrill , supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 479 [emphasis added].) Under a negligence theory, a plaintiff must also prove an additional element, namely, that the defect in the product was due to negligence of the defendant.

The motion is granted as to the cause of action for strict liability. Defendant's motion also asserts there is no triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant's actions constituted gross negligence. Whether or not any of the releases of liability are enforceable, Defendant cannot be released from liability for gross negligence. (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747.) However, Plaintiff does not include a separate cause of action for gross negligence in her complaint.

The form complaint asserts claims for motor vehicle, general negligence, intentional tort, products liability, premises liability, and emotional distress. B. The demurrer 1. Motor vehicle tort and general negligence claims Yu argues that the motor vehicle and general negligence claims are uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to support a claim against him.

Although not identical claims, a claim for dangerous condition of public property is similar to a premises liability claim and a premises liability is a negligence claim. Thus, the Court finds that given the similarities between these claims, dangerous condition of public property is a negligence claim for the purposes of section 394. Plaintiff’s cases are distinguishable as neither involves a possible negligence claim. Tutor-Saliba-Perini Joint Venture v.

The causes of action in the complaint are: 1) premises liability, 2) general negligence, 3) products liability (strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied and express warranties; and 4) negligence per se. Kaufman has since added former “Doe” defendants Rockber Partners, LLC (later dismissed); Daketta Los Carneros, LLC; Hurst Enterprises, Inc.; Meridian Group Real Estate Management, Inc.; Beyond Heating and Air, Inc.

As to the 6th Cause of Action for Premises liability, a cause of action for general negligence and one for premises liability are similar. Nevertheless, the allegations in the First Amended Complaint are different and separate from those in the 6th and 7th causes of action.

The elements of a claim for motor vehicle negligence or general negligence are duty, breach, causation and damages. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.) The Complaint does not allege how Defendants were negligent, simply that they were negligent in their ownership and operation of their vehicle such that it collided with Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Compl., GN-1.) An allegation of negligence is a legal conclusion, not a statement of fact.

The City of San Diego demurrers to the Third Cause of Action: Gross Negligence and the Fourth Cause of Action: Willful Failure to Warn – Civil Code § 846. Gross Negligence Wright v. State (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659 explains, "[a] public entity is not liable for tortious injury unless the liability is imposed by statute. (Gov.Code, § 815.)

Additionally, neither case held that a Plaintiff can bring a claim for common carrier liability under Civil code section 2100 based on negligence, and a separate negligence cause of action based on the same statutory basis against a public entity. Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the third cause of action for negligence. Metro is ordered to give Notice

The Court notes that Defendant demurred to the second cause of action for premises liability (count one negligence) and the second cause of action for premises liability (count two willful failure to warn). The Courts analysis only discussed premises liability (count one negligence) despite Defendant arguing that Plaintiff did not allege facts for premises liability under count two (willful failure to warn).

Second and Fourth Causes of Action: Premises Liability and Negligence LBMMC contends that Plaintiff’s causes of action for premises liability and negligence are duplicative of the first cause of action for medical malpractice as they as all three causes of action concern professional negligence. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. First, Plaintiff argues that the premises liability is not duplicative because it does not fall in the category of professional negligence.

The Court finds that based on the allegations in the FAC and authorities cited, Cutts has sufficiently alleged a cause of action for negligence and premises liability against BLVD 6200. The demurrer to the negligence and premises liability causes of action as to BLVD 6200 is overruled. Further, because the premises liability cause of action against all Defendants is based on the Kinsman exception, the Court overrules the demurrer to the premises liability cause of action as to all Defendants.

In asserting a negligence cause of action Plaintiff cannot rely on common law but must state the basis for liability. Lopez, supra 40 Cal.3d at 795. Plaintiff has not identified a statutory basis for Defendant’s negligence liability. The FAC allegations appear to be based solely on the common theory of negligence. Without an identified statutory basis for liability, Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a negligence cause of action.

In asserting a negligence cause of action Plaintiff cannot rely on common law but must state the basis for liability. Lopez, supra 40 Cal.3d at 795. Plaintiff has not identified a statutory basis for Defendant’s negligence liability. The FAC allegations appear to be based solely on the common theory of negligence. Without an identified statutory basis for liability, Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a negligence cause of action.

In asserting a negligence cause of action Plaintiff cannot rely on common law but must state the basis for liability. Lopez, supra 40 Cal.3d at 795. Plaintiff has not identified a statutory basis for Defendant’s negligence liability. The FAC allegations appear to be based solely on the common theory of negligence. Without an identified statutory basis for liability, Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a negligence cause of action.

In asserting a negligence cause of action Plaintiff cannot rely on common law but must state the basis for liability. Lopez, supra 40 Cal.3d at 795. Plaintiff has not identified a statutory basis for Defendant’s negligence liability. The FAC allegations appear to be based solely on the common theory of negligence. Without an identified statutory basis for liability, Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a negligence cause of action.

In asserting a negligence cause of action Plaintiff cannot rely on common law but must state the basis for liability. Lopez, supra 40 Cal.3d at 795. Plaintiff has not identified a statutory basis for Defendant’s negligence liability. The FAC allegations appear to be based solely on the common theory of negligence. Without an identified statutory basis for liability, Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a negligence cause of action.