Code of Civil Procedure sections 337.1 and 337.15, are statutes of repose. (See Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 644.)
Section 337.15, subdivision (a), provides: “No action may be brought to recover damages from any person, or the surety of a person, who develops real property or performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property more than 10 years after the substantial completion of the development or improvement for any of the following:
The express language of section 337.15 is that the 10-year limitations period begins to run upon “the substantial completion of the development or improvement” (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.15(a)) and “not later than” the earliest of four dates: “final inspection by the applicable public agency,” “recordation of a valid notice of completion,” “use or occupation of the improvement,” or “[o]ne year after termination or cessation of work on the improvement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.15(g).)
Whereas a statute of limitations begins to run at the time the injury is discovered, a statute of repose “is a bar on all suits brought more than a specified period after the date of manufacture.” (Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 681, 689.) It is a legal recognition that after a certain amount of time a product or construction has demonstrated its safety and quality, and it is not reasonable to hold a manufacturer or contractor legally responsible for accident or injury occurring after that time. (See Id.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1 establishes a four year statute of repose for injuries resulting from patent construction defects while section 337.15 sets a 10-year statute of repose for injuries resulting from latent construction defects. (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 644.) Thus, which section applies turns on whether a defect is latent or patent. (Id.)
Whether a defect is patent or latent “depends on whether it is ‘apparent by reasonably inspection.’” (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 644, citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1(e), 337.15(b).) A patent defect is “one which can be discovered by such an inspection as would be made in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence” while a latent defect is “one which is hidden and which would not be discovered by a reasonably careful inspection.” (Ibid, citations omitted.)
A suit to recover damages for a latent construction defect must be brought within 10 years of the date of substantial completion of construction, regardless of the date of discovery of the defect. (Code Civ. Proc., 337.15; Gundogdu v. King Mai, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 310, 314.) The faulty installation of fuel storage tanks is the type of defective construction affecting real property subject to the limitation. (See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009.)
However, the statute does not apply to causes of action based on willful misconduct or fraudulent concealment. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 337.15(f).) Willful misconduct is distinguished from negligence in that it is not marked by a mere absence of care. (Acosta v. Glenfed Development Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1294.) “[W]illfulness generally is marked by three characteristics:
(Id. at 1294-1295.)
Ordinarily a cause of action based on a construction defect must be brought within three years if based upon negligence (see Code Civ. Proc., § 338) or four years if based upon contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 337), unless the statute of limitations is tolled by the discovery rule. (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 646.) Discovery occurs, and the statutes begin to run, “‘only after the damage is sufficiently appreciable to give a reasonable man notice that he has a duty to pursue his remedies.’” (Id., citing North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 27.)
Rinker Boat Co (2009)174 Cal.App.4th 1297 for the proposition that the duration provision provides implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Act with a limited prospective existence beyond the date of delivery, but there is nothing that requires the purchaser to discover and report to the seller a latent defect within that time period. (Id. at 1310-1311.) Mexia makes clear that the implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of the sale. (Id. at 1304.)
Oct 31, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that because the general negligence claim arises from the construction defect created by Defendant, the ten-year statute of limitations of CCP § 337.15(a) applies. (Id.) The Court agrees and finds Section 337.15(a) to be applicable here—not Section 338. Even if there is a dispute over which of the above statutes applies, that is not sufficient to sustain the Demurrer based on a statute of limitations.
Oct 31, 2018
Wendy Chang or Jon R. Takasugi
Los Angeles County, CA
There is nothing that suggests a requirement that the purchaser discover and report to the seller a latent defect within that time period.” (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc., (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1310) Plaintiff alleges that upon discovery of the Vehicle’s nonconformities he took reasonable steps to notify Defendants.
Oct 25, 2018
Santa Cruz County, CA
The Supreme Court held that this was insufficient to allege equitable estoppel, explaining: “[T]he complaint is devoid of any indication that defendants' conduct actually and reasonably induced plaintiffs to forbear suing within the 10–year period of section 337.15. There is no suggestion that the repair attempts alleged, if successful, would have obviated the need for suit.
Oct 23, 2018
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
Los Angeles County, CA
There is nothing that suggests a requirement that the purchaser discover and report to the seller a latent defect within that time period. Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 1310 (bold emphasis added). The implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale. (See Moore v. Hubbard & Johnson [*1305] Lumber Co. (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 236, 241 [308 P.2d 794]; Brittalia Ventures v. Stuke Nursery Co., Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 17, 24 [62 Cal.
Oct 22, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Moreover, the issue is not whether the water heaters had a latent defect, but whether the defect manifested itself during the warranty period. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the 155 water heaters exhibited any defects prior to July 2018. Accordingly, A.O. Smith is entitled to summary adjudication of the 8th and 9th causes of action with respect to the 155 water heaters identified in Syler's Exhibit B.
Oct 18, 2018
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
Moreover, the issue is not whether the water heaters had a latent defect, but whether the defect manifested itself during the warranty period. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the 155 water heaters exhibited any defects prior to July 2018. Accordingly, A.O. Smith is entitled to summary adjudication of the 8th and 9th causes of action with respect to the 155 water heaters identified in Syler's Exhibit B.
Oct 18, 2018
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
Moreover, the issue is not whether the water heaters had a latent defect, but whether the defect manifested itself during the warranty period. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the 155 water heaters exhibited any defects prior to July 2018. Accordingly, A.O. Smith is entitled to summary adjudication of the 8th and 9th causes of action with respect to the 155 water heaters identified in Syler's Exhibit B.
Oct 18, 2018
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
(CCP § 337.15.) Plaintiffs claim the defects are latent. They cite paragraphs 17-19 of the Complaint. However, those paragraphs do not allege this. All paragraph 17 alleges is that plaintiffs did not discover the defects until after they acquired the Property. It does not allege when plaintiffs acquired the Property or what about the defects makes them latent rather than patent.
Oct 11, 2018
Contra Costa County, CA
Addressing the merits of TSPM's CC § 941 motion, the court not persuaded by TSPM's argument that CC § 941 and CCP § 337.15 should be interpreted the same way with respect to the term substantial completion. TSPM's argument is contrary to the express language of CC § 941(d) ["Sections 337.15 and 337.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to actions under this title"]. TSPM provides no authority espousing TSPM's interpretation of CC § 941.
Oct 11, 2018
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
Addressing the merits of TSPM's CC § 941 motion, the court not persuaded by TSPM's argument that CC § 941 and CCP § 337.15 should be interpreted the same way with respect to the term substantial completion. TSPM's argument is contrary to the express language of CC § 941(d) ["Sections 337.15 and 337.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to actions under this title"]. TSPM provides no authority espousing TSPM's interpretation of CC § 941.
Oct 11, 2018
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
IRM Corp. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 454, which essentially provided a claim against a landlord or hotel proprietor for any latent defect in the premises which existed at the commencement of a lease. In Peterson, the Court held that strict product liability could not be imposed on a landlord/hotel operator which purchased a bathtub from a third party manufacturer.
Sep 21, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Demurrer is sustained with leave to amend for the remaining Plaintiffs to allege: (1) facts in support of each cause of action as to each Plaintiff with requisite specificity as is required for fraud-based causes of action; (2) any allegations made against Vanguard in its separate capacities (e.g. developer, seller's agent, buyer's agent) to be clearly and separately made; (3) factual allegations regarding delayed discovery by each Plaintiff as to each alleged latent defect to be clearly made. =(501/REQ)
Sep 19, 2018
San Francisco County, CA
Rinker Boat Co (2009)174 Cal.App.4th 1297 for the proposition that the duration provision provides implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Act with a limited prospective existence beyond the date of delivery, but there is nothing that requires the purchaser to discover and report to the seller a latent defect within that time period. (Id at 1310-1311.) Mexia makes clear that the implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of the sale. (Id. at 1304.)
Sep 14, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Rinker Boat Co (2009)174 Cal.App.4th 1297 for the proposition that the duration provision provides implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Act with a limited prospective existence beyond the date of delivery, but there is nothing that requires the purchaser to discover and report to the seller a latent defect within that time period. (Id. at 1310-1311.) Mexia makes clear that the implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of the sale. (Id. at 1304.)
Sep 14, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57and held that a lessor of residential property “is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent defect in the premises when the defect existed at the time the premises were let....” (Becker v. IRM Corp., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 464.)
Sep 12, 2018
Fresno County, CA
. … [T]hese allegations were sufficient to overcome a demurrer based on the statute of limitations contained in section 337.15.” We disagree.
Sep 06, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
(CCP § 337.15 (a).) “Latent deficiency” means a deficiency which is not apparent by reasonable inspection. (CCP ¶ 337.15 (b).)
Aug 23, 2018
Contra Costa County, CA
(d) Sections 337.15 and 337.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to actions under this title.
Aug 23, 2018
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
(d) Sections 337.15 and 337.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to actions under this title.
Aug 23, 2018
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
337.15. The motion is DENIED. Triable issues of fact exist as to whether defendants engaged in willful misconduct. (See CCP ?337.15(f); Acosta v. Glenfed Development Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1278.)
Aug 17, 2018
San Francisco County, CA
Demurrer based on CCP 337.15 is overruled. Moving party failed to show that this statute is applicable to personal injury claims. To the extent moving party attempts to advance a new argument regarding 2-year statute of limitations in reply (not mentioned in the Notice of Demurrer, Demurrer or Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer), such argument is untimely and improper.
Aug 02, 2018
San Francisco County, CA
., § 337.15; El Escorial Owners’ Ass’n v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal App.4th 1337, 1358; FAC, ¶¶ 1-48, 54-62.) Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action for intentional/negligent nondisclosure is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); (Lazar v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) If no hearing is requested, this tentative ruling is effective immediately.
Jun 27, 2018
Assigned Judge
Yolo County, CA
On August 18, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint for (1) negligence, (2) latent defect, (3) negligent repair, (4) National Electric Code sections 300.10, 300.12, 680, et seq., (5) Los Angeles Municipal Code sections 91.8104.7 and 91.804.8, et seq., (6) Los Angeles Electrical Code sections 93.0104, 93.0201, 930304, and 93.0314, and (7) Health and Safety Code section 17920.3.
Jun 19, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Demurrer is OVERULED. 5th – 7th Affirmative Defenses Defendant contends Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations per CCP 337.1, 337.15, and 338. Plaintiffs may conduct discovery to obtain information regarding why their claims are barred under these code sections. Demurrer is OVERULED. 8th Affirmative Defense Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs lack standing.
Jun 13, 2018
Personal Injury/ Tort
Auto
Los Angeles County, CA
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