Code of Civil Procedure sections 337.1 and 337.15, are statutes of repose. (See Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 644.)
Section 337.15, subdivision (a), provides: “No action may be brought to recover damages from any person, or the surety of a person, who develops real property or performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property more than 10 years after the substantial completion of the development or improvement for any of the following:
The express language of section 337.15 is that the 10-year limitations period begins to run upon “the substantial completion of the development or improvement” (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.15(a)) and “not later than” the earliest of four dates: “final inspection by the applicable public agency,” “recordation of a valid notice of completion,” “use or occupation of the improvement,” or “[o]ne year after termination or cessation of work on the improvement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.15(g).)
Whereas a statute of limitations begins to run at the time the injury is discovered, a statute of repose “is a bar on all suits brought more than a specified period after the date of manufacture.” (Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 681, 689.) It is a legal recognition that after a certain amount of time a product or construction has demonstrated its safety and quality, and it is not reasonable to hold a manufacturer or contractor legally responsible for accident or injury occurring after that time. (See Id.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1 establishes a four year statute of repose for injuries resulting from patent construction defects while section 337.15 sets a 10-year statute of repose for injuries resulting from latent construction defects. (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 644.) Thus, which section applies turns on whether a defect is latent or patent. (Id.)
Whether a defect is patent or latent “depends on whether it is ‘apparent by reasonably inspection.’” (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 644, citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1(e), 337.15(b).) A patent defect is “one which can be discovered by such an inspection as would be made in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence” while a latent defect is “one which is hidden and which would not be discovered by a reasonably careful inspection.” (Ibid, citations omitted.)
A suit to recover damages for a latent construction defect must be brought within 10 years of the date of substantial completion of construction, regardless of the date of discovery of the defect. (Code Civ. Proc., 337.15; Gundogdu v. King Mai, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 310, 314.) The faulty installation of fuel storage tanks is the type of defective construction affecting real property subject to the limitation. (See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009.)
However, the statute does not apply to causes of action based on willful misconduct or fraudulent concealment. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 337.15(f).) Willful misconduct is distinguished from negligence in that it is not marked by a mere absence of care. (Acosta v. Glenfed Development Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1294.) “[W]illfulness generally is marked by three characteristics:
(Id. at 1294-1295.)
Ordinarily a cause of action based on a construction defect must be brought within three years if based upon negligence (see Code Civ. Proc., § 338) or four years if based upon contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 337), unless the statute of limitations is tolled by the discovery rule. (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 646.) Discovery occurs, and the statutes begin to run, “‘only after the damage is sufficiently appreciable to give a reasonable man notice that he has a duty to pursue his remedies.’” (Id., citing North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 27.)
The next argument Huntamer raises is based on the 10-year statute of repose of CCP § 337.15.
Jan 17, 2019
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
The next argument Huntamer raises is based on the 10-year statute of repose of CCP § 337.15.
Jan 17, 2019
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
The next argument Huntamer raises is based on the 10-year statute of repose of CCP § 337.15.
Jan 17, 2019
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
The next argument Huntamer raises is based on the 10-year statute of repose of CCP § 337.15.
Jan 17, 2019
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
The next argument Huntamer raises is based on the 10-year statute of repose of CCP § 337.15.
Jan 17, 2019
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
The next argument Huntamer raises is based on the 10-year statute of repose of CCP § 337.15.
Jan 17, 2019
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
The next argument Huntamer raises is based on the 10-year statute of repose of CCP § 337.15.
Jan 17, 2019
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
The next argument Huntamer raises is based on the 10-year statute of repose of CCP § 337.15.
Jan 17, 2019
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, cited by plaintiff, does not support the argument that plaintiff’s claim accrued only upon discovery of the latent defect. In Mexia, the Court of Appeal held that the Song-Beverly Act did not bar an action for breach of implied warranty based upon a latent condition not discovered by the consumer and reported to the seller within the duration period. Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1309.
Jan 15, 2019
Contract
Breach
Placer County, CA
Plaintiff argues that either Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1 (four years for patent defects) or section 337.15 (ten years for latent defects) applies. The Court need not at this time rule on the issue of what statute of limitations applies to the claims alleged in the Complaint. The work is alleged to have continued through June of 2016. (Complaint, ¶ 25.)
Jan 11, 2019
Orange County, CA
The gravamen of the FAC sounds in fraud, not as a latent defect. Section 337.15 simply is inapplicable. The action is not time-barred as Plaintiff has adequately pleaded facts constituting delayed discovery. Defendants alternatively argue that the FAC is time-barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), or section 339. Defendants are correct that section 338, subdivision (d) applies, as the gravamen of the FAC is “an action for relief on the ground of fraud.”
Jan 10, 2019
Santa Clara County, CA
Plaintiff alleges six causes of action against Defendant: (1) General Negligence; (2) Negligent Failure to Disclose Latent Defect; (3) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability (Common Law); (4) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability (Statutory); (5) Private Nuisance; and (6) Breach of Contract. Plaintiff’s action arises out of her residency in a sorority house for which she alleges Defendant acted as a master tenant/landlord.
Jan 02, 2019
San Luis Obispo County, CA
There is nothing that suggests a requirement that the purchaser discover and report to the seller a latent defect within that time period. Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 1310 (bold emphasis added). The implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale. (See Moore v. Hubbard & Johnson [*1305] Lumber Co. (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 236, 241 [308 P.2d 794]; Brittalia Ventures v. Stuke Nursery Co., Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 17, 24 [62 Cal.
Dec 24, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
The Court notes that it is not able to determine whether the complaint is time barred by CCP § 337.15 based on the current allegations and according to the standards set forth in CCP § 452. This is the tentative ruling for an appearance hearing at 10:30 a.m. on Friday, December 21, 2018. If no party appears at the hearing, this tentative ruling will become the order of the Court as of December 21, 2018.
Dec 20, 2018
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
The Court notes that it is not able to determine whether the complaint is time barred by CCP § 337.15 based on the current allegations and according to the standards set forth in CCP § 452. This is the tentative ruling for an appearance hearing at 10:30 a.m. on Friday, December 21, 2018. If no party appears at the hearing, this tentative ruling will become the order of the Court as of December 21, 2018.
Dec 20, 2018
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
San Diego County, CA
(“Westcare defendants”) remove Code of Civil Procedure sections 337, 337.1, 337.15, and 339.1 They add sections 312, 316, 317, 340.1, 340.2, 340.3 and 343. No reason for these changes appears in the motion. Sections 312 and 343 are general statements.
Dec 17, 2018
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
Fresno County, CA
(d) Sections 337.15 and 337.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to actions under this title.
Dec 13, 2018
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
(d) Sections 337.15 and 337.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to actions under this title.
Dec 13, 2018
Complex
Writ
San Diego County, CA
The Ninth Circuit recently settled the dispute among the District Courts and instructed that federal courts must follow the Mexia rule because there is no convincing evidence that the California Supreme Court would decide the latent defect discovery issue presented in Mexia differently. (Daniel, supra, 806 F.3d at 1223.)
Dec 11, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
¿ On August 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for (1) negligence, (2) latent defect, (3) negligent repair, (4) National Electric Code sections 300.10, 300.12, 680, et seq., (5) Los Angeles Municipal Code sections 91.8104.7 and 91.804.8, et seq., (6) Los Angeles Electrical Code sections 93.0104, 93.0201, 930304, and 93.0314, and (7) Health and Safety Code section 17920.3.
Dec 05, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Plaintiffs later filed a Certificate of Merit based on a consultation with an architect, but that was not until June 2018, after the 60 days allowed by CCP § 411.35 (b)(2) and after expiration of the ten-year statute of repose set forth in CCP § 337.15. (See Curtis Engineering Corp. v.
Nov 28, 2018
Contra Costa County, CA
Van Hirtum challenges plaintiffs’ first cause of action for negligence (four counts – general negligence, negligent failure to disclose latent defect, negligence per se, and negligent failure to perform covenant to repair) on the ground that Van Hirtum did not owe a duty to plaintiffs. The case law, however, does not support defendant’s position In J’Aire Corporation v.
Nov 26, 2018
Santa Barbara County, CA
However, section 337.15 imposes an absolute 10-year bar, based on the date of "substantial completion," regardless of discovery. The interplay between these statutes sets up a two-step process: (1) actions for a latent defect must be filed within three years (§ 337) or four years (§ 338) of discovery, but (2) in any event must be filed within ten years (§ 337.15) of substantial completion. (North Coast Business Park v.
Nov 08, 2018
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
However, section 337.15 imposes an absolute 10-year bar, based on the date of "substantial completion," regardless of discovery. The interplay between these statutes sets up a two-step process: (1) actions for a latent defect must be filed within three years (§ 337) or four years (§ 338) of discovery, but (2) in any event must be filed within ten years (§ 337.15) of substantial completion. (North Coast Business Park v.
Nov 08, 2018
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
MacElhenny, Levy & Company (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1689, the court specifically recognized that a vendor of real property may be liable for a latent defect if (1) the vendor concealed or failed to disclose the condition which it knows about or has reason to know about, (2) the condition involves an unreasonable risk of injury that the vendor understands or should realize, (3) the condition is unknown to the vendee, and (4) the vendor has no reason to believe that the vendee will discover the condition.
Nov 07, 2018
Santa Barbara County, CA
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