Code of Civil Procedure sections 337.1 and 337.15, are statutes of repose. (See Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 644.)
Section 337.15, subdivision (a), provides: “No action may be brought to recover damages from any person, or the surety of a person, who develops real property or performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property more than 10 years after the substantial completion of the development or improvement for any of the following:
The express language of section 337.15 is that the 10-year limitations period begins to run upon “the substantial completion of the development or improvement” (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.15(a)) and “not later than” the earliest of four dates: “final inspection by the applicable public agency,” “recordation of a valid notice of completion,” “use or occupation of the improvement,” or “[o]ne year after termination or cessation of work on the improvement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.15(g).)
Whereas a statute of limitations begins to run at the time the injury is discovered, a statute of repose “is a bar on all suits brought more than a specified period after the date of manufacture.” (Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 681, 689.) It is a legal recognition that after a certain amount of time a product or construction has demonstrated its safety and quality, and it is not reasonable to hold a manufacturer or contractor legally responsible for accident or injury occurring after that time. (See Id.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1 establishes a four year statute of repose for injuries resulting from patent construction defects while section 337.15 sets a 10-year statute of repose for injuries resulting from latent construction defects. (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 644.) Thus, which section applies turns on whether a defect is latent or patent. (Id.)
Whether a defect is patent or latent “depends on whether it is ‘apparent by reasonably inspection.’” (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 644, citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1(e), 337.15(b).) A patent defect is “one which can be discovered by such an inspection as would be made in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence” while a latent defect is “one which is hidden and which would not be discovered by a reasonably careful inspection.” (Ibid, citations omitted.)
A suit to recover damages for a latent construction defect must be brought within 10 years of the date of substantial completion of construction, regardless of the date of discovery of the defect. (Code Civ. Proc., 337.15; Gundogdu v. King Mai, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 310, 314.) The faulty installation of fuel storage tanks is the type of defective construction affecting real property subject to the limitation. (See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009.)
However, the statute does not apply to causes of action based on willful misconduct or fraudulent concealment. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 337.15(f).) Willful misconduct is distinguished from negligence in that it is not marked by a mere absence of care. (Acosta v. Glenfed Development Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1294.) “[W]illfulness generally is marked by three characteristics:
(Id. at 1294-1295.)
Ordinarily a cause of action based on a construction defect must be brought within three years if based upon negligence (see Code Civ. Proc., § 338) or four years if based upon contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 337), unless the statute of limitations is tolled by the discovery rule. (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 646.) Discovery occurs, and the statutes begin to run, “‘only after the damage is sufficiently appreciable to give a reasonable man notice that he has a duty to pursue his remedies.’” (Id., citing North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 27.)
Plaintiff sufficiently pleads around the ten-year and three year statute of limitations pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 337.15 and 338 by alleging specific facts justifying their forbearance from filing suit and describing certain injuries to real property occurring on July 24, 2008, respectively. (See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 384; Gentry v. Ebay (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 824; Lee v. Escrow (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 915, 917.)
Dec 01, 2011
Ventura County, CA
P asserts subrogation rights as homeowners insurer on an alleged latent defect in the construction of a home. D submits a certified 8/19/03 grant deed, of which this Court takes judicial notice. D demurs under Civil Code § 943(a), asserting that such a plaintiff must avail itself of the prelitigations procedures of Civil Code § 910 et seq. Rather than impose a pleading requirement on these cases, the preferred remedy, as suggested in Standard Pacific Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 176 Cal.
Jul 06, 2010
Insurance
Intellectual Property
Ventura County, CA
So, if P complains of a "latent" defect, any claim on a latent defect first discovered in April 2007 would expire at the time of the 10-year staute of repose in September 2009, at the latest.
Jun 30, 2010
Ventura County, CA
CCP section 337.15 bars this claim. The Certificate of Final Completion was issued 4/28/98. ZCON never entered into any agreement to toll the statute of limitations. No reasonable probability that defect can be cured by amendment. =(302/CWW)
Feb 10, 2010
San Francisco County, CA
Garcia, Woody and Long); 4) negligence – latent defect and breach of warranty (all plaintiffs v. Garcia, Woody and Blankenship); and 6) negligent misrepresentation (Cornwall v. Woody only; Molina v. Garcia, Woody and Blankenship). The Garcia and Blankenship defendants, along with Woody and Long, filed a Cross- Complaint for breach of fiduciary duty and indemnification against Mark Cornwall.
Feb 09, 2010
Santa Barbara County, CA
Garcia, Woody and Long); 4) negligence – latent defect and breach of warranty (all plaintiffs v. Garcia, Woody and Blankenship); and 6) negligent misrepresentation (Cornwall v. Woody only; Molina v. Garcia, Woody and Blankenship). The Garcia and Blankenship defendants, along with Woody and Long, filed a Cross- Complaint for breach of fiduciary duty and indemnification against Mark Cornwall.
Feb 02, 2010
Santa Barbara County, CA
The Sherwood defendants' MSJ/SAI is based on statute of limitations arguments: the bar of the 10 year statute of limitations for latent defects (CCP §337.15); the 3 year statute of limitations for plainitffs' negligence and strict liability claims (CCP §338); and the 4 year statute of limitations for the breach of implied warranty claims (CCP §337). 1.
Nov 23, 2009
Ventura County, CA
[Complaint ¶ 79] This allegation appears in the “negligence – latent defect and breach of warranty” cause of action. This allegation is far too uncertain to survive demurrer. Because of this uncertainty, it is not clear whether an action based on any such defects is barred by the prior litigation. The court will sustain the demurrer of Garcia and Blankenship to the complaint of Mark and D’Arcy Cornwall.
Nov 17, 2009
Santa Barbara County, CA
[Complaint ¶ 79] This allegation appears in the “negligence – latent defect and breach of warranty” cause of action. This allegation is far too uncertain to survive demurrer. Because of this uncertainty, it is not clear whether an action based on any such defects is barred by the prior litigation. The court will sustain the demurrer of Garcia and Blankenship to the complaint of Mark and D’Arcy Cornwall.
Oct 06, 2009
Santa Barbara County, CA
The complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, CCP 337.15. The complaint was filed when plaintiff's corporate status was suspended and remained suspended when the limitations period expired. The statute of limitations is a substantive defense and the revival of plaintiff's corporate status is not entitled to retroactive application. Benton v. County of Napa (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1490. =(302/PJM/AY)
Jul 28, 2008
San Francisco County, CA
The complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, CCP 337.15. The complaint was filed when plaintiff's corporate status was suspended and remained suspended when the limitations period expired. The statute of limitations is a substantive defense and the revival of plaintiff's corporate status is not entitled to retroactive application. Benton v. County of Napa (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1490. =(302/PJM/AY)
Jul 28, 2008
San Francisco County, CA
The complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, CCP 337.15. The complaint was filed when plaintiff's corporate status was suspended and remained suspended when the limitations period expired. The statute of limitations is a substantive defense and the revival of plaintiff's corporate status is not entitled to retroactive application. Benton v. County of Napa (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1490. =(302/PJM/AY)
Jul 28, 2008
San Francisco County, CA
THE COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CCP 337.15. THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED WHEN PLAINTIFF'S CORPORATE STATUS WAS SUSPENDED AND REMAINED SUSPENDED WHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD EXPIRED. THIS IS SUBSTANTIAL DEFENSE AND THE REVIVAL OF THE CORPORATE STATUS IS NOT ENTITLED TO RETOACTIVE APPLICATION. BENTON V. COUNRTY OF NAPA (1991) 226 CAL. APP 3RD 1485, 1490. =(302/PJM/AY)
Jun 10, 2008
San Francisco County, CA
Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363 is a change in the law related to CCP section 337.15. To the extent the motion relates to CCP section 337.15, the Court may consider it if due diligence has been shown. Baldwin v. Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 199-1200. The affidavit filed by defendants fails to explain the delay in bringing this motion.
Mar 24, 2008
San Francisco County, CA
WAS IDENTICAL TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY THE OTHER DEFENDANTS - DID THE EVIDENCE REFLECT A PATENT OR LATENT DEFECT. =(302/PJM/VC)
Feb 08, 2008
San Francisco County, CA
However, plaintiff's theory of liability is that asbestos is not a latent defect, but one that was well known in the 1960's and is the reason that Bechtel breached the GISO standards when it designed and constructed the plant. The questions regarding the Cohen Declaration will be addressed at the hearing. =(302/PJM/AY)
Nov 14, 2007
San Francisco County, CA
TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT WHETHER JUMP LATENT DEFECT OR OBVIOUS DANGER. TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT WHETHER WORKER'S COMPENSATION APPLICABLE BECAUSE ACCIDENT OCCURRED AT POST SEASON PARTY. TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT RE APPLICABILITY OF LABOR CODE 3352(F). (PB)
Mar 14, 2002
San Francisco County, CA
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