The Garment Industry in California is regulated by the Labor Code statutes (CA Labor Code §§2671 - 2692) and the California Code of Regulations (CA CR §§ 13600 - 13659), as promulgated by the California state Department of Industrial Relations and overseen by the Labor Commissioner (the “Commissioner”), who is advised by a 15-member advisory committee appointed by the Commissioner (CA LC §2674.1 and CA CR §13632).
“Garment manufacturing” is defined as “sewing, cutting, making, processing, repairing, finishing, assembling, or otherwise preparing any garment or any article of wearing apparel or accessories designed or intended to be worn by any individual…[including without limitation] clothing, hats, gloves, handbags, hosiery, ties, scarfs, and belts, for sale or resale [by other persons under the statutes…]” (CA Labor Code §2671).
Garment industry laws and regulations apply to “person[s],” meaning any individual or entity “engaged in the business of garment manufacturing,” but does not include employees in the industry, or people engaged “engaged solely in cleaning, alteration, or tailoring” (CA Labor Code §2671).
Garment industry employers must keep available records for three (3) years detailing (i) workers’ names and addresses; (ii) hours and wages; (iii) production sheets; and (iv) any conditions of employment. (CA Labor Code §§2673 - 2673.1). Labor Code §13631 provides that the records must be kept for four (4) years “unless otherwise specified.”
Workers are guaranteed state minimum wage and overtime compensation, apportioned based on the work they complete. Workers may enforce the law with a complaint to the Commissioner, who will investigate and rule on the matter, subject to judicial review. (CA Labor Code §2673.1).
An employee's claim of hours worked and back wages due shall be presumed valid absent contradictory “specific [and] compelling” evidence from the employer, including “accurate and contemporaneous” records as required by the statute. Both parties can receive attorney’s fees and sanctions in the case of bad faith.
Every person engaged in the business of garment manufacturing must register with the Labor Commissioner as either a “Contractor” (includes subcontractors); or “Manufacturer,” under penalty of misdemeanor.
Employee leasing companies and temp agencies that provide garment industry employees must also register, and provide notice to the Labor Commissioner of all such employee contracts with relevant employment details (e.g., name / hours / term).
Registrants must update with Commissioner with material changes (e.g., new address).
All registrants must display in at least three (3) inch letters their Name; Address; and Garment manufacturing registration number, placed on the front of the business premise and main exterior entrance.
Registration can be extended up to 90 days while the Labor Commissioner reviews a renewal application. (CA LC §2675.2)
A commissioner may, at the commissioner’s discretion, impose penalties, revoke regulations and confiscate or dispose of goods.
The Division may confiscate and place into custody all garments manufactured by an unregistered person. The garments can be disposed of or destroyed, but not placed into the stream of commerce.
The Division will provide notice to the person by registered mail and telephone.
If a person’s garments are confiscated twice within a five-year period, the Division may also confiscate the means of production (including manufacturing equipment), except where the lack of registration was because of a delayed renewal application.
The Commissioner establishes a General Fund to employees damaged by a garment manufacturer or contractor’s failure to pay wages and benefits as required by the law.
Funds in the account are derived from:
The commissioner can investigate and mediate contract disputes in the garment industry (CA LC §2680.5).
Anyone against whom a penalty is assessed or whose goods are confiscated can appeal to the Commissioner in writing within 15 business days after the citation, and are entitled to an informal hearing within 30 days (10 days if confiscated goods are involved.)
The Commissioner will issue a finding / determination within 15 days after the hearing, and seek a judgment in state court. The Commissioner’s finding may be appealed by writ of mandate in CA Superior Court.
In order to prevent employers from closing their shops to avoid paying their employees' wages and then reopening as another business, a successor employer in the garment industry is liable for wages due by a predecessor employer if the successor:
CA LC §§2685 - 2692 govern proceedings for arbitration of pricing and quality disputes based on written contracts between garment manufacturers and contracts.
Upon request, the Department of Industrial Relations appoints an arbitration panel:
Within seven (7) days, the parties receive notice of the arbitration date/time and location.
The hearing must be no later than twenty-one (21) days after the request is filed, but afford the parties at least five (5) days notice before the hearing.
If no parties appear at an arbitration, arbitration rights are forfeited, with costs applied to the requesting party. If only one party appears, the hearing proceeds and is binding.
The Arbitration chairperson is empowered to issue subpoenas;
Each party may be represented by an attorney at the party’s expense;
Evidence rules are inapplicable, all relevant evidence shall be admitted.
Testimony must be taken under oath;
No formal records are kept, except by the parties’ request;
The panel may request additional evidence for up to three (3) days after the hearing;
The panel’s award is decided by majority vote, written and signed by panel members;
At most fifteen (15) days after the hearing, the panel issues a written award with a finding for all arbitration questions, and notify both parties and the Commissioner.
Parties shall bear all arbitration costs (including interpreters requested by the panel), but the panel may impose such costs (including attorneys fees) as party of its award.
Within ten (10) days, parties must file either: Notice of appeal with the applicable superior court; or File proof of compliance with the Commissioner.
California law prohibits employment of industrial homeworkers in the garment industry.
CA CR §13622 permits aged or disabled homeworkers to obtain special authorization for homework permits in the garment industry if the Division finds:
The industrial homeworker was working for an employer prior to Sept. 1, 1941, and is:
Garment industry workers completing at garments at home for another party (other than personal or family use) are presumed to be employees and not independent contractors (“Industrial homeworkers”).
Employers of industrial homeworkers must obtain an industrial homeworker license.
Industrial homeworkers must obtain an industrial homeworker permit, and keep accurate records of their hours and work, submitted regularly to their employer.
The Division has the right to inspect the place of business and records of registrants.
Where an employer violates the code or regulations, the Division can revoke licenses or permits, and confiscate garments or materials used in violation of the law.
“Intermediary transactions are very common in the downtown Los Angeles garment industry…”
“Proof of a contract through invoices alone is meager evidence that this transaction and this alleged relationship between the parties existed. Kim does not provide correspondence or even declaratory evidence of an oral agreement between the parties that might corroborate her version of events. As Emory Park points out, Kim provides no details about the clothing products, including who ordered them, how she manufactured them, where she purchased them, or where she sourced the materials...The absence of these pertinent facts indicates that Kim’s declaration are not set forth with sufficient particularity in violation of section 482.040.
“In reply, Kim argues that she acted as intermediary in some transactions with Jindi China and Emory Park, and in others she was a direct seller who purchased goods from Jindi China and sold them to Emory Park...Kim contends that this lawsuit is about direct sales...She attaches purchase orders to Jindi China and Jindi China’s Packing Lists to Emory Park to corroborate her version of events...Kim contends that she “dug up” these additional documents, which were previously misplaced...
“There are several defects with Kim’s reply. First, Kim has presented evidence in reply – purchase orders and packing lists – that were required with her moving papers. Emory Park has had no opportunity to oppose this evidence. New evidence/issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly presented to a trial court and may be disregarded. Regency Outdoor Advertising v. Carolina Lances, Inc., (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1333.
“Second, although Kim claims that she prepares the purchase orders, those contained in her Exhibit D state that Jindi China is the vendor and Emory park is the shippee. Nothing on the invoices which Kim claims she prepared identifies her as the seller.
“Third, and perhaps most important, Kim alleges that she acted as an “independent seller” in which Jindi China would manufacture and ship the goods to Emory Park FOB. Assuming this is true, Kim provides no evidence that she owned the goods shipped to Emory Park. In fact, the evidence from Jindi China is that when Kim was a direct importer of Jindi China’s products, she took the products and did not pay for them.... There is no reason to attach Emory Park’s assets to pay for goods which Kim never paid for herself. Jindi China and Emory Park have made separate arrangements to address the problems caused by Kim’s failures by assigning their claims to Jindi USA.
“Kim has not shown the probable validity of her claims. The application for right to attach order is denied.” Evelyn Kim vs. Emory Park Inc. Et Al, BC675614 (1/30/2018) (https://trellis.law/ruling/BC675614/evelyn-kim-vs-emory-park-inc-et-al/201801307ab861).
“Since plaintiff prevailed on his claims for unpaid wages, plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney fees. (See, California Labor Code, Section 1194.)
“The Court declines to exercise its discretion to deny the entire fee request. Under Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, a court that is “firmly persuaded that the plaintiff's attorney had no reasonable basis to anticipate a FEHA damages award [of $25,000 or more] ... may deny, in whole or in part” the fee request. (Id. at 987) The Court is not “firmly persuaded” that it should deny fees because plaintiffs recovered less than $25,000. At trial plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that he reasonably anticipated a damage award that would exceeded $25,000.
“The most widely accepted approach for determining a “reasonable” fee award is the “lodestar” method. The lodestar figure is calculated using the reasonable rate, multiplied by the reasonable number of hours spent on the case. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 C4th 1122, 1131-1132.)
“In the present case, the court finds that the reasonable hourly attorney rate for plaintiff’s counsel Kane Moon is $400 per hour, and the reasonable hourly attorney rate for plaintiff’s counsel Allen Feghali is $250 per hour. This hourly rate is within the range of attorneys as experienced as plaintiff’s counsel in the local legal community.
“The court finds that the reasonable number of hours spent by attorney Kane Moon on this case was 75 hours, and the reasonable number of hours spent by attorney Matthew Hale on this case was 90 hours. In making this determination the court found that plaintiff’s counsel inappropriately billed for some clerical tasks and that some of the billing was excessive, especially for attorneys as experienced as plaintiff’s counsel. While plaintiff has the right to have multiple attorneys, the court finds that some of the attorneys work were duplicative and unnecessary.
“An upward adjustment to the lodestar is not warranted in this action. This was a very straight forward and simple wage and hour case. This case did not present any novel or difficult issues. There is no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from taking other cases. Plaintiff had limited success in this action.
“A downward adjustment to the lodestar is not warranted in this action. Plaintiff took this case on a contingency. While plaintiff had limited success, the court is not inclined to do any further downward adjustment to the loadstar.
“Attorney fees need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action when the causes of action are so inextricably intertwined that it would be impractical or impossible to separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units. In the present case, plaintiffs’ various claims involve a common core of facts and are based on related legal theories, and as such, it would be impractical or impossible to separate the attorneys’ time.
“Based upon the foregoing, the court awards plaintiff’s attorney fees in the amount of $52,500.” Antelmo Herrera vs. Joseph Shamtoob, BC575656 (1/1/2017) (https://trellis.law/ruling/BC575656/antelmo-herrera-vs-joseph-shamtoob/2017030161d359).
“Section 218.7, enacted on October 14, 2017 and applicable to contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2018, states:
“[A] direct contractor making or taking a contract…for the construction, alteration, or repair of a building” shall assume, and is liable for, any debt owed to a wage claimant… incurred by a subcontractor at any tier acting under, by, or for the direct contractor for the wage claimant’s performance of labor included in the subject of the contract between the direct contractor and the owner.” §218.7(a)(1).
“The direct contractor’s liability extends only to unpaid wage, fringe or other benefit payment or contributions, including interest, but shall not extend to penalties or liquidated damages. §218.7(a)(2).
“Deacon contends that section 218.7 creates exactly the liability that the hearing officer thought exists under section 2810.3. Pet. Op. Br. at 11. If the hearing officer were correct, there would be no need for section 218.7, and the law does not presume that the Legislature performed an idle act. Shoemaker v. Myers, (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 22. Pet. Op. Br. at 12. Deacon contends that section 2810.3 should be construed in a manner that does not subsume section 217.8, and the way to do so is that section 2810.3 governs only relationships where workers are borrowed and section 218.7 extends liability to direct contractors for a subcontractor’s failure to pay its workers. Id.
“The Commissioner correctly points out that the hearing officer’s interpretation of section 2810.3 does not render section 218.7 an idle act so long as section 218.7 adds something substantive to the existing law. Opp. at 18. According to the Commissioner, section 218.7 does so in two ways. First, the two laws have different remedies. Section 2810.3 provides for "all civil legal responsibility and civil liability" for the payment of wages, including statutory liquidated damages, and civil and statutory penalties. Section 218.7’s remedy is limited to unpaid wages, other payment benefits, and interest, but not penalties or liquidated damages. Second, section 218.7 applies without regard to the number of employees of the direct contractor or subcontractor, whereas section 2810.3 expressly excludes any business entities with a workforce of fewer than 25 workers, and any business entities with five or fewer workers supplied by one or more labor contractors. §2810.3(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Opp. at 18.
“The Commissioner is correct that the two statutes have somewhat different remedies and section 218.7 has a broader application to contractors than section 2810. This negates any conclusion that the hearing officer’s interpretation of section 2810.3 would make enactment of section 218.7 an idle act.
“Yet, Deacon is surely correct that section 218.7’s legislative history shows its purpose was to address the very public policy issue raised by the hearing officer -- “that workers in the construction industry employed by subcontractors needed greater protection” and that the general contractor ultimately benefits from the work performed by the subcontractor’s employees and is in a stronger position to ensure their payment. AR 23.
A July 18, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee report for AB 1701 confirms this public policy choice:
“Under current law, if a subcontractor on a private construction project fails to pay all of the wages, fringe benefits, and contributions to which the workers are lawfully entitled, the primary recourse for the workers and the labor trust fund is to seek payment from the subcontractor who stiffed them. Alternatively, the workers may engage in the sometimes lengthy, costly, and not always successful process of trying to impose a mechanics lien on the project. Either way, the workers and the trust funds may find themselves going unpaid for some time or even not getting paid at all. This bill, by contrast, would make the direct contractor liable for any unpaid wages, fringe benefits, or contributions. In this way, the direct contractor becomes the backstop that ensures workers and trust funds are not left holding the bag.” Pet. RJN Ex. A, pp. 14-15 (emphasis added).
“Imposing liability on a general contractor for the failure of a subcontractor to pay wages or benefits would be new in the context of California private sector construction projects. Yet the concept has plenty of precedent.” Pet. RJN Ex. A, p. 21 (emphasis added).
“This legislative history clearly shows both that the Legislature did not believe that construction industry general contractors were liable for the wages of their subcontractors under existing law. AB 1701’s legislative history repeatedly refers to section 2810.3, yet does not state that section 2810.3 imposed liability on general contractors in the construction industry for their subcontractor’s workers’ wages: “[Existing law provides that a client employer shares with a labor contractor all civil legal responsibility and civil liability for all workers supplied by that labor contractor for the payment of wages….” Pet. RJN Ex. A, pp. 9, 15, 27 (second emphasis added). AB 1701’s legislative history shows a legislative intent to rectify this problem by imposing liability on the general contractor for such wages without regard to whether the workers were supplied by the labor contractor.
“The Commissioner discounts AB 1701’s description of contractor liability as “new”, arguing that it should carry little weight for the court’s interpretation of section 2810.3. Opp. at 18. The court disagrees. While a single inapt description might have little weight, AB 1701’s legislative history as a whole demonstrates that the Legislature believed that existing law did not cover a construction general contractor unless the contractor obtained workers in the underground industry of temp workers.
“In sum, while the hearing officer’s interpretation would not render section 218.7 an idle act, the passage of section 218.7 is compelling evidence that the Legislature did not believe that section 2810.3 already provided that a construction contractor would be liable for its subcontractor’s workers’ wages unless the subcontractor provided workers to the contractor. This legislative belief supports the plain meaning interpretation of section 2810.3, as supported by its own legislative history, that section 2810.3 imposes liability on entities that “borrow” workers, not those that subcontract only for a scope of work.” Deacon Corp. vs. Labor Commissioner State of California, BS170083 (2/27/2018) (https://trellis.law/ruling/BS170083/deacon-corp-vs-labor-commissioner-state-of-california-et-al/20180227b48a53).
“Defendants make three arguments on Demurrer: (1) that Guardado has not pleaded the names or facts of Labor Code violations as to other aggrieved employees sufficient to sustain a PAGA claim on their behalf (Demurrer at pp. 3–4); (2) that Guardado has not adequately pleaded that U.S. Garments Inc. and U.S. Garments, LLC are alter-egos (Demurrer at pp. 4–5); and (3) that Guardado has not pleaded facts with sufficient specificity to state any underlying violation of the Labor Code to support her PAGA claim. (Demurrer at pp. 6–9.)
“Defendants fail to provide any authority supporting their first argument that PAGA plaintiffs must name each member of their purported class of aggrieved employees. The court accordingly finds this argument without merit.
“The court also may not sustain a demurrer on the basis that Guardado has failed to allege an alter-ego relationship among the Defendants, as alter-ego is but one theory that Guardado advances for holding both Defendants liable for the same violations. The primary theory appears to be joint-employer liability based on allegations that both Defendants controlled Guardado’s working life. (Complaint ¶ 14; see Service Employees Internat. Union v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 761, 772–73 [explaining joint-employer doctrine].) Defendants levy no challenge against this theory in their Demurrer, and since “[a] demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained,” this court lacks authority to sustain the demurrer as to the alter-ego theory if the underlying claims would continue on an alternative basis. (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)
“Defendants’ final argument, that Guardado “fails to allege any specific facts sufficient enough to give notice to Defendants as to exactly how much she, or any other ‘non-party Aggrieved Employee’, alleges not to have been paid” as a result of the violations, is likewise without merit. (Demurrer at p. 7.) The argument rests essentially on two cases with virtually identical holdings: that a plaintiff alleging a simple claim to wages unpaid upon termination under the Labor Code must allege the amount of wages due. (Oppenheimer v. Robinson (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 420, 423, cited in Oppenheimer v. Moebius (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 818, 819–20.) Both cases involved plaintiffs who sought a definite amount of damages or penalties for wages unpaid upon termination, but failed to allege facts providing any basis for the amount claimed, other than the amount itself.
“Those cases are distinguishable. Guardado here does not allege entitlement to a definite sum on an inscrutable basis, but instead alleges a series of unlawful practices on the part of Defendants which violate the Labor Code and deprived Guardado and other employees of their wages: rounding down their hours worked (Complaint ¶ 56), forcing employees to work through meal and rest breaks by daily productivity quotas (Complaint ¶ 57), and not paying employees for the time they worked before and after their scheduled shifts. (Complaint ¶ 58.) Defendants do not cite any authority for the proposition that PAGA allegations of this type must be pleaded with any greater specificity than Guardado has done here.
Accordingly, the Demurrer is OVERRULED in its entirety.” BC679008 - ROSA GUARDADO VS US GARMENT INC ET AL (4/9/2018) (https://trellis.law/ruling/BC679008/rosa-guardado-vs-us-garment-inc-et-al/20180409e0bcdf).
“The relevant issue is whether the amount owed to Abbott is fixed and readily ascertainable. The fact that some purchase orders were cancelled or modified and that Abbott’s entitlement to commission fluctuated affects this issue. But Abbott’s commission information spreadsheet shows that he accounted for these variables. Abbott Decl. ¶23, Ex. 7. Abbott’s spreadsheet lists the vendor, the garments sold, the quantity sold, the selling price, the order date, the invoice number, the status of the order (cancelled or not cancelled), the commission rate for the sale, and the commission owed. Ibid. Abbott’s collection of this information in the ordinary course of his business serves as validation of these figures. Ibid. Abbott has shown that the amount that he seeks to attach is fixed and readily ascertainable.[4]
b. Probable Validity
The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages to plaintiff. Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.
The question for probability of success is whether Defendants’ calculations or Abbott’s are more reliable. It is remarkable that Baldwin Sun claims that it owed Abbott only $74,8326.19 in total commissions from August 2017 through May 2018, whereas Abbott claims that he was owed $111,881.09 in unpaid commissions in that same time frame. Abbott Decl. ¶¶ 18, 21. Reviewing the spreadsheets and underlying evidence, the court finds Abbott’s evidence more persuasive. Abbott presents a more comprehensive compilation of information as well as the purchase orders upon which this compilation is based. Abbott Decl. ¶24, Exs. 7-8. By contrast, Baldwin Sun presents no supporting documentation for its spreadsheet and appears to predicate its calculations on cancelled/changed orders which it fails to delineate. See K. Trinh Decl., Exs. D, E.
Defendants argue that Abbott has not shown the probable validity of his claim because he breached the Agreement. Opp. at 14-15. Abbott (1) misrepresented customer future needs in presenting orders to Baldwin Sun, including a particular customer in 2015 (K. Trinh Decl. ¶6), (2) failed to follow up when a customer expressed interest (K. Trinh Decl. ¶5), and (3) may have taken Baldwin Sun samples and used them for other manufacturers (K Trinh Decl. ¶7). Ibid.
A defendant may raise a claim of offset for any indebtedness of the plaintiff to the defendant raised in a cross-complaint or affirmative defense in an answer. CCP §483.015(b)(2), (3). The defendant’s offset claim under CCP section 483.015(b)(2) or (3) must be supported by sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case of attachment in its own right. Lydig Construction, Inc. v. Martinez Steel, (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 937; Pos-A-Traction, Inc. v. Kelly Springfield, (C.D. Cal. 1999) 112 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1183.
None of Defendants’ assertions present a prima facie case of offset. Baldwin Sun presents no evidence that Abbott intentionally (or even negligently) mispresented to Baldwin Sun any customer’s interest in purchasing additional products. Baldwin Sun manufactured additional product without a purchase order at its own risk. Baldwin Sun does not negate the prospect that particular customers may have expressed interest to Abbott that they would be purchasing more products and then later lost interest. Baldwin Sun also has failed to show that Abbott failed to follow up any customer’s interest, and has no evidence that Abbott actually used its samples with other manufacturers. Abbott refutes the existence of these alleged breaches. Abbott Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 5-9. Even if such breaches of the Agreement did exist, they would furnish grounds for termination of the Agreement, not to avoid paying Abbott his duly-earned commission altogether.
Abbott has established the probable validity of his breach of contract claim as against Baldwin Sun. Abbott has shown that (1) the Agreement exists between the Abbott and Baldwin Sun (Abbott Decl. ¶4, Ex. 1), (2) Abbott performed his obligations under the Agreement by providing Baldwin Sun with independent wholesale apparel sales representative services (Abbott Decl. Exs. 7-8), (3) Baldwin Sun breached the Agreement by failing to provide Abbott with accurate commission statements and all commission owed (Abbott Decl. ¶¶ 17-18, 21), and (4) Abbott has suffered damages in an amount equal to the amount owed.
Abbott has shown a probability of success and right to attach against Baldwin Sun in the amount of $116,270.51.” Kenneth Abbott vs. Baldwin Sun Inc. Et Al, BC716333 (2/28/2019) (https://trellis.law/ruling/BC716333/kenneth-abbott-vs-baldwin-sun-inc-et-al/20190228658a9b).
“Defendant here submits very weak evidence to show that it has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. There is a declaration from Ke Chiang Liao, KL Global’s principal, who explains the various interactions with plaintiff’s principal, Sandy, and states, “It is my opinion that Sandy and Deshnok Ovreseas has and continues to conspire to damage KL Global’s reputation in the apparel industry so that she can claim my brand and my clients as her own.”... There is no real explanation that the company has an expectation of privacy in its banking records, and that the information included in those records could implicate trade secrets.
“Defendant primarily relies on outdated statutory sections and case law, and assumes the initial burden is on plaintiff.
“Nevertheless, the court may find that even a corporate defendant, with somewhat limited privacy rights, would reasonably have an expectation of privacy with respect to its banking records, and that unfettered access to this information from a banking institution on the part of a customer in a competitive business, in which the customer is evidently attempting to damage defendant’s business reputation, could give rise to an intrusion that is serious.
“Plaintiff should then in opposition explain what legitimate and important countervailing interests would be served by the disclosure of the bank records directly from the bank. Plaintiff argues that the records are essential to determine whether defendant represented itself as a company that was viable and had sufficient money to pay for half a million dollars’ worth of products and also whether defendant fraudulently transferred assets to third parties instead of paying the money to plaintiff. Plaintiff also argues that the documents sought are only from the time period when the parties began to do business in 2017 and to put the transaction in context, and that with respect to third party privacy, plaintiff is entitled to the identity of witnesses.
“With respect to the identification of feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy, defendant argues in the reply essentially that the discovery is overly broad and premature, as the time period is for many months before the parties entered into a relationship, there is no fraudulent transfer claim in the current pleadings, and plaintiff has not, even in recent discovery, sought any bank records directly from defendant, which would appear to be the most logical and least intrusive means for obtaining information concerning the viability of the company.
“In weighing this showing, it is not clear that plaintiff has established a compelling interest in this information sufficient to overcome the privacy interest at this juncture in the litigation, particularly where the records have not yet been sought through written discovery requests directly on the corporation. If it should turn out that certain records seem to be missing or are incomplete, a subpoena to the banking institution which seeks more specific records would appear to be a better outcome in connection with the interests of the parties as well as those of the third party banking institution. The motion is granted without prejudice to plaintiff seeking to subpoena information if and when plaintiff can establish that the information cannot be obtained through less intrusive means.” “No Case Name Available”, EC688874 (1/11/2019) (https://trellis.law/ruling/EC688874/no-case-name-available/20190111b9e53d).
Labor Code §226.7 and IWC Wage Orders; (5) Failure to Pay Wages Upon End of Employment in Violation of Labor Code §§201 and 202 (6) Failure to Pay All Wages Earned on Regular Pay Period in Violation of Labor Code §204; (7) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Statement in Violation of Labor Code §226; (8) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage in Violation of Cal. Labor Code §§1194, 1197; (9) Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq; (10) Statutory Penalties for Violation of the Cal. Labor Code Pursuant to Cal.
ADRIANA CALLEROS VS. U.S. GARMENT, LLC
VC066225
Aug 10, 2017
Los Angeles County, CA
Deputy Sima falsely stated that he observed Bonded was not displaying a garment registration as required by Labor Code section 2676.5. Sima interviewed Moses Babazadeh (“Babazadeh”), Bonded’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), and asked Babazadeh to provide him with a copy of the garment registration. Bonded was previously cited for a violation of Labor Code section 2676.5 which occurred on September 8, 2016 and Bonded obtained a registration certificate in October 2016.
BONDED APPAREL, INC. VS THE LABOR COMMISION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
20STCP00501
Mar 18, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Administrative
Writ
LABOR CODE §§ 1194, 1194.2, 1197, AND WAGE ORDER (FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGE); 7. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 510, 1194, AND 1198 (UNPAID OVERTIME); 8. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 226.7 AND 512(A) (UNPAID MEAL PERIOD PREMIUMS); 9. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 201, 202, AND 203 (FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES AT TIME OF TERMINATION); 10. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE § 204 (FAILURE TO PAY WAGES); 11. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE § 226 (NONCOMPLIANT WAGE STATEMENTS); 12. VIOLATION OF CAL.
LARRY DIXON, JR. VS RICKY MAMARADLO, ET AL.
19STCV45606
Jun 30, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
Moreover, Labor Code sections 248.1, 248.2, and 248.6 each provide that violations of the Covid-19 paid supplemental leave provisions are to be enforced by the Labor Commissioner. (Labor Code, §§248.1, subd. (d)(1), 248.2, subd. (d), 248.6, subd. (d).) Accordingly, neither Aguirre nor any putative class member has a private right of action to enforce the alleged Labor code violations set forth in the Eighth and Eleventh Causes of Action.
2023CUOE015868 AGUIRRE VS THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY
2023CUOE015868
Apr 18, 2024
Ventura County, CA
LABOR CODE §§ 1194, 1194.2, 1197, AND WAGE ORDER (FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGE); 7. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 510, 1194, AND 1198 (UNPAID OVERTIME); 8. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 226.7 AND 512(A) (UNPAID MEAL PERIOD PREMIUMS); 9. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 201, 202, AND 203 (FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES AT TIME OF TERMINATION); 10. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE § 204 (FAILURE TO PAY WAGES); 11. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE § 226 (NONCOMPLIANT WAGE STATEMENTS); 12. VIOLATION OF CAL.
LARRY DIXON, JR. VS RICKY MAMARADLO, ET AL.
19STCV45606
Jan 07, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
This is an action relating to violations of the Labor Code. On August 11, 2022, during a bench trial, the Court granted the motions for judgment per Code Civ. Proc. § 631.8 of Defendants Reptile Factory, LLC and Geovanni Solis. On August 24, 2022, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. On August 31, 2022, Defendants filed a memorandum of costs in the amount of $12,190.09.
MAUREEN LEWIS, ET AL. VS REPTILE FACTORY, LLC
19STCV34940
Feb 16, 2023
Los Angeles County, CA
Plaintiff’s 6th cause of action for Failure to Provide Paid Sick Days fails to the extent plaintiff seeks PAGA penalties based on violations of Labor Code §§245.5, 246, 246.5, 247, 247.5, 248.5 and 249, the only statutes plaintiff cites in this claim. None of them are listed in Labor Code §2699.5 as statutes on which a PAGA claim may be based.
OMRAN HAMID VS. NIKE RETAIL SERVICES, INC.
30-2017-00904483-CU-OE-CXC
May 10, 2019
Orange County, CA
LABOR CODE §§ 1194, 1194.2, 1197, AND WAGE ORDER (FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGE); 7. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 510, 1194, AND 1198 (UNPAID OVERTIME); 8. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 226.7 AND 512(A) (UNPAID MEAL PERIOD PREMIUMS); 9. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 201, 202, AND 203 (FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES AT TIME OF TERMINATION); 10. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE § 204 (FAILURE TO PAY WAGES); 11. VIOLATION OF CAL. LABOR CODE § 226 (NONCOMPLIANT WAGE STATEMENTS); 12. VIOLATION OF CAL.
LARRY DIXON, JR. VS RICKY MAMARADLO, ET AL.
19STCV45606
Jan 10, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
The Court rules on the joint motion for approval of PAGA settlement as follows: The parties bring this unopposed motion pursuant to Labor Code section 2699 subd. (l) subject to a fairness standard outlined in cases such as (Gutilla v. Aerotek, Inc. (E.D. Cal. 2017) 2017 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 41655, *7, Echavez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (C.D. Cal. 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141134, *7, Vargas v. Cent. Freight Lines, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157976, *7, and Flores v.
ABDELAZIZ VS THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY RESTAURANTS INC [E-FILE]
37-2016-00039775-CU-OE-CTL
Oct 04, 2018
San Diego County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
The Cheesecake Factory Restaurants, Inc. Motion for Court Approval of PAGA Settlement Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for court approval of PAGA settlement is granted as prayed. The court has carefully reviewed the moving papers along with the entirety of the court file and determines that the settlement is genuine, meaningful, and consistent with the underlying purposes of the PAGA-related statute. Labor Code § 2699(l); O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D.
S-CV-0041667
Mar 01, 2022
Placer County, CA
Defendants make three arguments on Demurrer: (1) that Guardado has not pleaded the names or facts of Labor Code violations as to other aggrieved employees sufficient to sustain a PAGA claim on their behalf (Demurrer at pp. 3–4); (2) that Guardado has not adequately pleaded that U.S. Garments Inc. and U.S. Garments, LLC are alter-egos (Demurrer at pp. 4–5); and (3) that Guardado has not pleaded facts with sufficient specificity to state any underlying violation of the Labor Code to support her PAGA claim.
ROSA GUARDADO VS US GARMENT INC ET AL
BC679008
Apr 09, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
This action arises out of the death of Jose Zaldivar while performing improvements at a frozen desserts factory owned by non-party Sweety Novelty, Inc. (Sweety). The factory sits on property that the Lees own and lease to non-party Sweety. Plaintiffs filed their operative First Amended Complaint in December 2021. They allege causes of action for (1) negligence (under Labor Code section 3706), (2) negligence premises liability, and (3) wrongful death.
ELVA ZALDIVAR, ET AL. VS STEVE LEE, ET AL.
19STCV20803
May 17, 2022
day s
Los Angeles County, CA
(“Cheesecake Factory,” erroneously sued as The Cheesecake Factory Restaurants, Inc.) discriminated against, wrongfully terminated, and committed violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and the Labor Code against Plaintiff Luz Garcia (“Garcia”) after she suffered a disability.
LUZ GARCIA VS THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY RESTAURANTS INC
BC673253
Mar 04, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
This is an action relating to violations of the Labor Code. Defendant Reptile Factory, LLC moves for summary judgment on the ground that it was never the employer of Plaintiff Maureen Lewis. Alternatively, Defendant seeks to limit its damages to after July 16, 2019, when it was formed as an entity. Defendant also seeks summary adjudication on these issues, as well as the issue of standing for the seventh and eighth causes of action given that, again, Defendant was not Plaintiffs employer.
MAUREEN LEWIS, ET AL. VS REPTILE FACTORY, LLC
19STCV34940
Jun 21, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
“The [Labor Code 1102.5] non-FEHA cause of action asserted by Plaintiff does not involve a statute that expressly excepts an award of costs from the mandatory provisions of section 1032, subdivision (b), as does Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b).” (Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1059.)
SHENETTA D TONEY VS. LODI UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
STK-CV-UOE-2015-0005208
Feb 20, 2020
San Joaquin County, CA
Defendants question whether Plaintiff timely served "notice to the LWDA under Labor Code 2699.3(a)(1)(A)" to preserve their ability to prosecute their PAGA claim. See ROA # 82 at page 4. However, Defendants chose to file Answers - ROA # 23, 24 - to the Complaint rather than challenge the timeliness of Plaintiff's PAGA claim through a Demurrer or, as of yet, a summary judgment Motion.
SALDANA VS MARISCOS AND STREET TACOS INC
37-2022-00025334-CU-OE-CTL
Jun 09, 2023
San Diego County, CA
Caitac Garment Processing, Inc.
EMMANUEL VAZQUEZ VS CAITAC GARMENT PROCESSING INC ET AL
BC625120
May 09, 2017
Los Angeles County, CA
This is an action relating to violations of the Labor Code. On August 11, 2022, during a bench trial, the Court granted the motions for judgment per Code Civ. Proc. § 631.8 of Defendants Reptile Factory, LLC and Geovanni Solis. On August 24, 2022, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff Maureen Lewis now seeks to vacate the Courts judgment pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 663.
MAUREEN LEWIS, ET AL. VS REPTILE FACTORY, LLC
19STCV34940
Oct 04, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
This Tentative Ruling is made by Judge Stephen Pulido The motion of Plaintiffs Jesse Cruz and Tiare Ramirez, as aggrieved employees pursuant to the Private Attorney General Act, on behalf of the State of California and other aggrieved employees, for approval of the settlement of their claim for PAGA civil penalties with Defendants Burlington Coat Factory of Texas, Inc., Burlington Merchandising Corporation, and Burlington Stores, Inc., pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(l)(2), is GRANTED.
CRUZ VS BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY OF TEXAS INC
RG19031527
Apr 22, 2021
Alameda County, CA
Plaintiff’s operative Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512 (meal and rest breaks), (2) violation of Labor Code §§ 510-515, 1194 and 1198 (unpaid overtime), (3) violation of Labor Code § 2802 (reimbursements), (4) violation of Labor Code §§ 1182.12-1194 (minimum wage), (5) violation of Labor Code § 226(a) (inaccurate wage statements), (6) retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 6310 (by Plaintiff Lee only), (7) retaliation in violation of Labor Code §§ 98.6
JUWON LEE VS POL CLOTHING, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 250,
20STCV04380
Jul 10, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION – LABOR CODE 201-203 Kaiser’s demurrer to the third case of action under Labor Code 201-203 is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The court has held that “paid sick time” under Labor Code 246(l) is not a form of “wages” as defined in Labor Code 200. As a result, the alleged miscalculation and late payment of paid sick leave is not the late payment of wages and a violation of Labor Code 201-203.
LIU VS KAISER PERMANENTE INTERNATIONAL
RG21093802
Nov 17, 2021
Alameda County, CA
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION – LABOR CODE 201-203 Kaiser’s demurrer to the third case of action under Labor Code 201-203 is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The court has held that “paid sick time” under Labor Code 246(l) is not a form of “wages” as defined in Labor Code 200. As a result, the alleged miscalculation and late payment of paid sick leave is not the late payment of wages and a violation of Labor Code 201-203.
LIU VS KAISER PERMANENTE INTERNATIONAL
RG21093802
Nov 05, 2021
Alameda County, CA
Factual Background This is an action for employment discrimination and labor code violations. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges as follows. Plaintiff Rudy Mendez Hernandez (“Plaintiff”) was an employee of Defendant Wheel Pros, LLC (“Wheel”) from 2002 to 2017. (FAC ¶ 6.) Plaintiff began to suffer from chronic back pain caused by repeated lifting of heavy aluminum billets for work. (FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiff compensated for this injury by from time to time laying on the factory floor. (FAC ¶ 7.)
JORDY GAEL GARCIA ET AL VS ASCENCION CATHOLIC SCHOOL ET AL
BC698691
Jun 20, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
Factual Background This is an action for employment discrimination and labor code violations. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges as follows. Plaintiff Rudy Mendez Hernandez (“Plaintiff”) was an employee of Defendant Wheel Pros, LLC (“Wheel”) from 2002 to 2017. (FAC ¶ 6.) Plaintiff began to suffer from chronic back pain caused by repeated lifting of heavy aluminum billets for work. (FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiff compensated for this injury by from time to time laying on the factory floor. (FAC ¶ 7.)
RUDY MENDEZ HERNANDEZ VS WHEEL PROS LLC ET AL
BC698681
Jun 20, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
She alleges a single cause of action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 et seq. ("PAGA") for alleged seating violations while she worked at Tesla's facility. Specifically, she alleges that Tesla did not allow her to sit for long periods when she was not actively engaged in assigned work in violation of applicable California wage orders. ANALYSIS OF MOTION TO COMPEL 1. SROG No. 18 and RFPD No. 19 re: Busing of CitiStaff Employees to Tesla's Facility.
JAMES VS CITISTAFF SOLUTIONS, INC.
RG20061660
Aug 23, 2021
Alameda County, CA
(See, California Labor Code, Section 1194.) The Court declines to exercise its discretion to deny the entire fee request. Under Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, a court that is “firmly persuaded that the plaintiff's attorney had no reasonable basis to anticipate a FEHA damages award [of $25,000 or more] ... may deny, in whole or in part” the fee request. (Id. at 987) The Court is not “firmly persuaded” that it should deny fees because plaintiffs recovered less than $25,000.
ANTELMO HERRERA VS JOSEPH SHAMTOOB
BC575656
Mar 01, 2017
Los Angeles County, CA
Defendants question whether Plaintiff timely served "notice to the LWDA under Labor Code 2699.3(a)(1)(A)" to preserve their ability to prosecute their PAGA claim. See ROA # 82 at page 4. However, Defendants chose to file Answers - ROA # 23, 24 - to the Complaint rather than challenge the timeliness of Plaintiff's PAGA claim through a Demurrer or, as of yet, a summary judgment Motion.
SALDANA VS MARISCOS AND STREET TACOS INC
37-2022-00025334-CU-OE-CTL
Apr 27, 2023
San Diego County, CA
Defendants question whether Plaintiff timely served "notice to the LWDA under Labor Code 2699.3(a)(1)(A)" to preserve their ability to prosecute their PAGA claim. See ROA # 82 at page 4. However, Defendants chose to file Answers - ROA # 23, 24 - to the Complaint rather than challenge the timeliness of Plaintiff's PAGA claim through a Demurrer or, as of yet, a summary judgment Motion.
SALDANA VS MARISCOS AND STREET TACOS INC
37-2022-00025334-CU-OE-CTL
May 19, 2023
San Diego County, CA
December 13, 2022 On August 26, 2020, Plaintiff Fabiola Yani (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Burlington Coat Factory Direct Corporation and Laura Charles (collectively, Defendants), alleging (1) discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); (2) harassment in violation of FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (4) unlawful retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5; (5) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (6) failure to provide
FABIOLA YANI VS BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY DIRECT CORPORATION, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, ET AL.
20STCV32519
Dec 13, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
The Master Agreement also confirms all Labor Code violation remedies other than PAGA are available through the grievance procedure, as earlier quoted: This Agreement expressly waives the requirements of PAGA and authorizes the permanent arbitrator to award any and all remedies otherwise available under the California Labor Code, except the award of penalties under PAGA that would be payable to the
FCS057517
Oct 13, 2022
Solano County, CA
The Master Agreement also confirms all Labor Code violation remedies other than PAGA are available through the grievance procedure, as earlier quoted: This Agreement expressly waives the requirements of PAGA and authorizes the permanent arbitrator to award any and all remedies otherwise available under the California Labor Code, except the award of penalties under PAGA that would be payable to the
FCS057517
Oct 14, 2022
Solano County, CA
The Master Agreement also confirms all Labor Code violation remedies other than PAGA are available through the grievance procedure, as earlier quoted: This Agreement expressly waives the requirements of PAGA and authorizes the permanent arbitrator to award any and all remedies otherwise available under the California Labor Code, except the award of penalties under PAGA that would be payable to the
FCS057517
Oct 15, 2022
Solano County, CA
The Master Agreement also confirms all Labor Code violation remedies other than PAGA are available through the grievance procedure, as earlier quoted: This Agreement expressly waives the requirements of PAGA and authorizes the permanent arbitrator to award any and all remedies otherwise available under the California Labor Code, except the award of penalties under PAGA that would be payable to the
FCS057517
Oct 17, 2022
Solano County, CA
The Master Agreement also confirms all Labor Code violation remedies other than PAGA are available through the grievance procedure, as earlier quoted: This Agreement expressly waives the requirements of PAGA and authorizes the permanent arbitrator to award any and all remedies otherwise available under the California Labor Code, except the award of penalties under PAGA that would be payable to the
FCS057517
Oct 16, 2022
Solano County, CA
The Master Agreement also confirms all Labor Code violation remedies other than PAGA are available through the grievance procedure, as earlier quoted: This Agreement expressly waives the requirements of PAGA and authorizes the permanent arbitrator to award any and all remedies otherwise available under the California Labor Code, except the award of penalties under PAGA that would be payable to the
FCS057517
Oct 18, 2022
Solano County, CA
The complaint alleged seven causes of action for harassment in violation of FEHA (race, color, national origin, religious belief, sex and/or gender, sexual orientation); harassment in violation of FEHA (pregnancy); failure to prevent harassment in violation of FEHA; retaliation in violation of FEHA; retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 6310; defamation and failure to provide rest breaks (Labor Code § 226.7).
RODELA ET AL. V. HATAYAMA ET AL.
15CECG01551
Jul 18, 2016
Fresno County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 542-43 ["On its face, the complaint alleges Marshalls committed Labor Code violations, pursuant to systematic companywide policies, against Williams and others among its nonexempt employees in California, and seeks penalties and declaratory relief on behalf of Williams and any other injured California employees."]; id. at 551 ["California law has long made clear that to require a party to supply proof of any claims or defenses as a condition of discovery in support of those
JAMES VS CITISTAFF SOLUTIONS, INC.
RG20061660
Jan 07, 2021
Alameda County, CA
(CACI 4605; See Labor Code §6310(a), (c).) Plaintiff’s health and safety complaint retaliation cause of action is based on the same underlying allegations as her violation of Labor Code §1120.5 cause of action.
SUE ALMONTE VS CURRENT AIR CLOTHING, INC.
20STCV46492
Aug 20, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
In this employment action, Plaintiff Lizbeth Parra (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint on November 20, 2023, alleging causes of action for FEHA violations and violations of the Labor Code against her former employers, Defendants the Cheesecake Factory Inc., and the Cheesecake Factory Restaurant, Inc. (collectively, Defendants). On January 22, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties arbitration agreement. Plaintiff opposed the motion.
LIZBETH PARRA VS THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY INCORPORATED, ET AL.
23STCV28419
Mar 28, 2024
Los Angeles County, CA
The non-FEHA cause of action – the Labor Code claim –does not involve a statute that expressly excepts an award of costs from the mandatory provisions of section 1032(b) like Government Code section 12965(b).
HARVEY VS. ANAHEIM HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT
30-2017-00961061
Jul 30, 2020
Orange County, CA
Costs for Labor Code Cause of Action Defendant also argues that it is entitled to its costs as a matter of right for the sixth cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5, which is not subject to the exception under FEHA. (Opposition at p. 4.) Defendant contends that the whistleblower retaliation argument is the most significant amount of [Plaintiffs] claims because Plaintiff spent approximately 35% of his opposition to the summary judgment motion arguing about this cause of action.
LUCAS TAPIA VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
20STCV48642
Dec 01, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
This finding was based on the invocation of Labor Code § 223 in ¶ 114 of the Fourth Cause of Action. Upon reviewing the claim again, the Court is concerned that inclusion of ¶ 114 in the Fourth Cause of Action may be an editing mistake. The Fourth Cause of Action claims overtime violations. Labor Code § 223 has nothing to do with overtime but, instead, addresses payment of wages below a designated rate—the subject of the Third Cause of Action. Overtime claims are not exempt under § 229.
WYATT VS ORANGE COUNTY COURIER & LOGISTICS LLLP
30-2017-00937665-CU-OE-CXC
Mar 29, 2019
Orange County, CA
Second Cause of Action (Failure To Pay Meal Breaks In Violation of Labor Code § 512); Third Cause of Action (Labor Code §§ 512, 226.7); Fourth Cause of Action (Failure To Pay Overtime In Violation of Labor Code § 510 and 12 CCR 1150); Fifth Cause of Action (Failure To Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statement Upon Payment of Wages In Violation of Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3); Sixth Cause of Action (Waiting Time Penalties Pursuant To Labor Code § 203).
HYANG AR JEON VS ROSETTE APPAREL INC ET AL
BC690678
Aug 13, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Therefore, any discriminatory act in violation of Labor Code § 132a took place on or before September 13, 2018, the date Plaintiff was terminated. The court again finds that Plaintiffs claims for discrimination (under Civil Code § 51), retaliation (under Labor Code § 132a), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress are barred by the above statutes of limitations.
NIEVES ARAUJO VS COMPLETE CLOTHING CO.
21STCV35034
May 25, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
Everyday clothing, such as long-sleeve shirts, long pants, street shoes, and normal work boots.” Labor Code 2802 is distinct from 29 CFR § 1910.132, but the federal regulation is consistent with the analysis in the IWC’s “white uniforms” and “tropical shirt” letters.
MENDOZA VS MARKET
RG21100503
Nov 12, 2021
Alameda County, CA
The TAC asserts: (1) – (5) violation of FEHA; and (6) violation of Labor Code §98.6 and 1102.5. On 6/11/21, the court granted County’s MSJ, of which Plaintiff is appealing. On 10/13/21, County filed a memorandum of costs for deposition costs and service of process costs totaling $15,880.14. Plaintiff moves to tax the costs. She contends that the memorandum of costs is untimely.
SGARLATO VS COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE
RIC1809268
Dec 08, 2021
Riverside County, CA
Issue 2: Does the Christiansburg standard apply to Labor Code section 1102.5 claims with respect to awarding costs? Here, the parties agree that the Christiansburg standard does not apply to Evanss Labor Code section 1102.5 whistleblower claim.
TYLER EVANS VS AIDS HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
19STCV23201
Apr 17, 2024
Los Angeles County, CA
These allegations identified "the specific provisions" of the Labor Code alleged to have been violated, as required by section 2699.3, subdivision (a)(1)(A). But with one exception, the 2009 Notice was a string of legal conclusions that parroted the allegedly violated Labor Code provisions. It did not state facts and theories supporting the alleged violations not implied by reference to the Labor Code.
GASTELUM-RIVERA VS ACE RELOCATION SYSTEMS INC [EFILE]
37-2020-00017709-CU-OE-CTL
Nov 05, 2020
San Diego County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
Labor Code § 203(a) provides for waiting time penalties if the employer “willfully fails to pay” the wages of an employee who is discharged. “A willful failure to pay wages within the meaning of Labor Code Section 203 occurs when an employer intentionally fails to pay wages to an employee when those wages are due.” (8 C.C.R. § 13520.)
AMY STAUNTON, ET AL. VS PAIGE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
20STCV47476
Aug 12, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
Code § 226.7, (11) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements in Violation of Labor Code § 226, (12) Waiting Time Penalties in Violation of Labor Code § 203, and (13) Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq.
GIOVANNA GRIMES VS GAME SPORTS BAR AND GRILL , ET AL.
19STCV29123
May 11, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
The Cheesecake Factory, et al.
ANA YESENIA URIAS ACOSTA VS THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY RESTAURANTS, INC, ET AL.
23SMCV00170
Jun 06, 2023
Los Angeles County, CA
Second Cause of Action (Failure To Pay Meal Breaks In Violation of Labor Code § 512); Third Cause of Action (Labor Code §§ 512, 226.7); Fourth Cause of Action (Failure To Pay Overtime In Violation of Labor Code § 510 and 12 CCR 1150); Fifth Cause of Action (Failure To Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statement Upon Payment of Wages In Violation of Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3); Sixth Cause of Action (Waiting Time Penalties Pursuant To Labor Code § 203).
HYANG AR JEON VS ROSETTE APPAREL INC ET AL
BC690678
Nov 02, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Leis and dated May 24, 2022, in which Judge Leis concluded that Sweety was the ultimate hirer and statutory employer of Zaldivar under Labor Code section 2750.5. Based on this conclusion, Judge Leis granted co-defendants Steve and Tracy Lees motion for adjudication of Plaintiffs first cause of action based on Labor Code section 3706.
ELVA ZALDIVAR, ET AL. VS STEVE LEE, ET AL.
19STCV20803
Dec 15, 2023
Los Angeles County, CA
The application was made pursuant to Labor Code §98.2(b), which requires the appellant employer to post bond unless the appellant employer shows that she is indigent. The Court, without a hearing, ruled on the application on 5/13/20. The Court’s order indicates that the application is denied because Ernst failed to file any supporting declaration. Motion for Reconsideration On 5/28/20, Ernst filed this motion for reconsideration.
MARITZA LUCERO ERNST VS EFRAIN DEL REAL
20LBCP00110
Sep 22, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
.: BC698681 Hearing Date: August 20, 2019 [TENTATIVE]RULING RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE Factual Background This is an action for employment discrimination and labor code violations. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges as follows. Mendez Rudy Mendez Hernandez (“Mendez”) was an employee of Defendant Wheel Pros, LLC (“Wheel”) from 2002 to 2017. (FAC ¶ 6.) Mendez began to suffer from chronic back pain caused by repeated lifting of heavy aluminum billets for work. (FAC ¶ 7.)
RUDY MENDEZ HERNANDEZ VS WHEEL PROS LLC ET AL
BC698681
Aug 20, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
The operative First Amended Complaint alleges nine causes of action for: 1) harassment; 2) discrimination; 3) failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation; 5) labor code §§ 98.6 and 1102.5; 6) adverse action in violation of public policy; 7) disability discrimination; 8) failure to accommodate; and 9) failure to engage in an interactive process. On January 31, 2020, Defendant moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication of each cause of action and punitive damages.
RHONDA CLARK VS ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL
BC713141
Mar 08, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
An employer is not liable for penalties under Labor Code section 203 if the employer makes a “good faith legal mistake in failing to pay its workers their full wages upon termination of their employment.” ( Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 765, 782-783.) In this case, Defendant proffers evidence that it never received an invoice from Plaintiff’s agent because Plaintiff’s agent neglected to send one.
MICHAEL MALINARIC VS STRATEGIC PARTNERS, INC.
20STCV03942
Jun 28, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
The release may not extend to future claims by aggrieved employees for wages and other “victim-specific” remedies, even those that can be characterized as part of a “civil penalty” recoverable under Labor Code § 558 and that are recovered as part of the settlement of this action. 4. The evidence is still insufficient to permit the Court to perform a lodestar cross-check in connection with the Court evaluation of the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees being paid as part of the settlement.
GAITAN VS. AVENUE STORES, LLC
30-2017-00924392-CU-OE-CJC
Mar 15, 2019
Orange County, CA
Code §§ 201, 1182.12, 1194, 1194.2, (9) failure to indemnify for necessary business expenses in violation of Labor Code § 2802, (10) failure to provide meal and rest breaks in violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512, (11) failure to provide itemized wage and hour statements in violation of Labor Code §§ 226, et seq., (12) waiting time penalties (Labor Code §§ 201-203), (13) Private Attorney General’s Act (“PAGA”).
PEDRO REZA VS MOA MOA INC
BC719699
Mar 12, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
The Court finds that Plaintiffs non-FEHA claim for retaliation under the Labor Code is intertwined and inseparable from his FEHA claim for retaliation such that apportionment is impractical. As evidenced by the analysis in the motion for summary judgment, this Court combined the discussion as to the FEHA and Labor Code retaliation claims. (Minute Order dated Apr. 6, 2022.) The case presented overlapping issues and the same underlying facts.
KEVORK KAZANDJIAN VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES
19STCV21241
Sep 13, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
In the absence of such an “express exception” in the context of Labor Code § 1102.5, which Gilliam has not pointed out to the court, the analysis of Williams is distinguishable from the present case. Gilliam argues that it would, in any event, controvert public policy to allow cost awards against unsuccessful whistleblower plaintiffs. (Motion at pp. 5–6.)
KENNETH GILLIAM VS PASSAGES MALIBU PHP LLC ET AL
BC631515
Jul 10, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
Motion for Attorney Fees (and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel) – WFP moves for attorney fees pursuant to Gov’t Code § 12965(b) and Labor Code § 218.5. The FEHA attorney fee statute authorizes an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a FEHA action if the Court, in its discretion, determines that the plaintiff’s case was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after the case clearly became so. Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
NANCY ARAMBULA CORONA VS WEISS FAMILY PROPERTIES LLC ET AL
BC569620
Mar 29, 2017
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
The operative First Amended Complaint alleges nine causes of action for: 1) harassment; 2) discrimination; 3) failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation; 5) labor code §§ 98.6 and 1102.5; 6) adverse action in violation of public policy; 7) disability discrimination; 8) failure to accommodate; and 9) failure to engage in an interactive process. On January 31, 2020, Defendant moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication of each cause of action and punitive damages.
TERESA LEBRON ET AL VS AUGUST JOHNSON ET AL
BC681773
Mar 08, 2021
day s
Los Angeles County, CA
Personal Injury/ Tort
Auto
; Violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 (Unpaid Business Expenses); Violation of California Labor Code §226(a) (Non-Compliant Wage Statements); Violation of Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq.
EXPRESS MESSENGER SYSTEMS WAGE AND HOUR CASES
JCCP4789
May 03, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
Blume avers that Penney OpCo transacts business throughout the United States, including selling clothing and accessories across state lines. (Blume Decl. ¶ 15.) Based on this averment, Penney OpCo demonstrates that plaintiffs employment involved interstate commerce. This is all that is required under the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, under Labor Code § 432.6(f), the Agreement is enforceable.
DIANE CANALES VS PENNEY OPCO LLC., A VIRGINIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
22STCV09901
Aug 18, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) violation of Labor Code section 203 – Continuing Wages, (2) violation of Labor Code section 203.1 – Wages by Check on Which Payment Refused, (3) violation of Labor Code sections 510 and 1194 – Failure to Pay Minimum Wage and Overtime, (4) violation of Labor Code section 226(a) – Failure to Provide Pay Stubs, (5) violation of the Unfair Competition Law, (6) violation of Labor Code section 226(b) – Failure to Provide Employment Records, (7) violation of Labor Code
M ESTRADA, ET AL. VS SCARS OF THE MIND PICTURE COMPANY, ET AL.
18STCV06219
Feb 28, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
FCS055842 Defendants’ Demurrer to Amended Petition/Complaint TENTATIVE RULING Labor Code §1102.5(b) bars retaliation by an employer, or anyone acting on behalf of the employer, based on an employee’s disclosure of information that he or she reasonably believes constitutes a violation by the employer of statute or regulation.
FCS055842 - WHITNEY, JOHN VS THE CITY OF VALLEJO AND ITS (DMS)
FCS055842
Apr 21, 2022
Solano County, CA
The Court in Koons does not address whether such expenses qualify as wages under Labor Code sections 200 or 221. However, "Courts have recognized that 'wages' also include those benefits to which an employee is entitled as a part of his or her compensation, including money, room, board, clothing, vacation pay, and sick pay." (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.)
KYOWA KIRIN PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INC VS FOURNIER
37-2020-00043761-CU-BC-CTL
Aug 05, 2021
San Diego County, CA
Contract
Breach
Defendant asserts Plaintiffs are claiming to represent every former and current employee of Defendant for any Labor Code violation. The court finds the limitation stated in the SAC at paragraph 70 as well as a reading of the pleading as a whole sufficiently limits and defines the proposed representative class to those non-exempt employees required to wear protective equipment.
LOPEZ V. RUIZ FOOD PRODUCTS, INC.
VCU 275105
Mar 26, 2019
Tulare County, CA
Conversely, Defendant argues that Plaintiff continued to reference her Labor Code § 132 (a) claim, despite having previously dismissed these claims. Moreover, Defendant states that the discovery conducted was routine and that they are only requesting the fees and costs incurred in the motion for summary judgment. The Court finds that although Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to pretext, the complaint was not completely groundless or without a legal or factual basis.
JEANETTE FRANCE VS LOS ANGELES DEPT OF WATER AND POWER ET AL
BC719459
Jul 08, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
Crenshaw has established that it was Plaintiff's employer and her claim is thus barred by California Labor Code Section 3600 et seq. The defendant has established that worker's compensation is plaintiff’s exclusive remedy because her claim fails to meet the requirements of the Power Press Exception as provided in Labor Code § 4558.
SANTOS VS CRENSHAW MANUFACTURING
30-2017-00948027-CU-PO-CJC
Aug 31, 2018
Orange County, CA
Neither parties dispute that the Subject Machine is a power press as defined by Labor Code § 4558. Plaintiff further concedes that he does not oppose the summary judgment motion as to the second cause of action for products liability only. The issue before the Court is thus whether the power press exception applies pursuant to Labor Code § 4558 as to the first cause of action sounding in general negligence.
VAHEH BAGHDASARIAN VS SENCORP WHITE INC ET AL
BC715042
Mar 26, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Personal Injury/ Tort
Products Liability
In this regard, it is clear that Guerrero, which was decided in 2013, is not controlling as to Labor Code § 1451, which became effective January 1, 2014, to the extent that Guerrero conflicts with Labor Code § 1451. Labor Code, § 1451 provides in pertinent part as follows: As used in this part, the following definitions apply: (a) (1) “Domestic work” means services related to the care of persons in private households or maintenance of private households or their premises.
LESNIA MOJICA VS SYMACTION COMMUNICATIONS LLC ET AL
BC619720
Mar 16, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
California Labor Code section 3602 states “[w]here the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section and Sections 37036 and 4558, the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer.”
MATILDE EK, ET AL. VS SEE'S CANDIES, INC., ET AL.
20STCV49673
Apr 13, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
(7) violation of Labor Code § 1102.5 whistle blower, (8) wrongful termination.
DAVID LILE VS MR WHEELS, INC. D/B/A AUTONATION TOYOTA SCION CERRITOS
19STCV30636
Dec 20, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Again, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint against CB in this action asserted causes of action for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy, Violation of Labor Code Section 1050, Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, Defamation Per Se and Discrimination in Violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (i.e., FEHA). Plaintiff fails to address Williams, Christianburg, Holman and Roman, as set forth above. The motion is unopposed.
MATTHEW ROBERSON VS COMMUNITY BANK
KC068904
Apr 05, 2019
Gloria White-Brown
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
Defendants fail to address their burden of proof under Labor Code section 2750.5. Labor Code section 2750.5 presumes the hired contractor is an employee, and to establish otherwisei.e., to establish independent contractor statusthe statute prescribes both who has the burden of proof and what must be proven. ( Blackwell v. Vasilas (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 160, 172.)
ELVA ZALDIVAR, ET AL. VS STEVE LEE, ET AL.
19STCV20803
Dec 05, 2023
Los Angeles County, CA
The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs cause of action for retaliation under Labor Code § 132a. 3. The FAC does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as to Defendant. 4. The FAC is uncertain. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the Demurrer. Discussion [1] I.
NIEVES ARAUJO VS COMPLETE CLOTHING CO.
21STCV35034
Sep 22, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
Code §1102.5, (12) Interference with, Restraint, and Denial of Family Leave in Violation of the CFRA, and (13) Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Govt Code §§ 12940 et. seq.
MAURILIO WILCOX VS MOLINA HEALTHCARE, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, ET AL.
21STCV07894
Dec 13, 2023
Los Angeles County, CA
.: 20STCV14662 Hearing Date: January 25, 2023 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: Plaintiff Melissa mandell-browns motion to tax costs BACKGROUND On April 15, 2022, Plaintiff Melissa Mandell-Brown (Plaintiff) initiated this wrongful termination action against Defendants Novo Nordisk Inc. and Zamaneh Zamanian (collectively, Defendants), alleging breach of contract, violations of FEHA and CFRA, unfair business practices, fraud, and Labor Code violations.
MELISSA MANDELL-BROWN VS NOVO NORDISK INC., ET AL.
20STCV14662
Jan 25, 2023
Los Angeles County, CA
Defendant Pedro Rivera is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys fees because the claims asserted against him were frivolous, groundless, and baseless and/or asserted in bad faith and he is the prevailing party in the complete defense of all claims asserted against him brought by Plaintiff under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA) and under the Labor Code for unpaid wages. (Motion, p. 2:7-12.)
JANE DOE VS PEDRO RIVERA, ET AL.
20STCV42257
Aug 17, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
A), “ ‘AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE’ and/or ‘AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEES’ refers to any person that is currently or was employed by DEFENDANT and against whom one or more of DEFENDANT’s alleged labor code violations was committed.” That is, “aggrieved employee” is defined in terms of the underlying merits rather than objective, non-merits-based criteria.
MONTANO VS. JGT, INC.
20-01151624
Jul 14, 2023
Orange County, CA
Kenson also relies on paragraph nine, but it also limits release to “all issues under the labor code.” Pole Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. E ¶ 9. In summary, Kenson’s argument fails for three reasons. First, the language in the settlement release expressly limits liability to claims within the scope of workers’ compensation law. Second, the standard language of the preprinted form used in workers’ compensation settlements does not release employers from liability outside workers’ compensation law.
ADRIAN MORALES VS KENSON CABINETS ET AL
BC621960
May 08, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
in violation of public policy, (9) Labor Code section 2699, et seq. for violations of Labor Code sections 98.6 and 1102.5, and (10) defamation against Defendants Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Southern California Permanente Medical Group, Inc.
BC99355
Apr 13, 2022
Los Angeles County, CA
Background On June 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed his verified complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) declaratory relief, (5) accounting, (6) violation of Corporations Code §17704.10, (7) violation of Labor Code §226(a), (8) violation of Labor Code §210, (9) violation of Labor Code §§510 and 1194, and (10) unfair competition.
ASHER LUGASSI VS LINDSEY BRESNICK, ET AL.
21STCV23186
Dec 09, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
The parties have not agreed upon a form of judgment to be entered because the parties disagree as to whether plaintiffs, as prevailing parties, are entitled to attorney fees under Labor Code section 218.5. The parties stipulated, and the court ordered, that the parties file briefs addressing their respective positions.
MARK HELTON ET AL VS EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION ETC
1267655
Feb 01, 2011
Santa Barbara County, CA
(See, California Labor Code, Section 12965(b).) Although the statute states that the court “may” award fees, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to fees “absent circumstances that would render the award unjust.” (Stephens v. Coldwell Banker (1988) 199 CA3d 1394, 1406; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 CA4th 359, 394.) The Court declines to exercise its discretion to deny the entire fee request. Under Chavez v.
SHACHIA ALI VS M & N FINANCING CO ET AL
BC538011
Oct 07, 2016
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
On March 21, 2014, Pilkington filed his complaint against Landmark asserting six causes of action: (1) breach of written contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (4) unpaid wages in violation of Labor Code section 201; (5) waiting penalties under Labor Code sections 201 to 203; and unfair competition in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.
WAYNE PILKINGTON VS LANDMARK GLOBAL INC
1466283
May 30, 2014
Santa Barbara County, CA
In Williams, the California Supreme Court upheld an order requiring an employer to disclose the identities and contact information of employees as part of discovery in a lawsuit alleging violations of employee rights under the Labor Code. (3 Cal.5th at 554.)
RANGEL VS COUPANG GLOBAL LLC
RIC2004185
Jan 16, 2022
Riverside County, CA
In Williams, the California Supreme Court upheld an order requiring an employer to disclose the identities and contact information of employees as part of discovery in a lawsuit alleging violations of employee rights under the Labor Code. (3 Cal.5th at 554.)
RANGEL VS COUPANG GLOBAL LLC
RIC2004185
Jan 15, 2022
Riverside County, CA
In Williams, the California Supreme Court upheld an order requiring an employer to disclose the identities and contact information of employees as part of discovery in a lawsuit alleging violations of employee rights under the Labor Code. (3 Cal.5th at 554.)
RANGEL VS COUPANG GLOBAL LLC
RIC2004185
Jan 18, 2022
Riverside County, CA
In Williams, the California Supreme Court upheld an order requiring an employer to disclose the identities and contact information of employees as part of discovery in a lawsuit alleging violations of employee rights under the Labor Code. (3 Cal.5th at 554.)
RANGEL VS COUPANG GLOBAL LLC
RIC2004185
Jan 17, 2022
Riverside County, CA
Labor Code section 2750.5 provides a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that a worker performing services for which a license is required pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code, or who is performing such services for a person who is required to obtain such a license[,] is an employee rather than an independent contractor.
ELVA ZALDIVAR, ET AL. VS STEVE LEE, ET AL.
19STCV20803
Mar 05, 2024
Los Angeles County, CA
Third Sub-Cause of Action (Civil Penalties Pursuant to Labor Code § 226.3).
JEFFREY BARR VS ACTION SALES & METAL CO INC ET AL
BC723895
Nov 12, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 934 (Dynamex) and now codified in Labor Code section 2750.3 only applies “[f]or purposes of [the Labor Code] and the Unemployment Insurance Code, and for the wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission.” This case does not concern those codes or orders but rather common law principles of respondeat superior.
MICHAEL FERRY V. CALIFORNIA OVERNIGHT, INC. ET AL.
FCS049046
Aug 31, 2020
E. BRADLEY NELSON
Solano County, CA
The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on November 16, 2018 and asserts causes of action for (1) misclassification as independent contractor, (2) failure to reimburse reasonable business expenses under Labor Code section 2802, (3) failure to pay wages under Labor Code section 204, (4) failure to provide lawful wage statements under Labor Code section 226, (5) retaliation under Labor Code section 98.6, and (6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
(NO CASE NAME AVAILABLE)
18STCV0322811
Nov 03, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Code § 1102.5 (Leidos, QTC); (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress (all Defendants); (13) violation of the Bane Act (Leidos, QTC, Smith, Dandridge, McGinnis, Kayahara); (14) failure to pay wages (Leidos, QTC); and (15) waiting time penalties (Leidos, QTC).
GRADY THOMAS VS LEIDOS, INC., ET AL.
20STCV02285
Jul 02, 2021
day s
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Wrongful Term
retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5; (5) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (6) failure to provide employee records.
FABIOLA YANI VS BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY DIRECT CORPORATION, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, ET AL.
20STCV32519
Jan 27, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5; (5) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (6) failure to provide employee records.
FABIOLA YANI VS BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY DIRECT CORPORATION, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, ET AL.
20STCV32519
Feb 18, 2021
Los Angeles County, CA
Employment
Other Employment
Neither parties dispute that the Subject Machine is a power press as defined by Labor Code § 4558. Plaintiff further concedes that he does not oppose the summary judgment motion as to the second cause of action for products liability only. The issue before the Court is thus whether the power press exception applies pursuant to Labor Code § 4558 as to the first cause of action sounding in general negligence.
VAHEH BAGHDASARIAN VS SENCORP WHITE INC ET AL
BC715042
Apr 16, 2021
12/14/2022
Los Angeles County, CA
Personal Injury/ Tort
Products Liability
For full print and download access, please subscribe at https://www.trellis.law/.
Please wait a moment while we load this page.
Your subscription has successfully been upgraded.
Your content views addon has successfully been added.
No Worries!
Adding your team is easy
in the "Manage Company Users" tab
