Scope and Purpose of Act

The Jones Act provides sea-based employees with the right to sue their employers for injuries/illnesses arising out of their maritime employment. (Chandris v. Latsis, (1995) 515 U.S. 347, 354.) The policy behind the protection is protection because of the particular nature of work being "exposed to the perils of the sea." (Id.)

The Jones Act is a federal law that authorizes “seamen” to sue persons who employ them either as formal employees or independent contractors for their negligence. (Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis (1995) 515 U.S. 347, 354, 361-362; see also, Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris (2001) 532 U.S. 811, 817; Mahramas v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. (1973) 475 F.2d 165, 171; 46 U.S.C. § 30104.)

“Seamen” are “mariner[s] . . . who live[] [their] life upon the sea” (Warner v. Goltra (1934) 293 U.S. 155, 157), and who are thus “continually exposed to the hazards of the deep” (Reyes v. Vantage S.S. Co. (5th Cir. 1977) 558 F.2d 238, 243). The Jones Act changed the prior law that had limited employers’ liability to the cost of “maintenance and cure” (The Osceola (1903) 189 U.S. 158, 175), and did so by granting seamen “the same rights to recover for negligence as other tort victims” (McDermott Int’l., Inc. v. Wilander (1991) 498 U.S. 337, 342). Despite its remedial goal (Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co. (5th Cir. 1975) 507 F.2d 216, 224, overruled in part on other grounds, Gautreaux v. Scurlock 10 Marine, Inc. (5th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 331, 339), however, the Jones Act’s expanded remedy applies only against a seaman’s employer. (Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister (1949) 337 U.S. 783, 787, fn. 6 (McAllister) [“a seaman has the advantages of the [Jones] Act only against his employer”]; Norfolk, at 817.)

Jurisdiction

Although state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over lawsuits seeking recovery for torts committed on the high seas (28 U.S.C. § 1333; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. (1942) 317 U.S. 239, 245 (Garrett)), the law applied in such lawsuits is federal substantive law, not state law. (Garrett, at 245; Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 365, 371-372; see also, Fahey v. Gledhill (1983) 33 Cal.3d 884, 887.)

"Seaman" Status Requirement

It is a pre-requisite to proving liability for Jones Act negligence that the injured maritime worker prove that he or she was a "seaman." The rationale behind the policy protecting the special interests of seamen does not apply to land-based workers. (Chandris, supra, 515 U.S. at 359-360.)

A seaman must both:

1. have an "employment related connection to a vessel in navigation" on the navigable waters of the United States and,
2. "contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission."

(Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai (1997) 520 U.S. 548, 559.)

To satisfy the first prong of the test, "a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." Land-based workers – even those whose work is related to the vessel – do not qualify as "connected to vessel in navigation." An employee's connection to a vessel in navigation is "substantial" in nature if the employee's work involves seagoing activities. The test is "whether the employee's duties take him to sea." (Id. at 554.)

“The appellate court [has] held that the question whether the plaintiff was a Jones Act seaman was one of fact in that case and that the issue should have been submitted to a jury.” (CNA Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 211 at 221 citing Gizoni v. Southwest Marine Inc. (990) 909 F.2d 385 at 387.)

The Jones Act and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act

“Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni (1991) 502 U.S. 81 affirmed Gizoni. Southwest noted: ‘[S]ome maritime workers may be Jones Act seamen performing a job specifically enumerated under the LHWCA.’ (CNA Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 211, 222, citing 502 Southwest at 88.) “It is by now ‘universally accepted’ that an employee who receives voluntary payments under the LHWCA without a formal award is not barred from subsequently seeking relief under the Jones Act. This is so, quite obviously, because the question of coverage has never actually been litigated. Moreover, the LHWCA clearly does not comprehend such a preclusive effect, as it specifically provides that any amounts paid to an employee for the same injury, disability, or death pursuant to the Jones Act shall be credited against any liability imposed by the LHWCA.” (CNA Ins. Co., citing Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, supra, at 91.)

“The court further held there is ‘no indication in the LHWCA that Congress intended to preclude or stay traditional Jones Act suits in the district courts.’ Indeed, the LHWCA anticipates that such suits could be brought. Title 33 U.S.C. § 913(d) tolls the time to file LHWCA claims ‘[w]here recovery is denied to any person, in a suit brought at law or in admiralty to recover damages in respect of injury or death, on the ground that such person was an employee and the defendant was an employer within the meaning of this chapter and that such employer had secured compensation to such employee under this chapter.’” (CNA Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 211, 222 n. 6. citing Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, supra, 502 U.S. at 90.)