Each year, all corporations doing business in California, including:
Must pay a corporate franchise tax each year:
Corporations (and LLCs electing to be classified and taxed like corporations) must pay a franchise tax due equal to the greater of:
Note: Many such corporations are also liable for a 6.65% alternative minimum tax
S Corporations doing business in California must pay a franchise tax due equal to:
LLCs (electing to be classified and taxed like partnerships rather than corporations) must pay a franchise tax due equal to:
LLPs must pay an annual franchise tax of eight-hundred dollars ($800).
Doing business is defined as “actively engaging in any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or profit” and applies to any taxpayer:
Corporations not deemed to be doing business in California include:
A corporation can petition the Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”) for a determination that the corporation’s activities do not constitute “doing business in California.”
Failure to pay the Franchise Tax may result in suspension of the corporation (or forfeiture of its property), including invalidation by a court of contracts made during the suspension.
A corporation's rights may be revived through an application to the FTB by:
"Thus, Plaintiff’s certificate of revivor validates the filing of this Complaint. This ground for demurrer is now moot…However, Defendant also argues that a contract entered into by a suspended corporation is voidable…Rev. & Tax Code § 23304.1(a) provides: 'Every contract made in this state by a taxpayer during the time that the taxpayer’s powers, rights, and privileges are suspended or forfeited pursuant to Section 23301, 23301.5, or 23775 shall, subject to Section 23304.5, be voidable at the request of any party to the contract other than the taxpayer…' In turn Rev. & Tax Code § 23304.5 provides: "A party that has the right to declare a contract to be voidable pursuant to Section 23304.1 may exercise that right only in a lawsuit brought by either party with respect to the contract in a court of competent jurisdiction and the rights of the parties to the contract shall not be affected by Section 23304.1 except to the extent expressly provided by a final judgment of the court, which judgment shall not be issued unless the taxpayer is allowed a reasonable opportunity to cure the voidability under Section 23305.1[1]. If the court finds that the contract is voidable under Section 23304.1, the court shall order the contract to be rescinded. However, in no event shall the court order rescission of a taxpayer’s contract unless the taxpayer receives full restitution of the benefits provided by the taxpayer under the contract…Accordingly, this ground for demurrer is persuasive, but Plaintiff must be given an opportunity to obtain relief from the voidability provisions by making an application to the Franchise Tax Board.Longevity Time Management, Inc. Vs. L'antica Pizzeria Da Michele Usa, Llc, 19Stcv33888 (12/31/2019) (https://trellis.law/ruling/19STCV33888/longevity-time-management-inc-vs-lantica-pizzeria-da-michele-usa-llc/2019123153ac46).
The Court may strike out any pleading "not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state." Code Civ. Proc. 436(b). "The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice." Code Civ. Proc. 437. The judicially noticed documents (Exhibit D) indicate that James W. Brady, Inc. was suspended by the California Franchise Tax Board in 2014. However, WCR, LLC was not formed until 2019 (Exhibits E and F). As the powers of the corporation were suspended before WCR was formed (see Rev. & Tax. Code 23301 and 23301.5), it could not have transferred its assets to a successor corporation. WCR cannot, as a matter of law, be a successor entity such that it cannot file an Answer on behalf of James W. Brady, Inc. Bommel Vs Warren's Carpet Cleaning, 37-2019-00038756-Cu-Pa-Ctl (12/3/2019) (https://trellis.law/ruling/37-2019-00038756-CU-PA-CTL/bommel-vs-warrens-carpet-cleaning/201912039115ea).
Defendant demurs to the entire complaint on the ground that Sayari[1] Enterprises LLC has been suspended and therefore lacks capacity to prosecute any claim against it.
“With exceptions not relevant here, ‘the corporate powers, rights and privileges of a domestic taxpayer may be suspended, and the exercise of the corporate powers, rights, and privileges of a foreign taxpayer in this state may be forfeited,’ if a corporation fails to pay its taxes.” (Bourhis v. Lord (2013) 56 Cal.4th 320, 324 (quoting Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23301).) A corporation may also be suspended for failure to file a tax return. (Rev. & Tax. Code § 23301.5.) In general, a “corporation may not prosecute . . . an action . . . while its corporate rights are suspended for failure to pay taxes.” (Bourhis, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 324 (quoting Reed v. Norman (1957) 48 Cal.2d 338, 343).)
"Although corporations are unable to prosecute actions while suspended, raising corporate suspension as a reason to dismiss a case is disfavored. (Traub Co. v. Coffee Break Service, Inc. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 368, 370 [explaining that a “plea of lack of capacity of a corporation to maintain an action by reason of a suspension of corporate powers for nonpayment of its taxes ‘is a plea in abatement which is not favored in law [and] is to be strictly construed.”].) Nevertheless, given that the lack of capacity of a plaintiff must be raised by special demurrer or it is generally waived, Defendant properly raised the issue. (CCP § 430.20.)
"Unless “mandated by governing statute, the capacity of the plaintiff to sue is not an element of a cause of action and the plaintiff corporation need not allege it is qualified to do business in this state or that it has paid all state taxes.” (Center for Self-Improvement & Community Development v. Lennar Corp. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1552–1553.) Thus, “the suspended status of corporate powers at the time of filing suit does not impede the trial court's jurisdiction to proceed, nor does a suspension after suit commences but before rendition of judgment deprive the court of jurisdiction or render the judgment void.” (Id. at 1553.)
"Here, Plaintiffs indicate that Sayari Enterprises will be revived before the hearing. (Oppo., at p. 5.) “A suspended corporation can regain its corporate powers by . . . applying to the Franchise Tax Board for a certificate of revivor.” (Ibid.) The “revival of corporate powers enables the previously suspended party to proceed with the prosecution or defense of the action.” (Ibid.)
"In light of Plaintiffs’ statement that they intend to revive Sayari Enterprises, LLC before the hearing, the demurrer on this basis is OVERRULED. (Cf. Cal-W. Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Corning Capital Grp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 304, 312–313 [upholding the dismissal of an entity where a related entity “represented to the trial court that it had no intention of reviving the corporate powers of [the entity] by paying its delinquent taxes”].) If, however, Plaintiffs cannot show at the hearing that the entity has been revived or that they have taken reasonable and diligent steps to revive it, the Court will consider sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend." Fred Sayari Vs City Of Pomona, Bs170504 (11/12/2019) (https://trellis.law/ruling/BS170504/fred-sayari-vs-city-of-pomona/20191112f6716b)
“A franchise to use public streets or rights-of-way is a form of property and a franchise fee is the purchase price of the franchise.” (Jacks v. Cty. of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248 at 262 citing Stockton Gas etc. Co. v. San Joaquin Co. (1905) 148 Cal. 313, 319; City & Co. of S. F. v. Market St. Ry. Co. (1937) 9 Cal.2d 743, 749.) Historically, franchise fees have not been considered taxes. (See County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba (1922) 188 Cal. 664, 670 [franchise fee based on gross receipts of utility is not a tax]; City & Co. of S. F. v. Market St. Ry. Co., supra, 9 Cal.2d at 749 [payments for franchises are not taxes]; Barbara County Taxpayer Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 940, 949-950 [franchise fees are not proceeds of taxes].) Nothing in Proposition 218 reflects an intent to change the historical characterization of franchise fees, or to limit the authority of government to sell or lease its property and spend the compensation received for whatever purposes it chooses. (See Cal. Const., arts. XIII A, § 3, subd. (b)(4), XIII C.)
This understanding that restrictions on taxation do not encompass amounts paid in exchange for property interests is confirmed by Proposition 26, the purpose of which was to reinforce the voter approval requirements set forth in Propositions 13 and 218. (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 262-263 citing Prop. 26, § 1, subd. (f), Historical Notes, reprinted at 2B West's Ann. Cal. Const., supra, foll. art. XIII A, § 3, p. 297 ["to ensure the effectiveness of these constitutional limitations, [Proposition 26] defines a ‘tax’ ... so that neither the Legislature nor local governments can circumvent these restrictions on increasing taxes by simply defining new or expanded taxes as ‘fees’”].)
Although Proposition 26 strengthened restrictions on taxation by expansively defining "tax" as "any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government" (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e)), it provided an exception for "[a] charge imposed for entrance to or use of local government property, or the purchase, rental, or lease of local government property." (Id. citinv subd. (e)(4).)
“A franchise is a negotiated contract between a private enterprise and a governmental entity for the long-term possession of land. Franchise fees are paid as compensation for the grant of a right of way, not for a license or tax nor for a regulatory program of supervision or inspection.” (Barbara County Taxpayer Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 940, 949.) “In sum, franchise fees are paid for the governmental grant of a relatively long possessory right to use land, similar to an easement or a leasehold, to provide essential services to the general public.” (Id.)
“The surcharge is not a tax if it is compensation for franchise rights.” (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248 at 267.) "[T]o constitute compensation for the value received, the fees must reflect a reasonable estimate of the value of the franchise." (Id.) "To constitute compensation for a property interest, however, the amount of the charge must bear a reasonable relationship to the value of the property interest; to the extent the charge exceeds any reasonable value of the interest, it is a tax and therefore requires voter approval." (Id. at 254.)
Verified declaration by petitioner to show that notice of administration was given to the Franchise Tax Board. PrC § 9202(c)(1) 4. Identification of and waivers of accounting from presumptive contingent remainder beneficiaries of the trust. The Trustee has a fiduciary duty to protect their interests, and cannot use his/her fiduciary position to relieve her/himself of the obligation to provide an accounting in this proceeding. Trustee and personal representative are the same person. 5.
Nov 05, 2020
Fenstermacher
Contra Costa County, CA
However, the same evidence demonstrates that David’s income is being garnished by the Franchise Tax Board and that the IRS is trying to liquidate all his properties. This is hardly a picture of robust financial health.
Nov 04, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
Escrow Defendant obtained written permission and consent from Plaintiffs to use the current sale proceeds of the Second Escrow to pay the necessary IRS tax and Franchise Tax Board withholdings due from the sale of Property 1. (Brennan Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C.) In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the exhibits were prepared in English, and never translated or explained to Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs fail to cite any legal authority a translation was required.
Nov 04, 2020
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
Lori Ann Fournier or Olivia Rosales
Los Angeles County, CA
Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 383). Another administrative exhaustion process applies to FEHA claims. The County concedes that Plaintiff complied with the FEHA administrative exhaustion process (at least in part) by filing a claim with DFEH on January 10, 2019. (See Dem. at 19.) The GCA required Plaintiff to file a government claim within six months of the accrual of his whistleblower claim. (Gov. Code § 911.2(a).)
Nov 02, 2020
Employment
Other Employment
Los Angeles County, CA
This section provided in part that, except in tax enforcement proceedings, ‘… it is a misdemeanor for the Franchise Tax Board, any deputy, agent, clerk, or other officer or employee, to disclose in any manner information as to the amount of income or any particulars set forth or disclosed in any report or return required under this part.’ (Although § 19282 has since been amended, the language of the present statute is substantially the same.)
Oct 30, 2020
Santa Barbara County, CA
At the hearing on September 25, 2020, the court considered the further declarations and briefs that had been submitted and ruled that surplus funds in the sum of $52,900.28, plus interest in the sum of $4,046.00, were to be distributed to the State of California Franchise Tax Board, for a total distribution of $56,946.28 to the Franchise Tax Board on its claim.
Oct 30, 2020
Other
Intellectual Property
Los Angeles County, CA
Verified declaration by petitioner to show that notice of administration was given to the Franchise Tax Board. PrC § 9202(c)(1) 5. Declaration to state when action under IAEA (with Notice of Proposed Action) was taken, when and to whom notice was given, whether notice was waived by anyone and whether any objections were received. CRC § 7.250 6. Identification of and waivers of accounting from presumptive contingent remainder beneficiaries of the trust.
Oct 29, 2020
George
Contra Costa County, CA
Grab's demurrer to the answer of defendant California Franchise Tax Board ("FTB") is overruled. Plaintiff is seeking recovery of less than $25,000. In limited civil actions, such as this, special demurrers are not allowed. (Code Civ. Proc.§ 92, subd. (c).) A demurrer to an answer on grounds that it is uncertain is a special demurrer. (Johnson v. Mead (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 156, 160.)
Oct 29, 2020
Business
Intellectual Property
San Diego County, CA
Defendants argue that since the execution of the Agreement, Plaintiff has been suspended by the State of California Franchise Tax Board and is no longer a legal entity. (Raftery Decl., Ex. B.) Despite this, Defendants allege that Plaintiff improperly filed this action in the wrong forum and the wrong county, and therefore must be ordered to comply with the ADR provisions in the Agreement and proceed to mediation and/or arbitration in Bakersfield rather than litigate in this Court.
Oct 28, 2020
San Luis Obispo County, CA
(“UCT”) has been suspended by the California Secretary of State for nonpayment of franchise tax and thus is not permitted to defend itself in this action. (Palm Valley Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Design MTC (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 553, 556.) UCT’s insurer A-One Commercial Insurance Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“A-One”) seeks to intervene in this action in order to protect its own interests.
Oct 23, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
s status as a corporate entity has been forfeited by the California Franchise Tax Board. As such, it does not have the legal capacity to sue. (Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1486;(Timberline, Inc. v. Jaisinghani (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1368; see also City of San Diego v. San Diegans for Open Government (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 568, 578, as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 17, 2016))
Oct 22, 2020
Real Property
other
San Diego County, CA
(“UCT”) has been suspended by the California Secretary of State for nonpayment of franchise tax and thus is not permitted to defend itself in this action. (Palm Valley Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Design MTC (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 553, 556.) UCT’s insurer A-One Commercial Insurance Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“A-One”) seeks to intervene in this action in order to protect its own interests.
Oct 22, 2020
Los Angeles County, CA
s status as a corporate entity has been forfeited by the California Franchise Tax Board. As such, it does not have the legal capacity to sue. (Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1486;(Timberline, Inc. v. Jaisinghani (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1368; see also City of San Diego v. San Diegans for Open Government (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 568, 578, as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 17, 2016))
Oct 22, 2020
Real Property
other
San Diego County, CA
s status as a corporate entity has been forfeited by the California Franchise Tax Board. As such, it does not have the legal capacity to sue. (Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1486;(Timberline, Inc. v. Jaisinghani (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1368; see also City of San Diego v. San Diegans for Open Government (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 568, 578, as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 17, 2016))
Oct 22, 2020
Real Property
other
San Diego County, CA
Verified declaration by petitioner to show that notice of administration was given to the Franchise Tax Board. PrC § 9202(c)(1) 5. Compliance with CRC 7.250 regarding any acts taken under IAEA w/notice of proposed action. (Specifics needed or statement that no action was taken) 6. Waiver of Accounting by petitioner or Accounting that complies with PrC § 1060 et seq. 7.
Oct 20, 2020
George
Contra Costa County, CA
Verified declaration by petitioner to show that notice of administration was given to the Franchise Tax Board. PrC § 9202(c)(1) 5. Compliance with CRC 7.250 regarding any acts taken under IAEA w/notice of proposed action. (Specifics needed or statement that no action was taken) 6. Waiver of Accounting by petitioner or Accounting that complies with PrC § 1060 et seq. 7.
Oct 20, 2020
George
Contra Costa County, CA
To date, the claims asserted against the surplus include: § Tracy Do as vested owner of record; § $2,851.16 as an unlawful detainer judgment against Tracy Do in favor of claimant Pacific Woods LLC; § $139,841.51 in unpaid state taxes owed by David Nguyen in favor of the California Franchise Tax Board. To determine the viability of the claims, it has been necessary to trace record ownership and recordations. Above all, it is also important to do equity in this matter.
Oct 16, 2020
Orange County, CA
The Court needs proof that a notice of hearing has been sent to the three heirs and the Franchise Tax Board, which filed a request for special notice on 6/10/20. (Prob. C. § 11601.) The petition for final distribution is not verified by Petitioner Daniel Cutright. (Prob. C. § 1021.) Absent verification, it will be denied. Supplement required Letters of general administration first issued in this case on 7/13/18. The inventory and appraisal was untimely filed on 11/22/19.
Oct 15, 2020
Probate
Trust
Ventura County, CA
The Court needs proof that a notice of hearing has been sent to the three heirs and the Franchise Tax Board, which filed a request for special notice on 6/10/20. (Prob. C. § 11601.) The petition for final distribution is not verified by Petitioner Daniel Cutright. (Prob. C. § 1021.) Absent verification, it will be denied. Supplement required Letters of general administration first issued in this case on 7/13/18. The inventory and appraisal was untimely filed on 11/22/19.
Oct 15, 2020
Probate
Trust
Ventura County, CA
Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 897, 912.) Requests Nos. 6 -13 are GRANTED per Evid. Code § 452(d)(court records). Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections Pursuant to CCP § 437c(q), the Court only rules upon the following objections to evidence which the Court deems to be material to the disposition of this motion: No. 7: OVERRULED. Goes to weight. Also, Plaintiff testified at Page 104:20-25 that she was told in an email that Principal Richardson instructed McQuay not to come to the cafeteria.
Oct 15, 2020
Employment
Other Employment
Los Angeles County, CA
Nature of Proceedings: Petition for Final Distribution The following must be submitted: 1) Notice to Franchise Tax Board. Notice MUST have been given to the Franchise Tax Board not later than 90 days after the date letters are first issued. (Prob. Code, § 9202, subd. (c)(1).) The Petition at paragraph 8c does not indicate notice was given. 2) Accounting or Waivers. Each person entitled to distribution from the estate may waive a final account by 1) filing a written waiver of account (Pob.
Oct 14, 2020
Santa Barbara County, CA
California Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 841, 879-82; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) The court is not required to impose a multiplier; the decision is discretionary. (Galbiso, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1089; Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1241.) Defendant has not requested the application of a multiplier, and the court finds that no multiplier is warranted here.
Oct 09, 2020
Orange County, CA
Notice was sent to the Franchise Tax Board on 8/7/20. The Court will grant the petition for final distribution. The proposed final distribution of the estate equally to Petitioner and Betty Bethers is consistent with the terms of the will. Proposed Order to be lodged prior to hearing per Local Rule 10.00.D.1. __________________ The court discourages in-person appearances in Department J6 during the COVID-19 pandemic period.
Oct 08, 2020
Probate
Trust
Ventura County, CA
Nature of Proceedings: Petition for Final Distribution The following must be submitted: 1) Notice to Franchise Tax Board. Notice MUST have been given to the Franchise Tax Board not later than 90 days after the date letters are first issued. (Prob. Code, § 9202, subd. (c)(1).) The Petition at paragraph 8c does not indicate notice was given. 2) Accounting or Waivers. Each person entitled to distribution from the estate may waive a final account by 1) filing a written waiver of account (Pob.
Oct 07, 2020
Santa Barbara County, CA
Verified declaration by petitioner to clarify statement ¶ 19 that Franchise Tax Board filed a Creditor’s Claim. It appears no claim was filed. 3. Verified declaration by petitioner to specify plan of distribution, including approximate amount of cash to be distributed to each beneficiary. LR 7.301 4. Verified declaration by petitioner to include sale price of each asset sold so court can determine whether there were any losses on sale that should be included in statutory fee calculation 5.
Oct 06, 2020
George
Contra Costa County, CA
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