Easements in California

There, the court did not consider whether an easement gave the dominant propertys owner a right to exclusive possessioni.e., whether the easement was exclusive. Instead, the question was [w]hether a so-called exclusive easement constitutes ownership in fee, rather than an easement. ( Blackmore, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1600.)

If the court grants judgment for some or all of the Well Site Owners upon the stipulated facts, then the Easement Holders, their successors, and their assigns, will forever release and relinquish any and all claims against all of the Well Site Owners related to any easement or right of passage, however characterized, over the Well Site, whether by express easement, implied easement, easement by prescription, easement by necessity, or any other right or entitlement on, in, under, or through the Well Site.

Ackerly ) (Exhibit T) included the easement whereas the deed conveying title to Plaintiff (Exhibit C) does not reference the easement, suggesting the property was conveyed to Plaintiff without the easement.

¿ Regardless, Defendant has asserted that Plaintiff has no right to use any part of the easement. ¿ The cases that Defendant relies upon do not support dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. · There is no requirement that a Plaintiff needs to have future plans to use the easement. Further, the easement deeds identify the permissible uses of Plaintiffs easement.

Zissler’s predecessor in interest granted the easement to Saville’s predecessor in interest in a document recorded on January 21, 1994, which easement was clarified in a document recorded on March 18, 1994 (hereinafter “the Easement”). The original express Easement and subsequent clarification are both entitled “EASEMENT GENERAL.”

Based on the recorded First Easement Deed, Plaintiffs evidence establishes their easement rights over the area of land covered by the First Easement Deed. However, because the Second Easement Deed expired on May 15, 2004, Plaintiffs must establish some other basis for their claimed easement over the area covered by the Second Easement Deed. Plaintiffs argue prescriptive easement as an alternative basis for the claimed easement.

In contrast to a non-exclusive easement, an exclusive easement only permits the dominant owner to use the easement area. ( Romero v. Shih , (2022) 78 Cal. App. 5th 326, 349.)

This easement consists of the six (6) separately described parcels in Exhibit "C" hereto and depicted on the plot in Exhibit "D" hereto, together with an additional easement to maintain, repair and replace the existing telephone line at its existing location along the westerly line of [Parcel 2] (collectively, "Easement"). The Easement shall be appurtenant to [Parcel 3].

In order to prevail on a cause of action for prescriptive easement, the plaintiffor the party claiming an interest in the easement propertymust solely seek a nonpossessory right in the easement property, by way of a mere right to use the property of another, as opposed to exclusive title, or possession, of the easement property.

The Court further rejects Elliott's argument that it removed the USAF Easement from the title of Lot 1; or amended the USAF Easement to allow construction of buildings in the area affected by that easement, by obtaining an endorsement to the First American Title insurance policy removing the insurer's previous exception as to the USAF Easement.

Dodge’s (“Dodges” together) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to the second cause of action for Declaratory Relief for Easement By Necessity, and the third cause of action for Declaratory Relief for Easement by Implication, are granted without leave to amend.

Defendants chief argument is that the easement is too old to be enforced. He argues plaintiff has no Current Easement Agreement and instead relies on an outdated Easement Agreement. (Demurrer, p. 6.) He argues the easement was granted in 1965 to Jack Emreck and Sue Ann Emreck from Harold Rosen and does not mention the current property owner, plaintiff. (Demurrer, p. 4.) The easement is not outdated.

MODIFICATION OF EASEMENT “The current 10 foot easement benefiting the Antonucci Property and burdening the Faoro property reads: ‘An easement for existing and future structures and access over and upon that portion of Block 194 in said City of Santa Barbara, County of Santa Barbara, State of California described as follows: [legal description of easement area]’ “The parties shall sign and record a Modification of Easement that changes the wording and the purpose of the easement to: ‘A 10 foot easement for ingress

Here, Patel does not testify that the easement is in a state of disrepair, that any other lot owner has been paying for maintenance, or that any easement owner refused to pay for the cost of maintenance. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to show that Plaintiff or any other easement owner abandoned the easement.

When the easement “is an appropriate and useful adjunct” to another parcel of land owned by the easement holder, an appurtenant easement is presumed. (Id. at pp.196-198.) Especially, when a roadway easement provides access to a particular parcel of real property, the court is justified in concluding that the easement is appurtenant to the property served by the easement. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 523.)

When the easement “is an appropriate and useful adjunct” to another parcel of land owned by the easement holder, an appurtenant easement is presumed. (Id. at pp.196-198.) Especially, when a roadway easement provides access to a particular parcel of real property, the court is justified in concluding that the easement is appurtenant to the property served by the easement. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 523.)

When the easement “is an appropriate and useful adjunct” to another parcel of land owned by the easement holder, an appurtenant easement is presumed. (Id. at pp.196-198.) Especially, when a roadway easement provides access to a particular parcel of real property, the court is justified in concluding that the easement is appurtenant to the property served by the easement. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 523.)

When the easement “is an appropriate and useful adjunct” to another parcel of land owned by the easement holder, an appurtenant easement is presumed. (Id. at pp.196-198.) Especially, when a roadway easement provides access to a particular parcel of real property, the court is justified in concluding that the easement is appurtenant to the property served by the easement. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 523.)

Ransford’s (“Ransfords” together) Demurrer to the second cause of action for Declaratory Relief for Easement By Necessity, and the third cause of action for Declaratory Relief for Easement by Implication, are Sustained without leave to amend.

Paragraph 4.2 provides that plaintiff’s counsel will prepare and record an easement in favor of plaintiff “for ingress and egress over the existing driveway with the width of the easement not to exceed 17’ and said easement shall provide that there will be no parking on the driveway.” The agreement defendant signed is clear and unambiguous. The court does not accept defendant’s claim that she was surprised or mistaken about the placement of the easement.

Section 2 of the Agreement explains the easement as follows: 2. “Grant of Non-Exclusive Ingress and Egress Easement for Developer Parcel.

The deeds that created the Upper Easement grant an "access easement" for "ingress and egress" over the Upper Easement. According to the evidence, the Tarantinos knew plaintiff parked on the Upper Easement, but allowed plaintiff to park on the Upper Easement, extending what defendants characterize as a "neighborly accommodation" Citing Heath v.

As to the 4th Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief), C.E. 70-44 does not create a valid easement because the document does not contain a legal description of the property that is being subjected to the easement. See Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts No. 26.

Plaintiff’s complaint includes quiet title causes of action based on deeded easement, easement by prescription, easement by necessity, easement by implication and easement by balancing hardship. Plaintiff now brings this motion for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action for quiet title based on a deeded easement. The Loguzzos and the Scovills (collectively Defendants) oppose the motion.

In the present case, Plaintiff has not shown that the easement should be deemed extinguished. Indeed, extinguishment of the easement is improper even where an easement holder use of an easement prevents the servient property owner from making any use of the easement area. (Reichardt, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 769.) Rather, the proper remedy under such circumstances is an injunction requiring the easement owner to accommodate the servient tenement’s use of the easement area. (Ibid.)

In the present case, Plaintiff has not shown that the easement should be deemed extinguished. Indeed, extinguishment of the easement is improper even where an easement holder use of an easement prevents the servient property owner from making any use of the easement area. (Reichardt, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 769.) Rather, the proper remedy under such circumstances is an injunction requiring the easement owner to accommodate the servient tenement’s use of the easement area. (Ibid.)

In the present case, Plaintiff has not shown that the easement should be deemed extinguished. Indeed, extinguishment of the easement is improper even where an easement holder use of an easement prevents the servient property owner from making any use of the easement area. (Reichardt, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 769.) Rather, the proper remedy under such circumstances is an injunction requiring the easement owner to accommodate the servient tenement’s use of the easement area. (Ibid.)

In the context of a private easement, “[t]he conveyance of an easement limited to roadway use grants a right of ingress and egress and a right of unobstructed passage to the holder of the easement. A roadway easement does not include the right to use the easement for any other purpose.” (Schmidt v. Bank of Am., N.A. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1505.) Vierra argues that Rechlin has misused the Easement by using it for long-term storage, rather than ingress and egress.

Even if defendant could prove the parties intended to replace the recorded easement with the Cates easement, that easement does not achieve its purpose, and does not provide Tarlton access to his property. Third, plaintiff asserts that even if a recorded easement could be legally extinguished with an alternative, no alternative easement exists that would provide Tarlton with access. Further, an express, recorded easement is not extinguished merely due to the existence of an alternative. (Murphy v.

Demurrer to the 1st Cause of Action for Interference With Easement/Encroachment SCE alleges both an express easement and a prescriptive easement over the Property. Even assuming arguendo that Severns' request for judicial notice is sufficient to negate SCE's allegations of an express easement [ a finding the Court is not making], it does not negate SCE's allegations of a prescriptive easement over the Property.

The complaint alleges both an equitable easement and a prescriptive easement. There is a difference between the two. An equitable easement allows for exclusive use of the property in return for which the propertys owner must be compensated. If the use underlying the equitable easement ever ceases, though, the property is returned to the original owner and the easement evaporates.

The claims for negligence and nuisance do not depend on the validity of the disputed easement. Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts for interference with easement and for declaratory relief. Defendant argues the easement agreement is invalid. She contends that plaintiffs cannot show they are entitled to an exclusive easement and are therefore left with a purported grant for easement (i.e. the Easement Agreement) that has no ascertainable scope. (Demurrer, p. 9.)

Extinguishment of an easement is an extreme and powerful remedy which is utilized only when use of the easement has been rendered essentially impossible. Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal. App. 4th 754, 767. Section 811 authorizes extinguishment of an easement only where the easement owner performs or authorizes an act which permanently prevents use of the easement. Id.

The road leading from Defendants’ home to Pleasant Hill Road is a roadway ingress/egress easement that the three houses jointly possess. That easement does not appear to be at issue in this proceeding. Instead, in the general area of the orange circle is the so-called ‘2005 easement.’ The ‘2005 easement’ was entered into by prior owners of the two properties.

The FAC alleges four causes of action for Quiet Title – Relocation of Easement, Quiet Title – Easement by Prescription, Declaratory Relief, and Injunctive Relief. Defendants demur here to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for a prescriptive easement on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action.

Here, Plaintiffs are seeking an injunction maintaining the status quo that would prevent Defendants from building additional items within the easement area. If Defendants were to build additional items within the easement area it could obstruct Plaintiffs’ use of the easement. Such harm interferes with Plaintiffs’ rights to use the easement area. In contrast, Defendants will not be harmed if they are temporarily prevented from adding additional items to the easement area.

This evidence creates a triable issue of material fact as to whether the parties intended to subordinate the conservation easement, the speculation of plaintiff’s expert William Hutton as to the bank’s intent (paras. 12-15) notwithstanding. The court also notes that DeJoria would not have the power to subordinate the conservation easement, because he was not – nor could he be under the statutory scheme -- the holder of the easement (CC 815.3), as a private party cannot hold a conservation easement.

Under California law, an easement may be extinguished through abandonment or through the servient estate reacquiring the easement by adverse possession.

The McCune Property is the dominant tenement to a recorded landscape easement dated March 1, 1999, (Easement Agreement) to which the SWI Property is the servient tenement. (FAC, ¶ 8 & exhibit 1.) The easement is a landscape easement over an approximately 10 foot strip of land (Landscape Strip) on the SWI Property adjacent to the McCune Property. (Ibid.) The easement is limited to McCune’s right to maintain and grow trees, bushes, and hedges (Foliage) for landscape purposes. (Ibid.)

An easement is also abandoned if, for a period of 20 years or more, the easement is not used, there is no separate tax assessment of the easement, and no instrument creating, reserving, transferring or otherwise evidencing the easement is recorded. (Civ. Code § 887.050.) Under that section, an abandoned easement is unenforceable and is deemed to have expired. (Id.) An easement by grant can be lost by prescription. Glatts v. Henson (1948) 31 Cal.2d 368, 371; Sevier v.

This occurred long after Chevron claims it believed in 2007 that the easement was no longer necessary. Likewise, Chevron does not dispute that it paid rent on the Pipeline Easement Agreement for the entirety of the easement term, even beyond 2007, a time when it now asserts it believed the easement was unnecessary.

Under common law, the abandonment of an express easement requires a manifest “intent to forswear all future conforming uses of the easement.” Faus v. Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 350, 363.

Under common law, the abandonment of an express easement requires a manifest “intent to forswear all future conforming uses of the easement.” Faus v. Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 350, 363.

Under common law, the abandonment of an express easement requires a manifest “intent to forswear all future conforming uses of the easement.” Faus v. Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 350, 363.

Under common law, the abandonment of an express easement requires a manifest “intent to forswear all future conforming uses of the easement.” Faus v. Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 350, 363.

Under common law, the abandonment of an express easement requires a manifest “intent to forswear all future conforming uses of the easement.” Faus v. Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 350, 363.

Under common law, the abandonment of an express easement requires a manifest “intent to forswear all future conforming uses of the easement.” Faus v. Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 350, 363.

The Meaghers’ evidence establishes that they have repeatedly sought to obtain Creason’s approval for the fence, but that Creason has refused to provide such approval unless the property description of the Primary Easement is modified. The parties’ Settlement and Easement Agreement does not require that the property description of the Primary Easement be modified, or that a new survey of Defendant’s property or the Primary Easement be completed.

Defendants contend the alleged view easement is not an enforceable negative easement; reports the only easement location that is described in the grant deed is the South 30 feet of Parcel One, adjacent to and north of the plaintiffs’ property; nevertheless the plaintiffs claim a view easement “over the entirety of defendants property;” contend plaintiffs cannot “enlarge” the easement location; therefore, plaintiffs cannot allege a view easement over the entire property; that the alleged view easement is not

It provides a “driveway easement” burdening the property at 1660 Spring Street (1660 Spring) for “vehicular and pedestrian ingress, egress, and access …” (Driveway Easement). The agreement giving rise to the Driveway Easement provides, in part: “[1664 Spring]’s use of the Driveway Easement shall be exclusive, and [1660 Spring] shall not grant or assign to other private parties any ingress, egress, and access rights in the Driveway Easement Strip.”

Equitable Easement A Court has discretion to grant an equitable easement only if the party seeking an easement shows that (1) the need for an easement was innocent and not the result of the willful act of the party seeking the easement; (2) the property owner will not be irreparably injured by the easement, and (3) the hardship to the party seeking the easement is greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused to the servient owner over whose property the easement is granted. (Shoen v.

Therefore, Defendants conclude that the claims for easement by necessity and implication both fail. Easement by Necessity “An easement by necessity ‘ “arises by operation of law when a grantor conveys land that is completely shut off from access to any road by land retained by the grantor or by land of the grantor and that of a stranger . . . .

The easement in this case was created and recorded by the original landowners of Parcel A and Parcel B. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. C at 2 (“Creation of Original Easement”).

Williams has placed an iron fence around much, but not all of the easement. Williams’ claim to adverse possession is complicated because Zerlins’ easement was never intended to be exclusive. So, mere open and notorious possession of the driveway is insufficient because that is entirely consistent with the easement. To be adverse to the exercise of the easement, the use must substantially interfere with the easement. Clearly the iron fence and gate have done that for part of the easement but not all.

When a grantor or owner of a conservation easement has shown that a party has threatened injury or actually injured a conservation easement, the owner or grantor of the conservation easement may enforce the terms of the easement by injunctive relief granted by any court of competent jurisdiction. The terms of the statute are permissive and not mandatory.

The Court finds that the agreement to remove any obstructions in the easement areas includes the removal of the rocks, plants and irrigation, as well as, the stone/rock retaining wall near the street from the easement area and the stone/rock retaining wall closer to the top of the pathway. These items are obstructions in the easement area and must be removed from the easement area. The wooden retaining wall near the gate does not need to be removed.

The District alleges that it previously granted a company, PacTel Mobile Access, an easement over a portion of the School grounds to construct and maintain facilities related to mobile cellular communications. The easement was recorded on April 11, 1989, and the District is informed and believes that after assignments, transfers or otherwise defendant Los Angeles SMSA Limited Partnership dba Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) is the current entity having the rights under the easement to use the easement area.

Their property is encumbered by an easement. The easement was created in 2000 as part of approval of a subdivision map. (FAC ¶¶ 5-6.) The easement is known as “S-3 Access Condition” and includes the following language: “private right-of-way easement shall be left open for pedestrian access between Happy Valley Road and Glen Road”. (FAC ¶6.)

The parties dispute the degree of obstruction on the easement and whether Plaintiffs had the ability to access the Reif property by way of the easement.

Statutory Abandonment of Easement California Civil Code section 887.040 provides that “the owner of real property subject to an easement” shall bring an action in the superior court of the county in which the real property subject to the easement is located “to establish the abandonment of the easement and to clear record title of the easement.” (Civil Code § 887.040(a)-(b).)

Statutory Abandonment of Easement California Civil Code section 887.040 provides that “the owner of real property subject to an easement” shall bring an action in the superior court of the county in which the real property subject to the easement is located “to establish the abandonment of the easement and to clear record title of the easement.” (Civil Code § 887.040(a)-(b).)

Statutory Abandonment of Easement California Civil Code section 887.040 provides that “the owner of real property subject to an easement” shall bring an action in the superior court of the county in which the real property subject to the easement is located “to establish the abandonment of the easement and to clear record title of the easement.” (Civil Code § 887.040(a)-(b).)

Statutory Abandonment of Easement California Civil Code section 887.040 provides that “the owner of real property subject to an easement” shall bring an action in the superior court of the county in which the real property subject to the easement is located “to establish the abandonment of the easement and to clear record title of the easement.” (Civil Code § 887.040(a)-(b).)

The community driveway easement is seen to add a third party to the agreement the City of LA. The LADBS form shows that the City of LA obtains rights in determining whether the easement can continue to exist. The easement thus turns the current two-party easement into a three-party easement.

The Third Amended Complaint still fails to allege a definite oral easement or interference with particular rights. A grant of an oral easement may overcome the statute of frauds if formed by an executed oral agreement.

entryway to allow Plaintiffs free access to the Easement Area.

The Habibi parcel is burdened by a 20-foot wide easement for access in favor of the Soofer parcel and the Burney Trust parcel is burdened by a 30-foot wide easement for access in favor of the Habibi and Soofer parcels. For over forty years, use of the 20-foot easement area and the 30-foot easement area was limited to an approximately twelve-and-one-half foot wide paved driveway.

The court explained the difference between a stairway easement and a normal easement: “An easement, in the true sense of the word, is an interest in real estate, and survives the destruction of a part of the servient tenement when there is anything remaining upon which the easement may operate.

"Access Easement"); 2.

The Demurrer relates to Plaintiff Gary Lane and Raelene Lane’s Complaint for (1) easement by necessity; (2) equitable easement; (3) quiet title; (4) prescriptive easement; (5) quiet title; and (6) preliminary and permanent injunction.

Defendant Sebring’s reply also argues that he has a right to fully improve a driveway easement and the legal standard is not necessity. He further argues in the reply that because every other property owner has allowed the Diablo Trail road easement to be paved, the easement granted over plaintiff’s land must necessarily have granted the use of the easement by means of a paved road and, therefore, a paved easement can not be a trespass.

Assuming this is correct, the court intends to order Defendant Bradley to sign the Punta Grazing Roadway Easement Agreement. The court should further order that the Punta Grazing Roadway Easement Agreement shall be recorded. (Stipulation for Settlement, � 11��a new Access . . . Easement signed by the necessary parties shall be recorded.) 3. Attorney�s Fees Plaintiffs ask for an award of attorney�s fees of $15,060 and costs of $90 for filing fees.

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of a prescriptive easement or equitable easement. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that she seeks an easement, not title by adverse possession. Plaintiff further argues that there are triable issues of fact on the elements of prescriptive easement and equitable easement, which cannot be disposed of by this motion. Plaintiff alternatively requests leave to amend the complaint, if the court is inclined to grant summary judgment or adjudication.

Defendant argues that an easement “may only be extinguished by acts of the easement owner (dominant tenement) which are incompatible with use of the easement.” (Demurrer, p. 6, ll. 21- 22, citing Civ. Code, § 811 (3).) Defendant further argues that because the complaint does not allege facts showing an action by Defendant making use of the deeded easement permanently impossible, the demurrer should be sustained.

The grant of easement expressly provides: it is a non-exclusive perpetual easement appurtenant to and runs with the dominant tenement; the easement granted is the right of ingress and egress across the easement area, the right to erect and maintain a split rail fence approximately at the perimeter of the easement area, the right to landscape, maintain existing landscaping, replace and replant landscaping within the easement area, and the right to engage in outdoor recreation within the easement area, including

Waldron, the 2,464 square foot strip taken has a value of $4,106,806.29 after imposition of the easement. He thus values the subsurface easement at: $6,159,901.44 - $4,106,806.29 = $2,053,095. If Mr. Waldron had properly started with a lower value of the deep subsurface strip taken before imposition of the easement, his value of the easement would necessarily be less. For example, if Mr.

For the foregoing reasons, Meurer has established triable issues as to whether Caddell’s use of the Driveway Easement and purported Garden Easement was hostile to Meurer, and in the case of the Driveway Easement, the allowable width of the driveway. IV.

on pursuing litigation that sought an overly broad easement which would unduly harm Funk Youth’s remaining property, yet offering to pay for only the more limited easement.

Even if a change in circumstances were to make the alleged prescriptive easement accessible by the general public, the destination would not be accessible to the general public without Plaintiff’s permission, and such permission would arguably exceed the scope of any prescriptive easement asserted at this time.

Even if a change in circumstances were to make the alleged prescriptive easement accessible to the general public, the destination would not be accessible to the general public without Plaintiff’s permission, and such permission would arguably exceed the scope of any prescriptive easement asserted at this time.

. ¶ 14 . ) Plaintiffs also submit evidence that defendants and their agents are able to access the Easement Area, including photos of defendants actually accessing the Easement Area. (Supp. Bakker Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7 & Ex. C.)

easement” which means the trail corridors have not been established.

The Straight Note allegedly required defendants to remove an easement on the property within 24 months or pay plaintiff Tri-Tool Inc. the sum of $200,000 It is apparently not disputed that the easement remains. Accordingly, plaintiff seeks the $200,000. Defendants are defending this claim in part by asserting that plaintiff interfered with their efforts to remove the easement.

Defendants point to the legal description of the Dewitt property, asserting that plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the Parcel 2 easement, the Parcel 3 easement, or the Easement, because it does not include an express grant of any benefit in any easement or an intent to create an easement. Defendants argue that the Dewitt property is burdened by the Easement and does not benefit from it.

Philbrick’s first cause of action for Quiet Title to Express Easement alleges that an express Easement was created by reservation in 1923 that burdens the Michielssen Property in favor of the Philbrick Property, and that although the Easement contains a scrivener’s error, that the easement has been continuously and openly used since 1923, and that Michielssen had actual and constructive notice of the existence of the express Easement.

The conservation easement notice provisions apply when a public entity is acquiring the fee title to land already subject to a conservation easement, not to an eminent domain proceeding seeking to establish a conservation easement.

However, this description applies to the physical location of the easement and does not appear to have anything to do with the purpose of the easement. Based upon the express language in the easement and the declarations submitted by the parties, the Court has doubts regarding Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the scope of the easement.

By its plain language, section 1104 requires a valid easement to have been created as a threshold matter, even if the grantor had authority to grant the easement. Because no valid easement was created, as discussed above, section 1104 is inapplicable. Therefore, the demurrer must be sustained. In opposition, defendants persuasively represent that they can assert their right to the disputed easement by prescriptive and implied easement theories.

Seventh Cause of Action for Interference with Easement: Plaintiff failed to allege an easement based on prescription, implication, equitable or estoppel. Without a proper easement, Plaintiff cannot allege interference with an easement. Eighth Cause of Action for Nuisance: This cause of action fails, because it is based on the prior cause of action Interference with Easement. Clerk to give notice.

Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to continue to use the Access Easement on Defendants property, without interference from Defendants because they have acquired a prescriptive easement over the Access Easement. An easement involves primarily the privilege of doing a certain act on, or to the detriment of, anothers property&.

An easement is a certain narrow right to use the real property of another without owning it. A prescriptive easement is an easement right granted at law when one party (the dominant estate) uses or accesses the property of another (the servient estate) for a specific purpose, for a defined period of time, without consent.

Given the above, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication for quiet title related to the existence and validity of the Driveway Easement is granted. The Court finds that the Driveway Easement is a valid easement and enforceable according to its terms.

A grant of easement is to be interpreted liberally in favor of the grantee. (Civ. Code, § 1069; Laux v. Freed (1960) 53 Cal.2d 512, 522.) Here, the Grant Deed provides that the Easement is for “roadway purposes and incidents thereto upon, over and across the easement area.” (Complaint, Exhibit C.)

Defendants disagree that the Jollys’ permission to grant easement rights is unnecessary. They attach the actual Jolly easement which repeatedly authorizes only a single underground waterline. They also note that if the Jollys do not consent to the solution of adding a second underground pipe line, whether within the existing easement or parallel to it, the defendants could find themselves defending a lawsuit brought by the Jollys about the scope of the easement.

Prescriptive Easement. Plaintiff concedes DROLET’s motion with regard to her cause of action for a prescriptive easement. Implied Easement.

MOTION Notice Of Motion To Modify Order On Perliminary Injunction; GRANT BOTH MOTIONS IN PART--(1)PLAINTIFF CAN USE THE EASEMENT FOR ACCESS TO PARKING ON CONCRETE PAD AND FOOT TRAFFIC TO THE CONCRETE PAD; (2)UTILITY WORKERS CAN WALK ON THE EASEMENT TO PERFORM WORK; (3)UTILITY WORKERS CAN DRIVE ON THE EASEMENT AND PARK ON THE CONCRETE PAD; AND (4)UTILITY WORKERS AND PLAINTIFF CANNOT PARK ON THE EASEMENT AND/OR BLOCK EASEMENT.

It does not reference any easement and interpreting it as “expressly excluding” the “yard use” easement as Plaintiffs do simply because it references the grant deed containing the easement is not a reasonable construction. Defendants filed a cross-action, alleging that they remain the owners “of an easement appurtenant to [their property, 10106 Carmen Road, Cupertino].

The purpose of the Modification was to reduce the size of the easement and to grant the Defendants the right to erect stone columns at the entrance to their property. See Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts No. 4-14. The Covenant served a different purpose from the Easement Documents.