The Unruh Civil Rights Act

The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits businesses from denying any person access to public accommodations based on specified classifications. (Hessians Motorcycle Club v. J.C. Flanagans (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 833 citing Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1148.)

The primary purpose of the Unruh Civil Rights Act “is to compel recognition of the equality of all persons in the right to the particular service offered by an organization or entity covered by the act.” (Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 712, 733.)

The Act provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.... A violation of the right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–336) shall also constitute a violation of this section.” (Civil Code §51(b); Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 730; Gates v. Super. Ct. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 508, 512.)

Thus, a violation of Unruh may be alleged by proof of intentional discrimination, or by specifying a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which does not require a showing of intentional discrimination. (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 664-65.) A plaintiff seeking to establish a case under the Unruh Act must plead and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations. (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 854.)

Types of Discrimination Covered and Classification

The protection afforded by the Act applies to “all persons,” and is not confined to a limited category of “protected classes.” (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 730; see Gates v. Super. Ct. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 508, 512.)

The enumeration of particular kinds of discrimination in the Act is “illustrative, rather than restrictive.” (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 721, 732.) The Act’s “language and its history compel the conclusion that the Legislature intended to prohibit all arbitrary discrimination by business establishments,” whether or not the ground of discrimination is expressly set forth in the Act. (Id.) The Unruh Civil Rights Act must be liberally construed with a view to effectuating the purposes for which it was enacted and to promote justice. (Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24, 28.)

In addition to the particular forms of discrimination specifically outlawed by the Act (sex, race, color, etc.), courts have held the Act “prohibit[s] discrimination based on several classifications which are not specifically enumerated in the statute.” (Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 515, 520.) These judicially recognized classifications include unconventional dress or physical appearance (In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217-218), families with children (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 721, 736-741), homosexuality (Rolon v. Kulwitzky (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 289, 292), and persons under age 18 (O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal. 3d 790, 794).

Additional non-enumerated classifications may be recognized after analyzing:

1. “the language of the statute,
2. the legitimate business interests of the defendants, and
3. the consequences of allowing the new discrimination claim.”

(Scripps Clinic v. Super. Ct. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 917, 933.)

The Unruh Act has been applied in different cases of discrimination. (e.g., Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72, 72–76, as modified on denial of reh'g (Dec. 19, 1985) (“The Act is this state’s bulwark against arbitrary discrimination in places of public accommodation.”); Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 730, 742-743 (rejecting “adult only” apartment complexes under the Act); North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1145, 1153, 1159 (“A medical group providing medical services to the public has been held to be a business establishment for purposes of the Act.”); Nicole M. By & Through Jacqueline M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“public schools are business establishments within the meaning of the Unruh Act").) Note that the enumeration of particular kinds of discrimination in the Act is “illustrative, rather than restrictive.” (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 732.)

Business Establishments

The focus of the Unruh Civil Rights Act is the prohibition of discrimination by business establishments that provide goods, services, or facilities. (Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72, 83.)

Discrimination by an employer is specifically not covered by the Act. (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500 (holding that employee could not recover under the Unruh Civil Rights Act because employer’s alleged discrimination did not constitute discrimination made by a “business establishment” in the course of furnishing goods, services, or facilities to its clients, patrons, or customers).)

Standing

Standing does depend on payment for services. “The cases discussing discrimination under Sections 51 and 52 do not focus on whether patrons who were personally discriminated against have alleged or proved that they paid a fee or were subject to unfair pricing before bringing a lawsuit. Indeed, much of the legal history surrounding Sections 51 and 52 involve plaintiffs who – like [plaintiff] and his family – were refused services, thereby making a purchase impossible. To hold that plaintiffs here lacked standing would contradict both the language and the intent of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.” (Osborne v. Yasmeh (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1118.)

Whether the act in question occurred in California does affect standing. “The Unruh Act protects ‘all persons within the jurisdiction’ from certain enumerated forms of discrimination. Thus, by its terms, it is expressly limited to discrimination that takes place within California’s borders.” (Warner v. Tinder, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2015) 105 F.Supp.3d 1083, 1099; see also Keum v. Virgin American, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2011) 781 F. Supp.2d 944, 955 (“The Unruh Act only applies to discrimination that takes place within California’s jurisdiction.”).)

Damages

Civil Code § 52 governs damages in Unruh cases. “Whoever [violates] Section 51… is liable for… the actual damages… but in no case less than four thousand dollars… and any attorney’s fees…” (Civil Code § 52(a).)