What is defamation?

Useful Resources for Defamation

Recent Rulings on Defamation

101-125 of 4472 results

DALEY VS KLUNK

The demurrer to the third cause of action for defamation is overruled. This court previously overruled the demurrer to the defamation claim. (Fourth cause of action in Second Amended Cross-complaint.) No basis for reconsideration has been presented. Cross-Defendants Donald L. Daley III and DIII Transport Corporation's Motion to Strike re: Third Amended Cross-Complaint is granted in part and denied in part. Daley is moving to strike all the claims pled in the Cross-complaint.

  • Hearing

    Dec 03, 2020

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

(NO CASE NAME AVAILABLE)

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, Respondents/Plaintiffs’ cross-claims relating to breach of contract, fraud, defamation per se, and injunctive relief were submitted to arbitration. See Tauger Decl., ¶ 7; Booth Decl., Exh. D.

  • Hearing

    Dec 03, 2020

LEANDRA GONZALEZ, ET AL. VS VICTORIA VU, ET AL.

per se; (2) libel and slander; (3) false light; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) elder abuse restraining order.

  • Hearing

    Dec 03, 2020

SIRISUP VS. MATSUNO

Second Prong: Plaintiff’s Probability of Prevailing Defendant contends that plaintiffs cannot establish a probability of prevailing on the merits for Slander Per Se because the alleged defamatory statements were not sufficiently pled, are privileged, or are protected. Ann contends that she has made a prima facie showing of facts to support the third cause of action for Slander Per Se because the defamatory statements, including that Ann is an alcoholic, and has a mental illness, are all false.

  • Hearing

    Dec 03, 2020

STEPHEN WINICK VS GATEWAY WESTWOOD 1, LLC, ET AL.

“Immunity under Government Code section 821.6 is not limited to claims for malicious prosecution, but also extends to other causes of action arising from conduct protected under the statute, including defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Kayfetz v. State of California (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 491, 492, 203 Cal.Rptr. 33 [defamation]; Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1435–1437, 246 Cal.Rptr. 609 [intentional infliction of emotional distress].)”. (Gillan v.

  • Hearing

    Dec 02, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

ZENNI OPTICAL, INC., ET AL VS. JANE DOE

“Not every word of an allegedly defamatory publication has to be false and defamatory to sustain a libel action . . . [T]he test of libel is not quantitative; a single sentence may be the basis for an action in libel even though buried in a much longer text.” (Id. at p. 625 (citations and internal quotations omitted).)

  • Hearing

    Dec 02, 2020

ERAM VS. DOES

Although the Court of Appeal held that only one statement, paragraph 8.8, survives the anti-SLAPP motion, a single allegation will be the support for all of the causes of action, including the first for defamation per se. However, If the striking of the other eight statements had the “potential to narrow the issues and focus of the claimed false statements,” that is sufficient to permit an award of prevailing party attorney’s fees to a partially successful defendant. (Mann, supra, at p. 340.)

  • Hearing

    Dec 01, 2020

OSHEEN HAGHNAZARIAN ET AL VS ALAN ROMERO ET AL

Romero finally argues that the litigation privilege bars Yaghobyan’s sixth cause of action for defamation, arising from Romero’s characterization of her as a “liar” and “fraudster” in his motions, pleadings, and communications with others. (FAC at pp. 23–24.) The litigation privilege is embodied in Civil Code § 47.

  • Hearing

    Dec 01, 2020

ANDREW JOHN MILES VS SEDGWICK CMS, INC., ET AL.

(Sedgwick) and California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA), alleging: (1) defamation: libel; (2) intentional interference with prospective business relations; and (3) negligent interference with prospective business relations. Both Defendants now move for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. For ease, the Court has consolidated its analysis of both motions into a single motion.

  • Hearing

    Dec 01, 2020

GARY MARSH, AN INDIVIDUAL VS CASTING NETWORK OF AMERICA, A BUSINESS ENTITY FORM UNKNOWN

Plaintiff’s sole cause of action for defamation does not seek recovery for personal injury or wrongful death and is not a claim that requires a statement of damages. See Code Civ. Proc. § 425.10(b).

  • Hearing

    Dec 01, 2020

SIMMONDS VS. WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.

Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 336 (affirming directed verdict on slander of title claim and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on negligence claim). Civ. Code § 2924(d), specifically provides that the mailing, publication, and delivery of notices as required herein, and the performance of the procedures set forth in this article, shall constitute privileged communications within Civ. Code § 47.

  • Hearing

    Dec 01, 2020

DEANNE DWORETZKY VS BRENDA BUONORA, ET AL.

On February 25, 2020, Plaintiff Deanne Dworetzy (Plaintiff) filed suit against Buonora Development, Inc. and Brenda Buonora (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) age discrimination; (2) retaliation (3) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment; (4) wrongful termination; (5) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) defamation; (8) failure to pay wages; (9) failure to provide wage statements; (10) failure to provide employment records; (11) violation

  • Hearing

    Dec 01, 2020

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Wrongful Term

KIESLING VS BUNETA

On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. The moving defendants have filed a special motion to strike pursuant to CCP § 425.16.

  • Hearing

    Nov 30, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

PAUL COLICHMAN VS KIMBERLY SARAH DONER

I. 1st cause of action for Slander of Title—OVERRULED A claim for slander of title exists where defendant made a statement that casts doubt about the plaintiff’s ownership of certain real or personal property. See CACI 1730. “Slander of title is a false and unprivileged disparagement, oral or written, of the title to real or personal property, resulting in actual pecuniary damage.” 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2020), Torts §747.

  • Hearing

    Nov 30, 2020

  • Judge

    H. Jay Ford

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

KIESLING VS BUNETA

On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. The moving defendants have filed a special motion to strike pursuant to CCP § 425.16.

  • Hearing

    Nov 30, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

KIESLING VS BUNETA

On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. Defendant challenges the allegations in paragraphs 28, 42, 45, 47, 59-61, 67, 71, 75-78, 80, 103 of the Complaint.

  • Hearing

    Nov 30, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

KIESLING VS BUNETA

On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. The moving defendants have filed a special motion to strike pursuant to CCP § 425.16.

  • Hearing

    Nov 30, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

KIESLING VS BUNETA

On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. The moving defendants have filed a special motion to strike pursuant to CCP § 425.16.

  • Hearing

    Nov 30, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

KIESLING VS BUNETA

On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, assault, stalking, IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, electronic eavesdropping and negligence. Defendant challenges the allegations in paragraphs 28, 42, 45, 47, 59-61, 67, 71, 75-78, 80, 103 of the Complaint.

  • Hearing

    Nov 30, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

MELISSA PERSON VS KENNETH D. MATHIS, ET AL.

Defamation – "The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage." (Sanders v. Walsh (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 855, 862.) Mathis argues that he has a probability of prevailing on the defamation claim but cites only to the Cross-Complaint, which does not constitute evidence. Mathis thus fails to sufficiently meet his prima facie burden.

  • Hearing

    Nov 24, 2020

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Other Employment

KIARA JONES VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Defendant also subjected Plaintiff to battery, assault, sexual harassment, sexual assault, groping, unwanted sexual propositions, unwanted sexual comments, threats of violence, slurs, defamation, an unsafe work environment, inferior terms and conditions of employment, solicitation of negative feedback, failure to engage in good faith in the interactive process and provide a reasonable accommodation based on disability/perceived disability, increased scrutiny, false/pretextual criticism, failure to investigate

  • Hearing

    Nov 23, 2020

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Other Employment

TURMEL WOODS VS CITY OF COMPTON, A MUNICIPALITY

BACKGROUND The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) arises from Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful termination, alleging causes of action for: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (2) tortious breach of employment contract by termination; (3) wrongful demotion; (4) adverse employment action; (5) tortious breach of good faith and fair dealing; (6) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) negligence; and (9) defamation

  • Hearing

    Nov 23, 2020

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Wrongful Term

EVELYN LOZADA VS OGOM CHIJINDU

On October 14, 2020, counsel for Chijindu, Jeffrey Schwartz, filed a declaration in which counsel declares that “[o]n September 15, 2020, I emailed a Meet and Confer letter to Lozada's counsel ([email protected]) stating that, based upon my research, Lozada's cause of action for Defamation should be dismissed because Chijindu's statements that Lozada was a racist bigot were not provably false assertions of fact,” and attached a copy of the email as Exhibit A. (Schwartz Decl. ¶ 3.)

  • Hearing

    Nov 20, 2020

TONY SPEARS VS WALGREEN PHARMACY SERVICES MIDWEST, AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION, ET AL.

‘A “false light” cause of action is in substance equivalent to a libel claim, and should meet the same requirements of the libel claim . . . .’ Indeed, ‘[w]hen a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action.’" Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1264 (citations omitted).

  • Hearing

    Nov 20, 2020

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Wrongful Term

MELBE ZEPEDA VS GUSTAVO RODRIGUEZ

.; and (7) defamation. B. Motion on Calendar On August 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file the First Amended Complaint. On October 6, 2020, Defendant filed a reply brief. On November 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.

  • Hearing

    Nov 20, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

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