Cyber Exploitation – Distribution of Private Sexually Explicit Materials in California

of sexually explicit materials.

of sexually explicit materials (against Johnson).

of sexually explicit materials (against Johnson).

of sexually explicit materials (against Johnson).

The restraining order requested included that Rob “be restrained under Civil Code § 1708.85 from showing, posting online or on social media, or distributing in any way private, intimate or sexually explicit photos of me, or any photos of me in the hospital.” (Id., Attachment 23, ¶ 1.)

The restraining order requested included that Rob “be restrained under Civil Code § 1708.85 from showing, posting online or on social media, or distributing in any way private, intimate or sexually explicit photos of me, or any photos of me in the hospital.” (Id., Attachment 23, ¶ 1.)

of sexually explicit materials.

Code § 1708.85(f)(1) [allowing plaintiff who sues for intentional distribution of sexually explicit materials without consent to proceed under pseudonym]; Doe v. Lincoln Unified School Dist. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 758, 766 [citing cases where party used fictitious name to protect privacy interest].)

Code § 1708.85(a).) However, there shall be no liability if the distributed material was previously distributed by another person. (Civ. Code § 1708.85(c)(6).) In this case, the FAC claims that Nair, who Plaintiff shared the alleged content with, admitted that he shared the intimate content with several individuals, including Defendant Corbett who shared the content with additional people. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 12.)

Civil Code § 1708.85(f)(1) provides that a Plaintiff in a civil proceeding for violation of that section may exclude their true name and other identifying characteristics from the court record. More specifically, Civil Code § 1708.85(f)(2)(C) directs that all court orders shall be worded so as to protect the name or other identifying characteristics of the plaintiff from public revelation.

The Motion (ROA # 83) of Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Plaintiff") for a modification of injunction regarding use of Plaintiff's true name in subpoenas, pursuant to Civil Code 1708.85(f), and a continuance of trial and related dates, based on the requirements of the Revenge Porn Statute, Code of Civil Procedure 1708.85(f) which requires all documents filed, served, and used in discovery to use a pseudonym for Plaintiff, will be HEARD.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for (1) negligence; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (4) public disclosure of private facts; (5) distribution of private sexually explicit materials (CCP §1708.85); and (6) civil conspiracy. Defendants now demur to each cause of action. The primary argument made by Defendants is that each cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code §47(b).

This case arises out of the viewing and dissemination of sexually explicit photos of Plaintiff from Plaintiffs phone by Melissa Hammond, Robert Ruiz, Matt Lents, (collectively, the Individual Defendants). During an investigation into overtime compensation, CHP obtained Plaintiffs mobile phone. While searching Plaintiffs phone, Ruiz and Lentz discovered sexually explicit photos of Plaintiff. Ruiz and Lentz shared these photos with Hammond.

In the original litigation the jury found defendant violated of Civil Code §1708.85 on August 25, 2017. Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff served defendant with a deposition notice on September 1, 2020, setting defendant's deposition for October 15, 2020.

Code §1708.85, a plaintiff may proceed under a pseudonym, and other parties must redact identifying characteristics from court filings so as to prevent public revelation of plaintiffs identity. Cal. Civ. Code §1708.85(f)(1)-(2). Doe argues the opposition violates §1708.85(f)(1) by including her name, lawsuits in which she is involved and other identifying characteristics.

Code, § 1708.85(a)-(c).) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot carry her burden of showing a probability of success on the merits because the subject photographs related to matters of public concern, were previously distributed by another and did not expose an intimate body part.

Defendant is really attacking the pleading for failure to state a cause of action for violation of Civil Code § 1708.85 and the Unruh Civil Rights Act[1]. However, a motion to strike may not be utilized as a demurrer: Preliminarily, we note a motion to strike is generally used to reach defects in a pleading which are not subject to demurrer. A motion to strike does not lie to attack a complaint for insufficiency of allegations to justify relief; that is a ground for general demurrer. (Warren v.

On August 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (SAC) for (1) Defamation, (2) Libel, (3) Slander, (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), (5) Civil Code § 1708.85, and (6) Negligence against Defendant Cordoba.

Plaintiff argues that the application suggested by Defendant is outside the holding of Kapellas , which regarded unflattering reporting on family related matters – not the distribution of illegally distributed sexually explicit material depicting a candidate.

Code, § 1708.85(a)-(c).) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot carry her burden of showing a probability of success on the merits because the subject photographs related to matters of public concern, were previously distributed by another and did not expose an intimate body part.

Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) on 5/14/21 alleging eleven causes of action: 1) negligence; 2) negligent supervision; 3) negligent hiring/retention; 4) negligent failure to warn, train, or educate; 5) constructive fraud; 6) breach of fiduciary duty; 7) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); 8) gender violence;1 9) commercial sexual exploitation of a minor; 10) constructive invasion of privacy; and 11) distribution of sexually explicit materials. *** Defendant, Johnson

Sections 1708.5-1708.9 are about sexual battery, domestic violence, harassment, invasion of privacy, distribution of sexually explicit photos and video, and preventing entrance into a school or health facility. No such act is alleged in the complaint, and these sections are completely irrelevant to this case.

Sections 1708.5-1708.9 are about sexual battery, domestic violence, harassment, invasion of privacy, distribution of sexually explicit photos and video, and preventing entrance into a school or health facility. No such act is alleged in the complaint, and these sections are completely irrelevant to this case.

First Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code Section 1708.85 Civil Code section 1708.85, entitled “Distribution of sexually explicit materials; private cause of action; use of pseudonym,” provides, in relevant part: (a) A private cause of action lies against a person who intentionally distributes by any means a photograph, film, videotape, recording, or any other reproduction of another, without the other's consent, if (1) the person knew that the other person had a reasonable expectation that the

Tokyo Villa avers that the only statute that would allow Plaintiff to use a pseudonym is Civil Code 1708.85, which provides, in relevant part, that: (a) A private cause of action lies against a person who intentionally distributes by any means a photograph, film, videotape, recording, or any other reproduction of another, without the other’s consent...

To be blunt, the case revolves around a sexually explicit video, which wife claims husband stole from her computer and then used to blackmail her. Both parties are highly educated medical doctors. The complaint was filed July 18, 2016. ROA 1. There were profound problems with the initial filing, as plaintiff's counsel initially failed to comply with CRC 2.550. The court eventually worked out these issues. ROA 9-14. The defendant husband answered the complaint. ROA 30.

Code § 1708.85(c)(6).) Defendant asserts that this factual admission is fatal not only to Plaintiff’s claim of conspiracy against Messina, but also to any concept that he could have liability for the underlying tort he is claimed to have conspired to commit. Defendant contends that similarly fatal to a revenge porn claim against Defendant is the fact that there can be no liability under California Civil Code § 1708.85(c)(4) when the “distributed material constitutes a matter of public concern.”

Analysis (1) Violation of Civil Code § 1708.85 Defendant moves for summary adjudication on this cause of action on the grounds that Timmons did not distribute explicit photographs of Plaintiff and that Defendant is not vicariously liable for violation of Civil Code § 1708.85 because Timmons acted beyond the scope of his employment.

See, e.g., Civil Code §1708.85. Petitioner does not meet any of these criteria. He is on the DOJ’s child abuse index and seeks to get off it. He cites no statute which requires that his identity remain confidential. No exceptional circumstances exist that are highly sensitive and personal to him, such as sexual assault victim or HIV status. The injury Petitioner seeks to avoid will not be incurred by disclosure of his identity. He already is on CACI.

Plaintiffs Complaint alleges causes of action: (1) violation of Civil Code § 1708.85; (2) violation of common law right of publicity; (3) defamation per se; (4) defamation per quod; (5) intentional interference with existing and prospective economic relations; and (6) negligent interference with existing and prospective economic relations. Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Code § 1708.85). The statute does not, however, disfavor jury trials in actions brought under that section or otherwise limit a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial. The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s argument that she is attempting to protect her minor children from additional exposure to media coverage regarding the revenge porn claims by seeking to have those claims tried as a bench trial. Perhaps that argument will ultimately prevail upon Defendant.

Ferber (1982) 458 U.S. 747, the Supreme Court held that its previous obscenity standards did not apply to child pornography, as the First Amendment did not protect sexually explicit depictions of children. ( Id . at 761.) In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court held the question whether such images could nonetheless be entitled to constitutional protection due to educational, scientific, or artistic value would have to be resolved on a case-by-case, as applied basis. ( Id . at 773.)

Plaintiff Fidel Torres (“Torres”) was employed by Defendant D/T Carson Enterprises (“Carson Enterprises”) from March 6, 2018 to August 10, 2018 as a mechanic’s helper and welder. alleges that co-worker, Steven Young (“Young”) made sexually explicit comments and gestures to Plaintiff due to his perceived orientation. Plaintiff asserts that he complained to human resources (HR) and his direct supervisor about the alleged harassment, but no preventative action was taken.

Dissemination of Plaintiffs private images to Hammond Ruiz and Lenta contend they could not have disseminated Plaintiffs sexual images because they never accessed the sexual images, never had physical possession of Plaintiffs cell phone, and never had possession, custody, or control of the sexually explicit images seized from Plaintiffs phone per the warrant. (UMF 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35.)

California Civil Code section 1708.85 enacts a private cause of action for distribution of material exposing private body parts or sexual acts of another without permission. (Cal. Civ. Code §1708.85(a).) “A plaintiff in a civil proceeding pursuant to subdivision (a), may proceed using a pseudonym …” (Id. at (f)(1).)

On August 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (SAC) for (1) Defamation, (2) Libel, (3) Slander, (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), (5) Civil Code § 1708.85, and (6) Negligence against Defendant Cordoba. On November 13, 2023, Defendant Cordoba filed her Answer.

Code § 1708.85(f)(1) [pseudonym permitted in suit against person who distributes photos, films, etc. of plaintiff's intimate body parts].) Even in the absence of a statute, anonymity for parties may be granted when necessary to preserve an important privacy interest. ( DFEH v. Superior Court (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 105, 110.)

Distribution of Obscene Materials Cal. Civ. Code §1708.85(b) creates a private cause of action against a person who intentionally distributes material that exposes an intimate body part of another person without that persons consent. This cause of action is based on allegations that defendants, without consent, took pictures of Doe while she was partially clothed. Defendants argue the SAC does not allege distribution of these photos or facts showing liability for Olson, the HOA or LBPM.

Code § 1708.85. On August 20, 2018, the church member Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which Plaintiffs did not oppose. On August 21, 2018, the church Defendants filed their own anti-SLAPP motion, which Plaintiffs opposed. On September 12, 2018, the court granted both anti-SLAPP motions, struck the complaint, and ordered the action dismissed with prejudice. On October 5, 2018, Defendants filed the instant attorney fee motion. On January 25, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an opposition.

The SAC alleges (1) negligence (against the District); (2) negligent hiring, retention & supervision (against the District); (3) common law invasion of privacy (against Riden); (4) Constitutional invasion of privacy (against the District); (5) Constitutional Invasion of Privacy (against Riden); (6) violation of Civil Code 1708.85 (against Riden); (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) (against Riden); and (8) (erroneously

Sections 1708.5-1708.9 are about sexual battery, domestic violence, harassment, invasion of privacy, distribution of sexually explicit photos and video, and preventing entrance into a school or health facility. No such act is alleged in the complaint, these sections are completely irrelevant to this case, and they should not have been included in the complaint.

Code § 1708.85, [t]hough no court has yet addressed the applicable statute of limitations, it is likely the three-year statute of limitations applies which governs [a]n action upon a liability created by statute , other than a penalty or forfeiture. [CCP § 338(a)]. ( Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def. Ch. 2(XII)-D.) The SAC alleges Plaintiff discovered the revenge porn in the spring of 2020. The Complaint was filed in December 2021.

Code, § 1708.85, subd. (f)(1) [“A plaintiff who proceeds using a pseudonym and excluding or redacting identifying characteristics as provided in this section shall file with the court and serve upon the defendant a confidential information form for this purpose that includes the plaintiff's name and other identifying characteristics excluded or redacted.”].)

Specifically, between 50 and 100 times, in 2017, he (1) begged Plaintiff to give him “one night” so that he could show her what he was all about, and (2) made the sexually explicit comments regarding Plaintiff’s vagina or “pussy.” (Id). RUVALCABA also made prurient comments about Ms. Bolanos’ rear end over 100 times in 2017. (Id.) In mid-September 2017, RUVALCABA instructed another coworker: “Look. She’s bending down. She’s ready for you [i.e., for intercourse].