(Based on The State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 2016-195.)
One of the most important duties of an attorney is to preserve the secrets of his client, and “[n]o rule in the ethics of the legal profession is better established nor more rigorously enforced than this one.” (Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey (1932) 216 Cal. 564, 572.)
Preserving the confidentiality of client information contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. (In re Jordan (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575, 580.) Attorney-client privilege is necessary to “safeguard the confidential relationship between clients and their attorneys so as to promote full and open discussion of the facts and tactics surrounding individual legal matters.” (Mitchell v. Super. Ct. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 599.)
The duty of an attorney is “[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068(e)(1).) The attorney-client privilege is a statutorily created evidentiary rule that protects from disclosure a “confidential communication” between a lawyer and his or her client. (Evid. Code, § 954; Solin v. O’Melveny & Myers (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 451, 456-57.)
“Although exercise of the privilege may occasionally result in the suppression of relevant evidence, the Legislature of this state has determined that these concerns are outweighed by the importance of preserving confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship.” (Costco v. Super. Ct. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732.)
The party claiming the privilege has “the burden of establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise, i.e., a communication made in the course of an attorney-client relationship. Once that party establishes facts necessary to support a prima facie claim of privilege, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish the communication was not confidential or that the privilege does not for other reasons apply.” (Id. at p. 733.)
For purposes of the attorney-client privilege, “confidential communication” is defined as “information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence.” (Evid. Code, § 952; In re Jordan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 930, 939-40.) The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality applies to information relating to the representation, whatever its source, and encompasses matters communicated in confidence by the client, and therefore protected by the attorney-client privilege, matters protected by the work product doctrine, and matters protected under the ethical standards of confidentiality, all as established in law, rule and policy. (In the Matter of Johnson (Rev. Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 189.) In other words, information protected by the ethical duty of confidentiality is broader than what is protected as attorney-client privilege under the Evidence Code. (Id. at p. 189.)
“[A]n attorney is forbidden to do either of two things after severing his relationship with a former client. He may not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he formerly represented him nor may he at any time use against his former client knowledge or information acquired by virtue of the previous relationship.” (Wutchumna, supra, 216 Cal. at pp. 573-74; Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 822-23.)
When an attorney’s representation of a current client may conflict with the interests of a former client, the duty to maintain client confidences is jeopardized. (M’Guinness v. Johnson (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 602, 613.) Where an attorney’s representation of a former client is substantially related to the attorney’s representation of a current client, a presumption arises that the attorney has obtained confidential information from the former client. (Fiduciary Trust Internat. of California v. Super. Ct. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 465, 480.)
“To rebut the presumption, the challenged attorney has the burden of showing that the practical effect of formal screening has been achieved. The showing must satisfy the trial court that the employee has not had and will not have any involvement with the litigation, or any communication with attorneys or coemployees concerning the litigation, that would support a reasonable inference that the information has been used or disclosed. If the challenged attorney fails to make this showing, then the court may disqualify the attorney and law firm.” (In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 596.)
“A former client may seek to disqualify a former attorney from representing an adverse party by showing the former attorney actually possesses confidential information adverse to the former client.” (Costello v. Buckley (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 748, 754.) “There is no strict requirement of precise relationship between the factual and legal issues of the two cases.” (Id.)
“[T]he purpose of a disqualification must be prophylactic; an attorney may not be disqualified purely as a punitive or disciplinary measure.” (Neal v. Health Net, Inc. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 831, 844.)
“A trial court’s authority to disqualify an attorney derives from the power inherent in every court to control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.)
Proof, however, cannot be made by declaration based on information and belief. (Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497–1498.) The question is whether the plaintiff has presented evidence in opposition to the defendant’s motion that, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. (Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 965.)
Oct 21, 2019
Real Property
other
Los Angeles County, CA
The important point here is that Judge Smyth's decision was based on the untimeliness of plaintiff's resentencing request, not on the information provided by the District Attorney regarding plaintiff's conduct. There is simply no connection between his decision and the allegedly "false and misleading" information imparted by DDA Tafreshi. This leads inexorably to the conclusion that plaintiff suffered no injury as the result of the written representations which are at the core of this case.
Oct 21, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
San Diego County, CA
The important point here is that Judge Smyth's decision was based on the untimeliness of plaintiff's resentencing request, not on the information provided by the District Attorney regarding plaintiff's conduct. There is simply no connection between his decision and the allegedly "false and misleading" information imparted by DDA Tafreshi. This leads inexorably to the conclusion that plaintiff suffered no injury as the result of the written representations which are at the core of this case.
Oct 21, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
San Diego County, CA
Any proposed assignee, transferee or sublessee shall submit to Landlord an application and credit information for Landlord’s approval and, if approved, shall sign a separate written agreement with Landlord and Tenant Landlord’s consent to any one assignment, transfer or sublease, shall not be construed as consent to any subsequent assignment, transfer or sublease and does not release Tenant of Tenant’s obligations under this Agreement. . .” (Facts 15 & 16.) A.
Oct 21, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
The important point here is that Judge Smyth's decision was based on the untimeliness of plaintiff's resentencing request, not on the information provided by the District Attorney regarding plaintiff's conduct. There is simply no connection between his decision and the allegedly "false and misleading" information imparted by DDA Tafreshi. This leads inexorably to the conclusion that plaintiff suffered no injury as the result of the written representations which are at the core of this case.
Oct 21, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
San Diego County, CA
knowledge of ISCM’s affairs and ISCM’s confidential information to benefit Scott, and secretly prepared, and participated in the preparation of, pleadings filed by Scott.”
Oct 21, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
The important point here is that Judge Smyth's decision was based on the untimeliness of plaintiff's resentencing request, not on the information provided by the District Attorney regarding plaintiff's conduct. There is simply no connection between his decision and the allegedly "false and misleading" information imparted by DDA Tafreshi. This leads inexorably to the conclusion that plaintiff suffered no injury as the result of the written representations which are at the core of this case.
Oct 21, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
San Diego County, CA
The important point here is that Judge Smyth's decision was based on the untimeliness of plaintiff's resentencing request, not on the information provided by the District Attorney regarding plaintiff's conduct. There is simply no connection between his decision and the allegedly "false and misleading" information imparted by DDA Tafreshi. This leads inexorably to the conclusion that plaintiff suffered no injury as the result of the written representations which are at the core of this case.
Oct 21, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
San Diego County, CA
Plaintiffs request no. 13 further asks that the Court take judicial notice of Defendant’s Statement of Information obtained form the California Secretary of State’s website, and the fact that Defendant’s website admits they are a global payment gateway management company, and since 2007, under the dba of Authorize.net, provides credit-card processing services for independent sales organization resellers, on the grounds that the information is not reasonably subject to dispute and capable of immediate and accurate
Oct 21, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
Los Angeles County, CA
• Information from Twitchell Island where rice is grown next to corn on soils with similar organic matter content indicates that the subsidence rates are reduced by over 85%. Allen Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. 15 at 29-30 (Factors Affecting Sustainability on Staten Island, Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta). Additional Fact 49. • In 2009, DWR estimated that there was a 72% to 84% probability of levee failure on Staten Island.
Oct 21, 2019
San Joaquin County, CA
Accordingly, the attorney fee/cost award is limited to the billing entries which were accrued specifically in pursuing plaintiff’s PRA request. In reviewing the billing information supplied in the motion, that amount appears to be $2,120 in attorney fees and $435 in costs. Pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312(a) and Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5(a), no further written order is necessary.
Oct 21, 2019
Other
Intellectual Property
Fresno County, CA
The Court retains an independent right and responsibility to review the requested attorney fees and award only so much as it determines to be reasonable. (See Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 127-128.) While 1/3 of the common fund for attorney fees is generally considered reasonable, counsel shall submit lodestar information prior to the final approval hearing in this matter so the Court can compare the lodestar information with the requested fees.
Oct 18, 2019
Santa Clara County, CA
Class members are informed of their qualifying work weeks as reflected in defendants’ records and instructed how to dispute this information. Class members are given 60 days to request exclusion from the class, dispute their workweek information, submit a written objection, and/or submit a consent to join form. They are instructed that they must submit a consent to join form to participate in the FLSA settlement, but that they will still be able to participate in the class settlement without doing so.
Oct 18, 2019
Santa Clara County, CA
To nos. 142-143, Slim Glow objected on the basis that the RPDs seek documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine.
Oct 18, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed a petition on June 28, 2019 in which Plaintiff petitioned the Court for assignment of a Superior Court file number and asserted that: (1) it is an insurer on a claim submitted by Defendant who is its insured for a reported theft loss on January 28, 2019; (2) as part of the claim investigation being conducted by Plaintiff, Defendant is required to produce cell phone records from January 27, 2019 to January 29, 2019 with “push to talk” call information and tower site information; and
Oct 18, 2019
Other
Intellectual Property
Los Angeles County, CA
Where it said to enter her contact information and digital signature, she typed in her own cell phone number and email address but put down her father’s name as the adult who was signing the form. For birth date, she accidentally typed in her mother’s birthdate instead of her fathers. Defendants rely on a notice of claim letter sent to Defendants on May 14, 2018.
Oct 18, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Allegations Made on Information and Belief Jannki moves to strike portions of Paragraphs 13, 26, and 29 on the ground that they are made on information and belief without pleading a basis for believing the same. “ ‘A [p]laintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within his personal knowledge, if he has information leading him to believe that the allegations are true.’ ” Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)
Oct 18, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
Los Angeles County, CA
Defendants also misrepresented the nature of their chemical products, by withholding information from plaintiff regarding toxic chemicals released from their products during their anticipated or reasonable foreseeable uses, and such misrepresentation and withholding of information was ratified by the corporate officers and managers of each of the defendants.
Oct 18, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Additionally, the duties described of a dual representative real estate broker, as is the case here, would militate against the disclosure of the information at issue in the instant case, as “a dual agent may not, without the express permission of the respective party, disclose to the other party confidential information, including, but not limited to, facts relating to either the Buyer’s or Seller’s financial position, motivations, bargaining position, or other personal information that may impact price”.
Oct 18, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
Los Angeles County, CA
While Chase allegedly agreed to review Plaintiffs’ loan modification application, there are no allegations that Chase wrongfully rejected the application because it was using incorrect information and that it improperly handled the application, which deprived Plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain a loan modification that Plaintiffs were qualified to receive. Thus, the Court does not find that Alvarez applies to the facts of this case.
Oct 18, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
The 4/9/18 Service Professional Agreement states in relevant part: (c) REPRESENTATIVE ACTION WAIVER-PLEASE READ Handy and Service Professional mutually agree that by entering into this agreement to arbitrate, both waive their right to have any dispute or claim brought, heard or arbitrated as a representative action, including, but not limited to, a private attorney general action, and an arbitrator shall not have any authority to arbitrate a representative action, including, but not limited to, a private attorney
Oct 18, 2019
Employment
Other Employment
Los Angeles County, CA
As the Court cannot adequately analyze these factors with the information provided herein, the Court will consider this factor to be neutral in its analysis. Financial Condition & Insurance Policy Limits – No information is provided in the motion regarding Hanson’s financial condition or any insurance policy limits that may factor in to the settlement figure. Without information, therefore, the Court will consider these factors as neutral.
Oct 18, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Within 14 days of entry of the Court’s execution of the order, defendant need provide the contact information for class members to the class administrator, who must mail such notice (including re-mailings) within 30 days from receiving the mailing information.
Oct 18, 2019
Fresno County, CA
Based on this information, the court is inclined to CONTINUE the hearing on the application. Plaintiff must address the assignment issue and Defendant’s payment of $15,000.00 to Euler Hermes in a supplemental declaration.
Oct 18, 2019
Real Property
Landlord Tenant
Los Angeles County, CA
” #64 – This interrogatory seeks information concerning the doctors the decedent last visited but does not contain a time period. Therefore, the Court limits this interrogatory to five years before the decedent’s death. Defendant’s motion is granted. The Court orders Plaintiff to provide contact information for all doctors the decedent saw during this time period. #65 – Plaintiff’s objections are overruled. Defendant’s motion is denied because Plaintiff has provided a code-compliant answer.
Oct 18, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
other
Los Angeles County, CA
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