Purpose and Scope

“Vehicle Code section 14602.6 provides for the removal, seizure and impounding for 30 days of a vehicle driven by a driver while unlicensed or while his or her driving privileges are suspended or revoked.” (Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Department (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 546, 548-49 citing Veh. Code, Sec. 14602(a).) “Following notice by the impounding agency, the registered and legal owner of a vehicle that is removed and seized . . . shall be provided the opportunity for a storage hearing to determine the validity of, or consider any mitigating circumstances attendant to, the storage....” (Id., citing Sec. 14602.6(b).)

Vehicle Code section 14602.6 states in relevant part that: "(1) Whenever a peace officer determines that a person was driving a vehicle while his or her driving privilege was suspended or revoked, driving a vehicle while his or her driving privilege is restricted pursuant to Section 13352 or 23575 and the vehicle is not equipped with a functioning, certified interlock device, or driving a vehicle without ever having been issued a driver's license, the peace officer may either immediately arrest that person and cause the removal and seizure of that vehicle or, if the vehicle is involved in a traffic collision, cause the removal and seizure of the vehicle without the necessity of arresting the person in accordance with Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 22650) of Division 11. A vehicle so impounded shall be impounded for 30 days."

Legislative History and Purpose

Section 14602.6 was added to the Vehicle Code by Statutes of 1994, chapter 1221, section 13, as part of a number of provisions dealing with the registration and licensing of vehicles, the revocation and suspension of licenses and punishments for driving with a suspended or revoked license. It was introduced as Senate Bill No. 1758 by Senator Quentin Kopp on February 24, 1994. (Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Department (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 546, 557-58. citing Sen. Weekly Hist., No. 258 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) Oct. 5, 1994, at 639.) Section 14602.6 regarding impounding and storage of vehicles driven by unlicensed drivers and section 14604 making it unlawful for a vehicle's owner to knowingly allow another person to drive the vehicle upon a highway without first making a reasonable effort or inquiry to determine that the driver had a valid driver's license were both contained, along with other provisions, in Senate Bill No. 1758 as originally introduced and ultimately enacted into law. (Id., citing Text of Sen. Bill No. 1758 as chaptered, Stats. 1994, ch. 1221.)

The purpose of the bill, according to the Senate Committee on Judiciary analysis "is to make changes in the vehicle code to deter people from driving with a suspended license or under the influence, and permanently revoke the license of a driver convicted of assault using a vehicle as a deadly weapon." ((Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Department (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 546, 558 citing Senate Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1758 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess., as amended Apr. 14, 1994, at 5.) The need for the bill was described therein by Senator Kopp: "[U]nlicensed . . . drivers pose a threat to safety on our roads and highways." (Id.) “[I]t is clear that disqualified drivers are substantially over-involved in fatal accidents in California.” ( Id.)

Trial Court Discretion

In People v. One 1986 Cadillac Deville (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 157, 163, the court of appeal held that the trial court has discretion to deny forfeiture under Section 14607.6(a) even though all of the elements of the statute are met. In Cadillac, the driver of a motor vehicle was stopped for exceeding the speed limit. When the driver failed to produce a valid driver’s license, the vehicle was impounded. Because the driver had been previously convicted of driving while his driving privilege had been suspended, the district attorney initiated forfeiture proceedings. During the forfeiture hearing, the driver presented a valid driver’s license that was issued after his vehicle had been impounded. After considering the evidence, the trial court denied the petition for forfeiture and ordered the vehicle returned to the claimant.

On appeal, the district attorney argued that the trial court had no discretion to deny the petition because all of the criteria for forfeiture under Section 14607.6 had been met. The court of appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. (Id., at 163.) The court reasoned that the statutory language “subject to forfeiture” means the court has discretion whether to deny forfeiture. (Id., at 160.) Although the district attorney argued that reading the statute to confer discretion to deny forfeiture would defeat the purpose of the statute, which is to deter those previously convicted of driving without a license from again driving without a license, the court found this argument unpersuasive. The court noted that there is a significant deterrent in the costs and inconvenience inherent in impoundment and retention of the vehicle. Moreover, there is no assurance that the court will exercise its discretion to return the vehicle to the claimant. (Id., at 163.)