“Vehicle Code section 14602.6 provides for the removal, seizure and impounding for 30 days of a vehicle driven by a driver while unlicensed or while his or her driving privileges are suspended or revoked.” (Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Department (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 546, 548-49 citing Veh. Code, Sec. 14602(a).) “Following notice by the impounding agency, the registered and legal owner of a vehicle that is removed and seized . . . shall be provided the opportunity for a storage hearing to determine the validity of, or consider any mitigating circumstances attendant to, the storage....” (Id., citing Sec. 14602.6(b).)
Vehicle Code section 14602.6 states in relevant part that: "(1) Whenever a peace officer determines that a person was driving a vehicle while his or her driving privilege was suspended or revoked, driving a vehicle while his or her driving privilege is restricted pursuant to Section 13352 or 23575 and the vehicle is not equipped with a functioning, certified interlock device, or driving a vehicle without ever having been issued a driver's license, the peace officer may either immediately arrest that person and cause the removal and seizure of that vehicle or, if the vehicle is involved in a traffic collision, cause the removal and seizure of the vehicle without the necessity of arresting the person in accordance with Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 22650) of Division 11. A vehicle so impounded shall be impounded for 30 days."
Section 14602.6 was added to the Vehicle Code by Statutes of 1994, chapter 1221, section 13, as part of a number of provisions dealing with the registration and licensing of vehicles, the revocation and suspension of licenses and punishments for driving with a suspended or revoked license. It was introduced as Senate Bill No. 1758 by Senator Quentin Kopp on February 24, 1994. (Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Department (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 546, 557-58. citing Sen. Weekly Hist., No. 258 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) Oct. 5, 1994, at 639.) Section 14602.6 regarding impounding and storage of vehicles driven by unlicensed drivers and section 14604 making it unlawful for a vehicle's owner to knowingly allow another person to drive the vehicle upon a highway without first making a reasonable effort or inquiry to determine that the driver had a valid driver's license were both contained, along with other provisions, in Senate Bill No. 1758 as originally introduced and ultimately enacted into law. (Id., citing Text of Sen. Bill No. 1758 as chaptered, Stats. 1994, ch. 1221.)
The purpose of the bill, according to the Senate Committee on Judiciary analysis "is to make changes in the vehicle code to deter people from driving with a suspended license or under the influence, and permanently revoke the license of a driver convicted of assault using a vehicle as a deadly weapon." ((Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Department (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 546, 558 citing Senate Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1758 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess., as amended Apr. 14, 1994, at 5.) The need for the bill was described therein by Senator Kopp: "[U]nlicensed . . . drivers pose a threat to safety on our roads and highways." (Id.) “[I]t is clear that disqualified drivers are substantially over-involved in fatal accidents in California.” ( Id.)
In People v. One 1986 Cadillac Deville (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 157, 163, the court of appeal held that the trial court has discretion to deny forfeiture under Section 14607.6(a) even though all of the elements of the statute are met. In Cadillac, the driver of a motor vehicle was stopped for exceeding the speed limit. When the driver failed to produce a valid driver’s license, the vehicle was impounded. Because the driver had been previously convicted of driving while his driving privilege had been suspended, the district attorney initiated forfeiture proceedings. During the forfeiture hearing, the driver presented a valid driver’s license that was issued after his vehicle had been impounded. After considering the evidence, the trial court denied the petition for forfeiture and ordered the vehicle returned to the claimant.
On appeal, the district attorney argued that the trial court had no discretion to deny the petition because all of the criteria for forfeiture under Section 14607.6 had been met. The court of appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. (Id., at 163.) The court reasoned that the statutory language “subject to forfeiture” means the court has discretion whether to deny forfeiture. (Id., at 160.) Although the district attorney argued that reading the statute to confer discretion to deny forfeiture would defeat the purpose of the statute, which is to deter those previously convicted of driving without a license from again driving without a license, the court found this argument unpersuasive. The court noted that there is a significant deterrent in the costs and inconvenience inherent in impoundment and retention of the vehicle. Moreover, there is no assurance that the court will exercise its discretion to return the vehicle to the claimant. (Id., at 163.)
(1) The owner of the covered vehicle and we must agree upon the actual cash value of the covered vehicle. (ROA 58, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff claims that he never agreed to an "actual cash value" (or ACV) number for the vehicle in question. Accordingly, Plaintiff is alleging that his vehicle could not be bought out for the "actual cash value" and, instead, the Insurance Company was obligated to pay for repairs to the vehicle (less any deductible).
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
San Diego County, CA
(1) The owner of the covered vehicle and we must agree upon the actual cash value of the covered vehicle. (ROA 58, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff claims that he never agreed to an "actual cash value" (or ACV) number for the vehicle in question. Accordingly, Plaintiff is alleging that his vehicle could not be bought out for the "actual cash value" and, instead, the Insurance Company was obligated to pay for repairs to the vehicle (less any deductible).
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
San Diego County, CA
(1) The owner of the covered vehicle and we must agree upon the actual cash value of the covered vehicle. (ROA 58, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff claims that he never agreed to an "actual cash value" (or ACV) number for the vehicle in question. Accordingly, Plaintiff is alleging that his vehicle could not be bought out for the "actual cash value" and, instead, the Insurance Company was obligated to pay for repairs to the vehicle (less any deductible).
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
San Diego County, CA
Defendant presents undisputed evidence of Plaintiff’s breach of the cooperation clause by her refusal to produce the requested cellphone records, consumer information, release for the consumer information, and documents pertaining to the purchase or lease of the covered vehicle (UMF 6-16).
Solano County, CA
(1) The owner of the covered vehicle and we must agree upon the actual cash value of the covered vehicle. (ROA 58, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff claims that he never agreed to an "actual cash value" (or ACV) number for the vehicle in question. Accordingly, Plaintiff is alleging that his vehicle could not be bought out for the "actual cash value" and, instead, the Insurance Company was obligated to pay for repairs to the vehicle (less any deductible).
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
San Diego County, CA
The Decision ordered re-imposition of the suspension of Mendez’s driving privilege effective May 27, 2020 through May 26, 2022. AR 2, 4. E. Analysis Petitioner Mendez seeks a writ of mandate compelling the DMV to set aside its decision suspending his driving privilege. Mendez argues that the finding that he was driving is not supported by the evidence and that the Hearing Officer improperly excluded evidence and denied a continuance, thereby denying Mendez a fair hearing. 1.
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
No later than 11/30/20, Respondent shall set aside its 06/16/2020 Order of Suspension of Petitioner’s driving privilege or, in the alternative, show good cause why it has done so. Petitioner is ordered serve on Respondent written notice of the time and place of the hearing, a copy of the petition, all papers on which the petition is based, and this Minute Order, at least 16 court days prior to the date of the hearing if service is personal and additional time if service is achieved by other means.
Orange County, CA
It would frustrate the legitimate intention to postpone suspension or revocation of the driving privilege until conclusion of thefrequentlydelayed judicial proceedings." {Id. at 454.) So, too, in this case. As the Savoy court noted, "Licensing procedures have been set up . . . to protect the public from unfit practitioners. When a license is revoked, it is done primarily to protect society, not to punish the licensee." {Savoy, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at 1039.)
Sacramento County, CA
It would frustrate the legitimate intention to postpone suspension or revocation of the driving privilege until conclusion of the frequently delayed judicial proceedings.” (Id. at 454.) So, too, in this case. As the Savoy court noted, “Licensing procedures have been set up . . . to protect the public from unfit practitioners. When a license is revoked, it is done primarily to protect society, not to punish the licensee.” (Savoy, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at 1039.)
Sacramento County, CA
Overview of Vehicle Code sections 14602.6, 22852, 22651 and the CHP Policy Vehicle Code section 14602.6, subdivision (a)(1) states: “(a)(1) Whenever a peace officer determines that a person was driving a vehicle while his or her driving privilege was suspended or revoked, driving a vehicle while his or her driving privilege is restricted pursuant to Section 13352 or 23575 and the vehicle is not equipped with a functioning, certified interlock device, or driving a vehicle without ever having been issued a driver's
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 10751, subds. (e)(2) and (e)(3).) Conclusion No tentative ruling to issue at this time. Ruling to depend on what happens at the hearing.
Los Angeles County, CA
The Decision re-imposed the suspension of Kuznetsova’s driving privilege, finding that she was driving a motor vehicle with .08% or more weight of alcohol in her blood in violation of Vehicle Code sections 23140, 23152, and 23153 and was lawfully arrested. AR 4. The Decision was mailed to Kuznetzova on August 6, 2019. AR 5. The Decision informed Kuznetsova she could request judicial review of the Decision by contacting the superior court in her county of residence within 34 days of August 6, 2019. AR 5.
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
Petitioner Sonja Fulton requests a writ of mandate, commanding the Department of Motor Vehicles to set aside its Order revoking petitioner's driving privilege. When a person petitions for a writ of mandate following an order suspending his or her driver's license, the court is required to determine, based on the exercise of its independent judgment, whether the weight of the evidence supports the administrative decision. Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 456; CCP §1094.5.
Administrative
Writ
San Diego County, CA
The Decision concluded, based upon its findings, to re-impose suspension of Santizo’s driving privilege. On March 11, 2020, Santizo filed this petition for writ of mandate challenging the Decision. The petition is opposed by respondent Steven Gordon, Director, California Department of Motor Vehicles (respondent or DMV).
Santa Barbara County, CA
The hearing officer ended the stay of suspension against Petitioner’s driving privilege and re-imposed the suspension effective December 26, 2018 through December 25, 2020. (Ibid.) Writ Petition On March 6, 2019, Petitioner, in pro per, filed a petition for writ of mandate. On May 13, 2019, Respondent filed an answer. On March 20, 2020, Petitioner filed his opening brief in support of the petition.
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
[AR 005] DMV re-imposed the suspension of Munoz’s driving privilege. [AR 003] D. Standards of Review: When DMV suspends a person’s driving privilege pursuant to Veh. Code § 13353.2, that person may seek judicial review pursuant to Veh. Code § 13559(a), which provides: “The review shall be on the record of the hearing and the court shall not consider other evidence.” In this regard, Munoz’s footnote #1 regarding an accreditation body is outside the record.
Santa Barbara County, CA
If you refuse to submit or fail to complete a test your driving privilege will be suspended for one year or revoked for two or three years.... You do not have the right to talk to an attorney or have an attorney present before stating whether you will submit to a test, before deciding which test to take or during the test." AR 42; see also AR 31.
Administrative
Writ
San Diego County, CA
Krellestein does not dispute that he was told his driving privilege would be suspended if he refused to submit to a test. F. Conclusion The petition for writ of mandate is denied.
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
Thus, Petitioner challenges the administrative finding that she refused to take a chemical test after being properly admonished that her driving privilege would be suspended or revoked if she refused or failed to complete the required chemical test. (AR 6.) In her writ briefs, Petitioner does not otherwise challenge the findings upon which the decision is based.
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
The Court dissolves its September 18, 2019, order staying the license suspension and re-imposes the Department of Motor Vehicle’s suspension of petitioner’s driving privilege.
Santa Barbara County, CA
Section 16070(b) provides, in pertinent part: “Whenever the department receives an accident report … that alleges that any of the drivers involved in the accident was not in compliance with Section 16020 at the time of the accident, the department shall immediately mail to that driver a notice of intent to suspend the driving privilege of that driver.
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
If you refuse to submit to or fail to complete the required chemical test, your driving privilege will be suspended for a year or revoked for two or three years. 4. Refusal or failure to complete the required chemical test could be used against you in court and will also result in a fine and imprisonment if your arrest results in a conviction of driving under the influence. 5.
Santa Barbara County, CA
(d) [requiring for administrative suspension or revocation that “the person had been told that his or her driving privilege would be suspended or revoked if he or she refused to submit to, or did not complete, the test or tests].)
Santa Barbara County, CA
In opposition, Plaintiffs appear to argue Enterprise gave permission to Eliasyan to drive the vehicle without a proper background check, a proper license, an international driving permit, and/or a valid driving privilege, and did not offer Eliasyan the option of purchasing adequate insurance. (Opposition, pg. 4.)
Los Angeles County, CA
Petition for Writ filed by Petitioner Andres Garcia: The petition by Andres Gustavo Garcia for writ of mandate requiring respondent Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) to set aside or revoke its order dated 11/27/19, revoking petitioner’s driving privilege effective 12/06/19 through 12/05/22, and for attorney’s fees and costs, is DENIED. Petitioner’s unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
Orange County, CA
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