Elements for a Breach of Contract:
(See Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 830.)
The Court looks to the Parties’ written agreements as clear evidence of their intentions. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 800-801.)
“When a party's failure to perform a contractual obligation constitutes a material breach of the contract, the other party may be discharged from its duty to perform under the contract. Normally the question of whether a breach of an obligation is a material breach, so as to excuse performance by the other party, is a question of fact. Whether a partial breach of a contract is material depends on the importance or seriousness thereof and the probability of the injured party getting substantial performance. A material breach of one aspect of a contract generally constitutes a material breach of the whole contract.” (Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal. App. 4th 265, 277-278.) “The mental state of the breaching party and the timing of the breach are also relevant factors to determining the materiality of a breach.” (See Schellinger Brothers v. Cotter (2016) 2 Cal. App. 5th 984, 1002.)
In Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal. App. 4th 1233 the Court of Appeal found that the word “furnished” should be given its ordinary meaning:
“We need only resort to the first level of statutory analysis--the ordinary meaning of the language--to determine whether the beams were ‘furnished’ to the site within the meaning of the release. The usual, ordinary import of ‘furnish’ is to make something available. The first definition of "furnish" in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986) at page 923, is: ‘to provide or supply with what is needed, useful, or desirable.’ To deliver materials to a job site is certainly to ‘provide" materials.’” (Id. at 1240.)
Code § 1794; 15 U.S.C. § 2301].) In contrast, Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for fraud by omission could give rise to a recovery of punitive damages. Because the Court has overruled the demurrer to the seventh cause of action, Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages may stand. (See Civ. Code § 3294.) Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike the punitive damages is DENIED.
Apr 05, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
The motion to strike ¶ 82 regarding willful failure to comply with Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3) supporting a civil penalty of two times actual damages pursuant to Civil Code § 1794(c) is DENIED.
Apr 03, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
The parties also agreed upon plaintiff’s acceptance of the offer to compromise that defendant would pay a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action (See Civil Code, § 1794(d).), with the court to determine the amount should the parties be unable to agree. The parties concluded by agreeing that the offer was being made pursuant to Goodstein v.
Mar 28, 2019
El Dorado County, CA
., the Court found at page 993 that the fraudulent representations exposed the plaintiff to personal damages independent of the economic loss caused by the failure to deliver conforming products, e.g., injuries that could result from the defect helicopter parts. There was no claim that the fraud induced the helicopter manufacturer into the contract; instead, the fraudulent conduct occurred after the parties entered into the contract when the parts supplier provided false certificates with the goods.
Mar 26, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code § 1794, subd. (e)(1).) Thus BMW’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED as to the prayer for punitive damages. BMW also argues that Mirsakov cannot seek general or special damages, but that damages under the Song-Beverly Act are limited to out of pocket costs resulting from the violation. (Motion at pp. 5–6; Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (b).)
Mar 12, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 1794; see also Kwan v. Mercedes–Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 187–88.) The replacement/restitution remedy is available only for breach of an express warranty. (Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1262.)
Mar 07, 2019
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
s Exh. 16 [February 10, 2016 Letter], p. 1, ¶1); (ii) asserts Call Me's failure to deliver the goods (id. at pp. 1-2, ¶4) and a statement of Call Me's liability (id. at p. 2, ¶2); and (iii) it states the value of the undelivered property (in excess of $88,000) which, taken in context, appears sufficient to constitute a demand for payment if the goods are not delivered.
Mar 06, 2019
Ventura County, CA
Code, § 1794; see also Kwan v. Mercedes–Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 187–88.) The replacement/restitution remedy is available only for breach of an express warranty. (Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1262.)
Feb 26, 2019
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
Code § 1794.) Song-Beverly provides for a “civil penalty” which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual damages. (Civ. Code § 1794(c).) However, Plaintiffs sixth cause of action—fraud by omission—could give rise to a recovery of punitive damages. Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages is therefore DENIED. Motion to Strike: Damages under Civ. Code section 1793.2(a) This portion of the motion is MOOT per the ruling on demurrer as to the third cause of action.
Feb 26, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
But Civil Code § 1794 allows the bringing of private actions for “failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter,” which includes section 1793.2, subd. (a)(3), and the same section further authorizes the imposition of civil penalties “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Thus civil penalties are available. The Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Feb 25, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Plaintiff Cypress has failed to negate the existence of a triable issue of fact concerning the $ 150,000 bond premium it seeks to recover as breach of contract damages. There is no contractual language, either in the master contract or in the three subject purchase orders, suggesting that such a premium can fairly be characterized as part of the “price” to be paid for the subject solar modules. (See, Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2711, subd. (1).)
Feb 13, 2019
Contra Costa County, CA
’s failure to deliver a valid $3 million term sheet and their interference with Plaintiff’s negotiations to obtain financing.
Jan 24, 2019
Presiding
Santa Clara County, CA
Because the lease agreement provides for termination of the lease after delay in possession of 120 days, Defendants will argue that the failure to deliver possession within that time renders the lease unenforceable. (Motion at p. 3.) Defendants also argue that because these facts are known to Melrose, no prejudice will result. (Motion at p. 6.) Melrose has not opposed this motion. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File First Amended Answer is GRANTED. Defendants to provide Notice.
Jan 24, 2019
Real Property
Landlord Tenant
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 1794(d).) Section 1794 provides: If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code, § 1794 [emphasis added].)
Jan 11, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 1794(d).) Section 1794 provides: If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code, § 1794 [emphasis added].)
Jan 11, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code § 1794, subd. (e)(1).) Some courts have held the civil penalties are “akin to punitive damages” because “like other civil penalties, [the penalty] imposed as punishment or deterrence of the defendant, rather than to compensate the plaintiff.” (Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 184.) But that a civil penalty is “akin” to punitive damages is not a basis for pleading punitive damages separately from the civil penalty.
Jan 07, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 1794(d).) Section 1794 provides: If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code, § 1794 [emphasis added].)
Jan 02, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 1794(d).) Section 1794 provides: If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code, § 1794 [emphasis added].)
Jan 02, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 1794(d).) Section 1794 provides: If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code, § 1794 [emphasis added].)
Jan 02, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 1794(d).) Section 1794 provides: If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code, § 1794 [emphasis added].)
Jan 02, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 1794(d).) Section 1794 provides: If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code, § 1794 [emphasis added].)
Jan 02, 2019
Los Angeles County, CA
Code, § 1794, subds. (c), (e).) The Song-Beverly Act does not expressly provide for punitive damages. Plaintiff cites several federal district court decisions in support of the proposition that “the Song-Beverly Act . . . provides for punitive damages in case of willful breach.” (OPP at p. 9.)
Dec 06, 2018
Santa Clara County, CA
Here, Civil Code § 1794, provides for the recovery of costs and fees when a “buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation…or under an implied or express warranty or service contract…” Specifically, § 1794(d) states: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by
Dec 03, 2018
Orange County, CA
The crux of Plaintiff’s lawsuit is the District’s alleged delay in developing the Facility and failure to deliver sufficient quantities of compost material to Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends these are material breaches of the Sale and Leaseback Agreements. The District counters that the Leaseback Agreement does not require it to produce specific quantities of composting material and there was no specific timetable for the Facility’s construction and development or delivery of the compost.
Nov 29, 2018
San Luis Obispo County, CA
The crux of this lawsuit is the District’s alleged delay in developing the Facility and failure to deliver sufficient quantities of compost material to the Westlake Parties, who contend these are material breaches of the Sale and Leaseback Agreements. The District counters that the Leaseback Agreement does not require it to produce specific quantities of composting material and there was no specific timetable for the Facility’s construction and development or delivery of the compost.
Nov 29, 2018
San Luis Obispo County, CA
Please wait a moment while we load this page.