Sexual Battery (Civil) in California

The minute orders are somewhat crytic as to how Judge Bysshe wants this case managed; but this is a motion to continue a 12/21/09 trial on a forcible sexual battery/harrassment case in which the criminal proceeding/ investigation is past. The alleged perpetrator, who allegedly pled guilty to the misdemeanor sexual battery by restraint count, is now asserting in the civil case that the conduct was consensual. gmr

Defendant argues that it cannot be liable for sexual battery through either (1) vicarious liability/respondeat or (2) ratification. Plaintiff does not rebut, and therefore, concedes to the argument that Defendant cannot be held liability through vicarious liability/respondeat superior. With regard to ratification, the first cause of action for sexual battery does not sufficiently state facts to demonstrate ratification by Defendant. 2.

Defendant argues that it cannot be liable for sexual battery through either (1) vicarious liability/respondeat or (2) ratification. Plaintiff does not rebut, and therefore, concedes to the argument that Defendant cannot be held liability through vicarious liability/respondeat superior. With regard to ratification, the first cause of action for sexual battery does not sufficiently state facts to demonstrate ratification by Defendant. 2.

Mazariegos contends Villamarin was convicted of sexual battery by fraud on September 23, 2020 following a nolo contendere plea and sentenced to four years imprisonment. Mazariegos contends the cases are related because they involve “virtually identical factual scenarios” wherein Villamarin was consulted for treatment and engaged in sexual battery by fraud “under the guise of a ‘therapeutic’ massage.” The cases are not related under any prong of Rule 3.300(a).

On such facts, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the first cause of action for sexual battery without leave to amend. 3.

However, since Plaintiff Caryn Jordan amended the complaint to add the sexual battery cause of action, the Court’s previous ruling does not foreclose the Phan Defendants from filing a demurrer to that new cause of action. 3rd COA – Sexual Battery Sexual battery occurs, amongst other things, when a person “[a]cts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another,” including the anus, “and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results.”

battery.

Sexual Battery Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to constitute the intentional tort of sexual battery.

The Court concludes that there is, at minimum, a triable issue of material fact as to whether Beezy’s physical contact with Plaintiff’s vaginal area is “sexual” within the meaning of the sexual battery statute. Beezy’s motion for summary adjudication of the sexual battery claim is denied. C.

The claim for sexual battery under § 1708.5 also requires evidence that Defendant intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact without consent. It is distinct from a battery claim in that a sexual battery involves an intimate body part. Civ. Code, § 1708.5. The claim is adequately pled under Section 1708.5(a)(1). Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff underwent a liposuction procedure performed by Defendants. Complaint, ¶ 9. Plaintiff awoke twice during the procedure.

Because Plaintiff Maya prevailed on her FEHA claims as well as the wage and hour claims, the fees for her wrongful termination and sexual battery claims are recoverable since they are intertwined with the FEHA claims. However, because Plaintiff Quigley did not prevail on the FEHA causes of action, the fees for her FEHA and sexual battery claims should be apportioned.

In August 2008, Baker was booked for violating Penal Code section 243.4(c) for sexual battery where victim was unconscious of the act because of the perpetrator’s fraudulent representation of a professional purpose.[2] Pet. Arrest Records (“Arr. Rec.”) 7. Baker subsequently also was charged with sexual battery under Penal Code section 243.4(e)(1).[3] AR 128.

The original complaint alleges that Zhangqi Xu and Chau Xu committed acts of civil sexual battery against Plaintiff. (Ching Decl., Exhibit 1 at ¶ 25.) The FAC alleges that Chau Xu and Zhangqi Xu committed acts of civil sexual battery against Plaintiff. (Ching Decl, Exhibit 8 at ¶ 40.)

The FAC asserts cause of action for (1) negligence; (2) sexual battery; (3) infliction of emotional distress; (4) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the unfair competition law or "UCL"); (5) violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"); and (6) conspiracy to violate the UFTA. 2nd Cause of Action for Sexual Battery Defendants argue the claim for sexual battery fails because there are no allegations of any contact between Dr. Thota and plaintiff's intimate parts.

Case Number: 20STCV03709 Hearing Date: October 14, 2021 Dept: 28 Motion to Compel Nonparty LAPD to Produce Its Report Related to the Sexual Battery Involving Plaintiff S.C. Having reviewed the motion, notice of joinder, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On January 29, 2020, Plaintiff S.C.

Sexual Battery

By its very terms, Section 1708.5 defines a sexual battery as conduct committed by a person . Section 1708.5 does not apply to LAUSD. The court further observes that Section 1708.5 merely sets forth the elements of a sexual battery claim.

Sexual Battery As defined by California Civil Code section 1708.5, a person commits sexual battery if he or she does any of the following: (1) acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results; (2) acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another by use of his or her intimate part, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly

On June 27, 2018, David filed a first amended cross-complaint for sexual battery and battery. Plaintiffs demur to the sexual battery and battery causes of action alleged in David’s FAXC on sufficiency/sham pleading and uncertainty grounds. Plaintiffs argue that the FAXC is a sham because David added facts inconsistent to its prior pleading in order to avoid Plaintiffs’ demurrer being sustained.

The elements for sexual battery differ from medical battery. In contrast to medical battery, Civil Code section 1708.5 states, in part, "(a) A person commits a sexual battery who does any of the following: (1) Acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results."

Plaintiff’s sexual battery claim was filed after January 1, 2019, so falls within the ten-year statute of limitations. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §340.16. DENIED. Sexual Battery as to Ben Jewelry Defendant claims the sexual battery claims against Ben Jewelry are barred, either because plaintiff’s DFEH complaint was untimely or because the allegations are barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.

Plaintiff’s sexual battery claim was filed after January 1, 2019, so falls within the ten-year statute of limitations. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §340.16. DENIED. Sexual Battery as to Ben Jewelry Defendant claims the sexual battery claims against Ben Jewelry are barred, either because plaintiff’s DFEH complaint was untimely or because the allegations are barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that, regardless of whether the legal theory of liability is sexual harassment/battery, assault and battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the ultimate facts alleged by Plaintiff regarding Defendant LOWRY’s conduct sound in a sexual battery. (FAC ¶13.) As a result, the Court shall utilize the same standards in addressing Plaintiff’s first, second, third, and sixth causes of action.

Sexual Battery 2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 3. Assault 4. Negligence 5. Premises Liability RULING : The demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

In the instant case, defendant Hernandez contends that plaintiff’s cause of action for sexual battery is factually deficient and uncertain.

Furthermore, the allegations of the FAC are specific as to the conduct that Plaintiffs allege constitutes sexual battery or sexual assault permitting Boytis to understand the factual nature or extent of the causes of action for sexual battery and assault alleged against him. For these reasons, Boytis’s special demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action alleged in the FAC is overruled.

LaForteza Judge of the Superior Court [1] Civil Code section 1708.5 codifies the elements of the intentional tort of sexual battery.

Plaintiff alleges an offensive touching in a non-intimate manner sufficient to distinguish the battery claim from the sexual battery claim. (SAC, para 15.) Plaintiff also alleges specific omissions and misrepresentations by Defendant Lemus in communicating to Plaintiff about the results of the first exam and the need and true purpose of a second exam. (Id., para 16.)

The first amended complaint ("FAC") asserts causes of action for (1) sexual assault; (2) sexual battery; (3) gender violence; (4) violation of the Ralph Act; (5) violation of the Bane Act; (6) sexual harassment; and (7) negligence. Plaintiff moves to summarily adjudicate the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd causes of action.

DEMURRER: Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for sexual battery under Civil Code Section 1708.5.

A person commits a sexual battery when he/she acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results. See CC 1708.5(a)(1). Contrary to Hang’s assertion, imminent apprehension of the conduct is not required. Rather, imminent apprehension of the conduct is just one of the ways a person can commit sexual battery. See CC 1708.5(a)(1)-(3).

Sexual battery/IIED action filed 10/16/08. Trial set for 9/28/09. No subst. of atty. in the file. Counsel on ex parte labels D "petitioner"... why ? Asks for continuance but no specific date requested. gmr

The evidence likewise establishes that the alleged sexual battery was not “precipitated by a work-related dispute over performance of [Lanting’s] duties.” (See Ibid.) As such, the sexual battery was “not a risk that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the operation of” a trucking and storage company. (See Ibid.)

First Cause of Action for Sexual Battery Civil Code section 1708.5 provides the following: (a) A person commits a sexual battery who does any of the following: (1) Acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results.

Sexual Battery Causes of Action The Court finds that summary judgment and adjudication are properly denied here. “The doctrine of respondeat superior is an exception to the general rule that liability follows fault. Respondeat superior generally imposes liability on an employer when its employee engages in tortious conduct while acting within the course and scope of employment.

Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed causes of action would provide for a different and distinct civil remedy from a sexual battery claim under CCC § 1708.5. // // Prejudice Plaintiff argues that Defendant will not be prejudiced by the amendment because Plaintiff is not seeking to add or change any factual allegations beyond those currently in the FAC but only seeks to remove the sexual battery and assault causes of action and replace them with civil violations of the penal code sections

DEFENDANTS MOEINOLMOLKI & MOEIN SURGICAL ARTS DEMURRER Demurrer by Defendants Babak Moeinolmolki, M.D. and Moein Surgical Arts to the second cause of action for Sexual Battery alleged in Plaintiff Siran Saradzhyan’s Complaint is OVERRULED.

Sexual Battery As to the sexual battery claim, Plaintiff fails to allege lack of consent as a matter of law. A cause of action for sexual battery under Civil Code section 1708.5 requires the batterer intend to cause a harmful or offensive contact and the batteree suffer a sexually offensive contact. Moreover, the section is interpreted to require that the batteree did not consent to the contact. ( Angie M. v.

The claim for sexual battery under § 1708.5 also requires evidence that Plaintiff did not consent. It is distinct from a battery claim in that sexual battery involves an intimate body part. Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1225; Civ. Code, § 1708.5. After consideration of all of the relevant material facts as a whole, including Plaintiff’s testimony, whether Plaintiff consented to the conduct is a triable issue of fact.

The claim for sexual battery under Cal. Civil Code § 1708.5 also requires evidence that Plaintiff did not consent. It is distinct from a battery claim in that sexual battery involves an intimate body part. Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1225; Civ. Code, § 1708.5. After consideration of all of the relevant material facts as a whole, including Plaintiff’s testimony, whether Plaintiff consented to the conduct is a triable issue of fact.

Sexual Battery On May 18, 2023, Defendant filed a demurrer to the original complaint. On June 26, 2023, the court sustained in part (i.e., as to negligent COAs) and overruled in part (i.e., as to sexual battery and IIED COAs) the demurrer and granted leave to amend. On July 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) asserting four COAs: 1. Negligence/Negligent Supervision/Failure To Warn, Train Or Educate/Negligent Failure To Protect Plaintiff 2.

Specifically, during the alleged sexual battery, Plaintiff tried to leave but Defendant closed the door and pushed his body against Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶ 28.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant [tried] to trap her at her car in the motor court in the front yard of his Hollywood Hills home. (Complaint ¶ 56.) During that alleged sexual battery, Defendant pushed her against the car and forced his body against hers. (Complaint ¶ 19.) Plaintiff told him to stop and he would not listen.

Plaintiff’s sexual battery claim was filed after January 1, 2019, so falls within the ten-year statute of limitations. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §340.16. DENIED. Sexual Battery as to Ben Jewelry Defendant claims the sexual battery claims against Ben Jewelry are barred, either because plaintiff’s DFEH complaint was untimely or because the allegations are barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.

First Cause of Action – Sexual Battery in Violation of Civil Code, § 1708.5 The tort of sexual battery in violation of Civil Code section 1708.5 requires that the defendant intend to cause a “harmful or offensive” contact, that the batteree suffered a “sexually offensive contact,” and that the batteree did not consent to the contact. (Angie M. v. Super. Ct. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1225.)

The court held that CCP § 425.13 applied since her allegations were directly related to the professional services rendered by a health care provider: "[W]hen a gynecologist is accused, as here, of committing a sexual battery in the course of rendering gynecological services, that accusation is necessarily "directly related" to the manner in which the gynecological services were rendered."

The Court sustained the demurrer to the 2nd cause of action for sexual battery stating, "The FAC alleges Dr. Thota gave plaintiff injections, but does not allege that the doctor touched any of plaintiff's intimate parts." A sexual battery occurs when a person intends "to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results." Civ. Code, § 1708.5, subd. (a)(1). Dr.

The FAC is 75 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

The FAC is 75 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

The FAC is 75 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

The FAC is 75 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

The FAC is 75 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

The FAC is 75 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

The FAC is 75 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

It is 76 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

It is 76 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

It is 76 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

It is 76 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

It is 76 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

It is 76 pages (304 paragraphs) primarily describing an alleged sexual battery of her by Defendant Jon Jones, her housemate in the Monarch Housing Project, an affordable housing community for the disabled, and the housing project’s refusal to install security cameras.

Defendant ("The Regents") demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is: Sustained with 20-days leave to amend as to causes of action one [sexual battery (Civil Code sec. 1708.5) and two [sexual battery]. The demurrer is sustained with 20-days leave to amend as to cause of action three [FEHA-sexual harassment]. Sustained without leave to amend as to cause of action six [intentional infliction of emotional distress]. Sustained with 20-days leave to amend as to cause of action seven for negligence.

This sufficiently alleges an intentional violent act: an alleged sexual battery. (See FAC ¶ 7.) The demurrer to the second and third causes of action is overruled. B. The Fourth Cause Of Action Is Sufficiently Pleaded. The fourth cause of action alleges sexual battery.

Therefore, the court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the 4 th COA for sexual battery WITHOUT leave to amend. In sum, at this point, one of the negligence COAs is to be dismissed and as is the sexual battery COA. That leaves one negligence COA and an IIED COA. With sufficient facts pled as the foregoing COAs, the court will now turn to the constitutional issue. 4.

Sexual Battery Civil Code section 1708.5 provides the following: (a) A person commits a sexual battery who does any of the following : (1) Acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another , and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results.

Sexual Battery Under California law, a person commits sexual battery when he [a]cts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results. Cal . Civ.Code § 1708.5(a)(1); see also Shanahan v. State Farm General Ins. Co., 193 Cal.App.4th 780, 788, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 (2011) ([T]he tort of sexual battery requires an intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact.)

Plaintiff prays for punitive damages in the intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, battery, sexual battery, and false imprisonment causes of action. Ebling argues that Plaintiff’s has failed to comply with CCP § 425.13—thus, Ebling’s motion to strike should be granted.

For example, Form Interrogatory No. 6.1 asks if Defendant attributes any physical, mental, or emotional injuries to the incident, Defendant responds, As much as would be expected in a situation where a person is a victim of sexual battery and assault at the hands of a remorseless Plaintiff and his attorneys. This, is clearly combative and does not respond completely and straightforwardly to the question.

For example, Form Interrogatory No. 6.1 asks if Defendant attributes any physical, mental, or emotional injuries to the incident, Defendant responds, As much as would be expected in a situation where a person is a victim of sexual battery and assault at the hands of a remorseless Plaintiff and his attorneys. This, is clearly combative and does not respond completely and straightforwardly to the question.

(Although the Complaint alleges, in paragraph 24, that Smith continued to work for AC following his arrest for sexual battery in October 2017, the Complaint does not allege that AC was aware of that arrest.) Plaintiff is given leave to amend to allege facts demonstrating ratification of Smith's molestation of Plaintiff by AC. The Court will prepare the order. AC shall serve Notice of Entry of Order on Plaintiff.

AS TO THE 3RD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL BATTERY, THE OFFENSIVE TOUCHING, AS ALLEGED, WAS SUFFICIENTLY RELATED TO THE TREATMENT SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF TO REQUIRE AN EVIDENTIARY SHOWING UNDER CCP SECTION 425.13 BEFORE PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAN BE SOUGHT. (JH)

Like the FAC, the original complaint also alleged that a sexual battery and sexual assault occurred on March 9, 2022. The gravamen of Plaintiffs causes of action, in both the original complaint and the FAC, involve allegations of sexual battery and sexual assault that occurred on March 9, 2022. The fact that some unlawful conduct is alleged to have occurred before the EFAAs enactment does not preclude its application.

Subdivision (b) of section 1708 .5 provides [a] person who commits a sexual battery upon another [is] liable to that person for damages, including, but not limited to, general damages, special damages, and punitive damages. A cause of action for sexual battery under Civil Code section 1708.5 requires the batterer intend to cause a harmful or offensive contact and the¿batteree¿suffer a sexually offensive contact. ( Angie M. v. Superior Court ¿(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1225.)

On December 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed the second amended complaint for Sexual Battery, Sexual Orientation Related Violence, Sexual Harassment, Constructive Fraud, Unfair Business Practices, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Negligent Hiring Retention Supervision and Training, and Negligence.

On May 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendants for: 1) Sexual Harassment in Defined Relationship; 2) Sexual Battery; 3) Ralph Act - Gender Violence; 4) Professional Negligence; 5) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; 6) Fraud/Concealment; 7) Defamation; 8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and 9) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Defendants seek to strike the First Amended Complaint.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT RAISES A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT; RATHER PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AND THE INFERENCES THEREFROM CONSTITUTE SPECULATION THAT WHAT OCCURRED WAS AN ACCIDENTAL TOUCHING NOT SEXUAL BATTERY. =(302/PJM/PB)

(a) Sexual Battery, Adequacy of Allegation of Lack of Consent. The Cottage defendants demur to the first cause of action for sexual battery, contending once again that plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that the sexual conduct by Trimble was not consensual.

Despite the fact that the 1 st cause of action for Sexual Battery and 2 nd cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress are not alleged against LAUSD, Plaintiff references Government Code 815.2 within these causes of action. ( See FAC ¶12 (p.3:11), ¶18 (p.4:8).

In Leybas motion, the heading on page 6 argues that John Doe 7028s claim for sexual battery fails because there is no evidence that he intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with John Doe 7028s intimate parts or that a sexually offensive contact with Plaintiff resulted, either directly or indirectly. (Motion, p. 6.)

Because Cross-Complainant has failed to respond to the special interrogatory asking for the date of the alleged sexual battery and trespass in violation of the order, the appropriate sanction here is to preclude Cross-Complainant from introducing evidence of the date of the alleged sexual battery and trespass at trial. Regarding form interrogatory No. 17.1, the RFAs at issue are Nos. 1, 2, 4-8, 10-13, 15, 16, 18-20, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42-45, 48-71, 77-82, and 84-92.

Demurrer First Cause of Action for Sexual Battery (Civ. Code § 1708.5) Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against demurring Defendant. Civ.

Demurrer to 1st and 9th C/A: Sexual battery and Sexual Battery per Civil Code 1708.5: SUSTAINED in part with leave to amend; overrule in part A relevant distinction between the alleged sexual battery in the 1st cause of action and the alleged sexual battery in the 9th cause of action is not apparent. According to Witkin, some civil code statutes have been created for specialized forms of battery, and Civil Code §1708.5 appears to be one of them defining civil liability for the tort of sexual battery.

The California Supreme Court, in the Central Pathology decision that still defines the scope of the governing statute, stated in pertinent part as follows: “a cause of action against a health care provider for sexual battery would not, in most instances, fall within the statute because the defendant's conduct would not be directly related to the manner in which professional services were rendered.” (Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 192.)

On 2/17/22, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging that plaintiffs were patrons at the Mayfair Hotel at 1256 W 7th Street, Los Angeles, where a hotel security guard committed sexual battery on Plaintiff, a newlywed wife. The causes of action are: 1. NEGLIGENCE 2. NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETENTION, AND SUPERVISION 3. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 4. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 5. PREMISES LIABILITY 6. ASSAULT 7. BATTERY 8. SEXUAL BATTERY 9.

ADDED TO LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR FOR Ntc Of Defts' Mo For Summary Adjudication *** $100.00 Summ Adjud Mo Fee Paid Receipt # 521743 *** GRANT AS TO 5TH [BATTERY] & 6TH [SEXUAL BATTERY] CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER FRETLAND. BARRED BY WORKER'S COMP. DEFENDANT (EMPLOYER) DID NOT COMMIT ASSAULT, NO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S POSITIVE MISCONDUCT OR RATIFICATION, AND NO EXCEPTION CITED. DENY AS TO 7TH [IIED] CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER FRETLAND. GRANT AS TO 8TH [CC 51.7] CAUSE OF ACTION.

The allegations of sexual battery could support felony or misdemeanor charges against Sampang. (Pen. Code, §§ 240-243.4.)

(DSS 7) · After conducting its interview with Plaintiff, the Lakewood Sheriff's Department concluded that no sexual battery had occurred and that they were closing their file.

Plaintiffs also allege sexual battery from a worker hired by Defendant. Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: (1) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (2) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, (3) violation of California Civil Code Section 1708.5 (sexual battery) as to Plaintiff Evelyn, (4) constructive eviction, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On April 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Sexual Battery, Assault, Sexual Harassment, Workplace Harassment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Retaliation, Conversion, Trespass, and Invasion of Privacy. On April 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint for Sexual Battery, Assault, Work Place Harassment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Retaliation, Conversion, Trespass, Invasion of Privacy, and Non-Payment of Wages.

As to the fifth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act Plaintiff alleges the sexual battery she endured violates the Ralph Act. (Civ. Code, § 51.7.)

The complaint alleges four causes of action for sexual battery, sexual assault/stalking, fraud and intentional infliction of emotion al distress. Allan demurrers to the first three causes of action only. Sexual Battery CC § 1708.5 Allan's demurrer is OVERRULED. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to CC § 1708.5.

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that, regardless of whether the legal theory of liability is sexual harassment/battery, assault and battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the ultimate facts alleged by Plaintiff regarding Defendant LOWRY’s conduct sound in a sexual battery. (SAC ¶13.) As a result, the Court shall utilize the same standards in addressing Plaintiff’s first, second, third, and sixth causes of action.

Magdaleno’s alleged pattern of harassment, sexual battery, and assault. Lucia Mar argues there are common legal issues in both Actions. Lucia Mar asserts that the theories of liability in the Actions are the same, and that each Plaintiff claims a similar form of injury. Lucia Mar alleges that the trier of fact will have to evaluate the same questions in each Action: what Mr. Magdaleno did, when Lucia Mar learned about Plaintiffs’ allegations against Mr.

Battery in Violation of Civ.

Defendant demurs to the first cause of action for battery, second cause of action for assault, third cause of action for sexual battery, and ninth cause of action for violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. ANALYSIS Whether Defendant is Allegedly Liable for the Conduct of its Employee as it Relates to Battery, Assault, and Sexual Battery Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that his supervisor, Defendant Sierra, verbally threatened Plaintiff and repeatedly raped him.

The FAC, filed on April 27, 2017, asserts the following causes of action: (1) Professional Negligence of Therapist; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Battery; (4) Sexual Battery; (5) Sexual Battery by Therapist; (6) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (7) Negligence Per Se; and (8) Sexual Harassment. Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in all causes of action except for professional negligence and negligence per se.

PARTY’S REQUEST Plaintiff requests the Court grant the motion and compel nonparty LAPD to comply with the subpoena and produce the requested report on the sexual battery.

Notwithstanding, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, it is clear that the first cause of action is for sexual battery, and the second cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court is not bound by the captions or labels of a cause of action in a pleading and the nature and character of a pleading is to be determined from the facts alleged, not the name given by the pleader to the cause of action. ( Ananda Church of Self-Realization v.

S, filed a complaint against Torrance Unified School District and Dalan Anthony Johnson for (1) negligence, (2) negligent supervision, (3) negligent failure to warn train or educate, (4) constructive fraud (Civil Code 1573), (5) IIED, (6) sexual abuse and harassment in the educational environment (Education Code §220), (7) general violence, (8) sexual battery, and (9) sexual assault.

Nature of Proceedings: Motion: Set Aside Default/Default Judgment Plaintiff Regina Moxley filed her complaint against defendant Sant Ram Pallan for battery, sexual harassment (Civil Code § 51.9), sexual battery (Civil Code § 1708.5), false imprisonment, infliction of emotional distress, and physical abuse of a dependent adult. On July 18, 2012, the court entered defendant’s default. Defendant moves to set aside the default based on excusable neglect.