Medical Battery (Civil) in California

Our high court has made it clear that battery and lack of informed consent are separate causes of action. A claim based on lack of informed consent – which sounds in negligence – arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining consent. Saxena v.

The battery theory applies in those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

Our high court has made it clear that battery and lack of informed consent are separate causes of action. A claim based on lack of informed consent-which sounds in negligence-arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent. (See, e.g., Conte v.

But Plaintiff need not allege that an emergent situation did not occur to state a claim for medical battery. (See CACI 530A). “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery. Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239. Further, [t]he battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

“Our high court has made it clear that battery and lack of informed consent are separate causes of action. A claim based on lack of informed consent—which sounds in negligence—arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent. [Citations.]” Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 324.

The defendants are the doctor (Elizabeth Cerrone) and the medical group (the Escondido OB/GYN Medical Group, Inc.). Plaintiffs allege three causes of action: (1) general negligence, (2) medical battery, and (3) emotional distress. Defendants demur to only the second of those claims (the claim for medical battery).

[A] battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent. ( Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 324.) A battery also occurs [w]here a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained . . . . ( Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.)

Medical Battery (Third Cause of Action) As argued by Defendant, the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to state a claim for medical battery. “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs anoth[e]r, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

A claim for medical battery can also be stated when a patient conditions his consent to a medical procedure, and the doctor "exceeds the terms or conditions of the consent." (Ashcraft v.

The elements of a battery claim are set forth in CACI 1300. Medical battery is covered in CACI 530A. "Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery." Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239. "The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

DISCUSSION A patient may state a claim for medical battery against a physician when the physician fails to obtain the patient’s consent to a procedure, or performs a substantially different procedure than the procedure to which the patient consented. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240–241.) The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

Second Cause of Action for Battery Consent The absence of true consent by a patient for a procedure advocated or undertaken by a doctor can, depending on the specifics, give rise to either a battery action or a negligence action against the doctor. •battery There are generally two types of medical battery claims: (1) the “no consent for that procedure” claim; and (2) the “conditional consent which did not occur” claim.

Grant: The battery theory [is] reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

“Our high court has made it clear that battery and lack of informed consent are separate causes of action. A claim based on lack of informed consent—which sounds in negligence—arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent. (See, e.g., Conte v.

[Id. at 240-241] “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.” [Ibid.] Our high court has made it clear that battery and lack of informed consent are separate causes of action. A claim based on lack of informed consent—which sounds in negligence—arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives.

Battery “[B]attery and lack of informed consent are separate causes of action.” Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 325. “A claim based on lack of informed consent—which sounds in negligence—arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent.” Id.

A typical medical battery case is where a patient has consented to a particular treatment, but the doctor performs a treatment that goes beyond the consent. When an action is based upon the theory of surgery beyond consent, the gist of such action is the unwarranted exceeding of the consent. This is a theory of technical battery. For example, the patient consents to an electromyogram, a relatively uncomplicated procedure, but the doctor performs a myelogram, which involves a spinal puncture.

DISCUSSION A patient may state a claim for medical battery against a physician when the physician fails to obtain the patient’s consent to a procedure, or performs a substantially different procedure than the one subject to the patient’s consent. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240–241.) “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

DISCUSSION A patient may state a claim for medical battery against a physician when the physician fails to obtain the patient’s consent to a procedure, or performs a substantially different procedure than the one subject to the patient’s consent. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240–241.) “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

As pled, the allegations support a cause of action for battery. "We agree with the majority trend. The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

As Defendant argues, the allegations assert negligence or battery which are torts, not breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant either “negligently or intentionally” implanted saline instead of silicone breast implants. An action against a doctor arising out of his negligent treatment of a patient sounds in tort not contract. Bellah v. Greenson (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 614, 625. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

DISCUSSION Medical Battery When the patient consents to one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the tort is battery. However, if the doctor obtains the patient's consent to a particular treatment without disclosing all the risks and, as a result of that treatment, an undisclosed complication occurs, the resulting tort is negligence. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240-241.) As a general rule, one who consents to a touching cannot recover in an action for battery.

In the context of medical battery, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent. ( Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 324.) A battery also occurs [w]here a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained . . . ( Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.)

For reasons unknown, a battery count is not alleged. "An action 'should be pleaded in negligence' when the doctor performs an operation which plaintiff consents, but without disclosing sufficient information about the risks inherent in the surgery. [Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 241–242.] 'The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.' [Id., at p. 240.]" Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 316, 324-325.

The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present .

Demurrer – Medical Battery “[A] battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent.” (Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 324.) A battery also occurs “[w]here a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained.” (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.)

“The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

A claim based on lack of informed consent—which sounds in negligence—arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent.” (Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 324.) “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

“Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery.” ( Cobbs , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 239.) The term treatment constitutes a synonym for the word procedure, but also provides a broader base of interpretation.

Battery may also be found if a substantially different procedure is performed: “Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery.” ( Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.) “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

Accordingly, the court only addresses the second cause of action for medical battery. Medical Battery There are three elements to a claim for medical battery under a violation of conditional consent: the patient must show his consent was conditional; the doctor intentionally violated the condition while providing treatment; and the patient suffered harm as a result of the doctor's violation of the condition. ( Conte v. Girard Orthopedic Surgeons Medical Group, Inc.

A claim based on lack of informed consent – which sounds in negligence – arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent.” (Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 316, 324.) Here, the complaint adequately alleges a claim for medical battery. The complaint alleges that Dr.

Third Cause of Action This cause of action is for medical battery. “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

to be a battery or negligence.

It appears that the FAC is alleging a cause of action for medical battery. CACI No. 503A sets forth the elements necessary to establish a cause of action for medical battery. Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240-241, “We agree with the majority trend. The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.) The battery theory is reserved for those circumstances where a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. (Id. at p. 240.)

However, "[w]here a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery." (Id. at p. 239.) In such a situation, "the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present." (Id. at p. 240.) (Conte v. Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons Medical Group, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1267.)

French (1955) 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (patient consented to exploratory surgery; doctor performed a mastectomy); Zoterell v. Repp (1915) 187 Mich. 319, 153 N.W. 692 (consent given for a hernia operation during which doctor also removed both ovaries). Cobbs, 8 Cal.3d at 239. Cobbs goes on to explain that, [t]he battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

Plaintiff has alleged failure to obtain informed consent with factual allegations which do not support a claim for medical battery. "Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery. [Citations]." (Cobbs v.

When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

Claim for Battery A patient may state a claim for medical battery against a physician when the physician fails to obtain the patient's consent to a procedure, or performs a substantially different procedure than the one for which the patient consented. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240–241.) The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

Battery may also be found if a substantially different procedure is performed: “Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery.” (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.) “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

“‘Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery.’ [Citation.]” (Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495.) “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

“A typical medical battery case is where a patient has consented to a particular treatment, but the doctor performs a treatment that goes beyond the consent. ‘When an action is based upon the theory of surgery beyond consent, the gist of such action is the unwarranted exceeding of the consent. This is a theory of technical battery.’” Conte v. Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons Medical Group, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th at 1267, citing Pedesky v. Bleiberg (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 119, 123.

App. 4th 637, 646 [reversing trial court’s sustaining of demurrer; cause of action for battery was sufficiently stated to survive a demurrer when patient’s consent was for an operation on the T8-9 disk and doctor operated on the T6-7 and T8-8 disks.]) Defendants also argue that alleging a separate claim for medical battery is inappropriate because the harm arises out of the same “cause of action” (in the primary rights sense). Defendants’ argument is without merit.

The Supreme Court clarified the difference between claims based in negligence for lack of consent, and claims based in intentional battery in Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239-41. The Court found that the “battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.” (Id. at 240) The Court went on to distinguish between when lack of consent amounts to battery versus professional negligence. (Ibid.)

While defendant doctor “was doing this, he was standing at the end of the table and staring into [plaintiff's] eyes.” Defendant doctor “immediately stopped” when the nurse returned to the room. After the nurse again left, defendant doctor asked plaintiff “if she was all right.” . . . Defendant doctor “then put his hands on [plaintiff's] shoulders and began massaging them.” . . . Defendant doctor grabbed plaintiff's left hand “and directed it to his mouth to kiss it,” but plaintiff pulled her hand away.

Thus, “[a] medical battery occurs where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669 [quoting Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239] [internal quotation marks omitted].)

Battery Imaging's demurrer is sustained. The general rule is set forth in Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229. Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery. (Berkey v.

Failure to State Facts Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.) The battery theory is reserved for those circumstances where a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

Plaintiff seeks to add a claim for medical battery. Defendant argues that Plaintiff knew about this claim when she responded to Special Interrogatories indicating that Defendant did not obtain informed consent. Opposition, Ex A, 4:18. Lack of informed consent and medical battery are two distinct causes of action. The former sounds in negligence and arises when a doctor performs a procedure without adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives.

Shaw (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 658, 664 [doctor committed battery—a claim distinct from professional negligence—when he “performed an operation to which [plaintiff] did not consent”];; Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 634 [battery “should be reserved for those circumstances where a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented”].) Lack of consent is thus an essential element of medical battery.

When a patient consents to certain treatment, however, and the doctor performs that treatment but an undisclosed complication with a low probability occurs, any resulting action will lie in negligence rather than in battery. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240-241.) A doctor who performs an operation to which plaintiff consents, but without disclosing sufficient information about inherent risks, will be liable in negligence rather than battery. (Saxena v.

Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action for medical battery on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Traditionally, “[a] medical battery occurs where ‘a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained . . . .’” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669, quoting Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.)

Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240 (“[t]he battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented"). Although this is not a “typical” medical battery case, Plaintiff’s allegations are, nevertheless, sufficient to state a claim of medical battery.

On March 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint for medical negligence, and medical dental battery. RULING : Overruled. Defendant Providence Facey Medical Foundation submits a demurrer to the medical negligence and medical dental battery causes of action on grounds that plaintiff Muna Haddad fails to sufficiently articulate sufficient facts alleging separate and distinct claims for medical negligence and medical battery.

Examples of medical battery include when: “the patient consents to an electromyogram, a relatively uncomplicated procedure, but the doctor performs a myelogram, which involves a spinal puncture. [Citation.] Or, the patient consents to an operation on his right ear, but the doctor operates on the left ear. [Citation.]” (Id. at 1267-68.)

In attempting to allege a cause of action for medical battery, plaintiff should consult Cobbs v. Grant, which states “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

In the medical context, the battery theory is reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240–41.) When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present. (Id.)

This is true despite the fact that the original complaint included a battery cause of action. Cobbs v. Grant Defendant, in her moving papers, relies on Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239. Cobbs was decided in the medical malpractice context. The Court therein held: The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

In the medical context, the battery theory is reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240–41.) When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present. (Id.)

Analysis re: Second Cause of Action for Battery “Battery is an offensive and intentional touching without the victim's consent.” (Kaplan v. Mamelak (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) A battery can occur “if the physician performs a ‘substantially different treatment’ from that covered by the patient's expressed consent.” (Id. at 646.) “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

In the medical context, the battery theory is reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240–41.) When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present. (Id.)

Fourth Cause of Action – Medical Battery Plaintiff argues that because the consent she gave was based upon misrepresentations, the consent itself was void – thereby rendering Doctor Brown's performance of the procedure a battery. "When a patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present." (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240-241 (emphasis added).)

A harmful contact, intentionally done is the essence of a battery [citation omitted]. A contact is ‘unlawful’ if it is unconsented to [citation omitted].” Ashcraft v. King (1991) 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 611. A “clear case of battery” occurs where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained. Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.

A harmful contact, intentionally done is the essence of a battery [citation omitted]. A contact is ‘unlawful’ if it is unconsented to [citation omitted].” Ashcraft v. King (1991) 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 611. A “clear case of battery” occurs where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained. Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.

“A claim based on lack of informed consent—which sounds in negligence—arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent.” (Id.)

In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent." Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 324; see also Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240. Here, plaintiff alleges Dr. Thota failed to obtain her informed consent.

In Dennis, the court held that it was not battery when the doctor used a different brand of knee replacement than the one requested by the patient. Id. Defendant also cites to Daum v. SpineCare Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1285. In Daum, the court found that it was not battery when the doctor performed an implant, without informing the patient about the experimental nature of the implant. Id. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts for their claim of medical battery.

“Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery.” Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239. Further, “[t]he battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

MICRA's limitation on noneconomic damages applies to this sort of battery, which amounts to a claim that the doctor "failed to meet the applicable standard of care in rendering his services." (Id. at p. 352.)

Court's tentative: Ruling: Sustain Defendant Dignity Health's demurrer to the 2d C/A (Battery), with without leave to amend. Reason: Case law supports defendant hospital's position that battery is a cause of action directed at a doctor and not at a hospital. Plaintiffs did not submit any opposition, and have made no showing they could successfully amend this cause of action.

Shaw (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 658, 664 [doctor who performed breast enlargement to which patient had not consented "committed a battery."] "The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

“Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery.” (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239, internal citations omitted.) However, “[t]he battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

On 12/30/18, Plaintiff learned that Golden was on probation for having sexual relations with a patient, alerting her to the fact that a doctor having sexual relations with a patient is prohibited. Based on these facts, the Complaint asserts causes of action for: 1. Professional Medical Negligence 2. IIED 3. Battery 4. Assault 5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 6. Sexual Harassment 7.

In the medical context, the battery theory is reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240–41.) When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present. (Id.)

"A claim based on lack of informed consent-which sounds in negligence-arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent." (Id.) The allegations of the SAC blur this distinction. Although purporting to state a cause of action for medical battery, the allegations merely plead the absence of informed consent.

The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery. ( Cobbs v. Grant¿ (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239.) When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.

DISCUSSION A patient may state a claim for medical battery against a physician when the physician fails to obtain the patient’s consent to a procedure, or performs a substantially different procedure than the one to which the patient consented. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240–241.) “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

Plaintiffhas alleged failure to obtain informed consent with factual allegations which do not support a claim for medical battery. "Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery. [Citations]." (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239).

Battery and lack of informed consent are separate causes of action. A claim based on lack of informed consent-which sounds in negligence-arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent. (Saxena v.

With respect to the Subject Battery, Doctor Stevick notes that “the fourth row does not completely miss the tab, but instead has left a series of perfectly spaced marks indicating its presence.” (Id. ¶ 12; Exhibit (“Exh.”) 6.) “The spacing of the square pattern, along with every other geometric feature still present regarding the negative tabs, match those of the LG HG2 design. Thus, it is impossible to state that the subject battery is not an LG HG2.” (Id. ¶ 12.)

On 12/30/18, Plaintiff learned that Golden was on probation for having sexual relations with another patient, “alerting her to the fact that a doctor having sexual relations with a patient is prohibited.” (FAC, ¶ 29.) Based on these facts, the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts causes of action for: 1. Professional Medical Negligence 2. IIED 3. Battery 4. Assault 5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 6. Sexual Harassment 7.

But, "[w]here a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery." Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239; Perry v. Shaw (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 658, 664 [doctor who performed breast enlargement to which patient had not consented "committed a battery."]

Depending on the facts pled, lack of informed consent may constitute a cause of action for Negligence or a cause of action for Battery. A medical battery occurs when a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained. Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239. A medical battery also occurs when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. Id.

App.4th 744, in which gravamen of each claim was the allegation that the defendant doctor, in the course of rendering gynecological services, committed a sexual battery by touching and manipulating plaintiff's genitalia. In this matter, the MICRA cap does not apply to count one, the medical battery cause of action since the gravamen of that complaint was not professional negligence, but the intentional tort of battery. ( Perry 88 Cal. App. 4th at 671.)

Where the doctor performs the treatment to which consent was given but fails to make a proper disclosure, the tort is negligence; if the doctor performs a different one, the tort is battery. (Rainer v. Community Memorial Hosp. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 240, 255; see Kaplan v.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s treatment was not surgical in nature, thus, Plaintiff has no claim for medical battery. A medical battery occurs if a medical professional performs a substantially different treatment from that covered by the patient’s expressed consent. (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240.)

As Defendant argues in opposition, in the medical context, a battery “is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent.” Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 316, 324-325. A cause of action for battery is different from a claim for lack of informed consent. They are separate causes of action. The latter claim sounds in negligence based on a situation where a doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives.

As Defendant argues in opposition, in the medical context, a battery “is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor performs a procedure without obtaining any consent.” Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 316, 324-325. A cause of action for battery is different from a claim for lack of informed consent. They are separate causes of action. The latter claim sounds in negligence based on a situation where a doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives.

Second Cause of Action for Medical Battery In the medical context, battery occurs when a patient gives permission to a doctor to perform one type of procedure, but the doctor performs a substantially different procedure to which the patient did not consent. ( Perry v. Shaw (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 658, 660 .)

Second Cause of Action (Battery). A medical battery occurs where “a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained ... .” (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239 [104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1]; see Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495–1496 [21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36].)

This is because if the intent element is not explicitly stated in the instruction, it would be possible for a jury (incorrectly) to find a doctor liable for medical battery even if it believed the doctor negligently forgot about the condition precedent.” Dennis , supra, at 544.

“Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery.” Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239. Further, “[t]he battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.

Wilson contends that this lawsuit is about two distinct issues: (1) Wilson’s alleged battery and (2) whether Plaintiff was retaliated against for making complaints about water quality. Wilson contends that the battery issue is straightforward and is likely to be tried in a few days, whereas the issue about water quality will likely take weeks. Wilson contends he is not involved with the water quality issues and that he “is currently a frontline doctor treating Covid patients in intensive care units.

The court therefore sustains the Doctor Defendants, Garcia, and CHLA’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action for medical battery of decedent because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430, subd. (e).) The court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend the fifth cause of action for medical battery of decedent.