Effect of Bankruptcy on State Court Litigation in California

The state court should have given effect to the bankruptcy court's orders. By going further, the state court exceeded its jurisdiction, even if the state court believed that Rutz had valid grounds to object to the orders.

In this case, the bankruptcy court did apparently make express findings which were not made in Savage. So Savage does not stand for the proposition that a state court may ignore a federal bankruptcy court’s express findings. Once again, Plaintiff’s remedy, if he seeks to challenge the bankruptcy court’s findings, would be in federal court, not state court.

In this case, the bankruptcy court did apparently make express findings which were not made in Savage. So Savage does not stand for the proposition that a state court may ignore a federal bankruptcy court’s express findings. Once again, Plaintiff’s remedy, if he seeks to challenge the bankruptcy court’s findings, would be in federal court, not state court.

Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, on the Closing Date (as defined below), the Trustee shall sell to the Kang Trust, and the Kang Trust shall purchase all of the Trustee's right, title and interest "as is, where is" in the State Court Action as specified herein, including without limitation all of Debtors' State Court Action Claims against all defendants in the State Court Action, as of the Closing Date.

Subsequently, the bankruptcy court converted the proceeding to one under chapter 11. Gruntz moved to dismiss the criminal prosecution on the ground that the state court proceedings were in violation of the bankruptcy court's automatic stay. The state trial court denied the motion, and the matter proceeded to trial. Gruntz was convicted. On appeal in the state court, Gruntz argued that the criminal case was subject to the automatic stay.

On April 7, 2023, Grand Pacific filed a notice of order approving stipulation for limited relief from stay to proceed with state court litigation (Stipulation). The Stipulation was approved by a federal bankruptcy judge in a related bankruptcy action involving Hawthorne.

At issue here is the effect of the settlement, approved by the Bankruptcy Court, between Petitioners and the BR trustee on the Petitioners bankruptcy claim (based on the Order for Writ of Attachment) against Respondent McQueen in the pending state court action, the Ventura Action The Court concludes there is no res judicata effect precluding Respondent's pending motion for summary judgment. 1.

Broomand and Debtor; Filed three different motions before the state court to vacate the Resulting Trust Judgment, all of which were denied; Recorded the 2014 Quitclaim Deed while their third request to vacate the Resulting Trust Judgment was pending; Falsely represented to the state court that Debtor and Ms.

Discussion Defendants contend that this Court has the authority to decide the motion for judgment on the pleadings despite the pending bankruptcy on two grounds: 1) this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Bankruptcy Court over Ramirez’s claims, and 2) the automatic stay does not preclude a defensive action commenced by a debtor in state court. The Court finds Defendants’ argument well-taken.

On May 21, 2018, the parties were ordered to file Status Reports advising the Court as to the status of the bankruptcy stay. No Status Reports have been received. The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed a document entitled Notice to State Court of Removal of Action by Defendants, informing the Court that on June 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Removal of this action to the United States Bankruptcy Court.

DENY the judgment on the pleadings a to the fourth cause of action for fraud as the evaluation of that tort is a state court matter and not an issue of compensation for services as described in Bankruptcy Code §327 et seq. GRANT the request for judicial notice as to the records from the bankruptcy court: the notice of filing and the two pleadings filed in the bankruptcy docket. Ev. Code §452(d).

“The existence of federal sanctions for the filing of frivolous and malicious bankruptcy pleadings must be read as an implicit rejection of state court remedies. The mere possibility of being sued in tort in state court, with the potential for substantial damage awards, could deter persons from exercising their rights in bankruptcy. Thus, it is for Congress and the federal courts, not state courts, to decide what incentives and penalties shall be utilized in the bankruptcy process. [Citations Omitted.]”

As such, Carlos Padilla III can prosecute the underlying State Court Action in its entirety, provided all claims are related to non-dischargeable subject matter. Upon entry of judgment by the Orange County Superior Court, Carlos Padilla III shall seek (if appropriate) nondischargeability of the state court judgment before this Court.”

On 4/10/2023, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay in the Bankruptcy Action, stating the following, “Movants are requesting that the Court grant relief from stay to permit the parties’ return to state court to resolve the state law issues raised by the Pre-Bankruptcy Litigation operative [FAC], so that it can proceed against [CRAMG] insurance and the non-bankruptcy defendants to liquidate its claim.” (UMF 5, emphasis added.)

Bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to construe the automatic stay and to grant relief. Abdallah v. United Sav. Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1109. Aarons argues this court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether the automatic stay applies, and VST should bring this matter up before the bankruptcy court. The court agrees. Determining whether lifting of the stay on VSTs predecessor-in-interest also lifts the stay as to VST is outside the purview of the state court.

“The normal rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to the decisions of bankruptcy courts.” (Martin v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 752, 758.) “An order of the bankruptcy court, excluding a bankrupt’s obligation to his former wife under a property settlement from the discharge in bankruptcy, can be challenged solely by way of direct attack in the federal court; it may not be collaterally attacked in a proceeding in state court.” (Id. at p. 754.)

The automatic stay is core bankruptcy proceeding and a State court modifying that stay “would constitute unauthorized infringement upon the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to enforce the stay.” (In re Gruntz (2000) 202 F. 3d 1074, 1082.) It appears that any action by this Court on the matters before it would interfere with the rights of the parties currently before the Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court has a hearing on this matter set for June 13, 2018. III.

This is an issue for the bankruptcy court to decide, not this state court. At present, the enforceability/dischargability of the WeCosign judgments is an open issue. According to the memoranda on file, the issue is presently before the bankruptcy court, with no decision having yet been made. If the debts are dischargeable, they will be resolved in whole within the bankruptcy proceeding (and plaintiff’s adversary claims).

However, a state court does not have concurrent jurisdiction to determine the scope and applicability of a stay with respect to a core bankruptcy proceeding. (In re Marriage of Sprague & Spiegel-Sprague (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 215, 219.) Further, because the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over objections to discharge, state court judgments construing the scope of the bankruptcy discharge are not preclusive. (In re Pavelich (9th Cir. BAP 1999) 222 BR 777, 783.)

In Pauletto and Ross , the issue was whether the plaintiffs could bring malicious prosecution state court actions when the underlying proceedings were bankruptcy proceedings authorized by federal law. ( Satten v.

” ( Ibid. ) The bankruptcy court therefore denied Plaintiff’s request to stay distribution while Plaintiff pursued his claims in state court. ( Ibid. ) In Nathanson v. Hecker (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1158 ( Nathanson ), the Heckers filed a petition for bankruptcy while the parties were engaged in litigation in state court. ( Id. at p. 1161.) Nathanson filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court, and the court allowed his claim.

” ( Ibid. ) The bankruptcy court therefore denied Plaintiff Fateh Manesh’s request to stay distribution while Plaintiff Fateh Manesh pursued his claims in state court. ( Ibid. ) In Nathanson v. Hecker (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1158 ( Nathanson ), the Heckers filed a petition for bankruptcy while the parties were engaged in litigation in state court. ( Id. at p. 1161.) Nathanson filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court, and the court allowed his claim.

” ( Ibid. ) The bankruptcy court therefore denied Plaintiff Fateh Manesh’s request to stay distribution while Plaintiff Fateh Manesh pursued his claims in state court. ( Ibid. ) In Nathanson v. Hecker (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1158 ( Nathanson ), the Heckers filed a petition for bankruptcy while the parties were engaged in litigation in state court. ( Id. at p. 1161.) Nathanson filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court, and the court allowed his claim.

If the bankruptcy court later decides that the state court was incorrect, the state court proceedings in violation of the stay are void. See, e.g., In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.1992); In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d 123 (9th Cir.1989). On the other hand, if the state court is correct in deciding that the stay does not apply, the state court proceedings are not void. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1087.

A dispute arose in that development and a contractor asserted mechanics’ liens on the property as senior to Minnwest’s mortgage in a state court action. (Ibid.) Minnwest requested the title insurer to defend the action and to indemnify Minnwest. (Ibid.) The title insurer defended the action, but neither agreed to nor refused to indemnity Minnwest. (Id. at pp. *2-*3.) The state court subsequently issued an order ruling that the mechanics’ liens were superior to Minnwest’s mortgage. (Id. at p. *3.)

The Bankruptcy Court stated: “So it appears to me that the state court is trying to respect the automatic stay and the court’s jurisdiction. I appreciate that very much and believe, you know, we try to—the two courts try to get along and I do appreciate it. But by granting this motion for relief from the automatic stay I am saying to the state court judge, the state court whichever judge is presiding, you may do whatever you think you should do or not do with respect to the judgment.” [Ex.

. § 362 that was lodged with the bankruptcy court after the hearing. The proposed order provides that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is terminated as to the debtor and the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and that there is no automatic stay in place as to the non-debtor co-defendants in this state court action. City Lights has filed an objection to the notice, stating that it does not accurately reflect the bankruptcy court’s order.

Bankruptcy Court Case # 1:13-bk-12106-MT, In re Adolfo Flores, and in particular the "Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. of the Bankruptcy Code Approving Stipulation Granting Relief from the Automatic Stay" granted by United States Bankruptcy Judge Maureen Tighe and entered on May 6, 2014 (copy attached).

Status of the appeal to the 9th Circuit on the bankruptcy issue. 3. Even if Mr. Allen receives a favorable ruling in the pending appeal of the disgorgement/disallowance of fees issue, has there been a determination made as to whether the bankruptcy court or the state court has jurisdiction to rule on Allen's request for fees. 4. Has a formal order ever been entered staying the state court proceeding pending the outcome of the bankruptcy appeal.

In In re Beeney (9th Cir. 1992) 142 B.R. 360, 364, after receiving notice of discharge in a no asset case, plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy case and for an order allowing him to proceed with the state court case. The bankruptcy court denied his motion, stating there was no need to reopen his case, but implying that he should have taken action when the bankruptcy matter was open and thus could not proceed with the state case.

Kmart Corp. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1316, 1324 (“Discharge in bankruptcy of a cause of action asserted in state court litigation is a defense”); Mueller v. Elba Oil Co. (1942) 21 Cal.2d 188, 191; Williams v. Winter (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 474, 475. To obtain an order disposing of a complaint, or cause of action, the Defendant can demur to the pleading, or bring a motion for summary adjudication. See Flores v. Kmart Corp. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1316, 1324; CCP § 437c(o)(1).

The time has expired for seeking relief in state court from the judgment pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 473. Any relief from Plaintiff's collection of a discharged debt must be sought from the federal bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court must make the determination of whether the judgment lien created by the abstract of judgment recorded in November 2009 remains valid.

Following Ybarra, the Ninth Circuit BAP found that a fee award for post-petition pursuit of cross-complaints in state court were not discharged in the debtor’s bankruptcy in Bechtold v. Gillespie (In re Gillespie), 516 B.R. 586, 588 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2014). “The focus of Ybarra’s inquiry does not turn upon who is named as plaintiff and who is named as defendant.

Kmart Corp. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1316, 1324 (“Discharge in bankruptcy of a cause of action asserted in state court litigation is a defense”); Mueller v. Elba Oil Co. (1942) 21 Cal.2d 188, 191; Williams v. Winter (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 474, 475. To obtain an order disposing of a complaint or cause of action based on an affirmative defense, the Defendant can demur to the complaint, or bring a motion for summary adjudication of his defense. See Flores v.

On 01/23/20, at 5:50pm, defendant Todd Tucker (only) filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case (8:20-bk-10229-CB). On 01/24/20, this Court signed and entered Judgment against all defendants in plaintiffs’ favor in the aggregate amount of $578,926.32. On 01/28/20, at 5:27pm, defendant Tucker gave notice of his having filed for bankruptcy protection and requested an automatic stay of these state court proceedings. On 01/30/20, at 10:18am, this Court served on plaintiffs’ counsel Notice of Entry of Judgment.

Here, plaintiffs have made a strategic decision to file actions in both state court and federal court regarding the same underlying facts, and involving some of the same claims. However, the pendency of the appeal in the bankruptcy action does not automatically stay the state court action, nor would it serve the interests of judicial efficiency to stay the present case until the bankruptcy appeal is resolved.

Once judgment in the State court action is obtained, however, the court expects that a judgment of this court will be sought before any levies can occur. That is the obvious import of the court’s earlier relief of stay order. These issues have to be litigated somewhere, either in the adversary proceeding or in the State Court Action. So, the debtor’s lament about having to expend funds and time in defending herself is not persuasive. Litigation, unfortunately, appears to be in the cards either way.”

“[A]ccording to the plain language of these statutes, the state court's jurisdiction is suspended when the defendant seeking removal gives notice to the state court clerk, and it is reacquired when the district court clerk gives notice to the state court clerk in the form of a certified copy of the remand order.” (Spanair S.A. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 348, 356.)

Are any of the defendants in the TMCC, BMO or Compass bank suits named defendants in the pending Florida bankruptcy suit? 2. Is this state court action stayed as a result of the pending Florida bankruptcy suit involving Momentum Automotive Group? 3. As USRECH is a party to the Florida bankruptcy action in its suit against Momentum Automotive Group, can USRECH appear in this case? And, if USRECH is the beneficiary of a DACA, can USRECH receive monies outside of bankruptcy? 3.

Bankruptcy courts, and not state courts, have jurisdiction over all claims of willful violations of bankruptcy stays. Hicks v. E. T. Legg & Assocs . (2001) 89 Cal. App. 4th 496, 513. Parties are not permitted to avail themselves of state court remedies, to circumvent federal remedies for their opponents' alleged misuse of the bankruptcy process. Saks v. Parilla (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 565, 573-74.

This issue is distinct from whether the bankruptcy court can stay state court proceedings in its discretion.” (Id. at p. 336.) “It is clear that § 362 does not stay the hand of the trustee from continuing to prosecute a pre-bankruptcy lawsuit instituted by the debtor.” (Id. at p. 337.)

Merrick involved Defendants’ motion to dismiss the debtor’s state court action (as opposed to a debtor’s continued prosecution of the case) and Shah involved a Chapter 11 debtor in possession action (as opposed to a Chapter 7 action where the estate is controlled by bankruptcy trustee). Although the trustee abandoned Plaintiff’s case on 11/24/14, Plaintiff was under the mistaken belief that he had to wait for all of the bankruptcy issues to be resolved before he could continue the action.

App. 5th 973, 976 (In the Adversary Proceeding, Cabandong alleged that the debt underlying the $155,000 loan that was the subject of the state court action against Powell was nondischargeable under title 11 United States Code section 523.4 (See Fed. R. Bankr. Proc., rules 7001(6), 9002(1) [to determine the dischargeability of a debt, the creditor's civil action in bankruptcy court is an adversary proceeding].)).

Jafroodi to shield these records in the bankruptcy case, which itself was filed to avoid adjudication of Plaintiffs’ Labor Code claims in this state court. Finally, Plaintiffs note that all other protections in the protective orders will remain in place. In light of Plaintiffs’ arguments and the lack of opposition, the motion is granted.

Gerry on behalf of the Watsons was in direct violation of the stay order in the Kundas’ bankruptcy case (Case No. 9:10-bk-15284-RR). Mr. Ring advises that Mr. Gerry set the motion in state court, knowing that any actions against the Kundas were stayed by federal law. Mr. Gerry has not filed a response to Mr. Ring’s declaration. Ruling: Mr. Gerry cannot be found in contempt. No notice of stay was ever filed in this case. Also, if Mr.

“Any state court modification of the automatic stay would constitute an unauthorized infringement upon the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to enforce the stay.” (Id. at 1082.) Ruling The motion to set aside the trustee’s sale is denied. Next dates: Notice:

The defendant in Semtek argued that because the federal judgment of dismissal was "on the merits," that rule 41(b) controlled and the federal court dismissal had a claim preclusion effect in Maryland state court in which the new action was pending.

Pursuant to judicially noticeable documents, the joint plan did not contain any language retaining jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding, but rather directed that a party seeking any type of relief relating to a Plan provision can seek such relief in a state court of general jurisdiction. (Catanzarite Decl., Ex. A.) Plaintiffs claims herein do not affect the debtors rights in any waythey are claims against Attorney Aronson arising out of his independent duty to hold payments in trust.

A state court can neither invalidate such an order, nor amend it, nor ignore it. Thus, plaintiff will have to turn to the bankruptcy court or district court for relief from the discharge order. This Court does not direct what the proper procedure might be for plaintiff to seek such relief; indeed, the Court assumes that such a procedure is available, but does not pretend to know that for sure. It will be up to plaintiff to figure out how he may pursue this in the federal arena.

The arguments as to whether a state court has authority to question the Bankruptcy Courts jurisdiction over the Sale Order is of no consequence. As argued by Plaintiffs, the issues presented in this Set Aside Action are not to affect or set aside the Bankruptcy Sale. As detailed above, this Set Aside Action is to determine whether the Resulting Trust Judgment is void.

A state court does not have concurrent jurisdiction to determine the scope and applicability of the automatic stay with respect to a core bankruptcy proceeding. Bankruptcy courts have the sole authority to determine the scope of the automatic stay imposed by 11 United States Code section 362(a), subject to federal appellate review. In re Marriage of Sprague & Spiegel-Sprague (2003) 105 Cal. App. 4th 215, 219.

The California Supreme Court also has isolated another critical factor favoring a stay of the state court action in favor of the Federal action[:] the Federal action is pending in California not some other state. ( Caiafa Prof. L. Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800, 804.) The Court has considered the parties arguments and will, in the exercise of its discretion, stay the cross-action pending resolution of the parallel bankruptcy proceedings.

Elba Oil Co. (1942) 21 Cal.2d 188, 205 (“Our state courts give full faith and credit to the final judgments and orders of the United States District Courts” which “establish… the conclusiveness of the bankruptcy proceedings … in this state court action”); People v.

. § 1367 she had 30 days to file this action in state court from the date the bankruptcy case was voluntarily dismissed on March 23, 2016. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14.) Since she filed this action on April 22, 2016, she maintains the action is timely. The court disagrees that the 30-day period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 applies to the facts alleged in this complaint.

Carnation Co. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 161, 263 Cal.Rptr. 476, appellant debtor contended the automatic stay applied to his state court cause of action, suspended the superior court's jurisdiction over the case and tolled time under the five-year mandatory dismissal statute. (Code Civ.Proc., § 583.310.) This court held to the contrary. "[The] action was not stayed during the bankruptcy.

However, the authorities cited by Omidi Defendants and Top Surgeon Defendants relating to the procedures for substitution of parties do not involve whether a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, the real party in interest of the Plaintiffs’ claims, is required to substitute in as plaintiff in state court proceedings commenced prior to the bankruptcy.

On July 3, 2018, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was closed so that the Judgment Lien could be addressed in the Chapter 11 case and/or in state court proceedings. (Complaint, ¶ 30.) After it became clear that the Judgment Lien would have to be addressed in state court, Plaintiff retained new counsel to assist him in his efforts to set aside the default judgment in the Original Action. (Id., ¶ 31.)

In Shaoxing County, “[a] creditor of a bankrupt corporation sought to recover payment in state court from an individual based on an alter ego theory of liability. The individual argued that the alter ego claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate, because it alleged general injuries to the corporation that could establish a basis of liability for all corporate debts, and therefore, the state court action should be stayed.” (Shaoxing County, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th p. 1193.)

Such cases all concern the discretion of the bankruptcy court and do not address the discretion of a state court to retroactively annul any actions taken in violation of the automatic stay. Plaintiffs citation to In re Aki Oya , No. BAP SC-19-1095-BKUL, 2019 WL 5390007 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2019) is improper as citation to an unpublished opinions are not proper pursuant to California Rules of Court , Rule 8.1115(a).

However, since plaintiff has at least a theory of liability, and since very few courts have had occasion to consider (let alone decide) whether the remedy for a Yvanova violation is limited to monetary relief, or if the plaintiff can actually get the property back, this Court must first defer to the bankruptcy court for whether the issues are ready for resolution here in the state court.

Plaintiff implies Defendants made no claim against the bankruptcy estate, but does not actually state this. Moreover, even assuming without supporting evidence that the facts are as Plaintiff asserts, they do not support a finding the proposed amendment is futile. Plaintiff cites legal authority which states "offset cannot be used to revive in a state court proceeding a debt already discharged in bankruptcy." (In re Marriage of Williams (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1215, 1224.)

In summary, the District Court upheld all but one finding, essentially determining that Simas had engaged in willful conduct preventing access by the Powells to their real and personal property, i.e., trespass and conversion, and their claims were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The District Court also found that they were limited to monetary damages in their state court action. OPERATIVE COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, filed October 22, 2021, is the operative complaint.

In summary, the District Court upheld all but one finding, essentially determining that Simas had engaged in willful conduct preventing access by the Powells to their real and personal property, i.e., trespass and conversion, and their claims were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The District Court also found that they were limited to monetary damages in their state court action. OPERATIVE COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, filed October 22, 2021, is the operative complaint.

In summary, the District Court upheld all but one finding, essentially determining that Simas had engaged in willful conduct preventing access by the Powells to their real and personal property, i.e., trespass and conversion, and their claims were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The District Court also found that they were limited to monetary damages in their state court action. OPERATIVE COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, filed October 22, 2021, is the operative complaint.

In summary, the District Court upheld all but one finding, essentially determining that Simas had engaged in willful conduct preventing access by the Powells to their real and personal property, i.e., trespass and conversion, and their claims were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The District Court also found that they were limited to monetary damages in their state court action. OPERATIVE COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, filed October 22, 2021, is the operative complaint.

In summary, the District Court upheld all but one finding, essentially determining that Simas had engaged in willful conduct preventing access by the Powells to their real and personal property, i.e., trespass and conversion, and their claims were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The District Court also found that they were limited to monetary damages in their state court action. OPERATIVE COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, filed October 22, 2021, is the operative complaint.

In summary, the District Court upheld all but one finding, essentially determining that Simas had engaged in willful conduct preventing access by the Powells to their real and personal property, i.e., trespass and conversion, and their claims were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The District Court also found that they were limited to monetary damages in their state court action. OPERATIVE COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, filed October 22, 2021, is the operative complaint.

In summary, the District Court upheld all but one finding, essentially determining that Simas had engaged in willful conduct preventing access by the Powells to their real and personal property, i.e., trespass and conversion, and their claims were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The District Court also found that they were limited to monetary damages in their state court action. OPERATIVE COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, filed October 22, 2021, is the operative complaint.

Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Court State court jurisdiction is not proper to accomplish the adjustment of rights and duties within the bankruptcy process itself, which should be uniquely and exclusively federal (e.g., debtors' petitions, creditors' claims, disputes over reorganization plans, disputes over discharge, and such other proceedings). Satten v. Webb (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 365, 384. "...

Plaintiff has provided no authority that suggests that MBUSA’s failure to properly remove the District Court case to the Bankruptcy Court would somehow revert jurisdiction back to this Court—somehow skipping the District Court (the court that certainly had jurisdiction over the claim) entirely. Plaintiff points out that the District Court case “was closed.” However, Plaintiff presents no authority that a District Court closing a case grants the State Court jurisdiction.

That is so not only because of the comprehensive jurisdiction vested in the bankruptcy courts, [citation], but also because persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order. [Citation.] . . . Any state court modification of the automatic stay would constitute an unauthorized infringement upon the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to enforce the stay.

Plaintiff further argues that he can “seek a state court judgment for willful misconduct and enforce it outside the scope of insurance proceeds once the automatic stay is lifted when the bankruptcy case is closed.” (Opposition, p. 5:8-10.) This is a misreading of the Bankruptcy Order.

In Ming Yu Chau, the district court seemingly used the term “standing” to represent the concept of Article III standing as well as the concept as it exists in state court. (Ming Yu Chau, supra, 2018 WL 4680127.)

Defendant also argues it should be dismissed from the Complaint because the bankruptcy court approved its Plan. [A] state court may consider the applicability of a bankruptcy discharge when it is raised as a defense to an action. ( Flores v. Kmart Corp. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1316 [citing Local Loan Co. v.

“It is black letter law that, when a federal action has been filed covering the same subject matter as is involved in a California action, the California court has the discretion but not the obligation to stay the state court action.” Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Ca. Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800, 804.

It explained: In sum, we find that appellant failed in his duty to list a known creditor in his bankruptcy petition, and, by his silence, led respondents to proceed in ignorance to a final judgment in state court.

The California Supreme Court notes that “ ‘[t]he normal rules of Res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to the decisions of bankruptcy courts.’” (Martin v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 752, 758, 764 internal citations omitted [holding that a debt discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding was res judicata of collection efforts in state court].)

myself clear in connection with the first motion that the Trustee has not abandoned the domain names, and I view the matter of the state court litigation as a matter of standing, and that is that – I’ll try to make myself clear again.

Congress' authorization of certain sanctions for the filing of frivolous bankruptcy petitions should be read as an implicit rejection of other penalties, including the kind of substantial damage awards that might be available in state court tort suits . Even the mere possibility of being sued in tort in state court could in some instances deter persons from exercising their rights in bankruptcy.

A judgment creditor is entitled to request an award of fees and costs in state court for efforts exerted in bankruptcy proceedings. (See, e.g., Jaffe v. Pacelli (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 927, 937- 938.)

Congress' authorization of certain sanctions for the filing of frivolous bankruptcy petitions should be read as an implicit rejection of other penalties, including the kind of substantial damage awards that might be available in state court tort suits . Even the mere possibility of being sued in tort in state court could in some instances deter persons from exercising their rights in bankruptcy.

The time has expired for seeking relief in state court from the judgment pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 473. Any relief from Plaintiff's collection of a discharged debt must be sought from the federal bankruptcy court.

Once judgment in the State court action is obtained, however, the court expects that a judgment of this court will be sought before any levies can occur. That is the obvious import of the court’s earlier relief of stay order. These issues have to be litigated somewhere, either in the adversary proceeding or in the State Court Action. So, the debtor’s lament about having to expend funds and time in defending herself is not persuasive. Litigation, unfortunately, appears to be in the cards either way.”

. § 329(a), Defendant was required to disclose these funds to the bankruptcy court to the extent they were incurred in connection with the bankruptcy proceedings. Defendants do not dispute these facts. Defendants instead argue Plaintiff cannot enforce in state court the duty to disclose fees. Defendants assert that federal bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction over attorneys fees incurred in bankruptcy proceedings. This does not defeat Plaintiffs arguments.

Parties are not permitted to avail themselves of state court remedies, to circumvent federal remedies for their opponents' alleged misuse of the bankruptcy process. Saks v. Parilla (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 565, 573-74. Any sanctions imposed pursuant to this section shall be imposed consistently with the standards, conditions, and procedures set forth in subdivisions (c), (d), and (h) of Section 128.7. CCP §128.5(f).

[A] state court may consider the applicability of a bankruptcy discharge when it is raised as a defense to an action. ( Flores v. Kmart Corp. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1316 [citing Local Loan Co. v.

The action had been stayed due to the defendant’s pending bankruptcy. The trial court subsequently dismissed the action when it was reported that the bankruptcy court had removed the matter to federal court. When the federal court remanded the case to state court, the plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal, but the motion was denied. On appeal, the court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court had no power to dismiss the action in violation of the automatic stay.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Ascentium dismissed the district court action without prejudice so the new state court action could be filed against Walden, and the stipulation of entry of judgment entered if Walden defaulted. Noon Decl. ¶14. The reason a new state court action was filed is that most federal courts will not hold a case open for years while payments are being made and instead will dismiss the complaint. Alper Decl. ¶8.

Ingber, Plaintiff’s attorney, explains that Defendant Polyak is the principal of Oxbridge Coins, Inc., a debtor in bankruptcy since September 21, 2018. On October 11, 2019, Oxbridge filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against Plaintiff and its owner, Michael Johnson. The adversary proceeding alleges that Plaintiff and Johnson fraudulently transferred coins from the bankruptcy estate and wrongfully attempted to exercise control over Oxbridge property by filing the instant state court action.

The good news for plaintiff is that WeCosign’s decision to pursue Chapter 7 instead of Chapter 11 means the debts are still in existence; the bad news for plaintiff is that any money found belonging to WeCosign prepetition belongs to the bankruptcy court/trustee. See FRBP 3002(c). How then may plaintiff maintain a civil action here in state court for conduct implicating funds belonging to a party protected by the warm embrace of the bankruptcy court?

The good news for plaintiff is that WeCosign’s decision to pursue Chapter 7 instead of Chapter 11 means the debts are still in existence; the bad news for plaintiff is that any money found belonging to WeCosign pre-petition belongs to the bankruptcy court/trustee. See FRBP 3002(c). How then may plaintiff maintain a civil action here in state court for conduct implicating funds belonging to a party protected by the warm embrace of the bankruptcy court?

The good news for plaintiff is that WeCosign’s decision to pursue Chapter 7 instead of Chapter 11 means the debts are still in existence; the bad news for plaintiff is that any money found belonging to WeCosign pre-petition belongs to the bankruptcy court/trustee. See FRBP 3002(c). How then may plaintiff maintain a civil action here in state court for conduct implicating funds belonging to a party protected by the warm embrace of the bankruptcy court?

“It is well settled that such a fiduciary cannot be sued in state court without leave of the bankruptcy court for acts done in his official capacity and within his authority as an officer of the court.” (Id.) While a limited exception exists “with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such property,” “this section was not intended to apply to a breach of a fiduciary duty in the administration of a bankruptcy estate.” (Id. at 970.)

§ 524(a) bec ause Rafipoors discharge in bankruptcy precludes Plaintiff from suing him in this state court action ; (2) the reaffirmation of the guaranty after discharge was improper and does not revive the guaranty; (3) all causes of action arise strictly out of the guaranty and hence fail, and (4) any claims of alter ego against Rafipoor also fail because Plaintiff has not alleged a unity of interest and ownership between Rafipoor and Tenant or that there will be an inequitable result if the

In rejecting Dorfman’s claim that filing this action was in contempt of the bankruptcy discharge , the Court stated: [T]he claims being asserted against Richard B Dorfman in the state court action, captioned Sherry Box and James Fox v.

A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case." (§ 1447(c), italics added.) The state court is deprived of jurisdiction unless the federal court subsequently remands it. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). See, e.g., Seedman v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. D. of Cal. (9th Cir. 1988) 837 F.2d 413, 414). (ROA 136.)

Ultimately, the federal court denied removal and remanded the case back to the state court. On August 9, 2019, trial was scheduled for May 11, 2020. On January 27, 2020, J&J filed a motion for summary judgment set for hearing on April 9, 2020. On February 28, 2020, J&J submitted an ex parte request for a hearing on a motion for forum non conveniens. The Court was unable to accommodate the request for a hearing date prior to trial. The request was denied.

The Court finds no mention of state court proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court order dated December 17, 2010, or in the transcript of proceedings leading to that order. The Court intends to grant (i) the request to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of compelling Defendant Ronald Alvin Neff's deposition, (ii) the motion to compel Defendant's deposition, and (iii) the request for sanctions against Defendant's counsel of record in the amount of $1,600.00. (C.C.P. § 2025.450.)