Antitrust Laws

Useful Rulings on Antitrust Laws

Recent Rulings on Antitrust Laws

LASHANNA GRANT, ET AL. VS SELF-UPGRADE VENTURES LLC, ET AL.

Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 100, 127.) Plaintiffs contend they would not seek discovery into the merits. Instead, Plaintiffs would seek specific answers about what SUV knew about its California email audience and about SUV’s intimate relationship with Enrich. The key question that can determine whether SUV is subject to specific jurisdiction in California is: Did SUV and Enrich intend that their business benefit from California? (Farina v.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

SALVADOR MAGANA VS. SANTA PAULA MATERIALS INC

Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 527; In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 258.) Ruling on Motion to Quash The Court DENIES plaintiffs' request to continue this hearing to conduct further discovery relevant to the issue of specific jurisdiction as to SL and EMCSL. The Court granted plaintiffs a three month continuance to attempt to produce evidence establishing specific jurisdiction as to SL and EMCSL.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Products Liability

CHERYL SMITH, ET AL. VS WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., ET AL.

An “unfair” practice must be “tethered to an[] underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision” or must “threaten[] an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of an antitrust law.” Durell (2010) 183 CA4th 1350, 1366 (sustained demurrer to claim alleging that the defendant’s conduct “violates public policy, and is ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous;”’ because such allegation was “a vague test of unfairness” the court rejected.).

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    other

VENCLOSE INC., ET AL. V. COVIDIEN LP, ET AL. (LEAD CASE) [CONSOLIDATED WITH CASE NO. 18CV327382]

.; (8) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; 12 (9) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; and (10) Violation of 13 Cartwright Act. 14 On October 28, 2020, the court heard a demurrer by Defendants to the seventh through 15 tenth causes of action in the SAC.

  • Hearing

ANTHONY XEPOLIS VS TOKIO MARINE AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY

For a claim based on “unfair” business practices: “When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor's “unfair” act or practice invokes section 17200, the word “unfair” in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v.

  • Hearing

ALTERNATIVE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS INC VS WONG HODGEN

To show a business practice is unfair, the plaintiff must show "the conduct is tethered to any underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, or that it threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of an antitrust law." Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 613. "The third type of conduct proscribed by § 17200 is 'fraudulent' business practices.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

ALTERNATIVE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS INC VS WONG HODGEN

To show a business practice is unfair, the plaintiff must show "the conduct is tethered to any underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, or that it threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of an antitrust law." Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 613. "The third type of conduct proscribed by § 17200 is 'fraudulent' business practices.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

TRINA ALLEN VS MATTHEW SHEPHERD, ET AL.

For a claim based on “unfair” business practices: “When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor's “unfair” act or practice invokes section 17200, the word “unfair” in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, A CHARTERED COUNTY AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; VS JUAN ORDORICA, ET AL.

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on August 28, 2020, alleging causes of action for: (1) violation of the Cartwright Act, Business and Professions Code § 16720 against all Defendants; (2) conflict of interest in violation of Government Code § 1090, et seq. against all Defendants; (3) Receiving Fee or Reward for Services Rendered as a County Employee in violation of Los Angeles County Code § 5.44.020 against Ordorica; (4) fraud and deceit against all Defendants; (5) conspiracy to commit fraud against all Defendants

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Business

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

CORZINE V. RIEMANN

Antitrust Litig., No. 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD), 2018 WL 5785284, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2018). This factor supports denying the MTS. 4) Interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation There is no evidence of any non-party entities that have an interest in this action at this time. 5) Interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal litigation. “[T]he public has a significant interest in a system that encourages individuals to come to court for the settlement of their disputes.”

  • Hearing

SUPERIOR COURT VS. TLC OF THE BAY AREA

Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167-1168 (HealthMarkets); In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I and II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110.) The burden must be met by competent affidavits containing specific evidentiary facts or authenticated documentary evidence, not by allegations of an unverified complaint. (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I and II, at p. 110.) If plaintiffs satisfy that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

  • Hearing

VENCLOSE INC., ET AL. V. COVIDIEN LP, ET AL. (LEAD CASE) [CONSOLIDATED WITH CASE NO. 18CV327382]

(June 2019) 2019 WL 23 3782332, at *3.) 24 Venclose’s allegations focus only on injury to itself, not injury to competition generally. 25 Therefore, Venclose has not alleged a Cartwright Act claim.

  • Hearing

FUEL INJECTION VS FARRELL

These provisions, known as the Cartwright Act, make illegal the formation and operation of combinations or conspiracies for the unlawful purpose of restraining trade (People v. Santa Clara Valley Bowling Proprietor’s Ass’n (1965) 238 Cal.App.3d 225, 238.) Although the statutory language of the Cartwright Act is all-encompassing, California courts have limited its reach to unreasonable restraints. (UAS Management, Inc. v. Mater Misericordiae Hosp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 357, 364) b.

  • Hearing

ASSEMI BROTHERS, LLC V. WONDEFUL PISTACHIOS AND ALMONDS, LLC

We thus adopt the following test: When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor's ‘unfair’ act or practice invokes section 17200, the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.”

  • Hearing

SHEHEDA ABUSAMAHA VS AAA AUTO CLUB ENTERPRISES, ET AL.

The California Supreme Court has cautioned that when evaluating the “unfair” prong, “the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” (Cel-Tech, at p. 187.)

  • Hearing

  • Judge

    Paul A. Bacigalupo or Virginia Keeny

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

REYES VS MARCY LABORATORIES INC

(In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110; Jewish Defense Org. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054-55). Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Automobile Antitrust Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at 110-1the 1.; Jewish Defense Org., 72 Cal.App.4th at 1055).

  • Hearing

GOLDEN STATE EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, INC., ET AL. VS ANGELES-IPA, A MEDICAL CORPORATION

As to the “unfair” prong: “When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor's “unfair” act or practice invokes section 17200, the word “unfair” in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v.

  • Hearing

GREGORY HOWIE VS WILSHIRE COUNTRY CLUB, ET AL.

As to the “unfair” prong: “When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor's “unfair” act or practice invokes section 17200, the word “unfair” in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Wrongful Term

BK SEMS, USA, INC. VS G.A.E.M.S. INC.

Thompson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 487; In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127.) The moving parties are ordered to give notice.

  • Hearing

CITY OF EL MONTE VS CHUN C LI, ET AL.

Unfair acts among competitors means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the spirit or policy of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition. (Ibid.) Fraudulent acts are ones where members of the public are likely to be deceived. (Ibid.)

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    other

JACOB O'DONNELL V. MOBILITY LIFTER LLC, ET AL.

In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II, 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110 (2005) [citations omitted]. If the proffered evidence is not too imprecise and speculative, it may support a rational inference based on California activities. Id. at 112-114. 3. Evidence: a. Mobility’s Evidence: With its motion, Mobility submits Carroccio’s declaration. Mobility is incorporated in the state of Tennessee and has its principal place of Pleasant View, Tennessee.

  • Hearing

THE KONIGSBERG COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL. VS WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,A DELAWARE CORPORATION, ET AL.

“When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor's ‘unfair’ act or practice invokes section 17200, the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

  • Judge

    H. Jay Ford

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

HOWDY S KABRINS ET AL VS DIEGO DOUGHERTY NOVELLA

Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362 (citing In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110.)) If the plaintiff meets this burden, “it becomes the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Ibid.) Whether Defendant Purposefully Availed Himself of The Forum Plaintiffs argue that Defendant purposefully directed his activities toward a resident of the forum, Miss Gabriela Kabrina Alban (hereinafter, “Gabriela”).

  • Hearing

ALPHABET SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE CASES

These coordinated derivative actions allege breaches of fiduciary duty and derivative claims arising from nominal defendant Alphabet Inc.’s violations of European Union (“EU”) antitrust laws. On June 25, 2020, the Court confidentially issued to the parties its tentative ruling on defendants’ demurrers to the Second Consolidated Amended Stockholder Derivative Complaint (the “SAC”) (“Tentative Ruling”).

  • Hearing

REYES VS MARCY LABORATORIES INC

(In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110; Jewish Defense Org. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054-55). Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Automobile Antitrust Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at 110-11.; Jewish Defense Org., 72 Cal.App.4th at 1055).

  • Hearing

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