What is the anti-SLAPP statute?

Useful Rulings on Anti-SLAPP Statute

Recent Rulings on Anti-SLAPP Statute

FROM THE EARTH, LLC VS CITY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

Defendant argues that “the gravamen of Plaintiff’s cause of action against Beltran is Beltran’s purported conduct in official proceedings by the City of Commerce” which “is ‘protected speech’ under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Motion, p. 8:6-8.)

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Discrimination/Harass

DAVID BABAIE, ET AL. VS TRANS WEST INVESTIGATIONS, INC., A CORPORATION, ET AL.

Bauer Media Group USA, LLC (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1037 (“Simmons”), cited by Plaintiff, was not a determination of a demurrer but rather the determination as to whether the anti-SLAPP statute applied to the unlawful use of the tracking device; nonetheless, this case is instructive here. In Simmons, two plaintiffs, Richard Simmons and his caretaker, Reveles, commenced an action against the defendants for a violation of Penal Code section 637.7 for placing an electronic tracking device on Reveles’ car.

  • Hearing

DELLA K. EARLS, ET AL. VS TONI WEBER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE BRADFORD FAMILY LIVING TRUST, DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 1999, ET AL.

These claims are not subject to the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. The court finds that the Retaliatory Eviction claim arises out of Defendants’ petitioning activities, and is therefore subject to the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. Here, the Complaint alleges that Weber sent Della a 30-day notice to quit on 10/28/19. (Complaint, ¶ 33.) The claim is directed at Weber’s petitioning activities, and therefore subject to the anti-SLAPP statute.

  • Hearing

  • Judge

    Lori Ann Fournier or Olivia Rosales

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

DEVIN WEISBERG VS JAURIGUE LAW GROUP, ET AL.

They argue that because the stipulation was made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the marital dissolution action, it is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Motions at p. 6.) In Opposition, Weisberg concedes that “settlements are protected conduct under the Anti-SLAPP statute[.]” Weisberg argues only against the second prong of the test, below. (Oppos. at p. 8.) The Court will address only the second prong.

  • Hearing

ELLIOTT VS MALAND

Discussion Briggs moves strike Petitioner/Plaintiff Mara Elliott's petition under the anti-SLAPP statute, CCP section 425.16. The petition contains six causes of action. The Court already heard, and denied, the first three causes of action based on Briggs' ballot designation. ROA ## 41, 56. The fourth through sixth causes of action are each based on Briggs' statement of economic interests, alleging that the voters will be misled by Briggs failing to accurately disclose his true sources of income.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Administrative

  • Sub Type

    Writ

ELLIOTT VS MALAND

Discussion Briggs moves strike Petitioner/Plaintiff Mara Elliott's petition under the anti-SLAPP statute, CCP section 425.16. The petition contains six causes of action. The Court already heard, and denied, the first three causes of action based on Briggs' ballot designation. ROA ## 41, 56. The fourth through sixth causes of action are each based on Briggs' statement of economic interests, alleging that the voters will be misled by Briggs failing to accurately disclose his true sources of income.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Administrative

  • Sub Type

    Writ

LUCA FOSCHINI VS SHALINI ANANDA

On November 22, defendant filed a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (CCP § 425.16) and a motion to disqualify plaintiff’s counsel, both of which are scheduled for hearing on January 8, 2021. On November 3, defendant filed an opposition to the motions to compel, saying the motions are stayed per CCP § 425.16(g). An anti-SLAPP motion must be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.

  • Hearing

  • Judge Donna Geck
  • County

    Santa Barbara County, CA

KARL PERMAN, ET AL. VS YULIA GAYEVSKA, ET AL.

As to the first COA for civil extortion, the Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to communications which constitute criminal extortion as a matter of law. Id @ 807; Flatley v Mauro (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 299, 305. “The threat to report a crime may in and of itself be legal. But when the threat to report a crime is coupled with a demand for money, the threat becomes illegal, regardless of whether the victim in fact owed the money demanded. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 326–327.)” Id @ 805.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

BECK V. CATANZARITE, ET AL.

“The scope of protection for claims under the anti-SLAPP statute is not always the same as the scope of protection for communications under the litigation privilege.” (Third Laguna Hills Mutual v. Joslin (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 366, 375.) “The litigation privilege is a related concept, but it is separate and distinct from the anti-SLAPP statute. ‘[T]he litigation privilege is an entirely different type of statute than section 425.16.” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. La Marche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 737.)

  • Hearing

KRAFVE VS. KARFVE

“Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89, emphasis in original.)

  • Hearing

GARDEN GATE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION VS CATHERINE WELLS

“A court exercising its discretion to grant or deny a motion under section 425.16, subdivision (g) should remain mindful that the anti-SLAPP statute was adopted to end meritless suits targeting protected speech, not to abort potentially meritorious claims due to a lack of discovery.” Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891–892.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Business

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

  • Judge

    H. Jay Ford

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

LYLE HOWRY VS REGINALD MYLABATHULA BENJAMIN, ET AL.

Here, the issue is whether Defendants are the prevailing parties because they have only succeeded in striking three of the nine causes of action and, as to five causes of action, have not satisfied even the first requirement of showing they are grounded on protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute.

  • Hearing

RONALD J FREITAS VS TORI VERBER SALAZAR ET AL.

“The anti-SLAPP statute reflects the Legislature’s ‘strong preference for awarding attorney fees to successful defendants.’ ” (Lin v. City of Pleasanton (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 408, 425, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 730, 743; citation omitted.) “The term ‘prevailing party’ must be ‘interpreted broadly to favor an award of attorney fees to a partially successful defendant.’ ” (Id. at 425-426; citation omitted.)

  • Hearing

  • Judge

    David B. Flinn

  • County

    San Joaquin County, CA

BECK V. CATANZARITE, ET AL.

“[T]he issues in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the pleadings” and “the act or acts underlying a claim for purposes of an anti-SLAPP statute is determined from the plaintiffs’ allegations.” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 883, citations omitted.)

  • Hearing

INCEPTION ALTANOVA, LLC VS NORTH STAR HOLDINGS, INC.

North Star argues that Plaintiffs seek to hold North Star liable for conduct that is protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute. The Court notes that all allegations are incorporated by reference in the at-issue causes of action. Breach of contract Defendants argue that the conduct underlying the first cause of action is protected under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(e)(2). Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree whether the breach of contract cause of action is based on protected conduct.

  • Hearing

MAINOR VS PARK III CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION IMAGED]

"Public interest" within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly defined to include, in addition to government matters, private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and / or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity. Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal. App. 5th 119, 131.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Other

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

MAINOR VS PARK III CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION IMAGED]

"Public interest" within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly defined to include, in addition to government matters, private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and / or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity. Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal. App. 5th 119, 131.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Other

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

ALEJANDRO PULIDO VS BLUEMERCURY, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, ET AL.

v=iTACH1eVIaA&ab_channel=CNN) Nonetheless, if Trump did shoot someone on Fifth Avenue, he could not then claim the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute to avoid a damage suit by an injured bystander. Similarly, Open House could not hide behind the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute if it had, e.g., shot, spied upon or defamed a person in order to “protect its television show.”

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Wrongful Term

FIRST SECURE EQUITY LLC, ET AL. VS 2304 SAWTELLE LLC, ET AL.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs seek to impose liability for actions that are protected by the Anti-SLAPP Statute. Defendant argues that the conduct Plaintiffs seek to impose liability is protected under 425.16(e)(2). Section 425.16(e)(2) provides protection for “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Code Civ.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    Landlord Tenant

SHILIN JIANG VS DAZHI CHEN

“Our Supreme Court has recognized the anti-SLAPP statute should be broadly construed [citation] and that a plaintiff cannot avoid operation of the anti-SLAPP statute by attempting, through artifices of pleading, to characterize an action as a garden variety tort or contract claim when in fact the claim is predicated on protected speech or petitioning activity. [Citation.]

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Discrimination/Harass

WILLIAM POWERS, JR. V. DONALD JENSEN, ET AL.

(RJN, Ex. 10.) strike Denise Emerson’s petition for a civil harassment restraining order under the anti-SLAPP statute and (2) the court’s issuance of a civil harassment restraining order. Both decisions were affirmed. (RJN, Exs. 3, 6, 7.) The Jensens concede that each these cases did not involve Plaintiff but argue that he nonetheless represented his son and Keyes, at the hearing. (Mulder Decl., ¶ 6.) The Jensens argue that Plaintiff uses Powers III and Keyes as surrogates for his litigation.

  • Hearing

FIRST SECURE EQUITY LLC, ET AL. VS 2304 SAWTELLE LLC, ET AL.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs seek to impose liability for actions that are protected by the Anti-SLAPP Statute. Defendant argues that the conduct Plaintiffs seek to impose liability is protected under 425.16(e)(2). Section 425.16(e)(2) provides protection for “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Code Civ.

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    Landlord Tenant

GLORIA WEISCHADLE VS LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT CHARBONEAU, ET AL.

Defendants contend that for this reason, the activity is per se protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ attempt to invoke the anti-SLAPP law fails because “to the extent [the Complaint] alleges illegal and criminal conduct, there is no protected activity as defined by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 445.)

  • Hearing

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

ERIC DUFFY VS ADAM HAVENER

“The anti-SLAPP statute should be broadly construed and a plaintiff cannot avoid operation of the anti-SLAPP statute by attempting, through artifices of pleading, to characterize an action as a garden variety tort claim when in fact the liability claim is predicated on protected speech or conduct.” ((Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 519 [internal citations omitted].)

  • Hearing

MAX HENNARD VS ASIAN PACIFIC HEALTH CARE VENTURE INC ET AL

“ ‘The anti-SLAPP statute reflects the Legislature’s “strong preference for awarding attorney fees to successful defendants.” [Citation.] The term “prevailing party” must be “interpreted broadly to favor an award of attorney fees to a partially successful defendant.” [Citation.] However, a fee award is not required when the motion, though partially successful, was of no practical effect. [Citation.]

  • Hearing

  • Judge Donna Geck
  • County

    Santa Barbara County, CA

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