What is the anti-SLAPP statute?

Useful Rulings on Anti-SLAPP Statute

Recent Rulings on Anti-SLAPP Statute

ALEXANDRA FILIPPINI V. JEAN AVRICK

Case law holds that websites accessible to the public, like Facebook, are “public forums” for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. See, Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.4th 190, 199 (“It cannot be disputed that Facebook’s website and the Facebook pages at issue are ‘public forums,’ as they are accessible to anyone who consents to Facebook’s Terms.”).

  • Hearing

    Jul 13, 2020

RISCONSIN VS SEA BLUFF CANYON VILLAGE H.O.A.

In light of the above, the Court must find that the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute has not been established here, and the Motion is therefore denied. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

  • Hearing

    Jul 13, 2020

BOBBY GOSSAI VS PAUL J. DERANIA, ET AL.

“The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” Id. at 384. “Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.

  • Hearing

    Jul 13, 2020

JIN GEE VS SUNG BROTHERS CORP., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, in determining whether the anti-SLAPP statutory scheme provides for reciprocal fee awards, noted: “A plaintiff who prevails by defeating the motion to strike is not entitled to recover fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute simply by prevailing on the motion.

  • Hearing

    Jul 10, 2020

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

LAWRENCE CHIBUEZE, ET AL. VS TELOPS INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

“The anti-SLAPP statute should be broadly construed and a plaintiff cannot avoid operation of the anti-SLAPP statute by attempting, through artifices of pleading, to characterize an action as a garden variety tort claim when in fact the liability claim is predicated on protected speech or conduct.” (Ramona Unified Sch. Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 519 (internal citations omitted).)

  • Hearing

    Jul 09, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

  • Judge

    Maurice A. Leiter or Salvatore Sirna

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

ANTHONY GREENBERG VS DIANE HAYEK

Under Ulkarim, the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute is not fulfilled. As the first prong is not fulfilled, the court need not address prong two. Motion DENIED. BECAUSE OF THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC, PARTIES AND COUNSEL ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO AVOID IN-PERSON APPEARANCES AND TO APPEAR VIA COURT CALL.

  • Hearing

    Jul 09, 2020

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    Landlord Tenant

AMBASSADOR REAL ESTATE INC VS KASHAY

"The definition of 'public interest' within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly construed to include not only governmental matters, but also private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity." Damon, supra.

  • Hearing

    Jul 08, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Defamation

RENATO ROBISON VS MARIANAH CREVIOSERAT

A cause of action does not arise from protected activity for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute if the protected activity is merely incidental to the cause of action.” (Id. at 883-884 (Citations Omitted).) “Courts have held that a ‘mixed cause of action’—that is, one based on both protected and unprotected activity—‘is subject to section 425.16 if at least one of the underlying acts is protected conduct, unless the allegations of protected conduct are merely incidental to the unprotected activity.’

  • Hearing

    Jul 08, 2020

ESCAMILLA V. PERRY

Thus, ‘statements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that statute does not require any showing that the litigated matter concerns a matter of public interest. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]

  • Hearing

    Jul 07, 2020

INTELLIGENT SCM LLC ET AL VS RUSSELL W ROTEN ET AL

The California Supreme Court granted review “solely on the issue of whether ‘an appeal from the denial of a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.16) effects an automatic stay of the trial court proceedings.’” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that it does but also noted that “[s]uch an appeal does not, however, stay proceedings relating to causes of action not affected by the motion.” (Id. at p. 195, fn. 8.)

  • Hearing

    Jul 06, 2020

JOSHUA DUBINSKY VS JIM MULHEARN, ET AL.

A cause of action does not arise from protected activity for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute if the protected activity is merely incidental to the cause of action.” (Id. at 883-884 (Citations Omitted).) “At the first step, the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them. When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage.

  • Hearing

    Jul 02, 2020

RICHARD S HIRSCHFIELD VS TANYA COHEN

Cross-Defendant argues that the activity sued upon is protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute, specifically, Cross-Defendant argues that Cross-Complainant seeks to impose liability for engaging in protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (e)(1) and (4). Cross-Defendant argues that the action of filing a lawsuit is protected activity under section 425.16. In opposition, Cohen argues that Cross-Defendant has not met his initial burden on the Anti-SLAPP motion.

  • Hearing

    Jul 02, 2020

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    Landlord Tenant

NATALIE HOCKEY VS BRIGHTON COLLECTIBLES LLC

‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citations.] Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.]

  • Hearing

    Jul 01, 2020

  • Judge Donna Geck
  • County

    Santa Barbara County, CA

BLF INC. DBA LARRABURE FRAMING, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,, ET AL. VS CARPENTERS-CONTRACTORS COOPERATION COMMITTEE INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,, ET AL.

An attorney fee award under the anti-SLAPP statute is determined by the lodestar method and not the actual hourly rate. “This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel.” (Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1260; see also PLCM Group v.

  • Hearing

    Jun 30, 2020

  • Type

    Business

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

  • Judge

    Paul A. Bacigalupo or Virginia Keeny

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

JACOB REICH VS MANSOUR HASHEM

Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, the “the mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute … [m]oreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been “triggered” by protected activity does not entail it is one arising from such.” Rather, the “critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Ibid.)

  • Hearing

    Jun 30, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

JASON POST VS MELISSA SCHWARTZ ET AL

“The anti-SLAPP statute should be broadly construed and a plaintiff cannot avoid operation of the anti-SLAPP statute by attempting, through artifices of pleading, to characterize an action as a garden variety tort claim when in fact the liability claim is predicated on protected speech or conduct.” (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 519 [internal citations omitted].)

  • Hearing

    Jun 30, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

SUSAN HANNAFORD, ET AL. VS SEVEN SATELLITE PTY LTD, ET AL.

Defendant’s Statements Were Protected Activity The anti-SLAPP statute protects “any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) The anti-SLAPP statute also protects “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ.

  • Hearing

    Jun 26, 2020

SUSAN HANNAFORD, ET AL. VS SEVEN SATELLITE PTY LTD, ET AL.

Defendant’s Statements Were Protected Activity The anti-SLAPP statute protects “any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) The anti-SLAPP statute also protects “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ.

  • Hearing

    Jun 26, 2020

JENS NEUFINCK VS MARIA FERNANDEZ, ET AL.

Moreover, most of the alleged harassing conduct (the attempts to modify the lease, i.e., the pet, attorneys’ fees, and arbitration clauses, and the non-payment of interest on the security deposit) are not activities protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. In her reply, Maria argue that the attempted lease changes are equivalent to demand letters, which are generally protected activity.

  • Hearing

    Jun 26, 2020

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

BURNLEY V. ERB

Nor do we believe this conclusion frustrates the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. In this case, any allegations of protected activity were removed from the lawsuit before the anti-SLAPP motion was filed. Thus, at the time the motion was filed, there were no causes of action arising from protected activity to strike.” (JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 468, 477–479.)

  • Hearing

    Jun 26, 2020

SUSAN HANNAFORD, ET AL. VS SEVEN SATELLITE PTY LTD, ET AL.

Defendant’s Statements Were Protected Activity The anti-SLAPP statute protects “any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) The anti-SLAPP statute also protects “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ.

  • Hearing

    Jun 26, 2020

ELLEN SUZUKI VS YONEO TAKEHARA, ET AL.

In other words, the anti SLAPP statute is inapplicable as to protected conduct that merely evidences claims, but is not itself the basis for them. (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal. App. 4th 658, 673.) If moving parties successfully have shifted the burden, then opposing parties must demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the complaint. (Equilon Ent., LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)

  • Hearing

    Jun 25, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

AMY GOLDMAN VS TIMOTHY SCHEY, ET AL.

Defendants argue that the activity sued upon in these causes of action is protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute. The first cause of action is for a violation of CRC Rule 2.550. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that case no. 19SMCV01116 is a sealed case and that Defendants unlawfully obtained this information to begin eviction procedures against Plaintiff. The third cause of action is for retaliatory eviction. “A defendant’s burden on the first prong is not an onerous one.

  • Hearing

    Jun 25, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    other

DUAL DIAGNOSIS TREATMENT CENTER VS. HEALTH NET, INC., ET AL

In Dickens, the court held the communications were protected in terms of the anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, while the court will grant the motion to quash, that ruling is based on narrow procedural grounds and may be remedied by a different type of deposition subpoena and consumer notice to the Soverein plaintiffs. Sanctions Sovereign requests sanctions against Health Net in the amount of $7,500.

  • Hearing

    Jun 22, 2020

  • Judge

    Paul A. Bacigalupo or Virginia Keeny

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

(NO CASE NAME AVAILABLE)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the alleged acts are protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS Where acts alleged in a complaint are protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.)

  • Hearing

    Jun 22, 2020

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