Animals with Dangerous Propensities in California

There are no allegations the dog had previously bit or attacked Plaintiff or anyone else, why the dog had vicious and dangerous propensities, or how Li (as the owner of the premises, not the dog) had knowledge of the dog’s vicious and dangerous propensities. Without more, the allegations do not constitute despicable conduct or rise to the level of malice or oppression necessary to plead a claim for punitive damages.

There are no allegations the dog had previously bit or attacked Plaintiff or anyone else, why the dog had vicious and dangerous propensities, or how Li (as the owner of the premises, not the dog) had knowledge of the dog’s vicious and dangerous propensities. Without more, the allegations do not constitute despicable conduct or rise to the level of malice or oppression necessary to plead a claim for punitive damages.

There are no allegations the dog had previously bit or attacked Plaintiff or anyone else, why the dog had vicious and dangerous propensities, or how Li (as the owner of the premises, not the dog) had knowledge of the dog’s vicious and dangerous propensities. Without more, the allegations do not constitute despicable conduct or rise to the level of malice or oppression necessary to plead a claim for punitive damages.

Aside from knowing the tenants kept on the premises a shepherd dog, the landlords knew nothing about the dog, and therefore the facts before the trial court fell short of creating a triable issue of fact as to the landlords' knowledge of any dangerous propensities on the part of the dog. Id. at 818-822. Here, defendant contends that he had not seen the subject dog, had not seen the dog attack or bite anyone, and that he was not advised of any prior incident where the dog attacked or bit anyone.

It is because dangerous propensities are abnormal to dogs as a class that the rule of strict liability comes into play. Id. at 922. One who keeps a dog that to her knowledge is vicious, or which though not vicious possesses dangerous propensities that are abnormal thereby introduces a danger not usual to the community and which, furthermore, is not necessary to the proper functioning of the animal for the purposes that it serves. Id.

Moreover, in Yuzon, the circumstantial evidence purporting to show that Defendants had actual knowledge of the dogs dangerous propensities, consisted of barking or jumping against the fence, which the court deemed harmless, and insufficient to show actual notice of dangerous propensities. Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 164. There is no dispute here that Gaertner’s dog never appeared to show any aggressive tendencies and behaved “timidly” prior to the incident. UF 6.

Rodrigue declared she and GHP had no knowledge of Livingston’s dog or its dangerous propensities and that nobody contacted her or GHP to complain of the dog before the incident. Plaintiff does not establish that contrary facts may exist, such as evidence that Rodrigue or GHP actually had knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities or evidence that complaints about the dog had been made.

Defendants also cite to the deposition of Plaintiff Sara Castaneda, which does not address any of the Defendants’ knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. “Q: Okay. Would they have known – was this dog walking around with a leather jacket or something? A: No. Q: Okay. No. So there’s nothing that indicates this dog is somehow a bad dog; right? A: No. “ Motion Ex. A, 24:19-24. Plaintiff’s testimony does not affirm any of the Defendants’ knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities.

The Court finds Defendants have met their initial burden of showing they had no actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities and therefore owed no duty owed to Plaintiff with respect to the dog.

Moreover, in Yuzon, the circumstantial evidence purporting to show that Defendants had actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, consisted of barking or jumping against the fence, which the court deemed harmless, and insufficient to show actual notice of dangerous propensities. Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 164. There is no dispute here that Gaertner’s dog never appeared to show any aggressive tendencies and behaved “timidly” prior to the incident.” UF 6.

“It is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant’s dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm.” (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369.) Actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities can be inferred from circumstantial evidence only the inference is not based on speculation or conjecture. (Uccello v.

California Realty (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 813, 821 (“It should be emphasized [, however ,] that a duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities.

Down’s dog at the Property to anyone or anything, or that the dog acted aggressively towards anyone or anything, or otherwise exhibited any dangerous propensities.”) There is also insufficient evidence that Defendant Smith controlled the property (see Defendant’s Undisputed Material Fact, Nos. 9 and 10 and Declaration of Mary Smith, ¶¶7 and 8) at the time of the incident. Ucello v.

The focal question is not whether Plaintiff took any action to put the Defendants on notice of the dog's dangerous propensities – it is on whether the Defendants knew or should have known of the dog's dangerous propensities from all of the information available to them.

While Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant is not the owner of the dog or that the lease agreement prohibits dogs from being on the property, Plaintiff argues that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant had knowledge of the dog and its dangerous propensities.

Here, Jomafa has met its initial burden as the moving party to establish that Jomafa did not have actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Jomafa had never received any complaints that any dog on the premises had ever bitten, attacked or caused injury to another person or that any dog had ever escaped or run loose from the premises.

Plaintiff alleges Edmonds “owned, controlled, possessed and maintained the dog,” and “lived with the dog and took care of the dog.” (FAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff further alleges Edmonds “did not take any action to secure the dogs, including but not limited to, leashing the dog, or confining the dogs to an enclosed space.” (FAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges Edmonds “knew or should have known of the vicious and dangerous propensities of the large dogs [sic] and its inclination to attack people.” (FAC, ¶ 15.)

SWH presents undisputed facts showing Plaintiff cannot prove actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities and that there is no basis for an inference that it must have known of the dog’s dangerous propensities. (SWH’s Undisputed Material Facts #11-13, 28 [SWH did not control dog and dog did not previously display dangerous propensity].) Plaintiff does not raise a triable issue of material fact in response.

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff’s claims fail, as a matter of law, on account of the fact that they had no actual knowledge regarding the dangerous propensities of the dog. The Defendants argue that under Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514, as landlord they may only be found to have a tort duty if they had “actual knowledge” of the dangerous propensities of the dog.

With respect to dog-bite incidents, the Fifth District Court of Appeal has clearly stated “that a duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities.” (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514.)

An exception to this general rule of non-liability applies where a landlord had actual knowledge a dangerous condition, such as the dangerous propensities of a tenant's dog.

To state a cause of action against Defendants for negligence and premises liability, she must allege Defendants had actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. (Chee, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 [“[I]t is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenanet’s dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm”].)

Plaintiff denies that she has facts, documents, or evidence that Moving Defendants had actual knowledge of Hercules’ alleged dangerous propensities. (UMF No. 18, p. 5:16-5:27.) Plaintiff contends that Hercules’ size provided Moving Defendants with sufficient notice that Hercules had dangerous propensities. (UMF Nos. 19-20, p. 6:3-7:4.) Moving Defendants do not own or maintain Hercules. (UMF No. 16, p. 5:8-5:12.)

The bare, conclusory, and boilerplate paragraph stating Defendants knew or should have known of their dog’s dangerous propensities, but nevertheless failed to restrain the dog or warn of its dangerous propensities is insufficient. And even if facts were alleged showing Defendants did know of the probable consequences of failing to restrain the dog or warn of the dog’s dangerous propensities, there are no facts alleged indication Defendants willfully and deliberately ignored those probable consequences.

"[a]n owner of a dog may be held liable for injuries inflicted by it on another person without any showing the dog had any especially dangerous propensities or that the owner knew of any such dangerous propensities. (citing Civ. Code. §3342; see also Goldberg v. Rabuchin (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 111, 114, 149 P.2d 861.) However, to impose liability on someone other than the owner, even a keeper," 'previous knowledge of the dog's vicious nature must appear:" (Id. at 821 citing Buffington v.

The parties do not dispute that Defendant did not have knowledge of any dangerous propensities of the dog which allegedly attacked Plaintiff. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement, UMF No. 10.) Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to show he is able to establish that Defendant owed him a duty.

Finally, Vylox argues there is no allegation that Vylox was aware of the dog, and thus, Vylox had no legal duty to Plaintiff with regard to the behavior of the dog. Under current California law, a landlord owes no duty of care to protect a tenant or others from a tenant's dangerous dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities and the right to remove the dog. (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 507; Chee v.

Jones was attacked and bitten by Defendants’ dog, and that Defendants knew or should have known of the dog’s dangerous propensities. UF 6-7. The owner of the dog was Robert Kaye. UF 3-4. Plaintiff’s third cause of action is one for premises liability. UF 21. Plaintiffs’ discovery responses did not state any facts on which to base their claim for general negligence. UF 12-13. Instead, Plaintiffs stated that “discovery and investigation were continuing.” UF 13.

Defendant Teresa Duarte had no knowledge of any vicious or dangerous propensities of the dogs before the attacks. (UMF No. 9.) Plaintiff does not know if the dogs have attacked any other person. (UMF No. 10.) The Court finds Defendant Teresa Duarte has met her burden. The evidence submitted in support of the motion shows Defendant Teresa did not own the dogs, leased property to the owners of the dogs, and did not know of the dogs’ dangerous propensities.

All of this evidence is a sufficient basis for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the dog had dangerous propensities before plaintiff’s accident and presented a foreseeable risk of harm to persons off the premises.

One dog, Churro, was killed. The other dog escaped the attack. On November 23, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for strict liability, general negligence, negligence per se, strict liability causes by domestic animal with dangerous propensities, ultrahazardous activity, trespass to property, and negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander.

Inglewood Humane Soc. (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 415, 417, 124 P.2d 870.) (7) CARL cannot be held strictly liable in tort under the Dog Bite Statute. CARL can, however, be held strictly liable in tort under the common law theory that a keeper or possessor or handler knew or should have known of the vicious or dangerous propensities of the dog. The Third Cause of Action of the FAC alleges exactly that: "3.

Imposition of liability on the landowner requires actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Constructive knowledge is not enough to establish a duty of care. Because possession of rented premises is vested in the tenant, actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities is required. Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 514. As previously discussed, the undisputed facts establish that Defendant did not have actual knowledge of the dogs’ dangerous propensities.

PARTY’S REQUEST Defendant/Cross-Complainant Michael Cofsky (“Moving Party”) asks the Court to grant summary judgment in his favor and against Plaintiff because he did not have actual knowledge of the subject dog’s dangerous propensities and did not own the subject dog.

There is no dispute that Bautista Sr. did not have actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. He declares that he was never given notice of the dog’s dangerous behavior and has never seen the dog attack or bite anyone or otherwise exhibit dangerous behavior. Prior to the incident, he had never received any complaints about the dog and he had never received notice that the dog had ever escaped from the subject property due to any defect in the fence or gate.

Anthony untied his dog from a security bar outside of an apartment owned by Defendant Armor just prior to the dog biting Plaintiff. (Miguel Mas Depo., p. 9:2-10:9.) Moving Defendant argues that summary judgment is proper because it did not have actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. (Motion, p. 7:8-7:12.)

Second Cause of Action: Common Law Strict Liability based on Known Dangerous Propensities of a Domestic Animal Defendant argues that the second cause of action fails to state facts sufficient and is uncertain because the allegations in the SAC fail to establish that (1) the Defendant owned the cat that bit Plaintiff, (2) that the cat had an unusually dangerous nature and/or tendency and (3) that Defendant knew or should have known that the cat had vicious propensities.

Second Cause of Action: Common Law Strict Liability based on Known Dangerous Propensities of a Domestic Animal Defendant argues that the second cause of action fails to state facts sufficient and is uncertain because the allegations in the SAC fail to establish that (1) the Defendant owned the cat that bit Plaintiff, (2) that the cat had an unusually dangerous nature and/or tendency and (3) that Defendant knew or should have known that the cat had vicious propensities.

Even if Schwartz Defendants owed a duty of care to Plaintiff to warn of the dog, Schwartz Defendants evidence shows that they have never seen or heard of the dog doing anything dangerous. (Motion, Schwartz Decl., ¶ 8.) This is sufficient to demonstrate that Schwartz Defendants had no actual knowledge that the dog had any vicious or dangerous propensities. Under these circumstances, Schwartz Defendants also owed no duty of care to Plaintiff. Schwartz Defendants have thus met their burden.

Consequently, it is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant’s dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm.” (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal App 4th 1360, 1369.) The landlord’s actual knowledge of the animal’s dangerous propensities is required; “constructive knowledge” will not suffice.

Second Cause of Action: Common Law Strict Liability based on Known Dangerous Propensities of a Domestic Animal Moving Party argues that the second cause of action fails to state facts sufficient and is uncertain because the allegations in the FAC fail to establish that (1) the Moving Party owned the cat that bit Plaintiff, (2) that the cat had an unusually dangerous nature and/or tendency and (3) that Moving Party knew or should have known that the cat had vicious propensities.

He also states that he did not control the dog, was unaware of any information suggesting that the dog at issue had ever bitten anyone else before, and that he was unaware of any information that would otherwise suggest or cause him to believe that the dog had an unusually dangerous nature or tendency. (Id. at Nos. 34, 36, 38.) Thus, Defendant Tanning has demonstrated he lacked knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities..

The Court explained: Consequently, it is well-established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant’s dog unless the landlord had actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm. [citations omitted] A duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities. . . .

As a result, Hernandez and Carbajal contend that they owed no duty to protect Plaintiff from the dog. Although Hernandez and Carbajal were aware that co-defendants had a dog on the property, there is no evidence that Hernandez or Carbajal was actually aware of any dangerous propensities the dog may have possessed. (Hernandez Decl. ¶¶ 6-11; Carbajal Decl. ¶¶ 6-11.)

The moving Defendants/Landlords have established a lack of knowledge of the presence and/or dangerous propensities of the dog that allegedly injured Plaintiff. See Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369 ("[I]t is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant's dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm."

Aside from knowing the tenants kept on the premises a shepherd dog, the landlords knew nothing about the dog, and therefore the facts before the trial court fell short of creating a triable issue of fact as to the landlords' knowledge of any dangerous propensities on the part of the dog. ( Id. at 818-822.) Here, the tenant Marlena Ranieri owned the dog. (UMF No 17.) Montano was watching the dog temporarily ( Id .) Defendant argues that Aileen L.

Defendants Cerda argue that plaintiff is unable to establish the element of duty because they did not own the dog and had no knowledge of the dangerous propensities of the dog. They owned the rental property where the dog was kept. Plaintiff, who lived approximately 2 1⁄2 blocks from the property, had never complained about the dog and had no knowledge of previous dog attacks.

Defendant allegedly knew of the dog’s dangerous propensities, including its propensity for threatening and/or attacking others, and that the dog would remain unleashed on and around the property. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that despite Defendant’s knowledge, Defendant did not take any action to cure or ameliorate the risk. ¶ 19. The claims are adequately pled. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s knowledge of the animal’s dangerous propensities as reference above.

Consequently, it is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant's dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm.” (Chee v. Amanda Gold Property Management( 2006) 143 Cal App 4th 1360, 1369.) The landlord’s actual knowledge of the animal’s dangerous propensities is required; “constructive knowledge” will not suffice.

However, a landowner does not owe a duty of care for injuries caused by a dog on the premises unless there is evidence that the landlord had actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Constructive knowledge is not enough to establish a duty of care. Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 514; Donchin v. Guerrero (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 1832, 1839.

Defendants were aware and had actual knowledge that the dog possessed dangerous propensities that made it a menace and threat. They knew of the viciousness and dangerousness of the dog and of its inclination, or reasonably should have known those facts. The dog posed a risk of harm by virtue of its breed, and because it had a habit of attacking other dogs and/or people and/or jumping on other dogs and/or people and knocking them down.

There are no allegations that the dog escaped due to negligent maintenanceas such, the dog itself must have been a known dangerous condition. IRHC were not on actual or constructive notice that the dog would be considered a dangerous condition. IRHC were not aware of any dangerous propensities nor that the dog was any sort of danger to others.

Law Governing Dog Owner Liability for Dog Bites Dog owners may be held liable for injuries caused by their dogs under theories of negligence and strict liability. California has long followed the common law rule of strict liability for harm done by a domestic animal with known vicious or dangerous propensities abnormal to its class. ( Drake v. Dean (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 915, 921.)

There is a common law version of “strict” liability for injuries caused by animals with known dangerous propensities. This common law rule has nothing to do with the statutory strict liability rule. They are distinct. Because this common law rule still requires proof that the animal in question had dangerous propensities and that the owner knew about it, this common law rule is sort of a hybrid between ordinary negligence and statutory strict liability.

” - Prior to the incident, she “did not know nor had any reasons to know that [the dog] had any dangerous propensities.” (Declaration of Rosemary Fourzans, ¶¶ 3-8.) Defendant also proffers Michelle Funaro’s declaration, in which she states: - She is the sole owner of the dog. - Prior to the incident, the dog “never bit, attacked, or otherwise acted viciously towards another dog or person.

Consequently, it is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant's dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm." (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369.) "[A] duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities.

As for the negligence/premises liability causes of action, Defendants produced evidence that they had no prior knowledge that the dog that caused Plaintiff to fall and/or attempted to bite him had any vicious or dangerous propensities. They had never witnessed or received any reports or complaints regarding the dog nor did the dog exhibit any vicious tendencies. (UMF 35-41 and Plaintiff’s response thereto.)

.: BC656493 Hearing Date: February 14, 2019 [TENTATIVE] order RE: Defendant’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION The Court's tentative is to grant summary judgment because there is insufficient evidence to create a triable issue whether Defendant Sharon Jones knew her tenant's dog had dangerous propensities. The parties should be prepared to address this issue at the hearing.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs negligence cause of action fails because it did not own the subject dog and did not know of the dogs dangerous propensities to bite. Civil Code § 3342 makes the owner of any dog liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog. . . regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owners knowledge of such viciousness.

[SSUMF #12] When asked in discovery to state all facts in support of his claim that Mori had knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities or had bitten any other person or animal prior to the incident, Murray said the dog has dangerous propensities, has bitten more than one person and the fence was in disrepair.

While Plaintiffs opposition does not cite any legal authority either, the Court is aware that California has long established legal precedent regarding strict liability for harm caused by domestic animals with known dangerous propensities. ( Drake, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 921.) The FAC alleges that Defendants owned the cat in question, the cat attacked other persons on other occasions, Defendants knew about those other attacks, and the cat bit Plaintiff, thereby causing Plaintiff harm.

On the basis of Plaintiffs’ allegations that the dangerous condition on SVR’s premises was the “uncontrolled dangerous Doberman Pinscher dog ‘Ace yo> and as the Court previously noted that, “a duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities,” Plaintiffs were required to allege that SVR knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities. (Yuzon v.

On the basis of Plaintiffs’ allegations that the dangerous condition on SVR’s premises was the “uncontrolled dangerous Doberman Pinscher dog ‘Ace yo> and as the Court previously noted that, “a duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities,” Plaintiffs were required to allege that SVR knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities. (Yuzon v.

On the basis of Plaintiffs’ allegations that the dangerous condition on SVR’s premises was the “uncontrolled dangerous Doberman Pinscher dog ‘Ace yo> and as the Court previously noted that, “a duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities,” Plaintiffs were required to allege that SVR knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities. (Yuzon v.

On the basis of Plaintiffs’ allegations that the dangerous condition on SVR’s premises was the “uncontrolled dangerous Doberman Pinscher dog ‘Ace yo> and as the Court previously noted that, “a duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities,” Plaintiffs were required to allege that SVR knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities. (Yuzon v.

and its dangerous propensities.

This allegation suggests that Defendant knew his dog possessed dangerous propensities, but that Defendant attempted to keep his dog from harming other people. While the complaint alleges Defendant failed to keep his dog restrained on the day of the incident, there are no facts alleged to show that Defendant did so willfully or deliberately.

Indiana law “imposes on a dog owner the duty of reasonable care, even when the owner is unaware of the dog's vicious or dangerous propensities. [Citation] Without knowledge of the dog's vicious or dangerous propensities, the owner may become liable for damages the dog causes where the owner is otherwise negligent in the manner of his ‘keeping and control’ of the dog.” Id. at 988.

The report generated by The County of Los Angeles Department of Animal Care and Control further substantiates the absence of evidence showing Defendant HOA had the requisite knowledge of the dogs dangerous propensities. This is because there is no evidence showing such propensities existed for Defendant HOA to know of them. All evidence shows the dog exhibited dangerous propensities for the first time when it bit Plaintiff on July 10, 2017.

Under current California law, a landlord owes no duty of care to protect a tenant or others from a tenant's dangerous dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities and the right to remove the dog. (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 507; Chee v.

Defendants’ conflicting testimony regarding the restraint efforts only fuels suspicion that they knew, or had reason to know, that Max would make a run for it if another dog presented a perceived threat to the home. Defendants absolutely had a duty to restrain Max. Whether they breached that duty is a question for the jury. Strict Liability. One who keeps or harbors a dog with unusually dangerous propensities is strictly liable for harm caused by the dog. Priebe v.

Neither DeAngelis nor her tenant, Defendant Adamczyk, had ever seen or heard the dog on the premises or had any idea of any dangerous propensities the dog may have had, as neither owned or controlled the dog that bit Plaintiff. Opposition to the motion was due on or before Friday, August 11, 2017. Failure to file and/or serve an opposition constitutes an admission the motion is meritorious. (Rooney v. Vermont Inv. Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351, 367.)

Triable issues of material fact exist as to whether defendant owned, controlled, or maintained the dog as well as defendant’s knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities and of plaintiffs’ injuries following the alleged attack. The Court Grants judicial notice of Exhibit RJ1, which is a copy of section 4-5-701 of the City of Irvine Municipal Code, and Exhibit RJ2 which is a copy of section 4-1-45 of the County of Orange Code of Ordinances, pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452(c) and (h).

Here, the alleged intentional act appears to be intentionally entrusting the dog to a dog-walker, with knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, without sufficiently ensuring that the walker could control the dog, without instructing the dog walker to avoid Plaintiff’s property and without ensuring the dog was muzzled.

Moving Parties did not know any dogs kept at the leased property had dangerous propensities. (Ibid.) No one reported to Moving Parties that any dog was on the premises or that any dog at the premises had attacked or bit anyone or otherwise exhibited dangerous propensities. (UMF No. 11.) The Court finds Moving Parties have met their burden. Moving Parties’ evidence shows they are merely landlords to the owners of the dogs that bit Plaintiff.

Aside from knowing the tenants kept on the premises a shepherd dog, the landlords knew nothing about the dog, and therefore the facts before the trial court fell short of creating a triable issue of fact as to the landlords' knowledge of any dangerous propensities on the part of the dog. ( Id. at 818-822.) Here, Defendant has come forward with evidence that it did not have any actual knowledge that the dog was dangerous.

[A] landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant's dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm. [Citations.] . . . [A] duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities.

“An owner of a dog may be held liable for injuries inflicted by it on another person without showing the dog had any especially dangerous propensities or that the owner knew of such dangerous propensities. [Citations.] However to impose liability on someone other than the owner, even a keeper, ‘previous knowledge of the dog’s vicious nature must appear.’ [Citation].” (Lundy v. California Realty (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 813, 821.) With respect to the two alleged dog bites that occurred in 2015, and 2016.

The general rule is that a landlord is not liable for injuries caused by a tenants dog, unless the landlord knew the dog was dangerous. (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510-11.) It is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant's dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dogs dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm. (Chee v.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant HSBC BANK USA, NA knew, or reasonably should have known, that its tenant harbored a dog with dangerous propensities and/or which constituted a dangerous condition at the premises It is not enough for Plaintiff to allege that HBSC knew that the dog had dangerous propensities. Plaintiff must also allege that HBSC had the power to have taken measures on the property which would have prevented the victim’s injuries. (Donchin v.

Plaintiffs have not pled an adequate factual basis to support a finding that Tele Dolphin had or should have had prior knowledge of Peoples’ known dangerous propensities. The demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Parties are undisputed that defendant never owned the dog at subject, nor was the defendant made aware of any dangerous propensities of the dog. Defendant has presented sufficient evidence to show plaintiff's causes of action have no merit and there are no triable issues of material fact, thus defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant's evidentiary objections are overruled.

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend the complaint contains sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages, as the complaint alleges Defendant knew the dog had dangerous propensities and was warned the dog tried to attack Alex’s daughter and Plaintiffs’ dog on many occasions. Plaintiffs contend Defendant knowingly and willfully subject Plaintiffs to the risk of serious harm despite knowing of the dog’s dangerous propensities.

First, the allegation that the dogs were akitas and akitas are dangerous does not put Defendant on notice of his dogs’ dangerous propensities. “A dog is presumed to be tame, docile and harmless until the contrary appears.” (Drake v. Dean (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 915, 922.) Second, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts which show that Defendant had notice of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Plaintiff merely states in a conclusory fashion that Defendant was aware of the dogs’ aggressiveness.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges only that defendants were aware tenant had a pitbull and had “constructive notice that the dog was on their property….” (First Amended Complaint, pp. 1 and 3.) As such, the complaint fails to state sufficient allegations showing defendants knew of the dog’s presence on their property and its dangerous propensities.

The Declaration of Robin Carder, the HOA President since 2003, states that Defendant had not received any complaints from the subject dog, and therefore, had no actual notice of the dogs dangerous propensities. The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that had Defendant inspected the property that housed the dog (Property), pursuant to the CC&R, it would have obtained notice of the dog. (Opp., 8.)

In cases involving a dog bite, prior behavior may consist of either a vicious bite or behavior that clearly demonstrated the vicious propensity to bite. (Id.) An owner’s knowledge of a dog's vicious or dangerous propensities may be inferred by: (1) the general reputation of the dog, (2) the size and breed of the dog, or (3) the fact that the dog is kept chained or muzzled. (See Smith v. Royer (1919) 181 Cal. 165, 170; 1 California Torts (1994), "Strict Liability -- Animals," sec. 6.10[3], p. 6-10.)

Aside from knowing the tenants kept on the premises a shepherd dog, the landlords knew nothing about the dog, and therefore the facts before the trial court fell short of creating a triable issue of fact as to the landlords' knowledge of any dangerous propensities on the part of the dog. (Id. at 818-822.) Here, Dassoff asserts she did not own the subject dogs, as the dogs were owned by John’s fiancée and his fiancée’s mother. (See UMF 11.)

The Court herein held: It should be emphasized that a duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities. Because the harboring of pets is such an important part of our way of life and because the exclusive possession of rented premises normally is vested in the tenant, we believe that actual knowledge and not mere constructive knowledge is required.” (Id. at p. 514.)

Plaintiff argues that Defendants make the leap from these cases to conclude no duty if the dog owners did not know about the dangerous propensities of their dogs. Plaintiff has argued that Defendants’ lack of knowledge of the dangerous propensities of their dogs is not the controlling issue. It is Plaintiff’s position that Defendants undertook the duty to protect Plaintiff and failed to do so.

De la Cruz and Sanchez owned, trained, kept, maintained, controlled, and cared for certain mixed breed dog that caused injuries. Id., ¶6. Prior to January 1, 2016, the dog was possessed of dangerous propensities likely to cause injury to persons, which defendants were, or had they exercised reasonable diligence should have been, aware of.

As a landlord, Defendant argues her liability is limited because she did not know of Zero or his alleged dangerous propensities. Under California law, a landlord who does not have actual knowledge of a tenant's dog's vicious nature cannot be held liable when the dog attacks a third person.

Where a landlord is alleged to be liable for a dog bite, a landlord only has a duty of care to third persons to if the landlord had actual knowledge of the dog and its vicious propensities. ( Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514 ([A] duty of care may not be imposed on a landlord without proof that he knew of the dog and its dangerous propensities.) Here, Defendant contends she had no actual knowledge of the dogs presence on the property.

[I]t is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant's dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm. ( Chee v. Amanda Goldt Prop. Mgmt. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369.)

Plaintiff’s testimony also suggests the dog had dangerous propensities which gives rise to a cross-complaint against Barbara Marzec. (Rother Decl., ¶ 5.) No opposition was filed to this Motion. Defendant’s proposed cross-complaint arises out of the same act or occurrence underlying the complaint and Defendant acted in good faith in seeking leave to file the cross-complaint at this time.

Based on Plaintiff's admission that Defendant did not own the dog, he cannot establish the elements of negligence. Plaintiff's premises liability cause of action also fails. "[I]t is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant's dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm." (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369-1370.)

The motion, in fact, bases defendants argument on the argument that plaintiff sets forth no facts that defendant knew the dog was at the property or knew of any alleged dangerous propensities of the dog. [Motion, p. 8: 10-11]. As discussed above, this is simply not the case, as the FAC alleges facts supporting a reasonable conclusion that MLT knew the dog was at the property and knew of the alleged dangerous propensities of the subject dog. [FAC, paras. 32-34, 64].

With respect to a landowner’s duty to third persons regarding the pets of their tenants, the landowner must have actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge, of the dog and its dangerous propensities before a duty will arise. (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514.) The landowner has no duty to inspect the premises for dangerous animals. (Id.) Here Defendants did not have actual knowledge that the dog was dangerous. (UMF No. 14, 18.)