Abuse of Process in California

The court held that Civil Code section 47, the litigation privilege, barred her claim for abuse of process. Further, even if section 47 did not apply, “mere vexation or harassment are not objectives sufficient to give rise to the tort of abuse of process.” (Id. at 1303.) Susan S. controls here. Plaintiff’s sole existing cause of action, for abuse of process, is barred by the litigation privilege.

Without improper use of process, abuse of process has not been alleged.

Because this is the only allegation that appears to support the abuse of process COA, Cross-Defendants arguments again appear to misconstrue the allegations made in the second COA. Cross-Defendants focus their argument on the filing of the underlying Complaint and the filing of the Civil Harassment proceeding as the grounds for the abuse of process claim. However, as stated above, these two allegations are not proper grounds to support abuse of process.

Both these cases involve malicious prosecution rather than abuse of process. Abuse of process and malicious prosecution are separate claims. The court in Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27 (Bidna) described the difference between abuse of process and malicious prosecutions, stating: “Abuse of process is not just another name for malicious prosecution.

Both these cases involve malicious prosecution rather than abuse of process. Abuse of process and malicious prosecution are separate claims. The court in Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27 (Bidna) described the difference between abuse of process and malicious prosecutions, stating: “Abuse of process is not just another name for malicious prosecution.

Again, this cannot serve as the basis for an abuse of process claim. SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

The challenged claim is Plaintiffs’ 11th cause of action for abuse of process. To succeed on an abuse of process claim, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants: 1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process, and 2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057.)

Many courts... have specifically applied section 47, subdivision 2 to bar abuse of process actions... the mere filing or maintenance of a lawsuit . . . is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action." (Abraham v. Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. (2007) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 826.) Here, the basis for the Abuse of Process claim is Rick’s filing of “this lawsuit” for an improper purpose. Pursuant to Abraham v. Lancaster Cmty.

In this instance, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations within the seventh cause of action for abuse of process. An abuse of process claim is alleged by pleading an ulterior purpose and a willful act in the use of the process that is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 1157, 1168-1169.)

Second Cause of Action: Abuse of Process Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim must also fail” because “all Plaintiff has substantively plead in Plaintiff’s voluminous pleading is that Defendant filed a Complaint against Plaintiff and improperly maintained a cause of action for an improper purpose.” (Demurrer, p. 2:1-3.)

Here, the only allegation related to abuse of process is that Plaintiff filed two separate lawsuits against the same Defendant, which, as noted above, arise out of two different accounts. This conduct does not constitute abuse of process and Defendant’s sanctions request is DENIED. With regard to Defendant’s consolidation request, that request is not properly before the Court as Defendant has filed a demurrer -- not a motion to consolidate. Thus, the Court declines to consider the request.

Regents (2008) 44 Cal. 4th 876, which involved the tort of wrongful termination of employment which could only be committed by an employer, the tort of abuse of process can be committed by an employee or agent.

Accordingly, Cross-Complainant has not established that she is likely to prevail on this cause of action 2) Abuse of Process: The abuse of process cause of action is based on the filing of the lawsuit, which is not an improper purpose. (Cross-Complaint, ¶53 and ¶54.) The filing or maintaining a lawsuit, even for an improper purpose is not an abuse of process. (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1169.)

Motion For Leave To File An Anti-Slapp Motion Against Pltfs' "Abuse Of Process" Claim (Ccp 425.16 And 473(B)) MATTER CALENDARED FOR THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2006, LINE 4. DEFENDANT WARREN PUMPS, INC.'S Motion For Leave To File An Anti-Slapp Motion Against PLAINTIFFS "Abuse Of Process" Claim (Ccp 425.16 And 473(B), HEARING IS REQUIRED. =(302/REQ/JK-EX)

Motion For Leave To File An Anti-Slapp Motion Against Pltfs' "Abuse Of Process" Claim (Ccp 425.16 And 473(B)) SET FOR HEARING ON JULY 7, 2006 DEFENDANT WARREN PUMPS, INC. Motion For Leave To File An Anti-Slapp Motion Against Pltfs' "Abuse Of Process" Claim (Ccp 425.16 And 473(B)) IS CONTINUED TO JULY 20, 2006 PER COURT'S OWN MOTION.=(302/JUDGE BUSCH)

To Strike Causes Of Action For Malicious Prosecution And Abuse Of Process DEFENDANT GORDON AND REES LLP, S. KAPLAN, KATHLEEN MALONE To Strike Causes Of Action For Malicious Prosecution And Abuse Of Process. CONTINUED TO 9/3/03 FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY. DEPOSITION OF MENAGED (FORMER PROPERTY OWNER) 10 SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES. SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION DUE 8/25/03. SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY DUE 8/29/03. (302/KMM/PB)

Discussion The Complaint appears to allege three causes of action against Defendants: (1) intentional tort, (2) abuse of process, and (3) conversion. (See Compl. Item No. 10.) The Complaint, however, only attaches one page of allegations (page no. 4), alleging only facts as to the cause of action for intentional tort. The Complaint does not allege as facts as to the causes of action for abuse of process and conversion. Defendants demur to the causes of action for abuse of process and conversion.

The abuse of process count also alleges that due to defendant's conduct, she received a "large sum of money that she was not entitled to" out of the proceeds from the sale of GTS. Id., paragraphs 54-57. The abuse of process count further alleges that plaintiff voluntarily joined in the family court case. Id., paragraphs 9, 28, 52. The abuse of process count is insufficiently pled. It does not plead facts that defendant had an ulterior motive in using the judicial process.

Abuse of process To adequately allege abuse of process, plaintiff must “plead two essential elements: that the defendant (1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the process and (2) committed a willful act in a wrongful manner.” (Merlet v. Rizzo (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.)

Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 41 (SLAPP motion properly granted as to plaintiff’s abuse of process, malicious prosecution and IIED claims; abuse of process c/a failed because it only alleged maintenance of meritless lawsuit and no misuse of process). “Simply filing or maintaining a lawsuit for an improper purpose (such as might support a malicious prosecution cause of action) is not abuse of process. Malicious prosecution and abuse of process are distinct.

The cross-complaint includes causes of action for implied equitable indemnity, equitable indemnity, contribution, apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and IIED. The malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims all arise out of Cross-Defendants prosecution of 19LBUD02619 against Cross-Complainant. 3. Motion to Strike a. Procedural History of Motion Cross-Defendants filed this special motion to strike on 6/20/23.

Abuse of Process Defendants motion mentions the abuse of process claim in the notice but otherwise does not address abuse of process or applicable law in the motion. The motion only addresses probable cause for the previous case having the claim for breach of contract. The elements of a claim for abuse of process are: Ulterior purpose in commencing a process; and Willful act in an unauthorized use of the process. Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1057.

(iv) Find that Defendants fail to satisfy their shifted burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the merits of their sixth cause of action for abuse of process against Cross-Defendant Iaccone, on the ground that Defendants do not even attempt to satisfy their shifted burden.

Navid is being sued for several causes of action, including malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Both the including malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims are based on litigation activity in the prior action.

Abuse of Process This claim, too, was not sufficiently plead and proven. “[Abuse of process] concerns the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit….Hence, abuse of process claims typically arise for improper or excessive attachments [citation] or improper use of discovery [citation].” (S.A. v. Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 42.)

Many courts... have specifically applied section 47, subdivision 2 to bar abuse of process actions ... the mere filing or maintenance of a lawsuit . . . is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action." ( Abraham v. Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. (2007) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 826.) Here, the basis for the Abuse of Process claim is the Cernas’ filing of “this action” for an improper purpose. Pursuant to Abraham v. Lancaster Cmty.

IT ALSO WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF PROCESS TO CONTINUE THE ACTION. THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE, CIVIL CODE SECTION 47(B), IS A DEFENSE TO BOTH THE ABUSE OF PROCESS AND INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS. =(302/PJM/AY)

Abuse of Process “To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant must establish two elements: that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process; and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” (Brown v. Kennard (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 40, 44.) However, the filing or maintaining a lawsuit, even for an improper purpose is not an abuse of process. (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v.

DISCUSSION On December 30, 2022, Cross-Complainant filed a Cross-Complaint alleging three causes of action for (1) abuse of process, (2) fraudulent concealment, and (3) breach of contract. Cross-Defendant demurrers to each cause of action. Cause of Action for Abuse of Process Cross-Defendant argues that Cross-Complainants first cause of action for abuse of process fails to state a claim.

of process, and (15) violation of the UCL.

As stated by one court, “the essence of the tort of abuse of process—some misuse of process in a prior action—and it is hard to imagine an abuse of process claim that would not fall under the protection of the statute. Abuse of process claims are subject to a special motion to strike.” (Booker v. Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370.) This applies to actions filed by attorneys who advised clients. (Briggs v.

Plaintiff argues that the Cross-Complaint is defective because an abuse of process action will not lie for mere filing of litigation. (Demurrer at pp. 4–5.) There are two main elements of a cause of action for abuse of process: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Process is action taken pursuant to judicial authority.

The firstcause of action for abuse of process fails to state a claim for abuse of process because the filing and maintenance of a lawsuit itself, even if for an improper purpose, is an insufficient basis for an abuse of process cause of action. Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1169.

Massie’s third cause of action for abuse of process fails to state facts sufficient to state a claim and is unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e), (f).) With his abuse of process cause of action, Mr. Massie alleges Plaintiff “bears a large disparity in wealth” to Mr. Massie, “has expressed her ability to bear more in legal costs” than Mr. Massie, and that Mr. Massie has suffered damages as a result. (¶¶ 25-27.)

Lee filed a complaint against Defendants United Escrow Co., Tracy Ko, and Douglas Chadwick Biggins to allege a single cause of action for abuse of process. On March 3, 2022, Defendant United Escrow Co. moved the Court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, to strike the Complainant [sic] filed by Caroline S. Lee (Lee") [mis-matched quotation marks in original] filed on or about 2-15-2022, alleging a single cause of action for abuse of process. (Anti-SLAPP Motion (United 1), p. i:21-23.)

Abuse of Process Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for abuse of process because “there is nothing in paragraphs 34-42 indicating a misuse of discovery, the case was stayed in 2012, but almost exclusively were facts plead indicating malicious prosecution.” (Demurrer, p. 7:24-27 [citing FAC, ¶¶ 34-42].) Defendant maintains that “the abuse of process is not just another name of malicious prosecution.” (Id. at p. 7:20.)

ANALYSIS Motion to Compel Arbitration Defendant Adam Fields moves to compel arbitration of the third cause of action for abuse of process.

Plaintiff alleges a c/a for abuse of process. Protected conduct is clearly the gravamen of the 3nd c/a for abuse of process and automatically subject to SLAPP. See Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 735; see also Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1063 (abuse of process claims automatically subject to SLAPP). Plaintiff also alleges a c/a for negligence and NIED.

She asks for protection against abuse of process but does not identify any abuse of process to which she has been or is threatened to be subjected. Plaintiff does not provide authority for a stay of the proceedings or why one is necessary to accommodate the closing of an estate. Plaintiff does not identify any estate proceeding pending. Significantly, there is no proof of service attached to the motion. Given the lack of opposition to the motion, it is very likely that it was not served.

Abuse of Process and Intentional Misrepresentation are completely separate torts with separate elements. While Negligence and Negligent Misrepresentation are more closely related, they remain separate claims. Breach of Contract, Promissory Estoppel, and Promissory Fraud are all completely different theories which cannot be rolled into one. Plaintiffs need to plead each of these theories separately, and identify clearly which facts support which theories.

The fourth cause of action for abuse of process falls within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute. Cross-Complainants has not met their burden of showing a probability of success on the merits of any aspect of the abuse of process cause of action. Defendants/Cross-Complainant's Objections to Evidence are sustained. Attorney fees are awarded to Plaintiff/Cross-defendant Gorsira in an amount to be later determined upon a showing by Plaintiff/Cross-defendant.

See Blank , supra . 6 TH CAUSE OF ACTION – ABUSE OF PROCESS To state a claim for abuse of process, Plaintiff must allege facts showing Defendants (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. JSJ Limited Partnership (2012) 205 CA4th 1512, 1522. Merely filing a court action for an improper purpose does not qualify as abuse of process.

of process, and (15) violation of the UCL.

of process, and (15) violation of the UCL.

Plaintiff alleges a c/a for abuse of process. Protected conduct is clearly the gravamen of the 3nd c/a for abuse of process and automatically subject to SLAPP. See Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 735; see also Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1063 (abuse of process claims automatically subject to SLAPP). Plaintiff also alleges a c/a for negligence and NIED.

Defendant did withdraw its defense until after the abuse of process claim was dismissed. Once the abuse of process claim was dismissed, Defendant did not have a duty to defend under the malicious prosecution clause in the policy.

Gary’s fifth cause of action is for abuse of process. “‘[T]o establish a cause of action for abuse of process, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: that the defendant (1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the process and (2) committed a wilful act in a wrongful manner. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lee (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 34, 40.)

Second Cause of Action for Abuse of Process “[T]he two fundamental elements that constitute the basis of the tort of abuse of process [are]: ‘first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.’ ” Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 103–04 (quoting Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 461, 466. “Abuse of process is not just another name for malicious prosecution.

Abuse of Process Defendants demur to the fourth cause of action against them for Abuse of Process. To establish a cause of action for abuse of process, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: that the defendant (1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the process and (2) committed a willful act in a wrongful manner. ( Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 792.)

RSC argues: The claim for abuse of process based on the use of provisional remedies is not an actionable abuse of process recognized by the California Supreme Court.

This is insufficient to state a claim for abuse of process against Reis. The mere filing of the lawsuit, per the authority quoted above, cannot support a COA for abuse of process. However, as discussed above, there is an issue of erroneous service of process in the underlying case. P has alleged that this error in service was committed intentionally to prevent him from responding to the petition. (FAC ¶ 100).

“The common law tort of abuse of process arises when one uses the court's process for a purpose other than that for which the process was designed.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.) “To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant must establish that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process, and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” (Id. at 1057.)

“The essential elements for abuse of process are: (1) an ulterior motive; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 876 (citations omitted). “For purpose of abuse of process, the ulterior motive to prove is that the party employing the process did so for an end not germane thereto.

Except for the issues of prevailing party and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred, the anti-SLAPP motion by defendants Raytheon Company, et al. is MOOT because plaintiff has dismissed his sixth cause of action for abuse of process. (See, Dismissal of Sixth Cause of Action for Abuse of Process filed 10-28-17.)

To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant must establish two elements: that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process; and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. In other words, abuse of process requires an act outside the purpose of the process. ( Brown v. Kennard (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 40, 44, footnotes omitted.)

They are; (1) Abuse of Process-Intentionally Perpetrating Injustice (FACC, p. 7); and (2) Abuse of Process- Allegedly Filing False Declarations Regarding Service of Court Papers. (FACC, p. 12.) As the FACC itself notes, abuse of process is distinct from malicious prosecution. (See FACC, p. 3.) Despite this, both the demurring party and the opposing party treat the FACC as if it were alleging a claim for malicious prosecution also. That claim is nowhere formally pleaded in the cross-complaint, however.

On July 12, 2021, Behrouz Shafie and Behrouz Shafie & Associates, filed a special motion to strike the entire cross-complaint, or alternatively, to strike the Fifth Cause of Action of the Cross-complaint for Abuse of Process.

The third and fourth counts (abuse of process), which are based on the filing and serving of the two underlying lawsuits, lack merit since the mere filing and maintenance of a lawsuit is not sufficient to support a claim for abuse of process. See Oren Royal Oaks Venture & Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.3d at 1169. Moreover, plaintiff in opposing the Herzfeld defendants' demurrer concedes the abuse of process counts lack merit by his statement that he will "drop" the counts.

The first c/a for abuse of process alleges that “pursuant t the goals of the conspiracy Mr. Maleksalehi filed this action”, and named Mr. Tabatabai; tha “Mr. Tabatabai then sued Mr. Lindow in the same action”. (FACC ¶¶111, 112); that Lindow ha been damaged “as a result of the actions of Mr.

Defendants Mahmoud Assi and Harry Assi's special motion to strike the fourth cause of action for abuse of process pursuant to CCP § 425.16 is granted. Defendants have met their initial burden of establishing that the fourth cause of action contained in the complaint for abuse of process arose from the defendants' free speech or petition activity entitled to the protection of CCP § 425.16(e). Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits.

. ¶¶ 27, 45, 51-53 [claims for abuse of process and perjury]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1); Booker v. Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370-1371 [abuse of process claim subject to anti-SLAPP motion].) Cross-complainant has not met his shifted burden to show a probability of prevailing. (See, e.g., Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 955-956 [litigation privilege applies to perjury].) He has not shown the public interest exception applies. (See Code Civ.

ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT SUFFICIENT TO STATE CLAIM FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND ABUSE OF PROCESS. (JH)

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE ABUSE OF PROCESS GRANTED. NO SHOWING OF ULTERIOR MOTIVE. (302/AJR/AA)

Defendant demurs to the Cross-Complaint on the grounds that it fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (e). 1st Cause of Action for Fraud and Abuse of Process Cross-Complainant improperly attempts to state two different causes of action—fraud and abuse of process—in the first cause of action. Neither is supported by sufficient factual allegations.

For the instant motion, the only relevant cause of action against Moving Defendant Hovsepian is the 2nd cause of action for abuse of process.

DEMURRER DEMURRER OVERRULED AS TO 1)FRAUD 2)CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 3)SLANDER OF TITLE 4)ABUSE OF PROCESS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. ARBITRATION AND CONFIRMING JUDGMENT BARS CLAIMS ADVANCED. (AD(EX)

The filing of a lawsuit is not the equivalent of abuse of process. ( Trear v. Sills (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1359.) Moreover, as pled, Plaintiffs abuse of process cause of action is based on Defendants pursuit of restraining orders and based on reports to the City of Lakewood. The litigation privilege of Cal. Civ. Code §47(b) applies to Plaintiffs abuse of process claim. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend.

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT SET FOR HEARING ON THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2016, LINE 11 DEFENDANT T YEE, The Controller's demurrer to the sole cause of action for abuse of process Overruled. Thrivent has adequately alleged that the Controller had an ulterior motive in using the discovery processes and that it committed a willful act by using the discovery it received from Thrivent in violation of court orders.

Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim is explicitly based on Defendants bringing and maintaining a theory of adverse possession in their lawsuit. (FAC, ¶ 35.)

Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim is explicitly based on Defendants bringing and maintaining a theory of adverse possession in their lawsuit. (FAC, ¶ 35.)

Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim is explicitly based on Defendants bringing and maintaining a theory of adverse possession in their lawsuit. (FAC, ¶ 35.)

The demurrer to the sixth cause of action for abuse of process is sustained with leave to amend. The element of abuse of process are: - Ulterior purpose in commencing a process; and - Willful act in an unauthorized use of the process. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1057.) Cross-complainant alleges Cross-Defendants manufactured charges of elder abuse. (Cross-Complaint ¶39.)

Here, as discussed above, plaintiff's abuse of process claim is based on the allegation that defendant has misused the litigation process by subpoenaing its directors in the small claims action. Accordingly, the litigation privilege applies and bars the abuse of process claim. C. Conclusion. Based on the foregoing, the court strikes the entire abuse of process claim (paragraphs 29-35), as well as the allegations in paragraphs 17, 18, and 23(b).

Defendant contends the abuse of process cause of action also fails as Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead abuse of process and the litigation privilege applies to Defendant’s purported conduct. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 1. Protected Activity “To prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion, the movant must first make ‘a threshold showing the challenged cause of action’ arises from an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.”

MSC18-01760 NUMBER: CASE NAME: GARRETT VS PONTES *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS TO COA FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS IN HIS 5TH AMENDED COMPLAINT *TENTATIVE RULING:* Continued by the Court to August 12, 2022.

Plaintiffs second cause of action is for abuse of process. To state a claim for abuse of process, Plaintiff must allege that Defendant had an ulterior purpose in commencing a process, and that used the process for an unauthorized purpose. ( Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1057.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant appealed the underlying action to delay the enforcement of the judgment in favor of Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶¶ 32-33.)

CLAIMS FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS AND TRESPASS STRIKEN BASED ON CONCESSION BY PLAINTIFF. (CW)

Abuse of Process Defendant argues that Plaintiffs abuse of process claim is unsupported by the evidence. In particular, Defendant argues in full that: during trial there was no evidence that any conduct of Kenneth satisfied those legal requirements for abuse of process. (Vithlani Decl. ¶ 9). Granted, the jury found that Kenneth engaged in malicious prosecution by filing his Cross-Complaint.

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish her Second Cause of Action for Abuse of Process. For abuse of process, a plaintiff must show that the “defendant (1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the process and (2) committed a willful act in a wrongful manner.” Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 792.

Cross-Complaint asserts claims for Slander of Title and Abuse of Process arising out of protected activity. ("Cross-Defendant filed the Complaint on June 9, 2021, thereafter recorded notices of pendency of action upon Unit 202 and Unit 303, claiming some interest in each of the Subject Properties, and casting doubt upon Cross-Complainant's ownership."). Opposing party failed to show likelihood of prevailing on the merits re: privileged communications. CC 47(b)(4).

The demurrers to the first cause of action, for abuse of process, are sustained. First, the complaint is so vague that it is very difficult to determine what exactly the Plaintiff is complaining about. There is no allegation that any particular process in any particular prior litigation was somehow misused.

Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 792 [where defendant’s appeal was frivolous and meant to force plaintiffs into a “cheap settlement,” there was no abuse of process because defendant was entitled to appeal the judgment; defendant may be fined or caused to pay sanctions to the other party upon losing the appeal, but the act of filing the appeal did not constitute an abuse of process].) Simply, Tey Amo fails to state facts showing the act of filing the complaint was done in an unauthorized manner.

Plaintiff also argues in opposition that at the very least, the motion should be denied as it relates to the abuse of process cause of action, and the court should find that defendant owed plaintiff a duty to defend during the pendency of the abuse of process claim.

The cross-complaint includes causes of action for implied equitable indemnity, equitable indemnity, contribution, apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and IIED. The malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims all arise out of Cross-Defendants prosecution of 19LBUD02619 against Cross-Complainant. 3.

Second Cause of Action (Abuse of Process) In the Court’s opinion, the second cause of action does not plead an abuse of process distinguishable from the alleged malicious prosecution. Rather, the FAC merely claims that Mr. Mikhail’s intent in bringing a prior lawsuit may be gleaned from “his past conduct by bringing several other similarly situated frivolous/baseless lawsuits against Plaintiff Ordoubadi.” Mr.

AS TO ABUSE OF PROCESS SET FACTS BEYOND FILING SUIT THAT WERE PURSUED AND IN PROPER PURPOSE. SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND MOTION PROSECUTION RE: CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. (302/REQ/HE)

Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleged claims for Fraud, Abuse of Process, 42 USC 1983, and Conspiracy - Violation of RICO. In both actions, Plaintiff alleges violation of the same primary right, i.e., Plaintiff’s right to fair process, Defendant’s duty to ensure fair process, and Defendant’s breach by failing to disclose that Ronald Kreber was not a licensed attorney. Plaintiff raised identical issues and claims in both actions.

As to the First Cause of Action for abuse of process: Plaintiff must plead 1. that the Defendant entertained an ulterior motive in using the process and 2. committed a willful act in a wrongful manner. (Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Grp. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782. An action for abuse of process does not lie where process is used properly even though the motive may be bad. (Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 826.)

Ninth Cause of Action for Abuse of Process Defendants demur to the ninth cause of action on the ground that it is barred by the litigation privilege. As stated in the Courts ruling on Defendants anti-SLAPP motion, the claim for abuse of process is barred and must be stricken. The demurrers to this claim are moot. F.

University of Southern California, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1430-1431, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 [no civil causes of action for perjury or abuse of process for filing false declarations]; Kachig v.

Defendant met his initial burden to show the abuse of process and malicious prosecution causes of action arise out of protected conduct. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1) [judicial proceedings]; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90 [claims filed in court]; Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1063 [abuse of process]; Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 735 [malicious prosecution]; see also FAC ¶ 8; Thomas II Decl. ¶¶ 9 and 10.)

(Defendant), a self-represented party, has filed a cross-complaint against the Plaintiff, as well as Keystone, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, abuse of process, negligent misrepresentation, defamation, and injunctive relief. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike, following which defendant filed a first amended complaint for abuse of process, defamation/malicious misrepresentation, and injunctive relief.

The third amended cross complaint (TACC), containing causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and abuse of process. Aimco moves to strike under Californias anti-SLAPP statute. Courts resolving an anti-SLAPP motion under Cal. Civ. Code §425.16 must follow a two-step process. Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 733.

Elmasri demurs to the sole cause of action for Abuse of Process contained in the Cross-Complaint. “The common law tort of abuse of process arises when one uses the court's process for a purpose other than that for which the process was designed.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.)

The 6 th cause of action for abuse of process is governed by a one year statute of limitations. See Cantu (1992) 4 CA4th 857, 864; CCP 340(3). The limitations period begins to run when the abuse of process occurs; however, if the injury to the plaintiff does not occur when the abuse of process occurs, the limitations period begins to run when the injury occurs. Cantu , supra at 864.

However, it does appear that Plaintiff has alleged a cause of action for abuse of process. In order to allege a cause of action for abuse of process, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant (1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the process; and (2) committed a willful act in a wrongful manner. (State Farm Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lee (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 34, 39-40.)

Not only does the filing of the action and the certificate fall within the litigation privilege, but cross-complainants have not stated a cause of action for abuse of process. A claim for abuse of process arises when a party (1) for ulterior reasons (2) misuses the court's process for a purpose other than the purpose for which the process was designed.

While this evidence would generally support an abuse of process claim, it does not dispose of the privilege. Consequently, as to abuse of process, the motion is granted. 2. Malicious Prosecution Manuel opposes the motion by asserting the viability of a malicious prosecution claim.