Preview
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
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ARTINS AG,
Plaintiff, MOTION SEQUENCE NO. 3
-against-
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx INC. doing business as
THE xxx xxxxxxxxxx, INC., and
JOHN DOES, 1-10,
Defendants.
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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
AARON RICHARD GOLUB, ESQUIRE, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
24 East 64th Street, Fifth Floor
New York, New York 10065
ph: (212) 838-4811
fx: (212) 838-4869
Of Counsel:
Aaron Richard Golub
Nehemiah S. Glanc
Russell I. Zwerin
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT………………………………………………………………..……1
POINT I…………………………………………………………………………………………..…..2
DEFENDANT’S SANCTIONABLE VIOLATION OF
FOUR DISCOVERY RULES………………………………………………………………..2
A. This Court’s Individual Rule 1.b (Ex. 5)……………………………………..2
B. 22 NYCRR 202.7—The Good Faith Affirmation Rule……………………....3
C. 22 NYCRR 202.20-f………………………………………………………….3
D. New York County Supreme Court Civil Branch Rule 10 (Ex. 6)……………4
POINT II……………………………………………………………………………………………...6
PLAINTIFF’S DOCUMENT DEMANDS ARE MATERIAL AND NECESSARY
AND NOT OVERBROAD…………………………………………………………………...6
A. The Court Already Ruled that Plaintiff is Entitled to Discovery
(Ex. 1 p. 8)…………………………………………………………………...6
B. The Discovery Standards of CPLR 3101……………………………………..7
C. Plaintiff’s First Notice To Produce (Ex. 7) Is Not Overbroad
Or Burdensome And the Documents Requested Are Relevant,
Material and Necessary……………………………………………………….9
POINT III……………………………………………………………………………………………13
DEFENDANT’S CHECK (EX. C) IS MEANINGLESS
AND WAS PROPERLY REJECTED BY PLAINTIFF AS IT DID
NOT INCLUDE ANY STATUTORY INTEREST AT 9% PER ANNUM
(CPLR §§5001 and 5004) AND MADE NO PROVISION FOR
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ………………………………………………………………..13
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POINT IV…………………………………………………………………………………………...18
DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL SHOULD BE SANCTIONED AND COSTS
IMPOSED FOR FILING AN UTTERLY FRIVOLOUS MOTION FOR A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, WHICH IS COMPLETELY WITHOUT MERIT IN
LAW, CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE ARGUMENT FOR AN
EXTENSION, MODIFICATION, OR REVERSAL OF EXISTING LAW AND
VIOLATES FOUR DISCOVERY STATUTES AND COURT RULES…………………..18
A. Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order Was Made Without
Any Reasonable Belief that It Might Be Successful………………………..19
B. Defendant Misquotes 15 of Plaintiff’s 20 Document Demands to
Sensationalize Its Motion and Give the False Impression that
Its Motion Is Legally Meritorious…………………………………………..21
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………...22
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
All-County Medical v. Progressive Cas.,
8 Misc.3d 616 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005) ...................................................................................... 7
Allen v. Crowell-Collier,
21 N.Y.2d 403 (1968) ............................................................................................................... 7, 8, 9
Anuchina v. Marine Transp.,
216 A.D.3d 1126 (2d Dep’t 2023).................................................................................................... 5
Arazosa v. 3M Co.,
60 Misc. 3d 1205(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2018)................................................................................ 8
Barouh Eaton v. International Business Machines,
76 A.D.2d 873 (2d Dep’t 1980)................................................................................................ 12, 13
Bigman v. Dime Sav. Bank,
153 A.D.2d 912 (2d Dep’t 1989)...................................................................................................... 8
Boye v. Rubin & Bailin,
152 A.D.3d 1 (1st Dep’t 2017) ....................................................................................................... 20
Cajamarca v. Osatuk,
163 A.D.3d 619 (2d Dep’t 2018)...................................................................................................... 8
Dicostanzo v. Schwed,
146 A.D.3d 1044 (3d Dep’t 2017).............................................................................................. 7, 10
Eaton v. Chahal,
146 Misc.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Co. 1990)............................................................................. 4
Engel v. Hagedorn,
170 A.D.2d 301 (1st Dep’t 1991) ..................................................................................................... 6
Etzion v. Etzion,
7 Misc. 3d 940 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005) ..................................................................................... 9
Gilbert-Frank v. Guardsman Life,
78 A.D.2d 798 (1st Dep’t 1980) ....................................................................................................... 6
Goldberg v. Blue Cross.,
81 A.D.2d 995 (3d Dep’t 1981)........................................................................................................ 8
Golio v. Greenstein,
63 Misc. 3d 1210(A) (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2019) .................................................................... 8
In re Kover,
134 A.D.3d 64 (1st Dep’t 2015) ..................................................................................................... 21
In re Lumerman,
856 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sur. Westchester Co. 2008) ............................................................................... 7
In re Steam Pipe Explosion,
127 A.D.3d 554 (1st Dep’t 2015) ..................................................................................................... 7
In re Will of Ettinger,
7 Misc.3d 316 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005) ....................................................................................... 9
Intercontinental Bank v. Micale & Rivera,
300 A.D.2d 207 (1st Dep’t 2002) ................................................................................................... 21
Jackson v. Hunter Roberts Const.,
139 A.D.3d 429 (1st Dep’t 2016) .................................................................................................... 4
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Jones v. Maples,
257 A.D.2d 53 (1st Dep’t 1999) ..................................................................................................... 12
Jones v. Wissenbach,
80 A.D.2d 962 (3d Dep’t 1981)........................................................................................................ 8
Kamen v. Diaz-Kamen,
40 A.D.3d 937 (2d Dep’t 2007)...................................................................................................... 20
Kapon v. Koch,
23 N.Y.3d 32 (2014) ......................................................................................................................... 7
Lexington Acupuncture v. General Assur.,
35 Misc. 3d 42 (2d Dep’t App. Term 2012) ..................................................................................... 7
Manekas v. Allied Disc.,
6 Misc.2d 1079 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1957) .................................................................................... 14
Matter of David E.,
176 Misc.2d 363 (Fam. Ct. Orange Co. 1998) ................................................................................. 9
Matter of Elliot P.N.G.,
181 A.D.3d 961 (2d Dep’t 2020)...................................................................................................... 7
McMahon v. New York Organ Donor,
52 Misc.3d 201 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2016) ........................................................................................ 9
Minjak Co. v. Randolph,
140 A.D.2d 245 (1st Dep’t 1988) ................................................................................................... 15
Moran v. Int’l Playtex,
103 A.D.2d 375 (2d Dep’t 1984).............................................................................................. 15, 17
New York Univ. v. Cont’l Ins.,
87 N.Y.2d 308 (1995) ..................................................................................................................... 15
Pagan v. St. John’s,
169 Misc. 2d 248 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1996) ................................................................................. 7
Price v. New York City Bd. of Educ.,
16 Misc.3d 543 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007) ........................................................................................ 8
Rahman v. Pollari,
107 A.D.3d 452 (1st Dep’t 2013) ..................................................................................................... 7
Rivera v. NYP Holdings,
63 A.D.3d 469 (1st Dep’t 2009) ....................................................................................................... 7
Russell Pub. Grp., Ltd. v. Brown Printing Co.,
2014 WL 1329144 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2014) ................................................................................ 6, 7
Sage Realty v. Proskauer Rose,
251 A.D.2d 35 (1st Dep’t 1998) ....................................................................................................... 2
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc.,
2009 WL 5247497 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) ................................................................................ 12
Scheinfeld v. Burlant,
98 A.D.2d 603 (1st Dep’t 1983) ....................................................................................................... 6
State Farm v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408 (2003) ....................................................................................................................... 17
Stepping Stones v. Scialdone,
148 A.D.3d 855 (2d Dept. 2017) .................................................................................................... 10
Sterling Nat. Bank v. Ernst & Young,
62 A.D.3d 584 (1st Dep’t 2009) ..................................................................................................... 15
Suozzi v. Parente,
161 A.D.2d 232 (1st Dep’t 1990) ................................................................................................... 15
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Taylor v. State,
66 Misc. 3d 1229(A) (Ct. Cl. N.Y. 2019)......................................................................................... 8
U.S. Bank Trust v. Carter,
204 A.D.3d 727 (2d Dep’t 2022)...................................................................................................... 9
V.J.V. Transp. v. Santiago,
173 A.D.2d 537 (2d Dep’t 1991).................................................................................................... 14
Vargas v. Lee,
170 A.D.3d 1073 (2d Dep’t 2019).................................................................................................... 8
Venture v. Preferred Mut. Ins.,
153 A.D.3d 1155 (1st Dep’t 2017) ................................................................................................... 9
Woodward v. Levine,
179 A.D.3d 429 (1st Dep’t 2020) ..................................................................................................... 8
Rules
CPLR 3101....................................................................................................................................... 2, 7
CPLR 3101(a) .................................................................................................................................. 8, 9
CPLR 3103....................................................................................................................................... 5, 9
CPLR 3122....................................................................................................................................... 1, 4
CPLR 5001...................................................................................................................................... 2,13
CPLR 5004..................................................................................................................................... 2, 13
FRCP Rules 26, 30 and 45 ................................................................................................................. 12
Regulations
22 NYCRR 130-1.1a.................................................................................................................... 21, 24
22 NYCRR 202.7 ........................................................................................................................ Passim
22 NYCRR 202.20 ................................................................................................................... 3, 19, 20
22 NYCRR 202.20-f ................................................................................................................... Passim
22 NYCRR §130-1.1 (a) .............................................................................................................. 18, 19
22 NYCRR § 202.8-b ........................................................................................................................ 24
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendant blatantly failed to comply with several discovery rules: (i) 22 NYCRR 202.7;
(ii) This Court’s Individual Rule 1.b (Ex. 5); (iii) 22 NYCRR 202.20-f; and (iv) New York
County Supreme Court Civil Branch Rule 10 (Ex. 6). Consequently, Defendant’s motion for a
protective order must be denied and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions for filing a frivolous,
four-rule-breaking motion, should be granted.
22 NYCRR 202.7(a)— well-established blackletter law enacted more than 25 years ago
in 1998—provides that a motion relating to disclosure must be accompanied by an affirmation
from moving counsel attesting “that counsel has conferred with counsel for the opposing party in
a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion.” Failure to submit such an
affirmation, alone, warrants denial of the motion. At bar, there is no affirmation of good faith
annexed to Defendant’s moving papers.
Defendant’s counsel failed to call or email Plaintiff’s counsel to resolve the alleged
discovery issues and failed to follow the CPLR 3122 procedure for objecting to a Notice to
Produce (i.e., providing objections to the discovery sought in a response to the party seeking
such discovery rather than rushing off to Court with a motion for a protective order).
In direct contravention of 22 NYCRR 202.7(b), there is no indication on the face of
Defendant’s Notice of Motion that any affirmation of good faith was submitted in support of
Defendant’s motion for a protective order. Nothing in the Affirmation of Defendant’s counsel
Maria Angela Brusco, Esq. (Dkt.92)1—submitted in support of Defendant’s motion—addresses
any of the requirements of 22 NYCRR 202.7.
1“Dkt.” means the Docket number of the document in the New York State Courts Electronic
Filing system (“NYSCEF”).
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A party moving for a protective order bears the burden of demonstrating (with more than
conclusory assertions)2 that the disclosure sought is improper. At bar, Defendant’s motion
contains only conclusory assertions, rendering it subject to denial on this ground alone.
Defendant’s breaches of contract and conversion were so willful, intentional and done in
bad faith that they evince a high degree of moral culpability. Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff
its one-third share of the Phillips auction proceeds under the false pretext that Plaintiff
purportedly owed a debt to HCL—an unrelated third party—on two unrelated works of xxx.
Defendant repeatedly conditioned payment of Plaintiff’s one-third share of the Weyant auction
proceeds on two unrelated transactions in which Defendant has no ownership interest (see Ex. 1
Order p. 6-9; Pl. Memo3 Dkt. 32, Point II).
POINT I
DEFENDANT’S SANCTIONABLE VIOLATION OF FOUR DISCOVERY RULES
Defendant’s motion for a protective order is a sanctionable violation of four discovery
statutes and rules, including this Court’s Individual Rules. Each violation, alone, warrants
denial of Defendant’s motion. The violations, cumulatively, warrant sanctions.
A. This Court’s Individual Rule 1.b (“Individual Rule 1.b”)
The first page of this Court’s Individual Rule 1.b provides, in pertinent part, in bold and
CAPS (Ex. 5):
“1. Conferences
...
a. Parties are encouraged to resolve discovery disputes and enter into discovery
stipulations without court intervention to the extent possible. …
b. If the parties are unable to resolve discovery disputes the parties may request a
conference with the court. DISCOVERY MOTIONS MAY NOT BE FILED
WITHOUT FIRST CONFERENCING THE MATTER WITH THE
COURT.”
2 Sage Realty v. Proskauer Rose, 251 A.D.2d 35, 40 (1st Dep’t 1998).
3 ‘Pl. Memo’ means Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion seq. 1.
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B. 22 NYCRR 202.7—The Good Faith Affirmation Rule:
22 NYCRR 202.7 provides, in pertinent part:
“Section 202.7. Calendaring of motions; uniform notice of motion form;
affirmation of good faith
(a)…[N]o motion shall be filed with the court unless there have been
served and filed with the motion papers (1) a notice of motion, and (2)
with respect to a motion relating to disclosure or to a bill of particulars,
an affirmation that counsel has conferred with counsel for the opposing
party in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion”
(emphasis supplied).
...
(c) The failure of counsel to comply with this rule may result in the
denial of a discovery motion, without prejudice to renewal once the
provisions of this rule have been complied with, or in such motion being
held in abeyance until the informal resolution procedures of the court are
conducted.
C. 22 NYCRR 202.20-f:
22 NYCRR 202.20-f twice provides, in pertinent part, for an in-person or telephonic
conference between counsel:
“Section 202.20-f. Disclosure Disputes
(a) To the maximum extent possible, discovery disputes should be resolved
through informal procedures, such as conferences, as opposed to motion
practice.
(b) Absent exigent circumstances, prior to contacting the court regarding a
disclosure dispute, counsel must first consult with one another in a good faith
effort to resolve all disputes about disclosure. Such consultation must take
place by an in-person or telephonic conference. In the event that a discovery
dispute cannot be resolved other than through motion practice, each such
discovery motion shall be supported by an affidavit or affirmation from counsel
attesting to counsel having conducted an in-person or telephonic conference,
setting forth the date and time of such conference, persons participating, and the
length of time of the conference…” (emphasis supplied).
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D. New York County Supreme Court Civil Branch Rule 10 (“NY Court Rule 10”) (Ex.
6):
NY Court Rule 10 provides:
“Rule 10. Disclosure Disputes. Prior to making a discovery motion, counsel
shall consult one another in a good faith effort to resolve any discovery
disputes (see Uniform Rule 202.7). If a dispute is not thus resolved, the party
seeking disclosure, unless otherwise directed in the Background Information
section above, is advised to contact the Part Clerk promptly, and within any
applicable deadline, for the purpose of arranging a conference, in court or by
telephone.”
Prior to filing the subject motion, Defendant’s counsel made no attempt to confer with
Plaintiff’s counsel and, consequently, failed to submit an affirmation discussing good faith
attempts to resolve the discovery disputes. Defendant’s counsel did not even bother to serve
objections to Plaintiff’s discovery requests pursuant to CPLR 3122.
Defendant’s failure to adhere to 22 NYCRR 202.7, alone, constitutes sufficient grounds
to deny Defendant’s motion (let alone Defendant’s violation of three additional discovery
statutes and rules, i.e. this Court’s Individual Rule 1.b, 22 NYCRR 202.20-f and NY Court Rule
10. See Eaton v. Chahal, 146 Misc.2d 977, 982-983 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Co. 1990) (“Such
‘good faith’ rule…should be familiar to all attorneys engaged in a litigation practice”);4 Jackson
4 And further holding:
“The ‘good faith’ requirement is intended to remove from the court’s work load all but
the most significant and unresolvable disputes over what has been the most prolific
generator of pretrial motions: discovery issues. Most seasoned litigators know that, with
a modicum of good sense, discovery disputes can and should be resolved by the attorneys
without the necessity of judicial intervention. Plaintiffs’ attorney in all five actions has
essentially ignored the “good faith” requirements of the court rules. In three of the
actions, no mention of the “good faith” rule is made.
…
Significant, intelligent and expansive contact and negotiations must be held between
counsel to resolve any dispute and such efforts must be adequately detailed in an
affirmation.
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v. Hunter Roberts Const., 139 A.D.3d 429, 429 (1st Dep’t 2016); Anuchina v. Marine Transp.,
216 A.D.3d 1126, 1127-28 (2d Dep’t 2023). See Practice Commentaries (2018) to CPLR 3103
C3103:3A explaining “In supreme and county court, all motions relating to disclosure, including
a CPLR 3103(a) motion for a protective order, must include an affirmation by the moving
lawyer that the lawyer conferred with opposing counsel and made a good faith effort to resolve
the issues raised by the motion. See, e.g., 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.7(a)” (emphasis supplied).
Defendant further ignored the several rules requiring that it seek a conference prior to
filing the instant motion. 22 NYCRR 202.20-f warns that “[a]bsent exigent circumstances,
prior to contacting the court regarding a disclosure dispute, counsel must first consult with one
another in a good faith effort to resolve all disputes about disclosure” (emphasis supplied). The
consultation required under 22 NYCRR 202.20-f(b) “must take place by an in-person or
telephonic conference” (emphasis supplied).
Three of Defendant’s objections aptly demonstrate why a good-faith pre-motion
consultation is required by four separate Court rules. In Plaintiff’s Document Requests ##8 and
9 (D.Memo p. 7;5 Ex. 7 Doc. Req. ##8-9), Defendant objects to the time period of “January 1,
2001 to the present.”6 Clearly, January 1, 2001 was a scrivener’s error and should have been
January 1, 2021. Indeed, January 1, 2021 was set forth in the first part of Doc. Requests ##8-9.
The court…hereby denies each and every motion and cross motion, with costs against
each plaintiff based upon a complete and total failure to comply with section 202.7.” Id.,
at 982-983.
5“D.Memo” means Defendant’s subject Memorandum of Law dated December 7, 2023 (Dkt.
91).
6 Plaintiff’s Document Requests ##8-9 (Ex. 7) request “Documents and Communications
concerning [Defendant’s] complete financial condition and profits from January 1, 2021 to the
present, including without limitation…Documents and Communications reflecting” Defendant’s,
AS’s and/or ES’s “overall financial condition, net worth and net income from January 1, 2001
to the present.”
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A simple phone call or email between counsel would have cleared up that confusion.
Defendant intentionally misquotes 15 of Plaintiff’s 20 document demands (##1-3, 6-13
and 16-19) in Plaintiff’s First Notice to Produce Documents (Ex. 7) in an effort to make
Plaintiff’s demands seem much broader than they actually are. Defendant purports to quote
these document demands as “[A]ll Documents and/or Correspondence and/or
Communications…” (D.Memo pp.4-5) (emphasis in original). However, none of the document
demands starts with the word “All.” Defendant intentionally misquoted and inserted the phrase
“All” (italicized for extra emphasis), knowing that the phrase “All,” in some circumstances, is
deemed overbroad.7
POINT II
PLAINTIFF’S DOCUMENT DEMANDS ARE MATERIAL AND NECESSARY
AND NOT OVERBROAD
A. The Court Already Ruled that Plaintiff is Entitled to Discovery (Ex. 1 p. 8)
When the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s second cause of action for a full and complete
accounting (Ex. 1 p. 8), the Court held that Plaintiff could obtain whatever information it
required through discovery on its other causes of action. The Court held that “… ‘an action for
an accounting is inapposite where a party has also brought a damages suit for breach of contract
because the party can obtain any necessary information through discovery’ Russell Pub. Grp.,
Ltd. v. Brown Printing Co., No. 13 CIV. 5193 SAS, 2014 WL 1329144, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3,
7 See Gilbert-Frank v. Guardsman Life, 78 A.D.2d 798 (1st Dep’t 1980).
In any event, the ‘modern’ view is that the use of the phrase "all," in document requests
when relating to a specific subject matter, do not invalidate the request. Engel v. Hagedorn, 170
A.D.2d 301,301 (1st Dep’t 1991) (“While some of the discovery seeks ‘all documents’, these
requests are limited to specific subjects and are thus not overly broad.”); Scheinfeld v. Burlant,
98 A.D.2d 603, 603 (1st Dep’t 1983) (“To hold that the items lack specificity simply because
they start with the word ‘All’, would be to exalt form over substance and to frustrate the liberal
discovery provisions which CPLR article 31 was designed to accomplish.”).
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2014 (quotations omitted)” (Ex. 1 p. 8). Obedient to this Court’s Order (Ex. 1 p. 8) and
Defendants’ arguments on Motion seqs. 1 and 2 (Dkt. 88 p. 13), by serving its First Notice to
Produce Documents (Ex. 7) and its Notice of Deposition (Ex. 8), Plaintiff was attempting to
“[o]btain any necessary information through discovery” (Ex. 1 p. 8).
Indeed, it was Defendant, in its initial Memorandum of Law dated June 29, 2023 (Dkt. 88
p. 13) which cited and quoted the same holding in Russell Pub., supra, that the Court cited and
quoted in its Order (Ex. 1 p. 8), i.e. a separate accounting cause of action may be obviated when
Plaintiff can obtain its required discovery as a result of its other causes of action. Defendant
cannot now abandon their prior arguments in Motion seqs. 1 and 2, and argue in Motion seq. 3
that no discovery whatsoever is warranted.
B. The Discovery Standards of CPLR 3101
The term “material and necessary” in CPLR 3101 and the scope of disclosure in general,
is broadly and liberally interpreted.8 In Kapon v. Koch, 23 N.Y.3d 32, 34, 37 (2014), the court
interpreted the “material and necessary” requirement to mean “relevant.”9 The test to determine
if the information sought is material and necessary is one of usefulness and reason.10 What is
“material and necessary” must be interpreted liberally to require disclosure of any facts bearing
on the controversy. See Rivera v. NYP Holdings, 63 A.D.3d 469 (1st Dep’t 2009); All-County
Medical v. Progressive Cas., 8 Misc.3d 616 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005). The standard has been
8 See Allen v. Crowell-Collier, 21 N.Y.2d 403 (1968); Matter of Elliot P.N.G., 181 A.D.3d 961
(2d Dep’t 2020); Dicostanzo v. Schwed, 146 A.D.3d 1044 (3d Dep’t 2017); In re Lumerman,
856 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sur. Westchester Co. 2008); In re Steam Pipe Explosion, 127 A.D.3d 554
(1st Dep’t 2015), aff’d, 2016 WL 1688703 (2016); Rahman v. Pollari, 107 A.D.3d 452 (1st
Dep’t 2013); Rivera v. NYP Holdings, 63 A.D.3d 469 (1st Dep’t 2009).
9
See Allen, supra, at 407.
10See Allen, supra; Pagan v. St. John’s, 169 Misc. 2d 248 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1996);
Lexington Acupuncture v. General Assur., 35 Misc. 3d 42, 43 (2d Dep’t App. Term 2012).
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described broadly as extending to anything that is material, meaningful, relevant and
necessary.11 Discovery of relevant factual matters is an inherent right of a party in a plenary
action. See Price v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 16 Misc.3d 543, 550 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007).
To be deemed “material,” there only need be “any possibility that the information”
sought during discovery is sought “for possible use as evidence-in-chief or for cross-examination
or in rebuttal.” Vargas v. Lee, 170 A.D.3d 1073, 1075 (2d Dep’t 2019). Since a party seeking
disclosure often cannot “demonstrate that items it has not yet obtained contain material
evidence,” the party instead “must satisfy the threshold requirement that the request is reasonably
calculated to yield information that is...relevant.” Id., 1075.12 The term “necessary” does not
connote that the information sought must be indispensable, but only “needful.”13
The parties’ disclosure obligations extend to all relevant information calculated to lead to
relevant evidence and are not limited to information that can be used as evidence in chief. See
Cajamarca v. Osatuk, 163 A.D.3d 619, 620 (2d Dep’t 2018).14 Under the “material and
necessary” standard, disclosure is not limited to evidence directly related to the issues raised by
the pleadings.15 The words “material and necessary” in CPLR 3101(a) should be interpreted
liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy that will
11 See Jones v. Wissenbach, 80 A.D.2d 962, 962 (3d Dep’t 1981).
12See Golio v. Greenstein, 63 Misc. 3d 1210(A), *6 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2019); Taylor v.
State, 66 Misc. 3d 1229(A), *3 (Ct. Cl. N.Y. 2019); Arazosa v. 3M Co., 60 Misc. 3d 1205(A) *2
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2018).
13 Goldberg v. Blue Cross., 81 A.D.2d 995 (3d Dep’t 1981).
14 See Bigman v. Dime Sav. Bank, 153 A.D.2d 912, 913 (2d Dep’t 1989).
15See Allen, supra; Woodward v. Levine, 179 A.D.3d 429, 430 (1st Dep’t 2020) (discovery
requests sought specific information about business dealings that formed the basis of the
counterclaims).
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assist in the preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. See
All-County, supra. Any materials demanded through discovery that possibly can be used as
evidence in chief, for rebuttal or for cross-examination must be produced. See Etzion v. Etzion,
7 Misc. 3d 940, 943 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005).
The test of materiality and necessity applies regardless of the burden of proof.16 A
special burden of proof is placed on a party opposing disclosure with respect to proving hardship,
special circumstances, prejudice, privilege or confidentiality.17 The party seeking a protective
order must make a factual showing to be entitled to such relief under CPLR 3103(a), i.e., to
prevent “unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice.” In
re Will of Ettinger, 7 Misc.3d 316 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005).
Discovery is not precluded merely because the party seeking such discovery likely
possesses the information sought as the result of non-discovery investigation or as part of its
normal business records. See Matter of David E., 176 Misc.2d 363, 366 (Fam. Ct. Orange Co.
1998).
C. Plaintiff’s First Notice To Produce (Ex. 7) Is Not Overbroad Or Burdensome And
the Documents Requested Are Relevant, Material and Necessary
Each category of documents in Plaintiff’s First Notice to Produce (Ex. 7) is relevant,
material and necessary.
16See Allen, supra; McMahon v. New York Organ Donor, 52 Misc.3d 201, 203 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co. 2016).
17
See U.S. Bank Trust v. Carter, 204 A.D.3d 727 (2d Dep’t 2022) (holding that the moving party
has the initial burden of establishing either that the requested disclosure is utterly irrelevant to
the action or that the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or
obvious); Venture v. Preferred Mut. Ins., 153 A.D.3d 1155 (1st Dep’t 2017).
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Document Requests ##1-3 seek documents and communications 18 sent to or received by
Defendant, AS and ES concerning the Weyant Work.
Document Request #4 seeks discovery concerning funds sent to or received from certain
parties concerning the Weyant Work.
Document Requests ##5-6 request information concerning the Phillips auction estimate
of the Weyant Work (between £100,000 and £150,000 British Pounds).
Document Requests ##7-13 request information concerning Defendant’s net worth, a
critical component of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim.
Document Requests ##14-15 request information concerning payments to Defendant, AS,
ES, HCL, Mourot and Plaintiff from any party, third party or Phillips concerning the purchase,
storage and auction of the Weyant Work.
Document Requests ##16-19 request information concerning Defendant’s denials of the
allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC and Defendant’s defenses thereto.
Document Request #20 is a catch-all request for information that was not specifically
designated in the prior document requests.
In all, there are only 20 document requests, hardly a burdensome Notice to Produce.19
Defendant exaggerates the number of document demands—preposterously claiming that
Plaintiff’s 20 document demands aggregate to 98 document demands (D.Memo p. 7)—because
three of the demands (Ex. 7 Doc. Req. ##1-3) concern documents and communications
18“Document” and “Communications” are defined words in Pl.’s Notice to Produce (Ex. 7 pp. 1-
2).
19 Cf. the 266 document requests in Stepping Stones v. Scialdone, 148 A.D.3d 855, 856 (2d
Dept. 2017), which were stricken as overbroad and burdensome; Dicostanzo, supra at 1044
(striking a document demand consisting of 190 demands).
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pertaining to the 12 individuals and/or entities connected to this action20 and any third parties.
And as Defendant is well aware, the 12 individuals and entities, are for all practical purposes,
only 4 individuals or entities—Plaintiff is a single member entity, i.e. Safdie; Fiskadoro is a
single member entity i.e. Magid; HCL is a single member entity, i.e. Mourot with an xxx adviser
Redai; TAC is a two member entity, i.e. AS and ES with an xxx adviser Redai. For the sake of
clarity, Plaintiff separates Defendant TAC and its two principals, AS and ES, into three separate
document demands (Ex. 7 Demands 1-3).
There is nothing improper about Plaintiff seeking document discovery from Defendant
TAC’s two shareholders, i.e., former defendant xxxxx xxxxxx and his father Ely xxxxxx. As
previously disclosed to the Court in motion sequences ##1 and 2 (Ex. 9 Dkt. 64 Safdie Rep. Aff.
¶¶11-12; Ex. 10 Dkt. 54, pp. 10-11):
i. Former Defendant xxxxx xxxxxx (“AS”) and his father Ely xxxxxx (“ES”) own
Defendant TAC (Ex. 11 Dkt. 53 ¶2);
ii. TAC, then known as AFA, “exists principally as a vehicle for my father and I to
acquire and collect works of fine xxx.” (Id., ¶4) (emphasis supplied);
iii. ES owns a majority 80% interest in Defendant TAC (Ex. 10 Dkt. 54, pp. 14-15);
and
iv. ES was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud in connection with
the sale of forged artworks and was sentenced to 41 months in federal prison
(Exs. 12 and 13 Dkt. 55 and Dkt. 56).
Defendant’s cases are either inapplicable or distinguishable. Defendant cites an
20i.e. (i) Plaintiff; (ii) Plaintiff’s principal, Gabriel Safdie; (iii) Defendant TAC; (iv) TAC’s
minority member, AS; (v) TAC’s majority member, ES; (vi) HCL; (vii) HCL’s principal,
Mourot; (viii) Fiskadoro LLC—the entity from whom Defendant TAC allegedly sourced and
purchased the Weyant Work; (ix) Fiskadoro’s sole member, Jeffrey Magid; (x) Angela Redai,
who is TAC, HCL, ES, AS and Mourot’s xxx adviser and who was involved in the pre-suit
demands by Plaintiff to Defendant and to the principals of Defendant and HCL; (xi) Redai’s
entity, Artine Advisory LLC (“AAL”); and (xii) Phillips Auctioneers, Ltd. (“Phillips”). All of
the foregoing individuals and entities are defined in Pl’s Notice to produce (Ex. 7 pp. 3-4).
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inapplicable Federal Southern District case three times, i.e., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc.,
2009 WL 5247497 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (D. Memo pp. 5, 7 and 8), discussing Federal
discovery rules (FRCP Rules 26, 30 and 45) and general Federal discovery standards.
Incredibly, Defendant cites the infamous Jones v. Maples, 257 A.D.2d 53 (1st Dep’t 1999)
(D.Memo pp. 6, 8), in which plaintiff Chuck Jones, who was the “personal manager, press agent,
accountant, tax adviser and therapist” to defendant Marla Maples (Id., 54), sued Maples for
claims held to be “fantastic and delusional” (Id., 55) and perpetrated criminal “bizarre incidents
of harassment against Maples, which together create the impression that Jones derives
Preview
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------------------------------------X Index No. 650572/2023 ARTINS AG, Plaintiff, MOTION SEQUENCE NO. 3 -against- xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx INC. doing business as THE xxx xxxxxxxxxx, INC., and JOHN DOES, 1-10, Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------------X PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AARON RICHARD GOLUB, ESQUIRE, P.C. Attorney for Plaintiff 24 East 64th Street, Fifth Floor New York, New York 10065 ph: (212) 838-4811 fx: (212) 838-4869 Of Counsel: Aaron Richard Golub Nehemiah S. Glanc Russell I. Zwerin 1 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 TABLE OF CONTENTS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT………………………………………………………………..……1 POINT I…………………………………………………………………………………………..…..2 DEFENDANT’S SANCTIONABLE VIOLATION OF FOUR DISCOVERY RULES………………………………………………………………..2 A. This Court’s Individual Rule 1.b (Ex. 5)……………………………………..2 B. 22 NYCRR 202.7—The Good Faith Affirmation Rule……………………....3 C. 22 NYCRR 202.20-f………………………………………………………….3 D. New York County Supreme Court Civil Branch Rule 10 (Ex. 6)……………4 POINT II……………………………………………………………………………………………...6 PLAINTIFF’S DOCUMENT DEMANDS ARE MATERIAL AND NECESSARY AND NOT OVERBROAD…………………………………………………………………...6 A. The Court Already Ruled that Plaintiff is Entitled to Discovery (Ex. 1 p. 8)…………………………………………………………………...6 B. The Discovery Standards of CPLR 3101……………………………………..7 C. Plaintiff’s First Notice To Produce (Ex. 7) Is Not Overbroad Or Burdensome And the Documents Requested Are Relevant, Material and Necessary……………………………………………………….9 POINT III……………………………………………………………………………………………13 DEFENDANT’S CHECK (EX. C) IS MEANINGLESS AND WAS PROPERLY REJECTED BY PLAINTIFF AS IT DID NOT INCLUDE ANY STATUTORY INTEREST AT 9% PER ANNUM (CPLR §§5001 and 5004) AND MADE NO PROVISION FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ………………………………………………………………..13 ii 2 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 POINT IV…………………………………………………………………………………………...18 DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL SHOULD BE SANCTIONED AND COSTS IMPOSED FOR FILING AN UTTERLY FRIVOLOUS MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER, WHICH IS COMPLETELY WITHOUT MERIT IN LAW, CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE ARGUMENT FOR AN EXTENSION, MODIFICATION, OR REVERSAL OF EXISTING LAW AND VIOLATES FOUR DISCOVERY STATUTES AND COURT RULES…………………..18 A. Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order Was Made Without Any Reasonable Belief that It Might Be Successful………………………..19 B. Defendant Misquotes 15 of Plaintiff’s 20 Document Demands to Sensationalize Its Motion and Give the False Impression that Its Motion Is Legally Meritorious…………………………………………..21 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………...22 iii 3 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases All-County Medical v. Progressive Cas., 8 Misc.3d 616 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005) ...................................................................................... 7 Allen v. Crowell-Collier, 21 N.Y.2d 403 (1968) ............................................................................................................... 7, 8, 9 Anuchina v. Marine Transp., 216 A.D.3d 1126 (2d Dep’t 2023).................................................................................................... 5 Arazosa v. 3M Co., 60 Misc. 3d 1205(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2018)................................................................................ 8 Barouh Eaton v. International Business Machines, 76 A.D.2d 873 (2d Dep’t 1980)................................................................................................ 12, 13 Bigman v. Dime Sav. Bank, 153 A.D.2d 912 (2d Dep’t 1989)...................................................................................................... 8 Boye v. Rubin & Bailin, 152 A.D.3d 1 (1st Dep’t 2017) ....................................................................................................... 20 Cajamarca v. Osatuk, 163 A.D.3d 619 (2d Dep’t 2018)...................................................................................................... 8 Dicostanzo v. Schwed, 146 A.D.3d 1044 (3d Dep’t 2017).............................................................................................. 7, 10 Eaton v. Chahal, 146 Misc.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Co. 1990)............................................................................. 4 Engel v. Hagedorn, 170 A.D.2d 301 (1st Dep’t 1991) ..................................................................................................... 6 Etzion v. Etzion, 7 Misc. 3d 940 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005) ..................................................................................... 9 Gilbert-Frank v. Guardsman Life, 78 A.D.2d 798 (1st Dep’t 1980) ....................................................................................................... 6 Goldberg v. Blue Cross., 81 A.D.2d 995 (3d Dep’t 1981)........................................................................................................ 8 Golio v. Greenstein, 63 Misc. 3d 1210(A) (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2019) .................................................................... 8 In re Kover, 134 A.D.3d 64 (1st Dep’t 2015) ..................................................................................................... 21 In re Lumerman, 856 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sur. Westchester Co. 2008) ............................................................................... 7 In re Steam Pipe Explosion, 127 A.D.3d 554 (1st Dep’t 2015) ..................................................................................................... 7 In re Will of Ettinger, 7 Misc.3d 316 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005) ....................................................................................... 9 Intercontinental Bank v. Micale & Rivera, 300 A.D.2d 207 (1st Dep’t 2002) ................................................................................................... 21 Jackson v. Hunter Roberts Const., 139 A.D.3d 429 (1st Dep’t 2016) .................................................................................................... 4 iv 4 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 Jones v. Maples, 257 A.D.2d 53 (1st Dep’t 1999) ..................................................................................................... 12 Jones v. Wissenbach, 80 A.D.2d 962 (3d Dep’t 1981)........................................................................................................ 8 Kamen v. Diaz-Kamen, 40 A.D.3d 937 (2d Dep’t 2007)...................................................................................................... 20 Kapon v. Koch, 23 N.Y.3d 32 (2014) ......................................................................................................................... 7 Lexington Acupuncture v. General Assur., 35 Misc. 3d 42 (2d Dep’t App. Term 2012) ..................................................................................... 7 Manekas v. Allied Disc., 6 Misc.2d 1079 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1957) .................................................................................... 14 Matter of David E., 176 Misc.2d 363 (Fam. Ct. Orange Co. 1998) ................................................................................. 9 Matter of Elliot P.N.G., 181 A.D.3d 961 (2d Dep’t 2020)...................................................................................................... 7 McMahon v. New York Organ Donor, 52 Misc.3d 201 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2016) ........................................................................................ 9 Minjak Co. v. Randolph, 140 A.D.2d 245 (1st Dep’t 1988) ................................................................................................... 15 Moran v. Int’l Playtex, 103 A.D.2d 375 (2d Dep’t 1984).............................................................................................. 15, 17 New York Univ. v. Cont’l Ins., 87 N.Y.2d 308 (1995) ..................................................................................................................... 15 Pagan v. St. John’s, 169 Misc. 2d 248 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1996) ................................................................................. 7 Price v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 16 Misc.3d 543 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007) ........................................................................................ 8 Rahman v. Pollari, 107 A.D.3d 452 (1st Dep’t 2013) ..................................................................................................... 7 Rivera v. NYP Holdings, 63 A.D.3d 469 (1st Dep’t 2009) ....................................................................................................... 7 Russell Pub. Grp., Ltd. v. Brown Printing Co., 2014 WL 1329144 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2014) ................................................................................ 6, 7 Sage Realty v. Proskauer Rose, 251 A.D.2d 35 (1st Dep’t 1998) ....................................................................................................... 2 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 2009 WL 5247497 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) ................................................................................ 12 Scheinfeld v. Burlant, 98 A.D.2d 603 (1st Dep’t 1983) ....................................................................................................... 6 State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) ....................................................................................................................... 17 Stepping Stones v. Scialdone, 148 A.D.3d 855 (2d Dept. 2017) .................................................................................................... 10 Sterling Nat. Bank v. Ernst & Young, 62 A.D.3d 584 (1st Dep’t 2009) ..................................................................................................... 15 Suozzi v. Parente, 161 A.D.2d 232 (1st Dep’t 1990) ................................................................................................... 15 v 5 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 Taylor v. State, 66 Misc. 3d 1229(A) (Ct. Cl. N.Y. 2019)......................................................................................... 8 U.S. Bank Trust v. Carter, 204 A.D.3d 727 (2d Dep’t 2022)...................................................................................................... 9 V.J.V. Transp. v. Santiago, 173 A.D.2d 537 (2d Dep’t 1991).................................................................................................... 14 Vargas v. Lee, 170 A.D.3d 1073 (2d Dep’t 2019).................................................................................................... 8 Venture v. Preferred Mut. Ins., 153 A.D.3d 1155 (1st Dep’t 2017) ................................................................................................... 9 Woodward v. Levine, 179 A.D.3d 429 (1st Dep’t 2020) ..................................................................................................... 8 Rules CPLR 3101....................................................................................................................................... 2, 7 CPLR 3101(a) .................................................................................................................................. 8, 9 CPLR 3103....................................................................................................................................... 5, 9 CPLR 3122....................................................................................................................................... 1, 4 CPLR 5001...................................................................................................................................... 2,13 CPLR 5004..................................................................................................................................... 2, 13 FRCP Rules 26, 30 and 45 ................................................................................................................. 12 Regulations 22 NYCRR 130-1.1a.................................................................................................................... 21, 24 22 NYCRR 202.7 ........................................................................................................................ Passim 22 NYCRR 202.20 ................................................................................................................... 3, 19, 20 22 NYCRR 202.20-f ................................................................................................................... Passim 22 NYCRR §130-1.1 (a) .............................................................................................................. 18, 19 22 NYCRR § 202.8-b ........................................................................................................................ 24 vi 6 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendant blatantly failed to comply with several discovery rules: (i) 22 NYCRR 202.7; (ii) This Court’s Individual Rule 1.b (Ex. 5); (iii) 22 NYCRR 202.20-f; and (iv) New York County Supreme Court Civil Branch Rule 10 (Ex. 6). Consequently, Defendant’s motion for a protective order must be denied and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions for filing a frivolous, four-rule-breaking motion, should be granted. 22 NYCRR 202.7(a)— well-established blackletter law enacted more than 25 years ago in 1998—provides that a motion relating to disclosure must be accompanied by an affirmation from moving counsel attesting “that counsel has conferred with counsel for the opposing party in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion.” Failure to submit such an affirmation, alone, warrants denial of the motion. At bar, there is no affirmation of good faith annexed to Defendant’s moving papers. Defendant’s counsel failed to call or email Plaintiff’s counsel to resolve the alleged discovery issues and failed to follow the CPLR 3122 procedure for objecting to a Notice to Produce (i.e., providing objections to the discovery sought in a response to the party seeking such discovery rather than rushing off to Court with a motion for a protective order). In direct contravention of 22 NYCRR 202.7(b), there is no indication on the face of Defendant’s Notice of Motion that any affirmation of good faith was submitted in support of Defendant’s motion for a protective order. Nothing in the Affirmation of Defendant’s counsel Maria Angela Brusco, Esq. (Dkt.92)1—submitted in support of Defendant’s motion—addresses any of the requirements of 22 NYCRR 202.7. 1“Dkt.” means the Docket number of the document in the New York State Courts Electronic Filing system (“NYSCEF”). -1- 7 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 A party moving for a protective order bears the burden of demonstrating (with more than conclusory assertions)2 that the disclosure sought is improper. At bar, Defendant’s motion contains only conclusory assertions, rendering it subject to denial on this ground alone. Defendant’s breaches of contract and conversion were so willful, intentional and done in bad faith that they evince a high degree of moral culpability. Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff its one-third share of the Phillips auction proceeds under the false pretext that Plaintiff purportedly owed a debt to HCL—an unrelated third party—on two unrelated works of xxx. Defendant repeatedly conditioned payment of Plaintiff’s one-third share of the Weyant auction proceeds on two unrelated transactions in which Defendant has no ownership interest (see Ex. 1 Order p. 6-9; Pl. Memo3 Dkt. 32, Point II). POINT I DEFENDANT’S SANCTIONABLE VIOLATION OF FOUR DISCOVERY RULES Defendant’s motion for a protective order is a sanctionable violation of four discovery statutes and rules, including this Court’s Individual Rules. Each violation, alone, warrants denial of Defendant’s motion. The violations, cumulatively, warrant sanctions. A. This Court’s Individual Rule 1.b (“Individual Rule 1.b”) The first page of this Court’s Individual Rule 1.b provides, in pertinent part, in bold and CAPS (Ex. 5): “1. Conferences ... a. Parties are encouraged to resolve discovery disputes and enter into discovery stipulations without court intervention to the extent possible. … b. If the parties are unable to resolve discovery disputes the parties may request a conference with the court. DISCOVERY MOTIONS MAY NOT BE FILED WITHOUT FIRST CONFERENCING THE MATTER WITH THE COURT.” 2 Sage Realty v. Proskauer Rose, 251 A.D.2d 35, 40 (1st Dep’t 1998). 3 ‘Pl. Memo’ means Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion seq. 1. -2- 8 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 B. 22 NYCRR 202.7—The Good Faith Affirmation Rule: 22 NYCRR 202.7 provides, in pertinent part: “Section 202.7. Calendaring of motions; uniform notice of motion form; affirmation of good faith (a)…[N]o motion shall be filed with the court unless there have been served and filed with the motion papers (1) a notice of motion, and (2) with respect to a motion relating to disclosure or to a bill of particulars, an affirmation that counsel has conferred with counsel for the opposing party in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion” (emphasis supplied). ... (c) The failure of counsel to comply with this rule may result in the denial of a discovery motion, without prejudice to renewal once the provisions of this rule have been complied with, or in such motion being held in abeyance until the informal resolution procedures of the court are conducted. C. 22 NYCRR 202.20-f: 22 NYCRR 202.20-f twice provides, in pertinent part, for an in-person or telephonic conference between counsel: “Section 202.20-f. Disclosure Disputes (a) To the maximum extent possible, discovery disputes should be resolved through informal procedures, such as conferences, as opposed to motion practice. (b) Absent exigent circumstances, prior to contacting the court regarding a disclosure dispute, counsel must first consult with one another in a good faith effort to resolve all disputes about disclosure. Such consultation must take place by an in-person or telephonic conference. In the event that a discovery dispute cannot be resolved other than through motion practice, each such discovery motion shall be supported by an affidavit or affirmation from counsel attesting to counsel having conducted an in-person or telephonic conference, setting forth the date and time of such conference, persons participating, and the length of time of the conference…” (emphasis supplied). -3- 9 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 D. New York County Supreme Court Civil Branch Rule 10 (“NY Court Rule 10”) (Ex. 6): NY Court Rule 10 provides: “Rule 10. Disclosure Disputes. Prior to making a discovery motion, counsel shall consult one another in a good faith effort to resolve any discovery disputes (see Uniform Rule 202.7). If a dispute is not thus resolved, the party seeking disclosure, unless otherwise directed in the Background Information section above, is advised to contact the Part Clerk promptly, and within any applicable deadline, for the purpose of arranging a conference, in court or by telephone.” Prior to filing the subject motion, Defendant’s counsel made no attempt to confer with Plaintiff’s counsel and, consequently, failed to submit an affirmation discussing good faith attempts to resolve the discovery disputes. Defendant’s counsel did not even bother to serve objections to Plaintiff’s discovery requests pursuant to CPLR 3122. Defendant’s failure to adhere to 22 NYCRR 202.7, alone, constitutes sufficient grounds to deny Defendant’s motion (let alone Defendant’s violation of three additional discovery statutes and rules, i.e. this Court’s Individual Rule 1.b, 22 NYCRR 202.20-f and NY Court Rule 10. See Eaton v. Chahal, 146 Misc.2d 977, 982-983 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Co. 1990) (“Such ‘good faith’ rule…should be familiar to all attorneys engaged in a litigation practice”);4 Jackson 4 And further holding: “The ‘good faith’ requirement is intended to remove from the court’s work load all but the most significant and unresolvable disputes over what has been the most prolific generator of pretrial motions: discovery issues. Most seasoned litigators know that, with a modicum of good sense, discovery disputes can and should be resolved by the attorneys without the necessity of judicial intervention. Plaintiffs’ attorney in all five actions has essentially ignored the “good faith” requirements of the court rules. In three of the actions, no mention of the “good faith” rule is made. … Significant, intelligent and expansive contact and negotiations must be held between counsel to resolve any dispute and such efforts must be adequately detailed in an affirmation. -4- 10 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 v. Hunter Roberts Const., 139 A.D.3d 429, 429 (1st Dep’t 2016); Anuchina v. Marine Transp., 216 A.D.3d 1126, 1127-28 (2d Dep’t 2023). See Practice Commentaries (2018) to CPLR 3103 C3103:3A explaining “In supreme and county court, all motions relating to disclosure, including a CPLR 3103(a) motion for a protective order, must include an affirmation by the moving lawyer that the lawyer conferred with opposing counsel and made a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion. See, e.g., 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.7(a)” (emphasis supplied). Defendant further ignored the several rules requiring that it seek a conference prior to filing the instant motion. 22 NYCRR 202.20-f warns that “[a]bsent exigent circumstances, prior to contacting the court regarding a disclosure dispute, counsel must first consult with one another in a good faith effort to resolve all disputes about disclosure” (emphasis supplied). The consultation required under 22 NYCRR 202.20-f(b) “must take place by an in-person or telephonic conference” (emphasis supplied). Three of Defendant’s objections aptly demonstrate why a good-faith pre-motion consultation is required by four separate Court rules. In Plaintiff’s Document Requests ##8 and 9 (D.Memo p. 7;5 Ex. 7 Doc. Req. ##8-9), Defendant objects to the time period of “January 1, 2001 to the present.”6 Clearly, January 1, 2001 was a scrivener’s error and should have been January 1, 2021. Indeed, January 1, 2021 was set forth in the first part of Doc. Requests ##8-9. The court…hereby denies each and every motion and cross motion, with costs against each plaintiff based upon a complete and total failure to comply with section 202.7.” Id., at 982-983. 5“D.Memo” means Defendant’s subject Memorandum of Law dated December 7, 2023 (Dkt. 91). 6 Plaintiff’s Document Requests ##8-9 (Ex. 7) request “Documents and Communications concerning [Defendant’s] complete financial condition and profits from January 1, 2021 to the present, including without limitation…Documents and Communications reflecting” Defendant’s, AS’s and/or ES’s “overall financial condition, net worth and net income from January 1, 2001 to the present.” -5- 11 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 A simple phone call or email between counsel would have cleared up that confusion. Defendant intentionally misquotes 15 of Plaintiff’s 20 document demands (##1-3, 6-13 and 16-19) in Plaintiff’s First Notice to Produce Documents (Ex. 7) in an effort to make Plaintiff’s demands seem much broader than they actually are. Defendant purports to quote these document demands as “[A]ll Documents and/or Correspondence and/or Communications…” (D.Memo pp.4-5) (emphasis in original). However, none of the document demands starts with the word “All.” Defendant intentionally misquoted and inserted the phrase “All” (italicized for extra emphasis), knowing that the phrase “All,” in some circumstances, is deemed overbroad.7 POINT II PLAINTIFF’S DOCUMENT DEMANDS ARE MATERIAL AND NECESSARY AND NOT OVERBROAD A. The Court Already Ruled that Plaintiff is Entitled to Discovery (Ex. 1 p. 8) When the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s second cause of action for a full and complete accounting (Ex. 1 p. 8), the Court held that Plaintiff could obtain whatever information it required through discovery on its other causes of action. The Court held that “… ‘an action for an accounting is inapposite where a party has also brought a damages suit for breach of contract because the party can obtain any necessary information through discovery’ Russell Pub. Grp., Ltd. v. Brown Printing Co., No. 13 CIV. 5193 SAS, 2014 WL 1329144, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 7 See Gilbert-Frank v. Guardsman Life, 78 A.D.2d 798 (1st Dep’t 1980). In any event, the ‘modern’ view is that the use of the phrase "all," in document requests when relating to a specific subject matter, do not invalidate the request. Engel v. Hagedorn, 170 A.D.2d 301,301 (1st Dep’t 1991) (“While some of the discovery seeks ‘all documents’, these requests are limited to specific subjects and are thus not overly broad.”); Scheinfeld v. Burlant, 98 A.D.2d 603, 603 (1st Dep’t 1983) (“To hold that the items lack specificity simply because they start with the word ‘All’, would be to exalt form over substance and to frustrate the liberal discovery provisions which CPLR article 31 was designed to accomplish.”). -6- 12 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 2014 (quotations omitted)” (Ex. 1 p. 8). Obedient to this Court’s Order (Ex. 1 p. 8) and Defendants’ arguments on Motion seqs. 1 and 2 (Dkt. 88 p. 13), by serving its First Notice to Produce Documents (Ex. 7) and its Notice of Deposition (Ex. 8), Plaintiff was attempting to “[o]btain any necessary information through discovery” (Ex. 1 p. 8). Indeed, it was Defendant, in its initial Memorandum of Law dated June 29, 2023 (Dkt. 88 p. 13) which cited and quoted the same holding in Russell Pub., supra, that the Court cited and quoted in its Order (Ex. 1 p. 8), i.e. a separate accounting cause of action may be obviated when Plaintiff can obtain its required discovery as a result of its other causes of action. Defendant cannot now abandon their prior arguments in Motion seqs. 1 and 2, and argue in Motion seq. 3 that no discovery whatsoever is warranted. B. The Discovery Standards of CPLR 3101 The term “material and necessary” in CPLR 3101 and the scope of disclosure in general, is broadly and liberally interpreted.8 In Kapon v. Koch, 23 N.Y.3d 32, 34, 37 (2014), the court interpreted the “material and necessary” requirement to mean “relevant.”9 The test to determine if the information sought is material and necessary is one of usefulness and reason.10 What is “material and necessary” must be interpreted liberally to require disclosure of any facts bearing on the controversy. See Rivera v. NYP Holdings, 63 A.D.3d 469 (1st Dep’t 2009); All-County Medical v. Progressive Cas., 8 Misc.3d 616 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005). The standard has been 8 See Allen v. Crowell-Collier, 21 N.Y.2d 403 (1968); Matter of Elliot P.N.G., 181 A.D.3d 961 (2d Dep’t 2020); Dicostanzo v. Schwed, 146 A.D.3d 1044 (3d Dep’t 2017); In re Lumerman, 856 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sur. Westchester Co. 2008); In re Steam Pipe Explosion, 127 A.D.3d 554 (1st Dep’t 2015), aff’d, 2016 WL 1688703 (2016); Rahman v. Pollari, 107 A.D.3d 452 (1st Dep’t 2013); Rivera v. NYP Holdings, 63 A.D.3d 469 (1st Dep’t 2009). 9 See Allen, supra, at 407. 10See Allen, supra; Pagan v. St. John’s, 169 Misc. 2d 248 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1996); Lexington Acupuncture v. General Assur., 35 Misc. 3d 42, 43 (2d Dep’t App. Term 2012). -7- 13 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 described broadly as extending to anything that is material, meaningful, relevant and necessary.11 Discovery of relevant factual matters is an inherent right of a party in a plenary action. See Price v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 16 Misc.3d 543, 550 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007). To be deemed “material,” there only need be “any possibility that the information” sought during discovery is sought “for possible use as evidence-in-chief or for cross-examination or in rebuttal.” Vargas v. Lee, 170 A.D.3d 1073, 1075 (2d Dep’t 2019). Since a party seeking disclosure often cannot “demonstrate that items it has not yet obtained contain material evidence,” the party instead “must satisfy the threshold requirement that the request is reasonably calculated to yield information that is...relevant.” Id., 1075.12 The term “necessary” does not connote that the information sought must be indispensable, but only “needful.”13 The parties’ disclosure obligations extend to all relevant information calculated to lead to relevant evidence and are not limited to information that can be used as evidence in chief. See Cajamarca v. Osatuk, 163 A.D.3d 619, 620 (2d Dep’t 2018).14 Under the “material and necessary” standard, disclosure is not limited to evidence directly related to the issues raised by the pleadings.15 The words “material and necessary” in CPLR 3101(a) should be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy that will 11 See Jones v. Wissenbach, 80 A.D.2d 962, 962 (3d Dep’t 1981). 12See Golio v. Greenstein, 63 Misc. 3d 1210(A), *6 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2019); Taylor v. State, 66 Misc. 3d 1229(A), *3 (Ct. Cl. N.Y. 2019); Arazosa v. 3M Co., 60 Misc. 3d 1205(A) *2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2018). 13 Goldberg v. Blue Cross., 81 A.D.2d 995 (3d Dep’t 1981). 14 See Bigman v. Dime Sav. Bank, 153 A.D.2d 912, 913 (2d Dep’t 1989). 15See Allen, supra; Woodward v. Levine, 179 A.D.3d 429, 430 (1st Dep’t 2020) (discovery requests sought specific information about business dealings that formed the basis of the counterclaims). -8- 14 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 assist in the preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. See All-County, supra. Any materials demanded through discovery that possibly can be used as evidence in chief, for rebuttal or for cross-examination must be produced. See Etzion v. Etzion, 7 Misc. 3d 940, 943 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005). The test of materiality and necessity applies regardless of the burden of proof.16 A special burden of proof is placed on a party opposing disclosure with respect to proving hardship, special circumstances, prejudice, privilege or confidentiality.17 The party seeking a protective order must make a factual showing to be entitled to such relief under CPLR 3103(a), i.e., to prevent “unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice.” In re Will of Ettinger, 7 Misc.3d 316 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 2005). Discovery is not precluded merely because the party seeking such discovery likely possesses the information sought as the result of non-discovery investigation or as part of its normal business records. See Matter of David E., 176 Misc.2d 363, 366 (Fam. Ct. Orange Co. 1998). C. Plaintiff’s First Notice To Produce (Ex. 7) Is Not Overbroad Or Burdensome And the Documents Requested Are Relevant, Material and Necessary Each category of documents in Plaintiff’s First Notice to Produce (Ex. 7) is relevant, material and necessary. 16See Allen, supra; McMahon v. New York Organ Donor, 52 Misc.3d 201, 203 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2016). 17 See U.S. Bank Trust v. Carter, 204 A.D.3d 727 (2d Dep’t 2022) (holding that the moving party has the initial burden of establishing either that the requested disclosure is utterly irrelevant to the action or that the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious); Venture v. Preferred Mut. Ins., 153 A.D.3d 1155 (1st Dep’t 2017). -9- 15 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 Document Requests ##1-3 seek documents and communications 18 sent to or received by Defendant, AS and ES concerning the Weyant Work. Document Request #4 seeks discovery concerning funds sent to or received from certain parties concerning the Weyant Work. Document Requests ##5-6 request information concerning the Phillips auction estimate of the Weyant Work (between £100,000 and £150,000 British Pounds). Document Requests ##7-13 request information concerning Defendant’s net worth, a critical component of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. Document Requests ##14-15 request information concerning payments to Defendant, AS, ES, HCL, Mourot and Plaintiff from any party, third party or Phillips concerning the purchase, storage and auction of the Weyant Work. Document Requests ##16-19 request information concerning Defendant’s denials of the allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC and Defendant’s defenses thereto. Document Request #20 is a catch-all request for information that was not specifically designated in the prior document requests. In all, there are only 20 document requests, hardly a burdensome Notice to Produce.19 Defendant exaggerates the number of document demands—preposterously claiming that Plaintiff’s 20 document demands aggregate to 98 document demands (D.Memo p. 7)—because three of the demands (Ex. 7 Doc. Req. ##1-3) concern documents and communications 18“Document” and “Communications” are defined words in Pl.’s Notice to Produce (Ex. 7 pp. 1- 2). 19 Cf. the 266 document requests in Stepping Stones v. Scialdone, 148 A.D.3d 855, 856 (2d Dept. 2017), which were stricken as overbroad and burdensome; Dicostanzo, supra at 1044 (striking a document demand consisting of 190 demands). - 10 - 16 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 pertaining to the 12 individuals and/or entities connected to this action20 and any third parties. And as Defendant is well aware, the 12 individuals and entities, are for all practical purposes, only 4 individuals or entities—Plaintiff is a single member entity, i.e. Safdie; Fiskadoro is a single member entity i.e. Magid; HCL is a single member entity, i.e. Mourot with an xxx adviser Redai; TAC is a two member entity, i.e. AS and ES with an xxx adviser Redai. For the sake of clarity, Plaintiff separates Defendant TAC and its two principals, AS and ES, into three separate document demands (Ex. 7 Demands 1-3). There is nothing improper about Plaintiff seeking document discovery from Defendant TAC’s two shareholders, i.e., former defendant xxxxx xxxxxx and his father Ely xxxxxx. As previously disclosed to the Court in motion sequences ##1 and 2 (Ex. 9 Dkt. 64 Safdie Rep. Aff. ¶¶11-12; Ex. 10 Dkt. 54, pp. 10-11): i. Former Defendant xxxxx xxxxxx (“AS”) and his father Ely xxxxxx (“ES”) own Defendant TAC (Ex. 11 Dkt. 53 ¶2); ii. TAC, then known as AFA, “exists principally as a vehicle for my father and I to acquire and collect works of fine xxx.” (Id., ¶4) (emphasis supplied); iii. ES owns a majority 80% interest in Defendant TAC (Ex. 10 Dkt. 54, pp. 14-15); and iv. ES was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud in connection with the sale of forged artworks and was sentenced to 41 months in federal prison (Exs. 12 and 13 Dkt. 55 and Dkt. 56). Defendant’s cases are either inapplicable or distinguishable. Defendant cites an 20i.e. (i) Plaintiff; (ii) Plaintiff’s principal, Gabriel Safdie; (iii) Defendant TAC; (iv) TAC’s minority member, AS; (v) TAC’s majority member, ES; (vi) HCL; (vii) HCL’s principal, Mourot; (viii) Fiskadoro LLC—the entity from whom Defendant TAC allegedly sourced and purchased the Weyant Work; (ix) Fiskadoro’s sole member, Jeffrey Magid; (x) Angela Redai, who is TAC, HCL, ES, AS and Mourot’s xxx adviser and who was involved in the pre-suit demands by Plaintiff to Defendant and to the principals of Defendant and HCL; (xi) Redai’s entity, Artine Advisory LLC (“AAL”); and (xii) Phillips Auctioneers, Ltd. (“Phillips”). All of the foregoing individuals and entities are defined in Pl’s Notice to produce (Ex. 7 pp. 3-4). - 11 - 17 of 30 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/03/2024 04:40 PM INDEX NO. 650572/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 115 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/03/2024 inapplicable Federal Southern District case three times, i.e., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 2009 WL 5247497 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (D. Memo pp. 5, 7 and 8), discussing Federal discovery rules (FRCP Rules 26, 30 and 45) and general Federal discovery standards. Incredibly, Defendant cites the infamous Jones v. Maples, 257 A.D.2d 53 (1st Dep’t 1999) (D.Memo pp. 6, 8), in which plaintiff Chuck Jones, who was the “personal manager, press agent, accountant, tax adviser and therapist” to defendant Marla Maples (Id., 54), sued Maples for claims held to be “fantastic and delusional” (Id., 55) and perpetrated criminal “bizarre incidents of harassment against Maples, which together create the impression that Jones derives