Preview
Motion No. 5132126
NAILAH K. BYRD
CUYAHOGA COUNTY CLERK OF COURTS
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Court of Common Pleas
MOTION TO DISMISS
November 17,2023 16:27
By: MARKR. KOBERNA 0038985
Confirmation Nbr. 3021370
MARIO BLUE CV 23 985528
vs.
Judge: DEENAR. CALABRESE
CENTRAL CADILLAC
Pages Filed: 15
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO
MARIO BLUE, ) CASE NO. CV-23-985528
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DEENA CALABRESE
)
v. )
) DEFENDANT GS CADILLAC LLC’s
GS CADILLAC LLC d/b/a CENTRAL ) MOTION TO DISMISS
CADILLAC, )
)
Defendant. )
Now comes Defendant GS Cadillac LLC d/b/a Central Cadillac ("Central” or “Defendant”)
and, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), respectfolly requests that this Court dismiss the Complaint of
Plaintiff Mario Blue (“Blue” or "Plaintiff’) in the above-captioned matter for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. This Motion to Dismiss ("Motion”) is supported by the
attached Memorandum in Support.
Date: November 17, 2023 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Mark R. Koberna____________
Mark R. Koberna (038985)
Christopher S. Battles (0100538)
SONKIN & KOBERNA, LLC
3401 Enterprise Parkway, Suite 400
Cleveland, Ohio 44122
Telephone: (216) 514-8300
Facsimile: (216) 514-4467
mkobema@sklawllc.com
cbattles@sklawllc.com
Counsel for Defendant GS Cadillac LLC
d/b/a Central Cadillac
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
1. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff's Complaint against Central is one of ten (10) separate pro se lawsuits he1 2
has
filed in this Court in 2023 against various local and national businesses. Each of these lawsuits
involves a similar fact pattern and allegations: First, Plaintiff mails the business an unsolicited
document (typically a credit application or a "Notice of Dispute"), along with several fill-in-the-
blank forms of his own design which purport to: (a) provide certain vague instructions as to how
to handle or respond to the unsolicited document; and (b) create a durable financial power of
attorney between Plaintiff and agent "Mario D. Blue." When the business rightfully ignores these
bizarre documents. Plaintiff then mails a series of increasingly threatening notices, claiming that
the recipient is in breach of an unspecified contract or has failed to perform certain “legal duties.”
Plaintiff then files a lawsuit, alleging that his original unsolicited document is a “contract” and that
the business is liable for its purported failure to respond to his written demands.
Plaintiffs pattern of improper behavior and meritless litigation stretches back several
years, and his allegations have already been considered and rejected multiple times by state and
federal courts in Ohio. In fact, due to Plaintiff s history of "frivolous lawsuits" and "wasting the
Court's limited resources,” he has been declared a vexatious litigant by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, and enjoined "from filing any newr lawsuits or other
documents in [that court] without first seeking and obtaining leave to do so." Blue v. CSEA, No.
1:20-CV-02423-DAP (N.D.Ohio Sep. 29, 2021)?
1 As discussed in more detail below, it is unclear as to whether Plaintiff has filed suit in his matter as a pro se individual
or as a fictitious entity named “MARIO BLUE.” In the interest of simplicity, and consistent with Plaintiffs request
to be declared an indigent litigant for the purpose of his matter. Plaintiff will be referred to herein as “he,'him.”
2 A true and accurate copy of this Order, which is only available as a slip opinion, is attached hereto for the Court's
convenience.
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Here, Plaintiff mailed an unsolicited "Credit Application” to Central, which the dealership
never signed, agreed to, or performed—thus, no contract was created. Central did not fail to
perform any required duties, and is not in breach or default of any agreement with Plaintiff.
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state any viable claim against Central, and his Complaint should
be dismissed by this Court. Alternatively, by identifying himself as an "Agent” filing suit on behalf
of a fictitious entity known as "MARIO BLUE,’" Plaintiff has engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law, and his Complaint should be dismissed or struck pursuant to R.C. 4705.01.
IL FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On approximately August 22, 2023, Plaintiff completed portions of a form "Credit
Application.” ("Application”) which featured the branding of vehicle manufacturer Cadillac.
(Complaint Ex. 1). In the Application. Plaintiff provided his address, Social Security number,
driver's license number, and monthly income, stated that his occupation was "Beneficiary of a
Trust,” and identified his employer as "Blue Legacy Trust.” Id. Plaintiff wrote in the margin of the
Application that he was seeking financing for a "2023 Cadillac Escalade” in the amount of
"$1 17,335.00,” but he did not complete Section B of the Application, which required information
about the particular vehicle being financed. Id.
That same day, Plaintiff completed a homemade fill-in-the-blank form entitled "Tender
Instructions for Application” ("Instructions”), which he addressed to Central. (Complaint Ex. 2 p.
1). In the Instructions, Plaintiff identified himself as "Blue, Mario D. / the Agent, here on behalf
of MARIO BLUE / the Principal,” and instructed Central to, with regard to the Application, “apply
the Principal's balance to the Principal's account number: TBD, each and ever}' billing cycle
moving forward from the receipt of this document.” Id. Plaintiff s Instructions did not explain the
distinction between "Blue, Mario D.” and "MARIO BLUE,” nor did it identify the purported
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"balance" meant to be applied to the pm-ported "account.’' Id. However, Plaintiff further required
Central "to respond in writing if these instructions can not be completed,” and stated that if he did
not receive a response "within 5 (five) business days from the receipt of this document, * * * I
shall assume these Instructions have been successfully performed." Id.
Plaintiff provided the Application, Instructions, and several other documents to a "mailer /
server" named Linda Means, who sent them to Central via USPS Certified Mail. (Id. p. 8). This
mailing included a form entitled "Durable Financial Power of Attorney" ("Power of Attorney"),
in which an individual or entity identified as "MARIO BLUE, the principal, of MARIO BLUE,
State of Ohio," designated "Blue, Mario D., of MARIO BLUE, State of Ohio," as its legal and
financial attorney-in-fact. (Id. pp. 3-7). Ms. Means signed a "Certificate of Service" confirming
that Plaintiff s documents were mailed to Central on "the 22nd day of August, 2023," and had her
signature notarized by Notary Public Michael D. Willis. (Id. pp. 8-9). Plaintiff alleges that the
Application constitutes a "binding contract"3 between Central and himself, and that the
Instructions created "legal duties" that Central was required to follow. (Complaint p. I).4
On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff completed another fill-in-the-blank form that he created
entitled "Notice of Default—Opportunity to Cure," ("Cure Notice"), which he addressed to
Central. (Complaint Ex. 3 p. 1). In the Cure Notice, Plaintiff—again, identifying himself as "Blue,
Mario D. / the Agent"—accused Central of "failing] to perform your duties" as set forth in the
Instructions, and stated that he was granting Central "an additional 5 (Five) business days from the
receipt of this second notice to perform the duties you're required to do." Id. However, Plaintiff
3 Other than certain portions which are hand-written, the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint appear solely in uppercase
letters. In the interest of clarity, all quotations from the Complaint will be written in typical type case.
4 As described in more detail below, there is no document attached to the Complaint which constitutes a legally
enforceable contract between Plaintiff and Central. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to comply with Civ.R. 10(D), which
requires that "[wjhen any claim or defense is founded on * * * [a] written instrument, a copy * * * must be attached
to the pleading.
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provided no further clarity in the Cure Notice regarding Central's so-called "duties" contained in
the Instructions. Id.
On September 9.2023. Plaintiff sent Central a third fill-in-the blank form entitled "Default
Notice—Intent to Sue" ("Sue Notice"). (Complaint Ex. 4 p. 1). In the Sue Notice, Plaintiff again
accused Central of "fail [ing] to perform your duties” as set forth in the Instructions, and stated that
if Central did not perform as instructed, "a lawsuit shall be filed against Central Cadillac in the
proper venue of jurisdiction in regards to this matter." Id.
Plaintiff subsequently filed his Complaint in this matter on September 14, 2023—only
twenty-three (23) days after initially mailing the Application to Central. That same day, he filed a
second lawsuit, based on virtually identical facts and documents, in this Court against another
Northeast Ohio Cadillac dealership. See Blue v. Crestmont Cadillac Corp., Cuyahoga C.P. No.
CV-23-985436 (Sept. 14, 2023).
III. ARGUMENT
A. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) "for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint." Johnson v. Stachel, 2020-
Ohio-3015, 154 N.E.3d 577, 19 (Sth Dist.). The complaint must "state[ a] cause of action
cognizable in the forum," Univ, of Toledo v. Ohio State Emp. Rel. Bd., 2012-Ohio-2364, 971
N.E.2d 448, 8 (10th Dist.), and dismissal is appropriate "if it appears beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff can provide no set of facts entitling the plaintiff to recover," Johnson 19. Although the
court "must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences
must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party," NorthPoint Props. T Petticord, 179 Ohio App.3d
342, 2008-Ohio-5996, 901 N.E.2d 869, 11 (Sth Dist.), it may nonetheless grant a motion to
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dismiss where the contracts or documents "relied on expressly contradict the claim asserted in the
complaint.” Keenan v. Adecco Empl. Servs., 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-06-10, 2006-Ohio-3633, 16
(July 17,2016).
B. There is No Valid Contract Between Plaintiff and Central.
Plaintiff s sole cognizable claim in this matter, as alleged in his Complaint, is that Central
breached the Application, Instructions, and ancillary documents by failing to provide the motor
vehicle Plaintiff requested or complying with the "legal duties” purportedly created by the
Instructions. (Complaint pp. 1-2). However, Plaintiff has failed to properly allege, identify, or
attach to his Complaint any legally valid contract which exists between Central and himself.
Therefore, his claim is insufficient as a matter of law', and should be dismissed.
It is well-settled that the "(ejssential elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance,
contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for legal benefit and/or detriment), a
manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of consideration.” Perlmiiter Printing
Co. v. Slrome, Inc. 436 F.Supp. 409, 414 (N.D.Ohio 1976). An "express contract,” like the one
alleged here, ‘'exists when the parties assent to the terms of the contract as expressed by an offer
and acceptance, which may be embodied in the same document.” Zenfa Labs v. Big Lots Stores,
Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-691, 2003-Ohio-628, 50 (Feb. 11, 2003). Even if Plaintiffs
Application were interpreted as an offer for a unilateral contract, "which invites acceptance by
performance rather than by a reciprocal promise to perform,” acceptance does not occur until
performance takes place. Mulvey v. Guideline Mat. Ins. Co., 2017-0hio-7902, 98 N.E.3d 926,
12-14(1 Oth Dist.).
This is not the first time Plaintiff has attempted to establish a breach of contract claim under
these facts—and this is not the first time this Court has considered and rejected such efforts. In
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Blue v. McGuire, Plaintiff sent certified letters to several employees of Cuyahoga County Job and
Family Services, demanding proof that he had given consent for the Office of Child Support
Services to collect money from him; when the employees did not respond to his letters, he filed a
lawsuit against them. Sth Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108891,2020-Ohio-4292, 2, 9. This Court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that:
[T]here is no evidence that Blue and any of the defendants were parties to a contract.
Initiating correspondence with a person or entity, by certified letter or other means,
does not establish a valid contract. Further, even if Blue were able to establish that
he and any of the defendants were parties to a binding contract, he is unable to
establish that Defendants somehow breached this nonexistent contract. Therefore,
the trial court appropriately granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Id. 9. See also Blue v. Murray, Sth Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108971, 2020-0hio-4218 (dismissing
Plaintiff s complaint based on certified letter he alleged was a contract). Several other lawsuits
Plaintiff has recently filed in Ohio federal court have similarly been dismissed as frivolous. See,
e.g, Blue v. Ryan, 6th Cir. No. 19-4108,2020 U.S.App. LEXIS 17498 (June 3,2020), Blue v. U.S.
Dep 'I of Treasury, N.D.Ohio No. 1T9-CV-1926, 2019 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 221603 (Dec. 27, 2019),
Blue v. Wendy R., N.D.Ohio No. 1:20-CV-134, 2020 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 77729 (May 4, 2020).
Flere, Plaintiff alleges that the unsolicited Application he mailed to Central constitutes the
parties "entering] into a binding contract.” (Complaint p. 1). However, Plaintiff has not alleged
that Central: (a) counter-signed the Application; (b) produced any document which constitutes
acceptance of Plaintiffs offer; or (c) performed any term of the Application or Instructions.
Further, Plaintiff fails to allege that there was any meeting of the minds (or communication at all)
between Central and him regarding his request for a motor vehicle. This is crucial, given that the
purpose of the Application was to obtain financing for a motor vehicle—yet there are no
allegations or evidence that the parties agreed on several material terms of the transaction.
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including the specific vehicle being financed, the amount of Plaintiff s down payment, or the
amount and schedule for Plaintiff s monthly payments.
As Plaintiff presumably learned in McGuire, his unsolicited Application and Instructions
did not establish any contract with Central. Further, he has made no allegations (nor could he) that
Central responded to, performed, or even acknowledged any of the documents Plaintiff sent—or
that Plaintiff offered or provided any consideration for the purported "legal duties" that he expected
Central to fulfill. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of contract, and his
Complaint should be dismissed.
C. By Purporting to Represent the Entity "MARIO BLUE,” Mario D. Blue Has
Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice ofLcnv.
Alternatively, Plaintiff s Complaint should be dismissed or struck because he is a non
attorney who has filed suit on behalf of an entity, in violation of R.C. 4705.01. Plaintiff signed his
Complaint as "Blue, Mario D. / Agent for MARIO BLUE / Principal, without Recourse A.R.R.”
(Complaint p. 2); this is identical to how Plaintiff has identified himself in the Instructions, Cure
Notice, and Sue Notice. In fact. Plaintiff mailed to Central—and has attached to his Complaint—
the Power of Attorney, which purports to designate "Blue, Mario D.” as the attorney-in-fact for
"MARIO BLUE." To be clear, there is no registered business in Ohio called "MARIO BLUE."
and it appears to be a fictitious name derived by simply writing Plaintiff s name in uppercase
letters. However, if Plaintiff indeed intended to file this lawsuit as the agent for an entity known
as "MARIO BLUE." as he represents in his Complaint and exhibits, he is improperly representing
an entity and has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Under Ohio law, "[a] person who is not admitted to the practice of law' pursuant to the
Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar engages in the unauthorized practice of law'
when he or she provides legal services to another in this state." Disciplinary Counsel v. Kafele,
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108 Ohio St.3d 283, 2006-0hio-904, 843 N.E.2d 169,«[ 14 (citing Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A) and R.C.
4705.01). Such "unauthorized practice occurs when a layperson renders legal services * * * for a
corporate entity by attempting to manage legal actions and proceedings before courts of law," and
"preparing legal papers to be filed in court on [the entity's] behalf." Id. ^[ 15. It is well-settled that
a court may strike or dismiss "a complaint, or other pleading undertaken on behalf of a corporation
by a non-attorney [as] a legal nullity." DePaolo Indus. Dev.. LLC v. Blair & Latell Co., 11th Dist.
Trumbull No. 2014-T-0006, 2014-Ohio-4317, 14 (Sept. 30, 2014); see also id. 13 ("The Ohio
Supreme Court has long interpreted R.C. 4705.01 as prohibiting a corporation from maintaining
an action through an officer who is not a licensed attorney.'’).
Despite his inconsistent request to be declared an indigent litigant, Plaintiff deliberately
filed his Complaint against Central not as a pro se individual, but as the "Agent” for a separate
"Principal" entity known as "MARIO BLUE,” which has designated him as its attorney-in-fact
through the Power of Attorney. However, Plaintiff is not a licensed attorney, and is therefore
prohibited from initiating a lawsuit on behalf of a corporate entity under R.C. 4705.01 and Gov.Bar
R. VII(2)(A). Therefore, Plaintiff s Complaint should be dismissed or struck.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Central respectfully requests that Plaintiff s Complaint be
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Further, due to his history of frivolous
litigation in this and other Ohio courts, he should be declared a "'vexatious litigator” and prohibited
from initiating future legal proceedings in this Court without leave pursuant to R.C. 2323.52.
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Date: November 17, 2023 Respectfully submitted.
/s/ Mark R. Koberna_________
Mark R. Kobema (0038985)
Christopher S. Battles (0100538)
SONKIN & KOBERNA, LLC
3401 Enterprise Parkway, Suite 400
Cleveland, Ohio 44122
Telephone: (216) 514-8300
Facsimile: (216) 514-4467
mkobema@skl awl 1c. com
cbattles@sklawllc.com
Counselfor Defendant GS Cadillac LLC
d/b/a Central Cadillac
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Defendant Crestmont Cadillac Corporation's
Motion to Dismiss was filed electronically on November 17, 2023. Notice of this filing will be sent
to all parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing
through the Court’s system.
/s/ Mark R. Koberna________ .
Mark R. Kobema (0038985)
Counsel for Defendant Crestmont
Cadillac Corporation
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MARIO D. BLUE, et al.. ) Case No. 1:20 CV 2423
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
)
CSEA, )
) ORDER
Defendant. )
)
On May 19, 2021, Plaintiff Mario Blue paid a filing fee and moved to reopen the
captioned case. ECF Doc. 4. On September 24, 2021, Defendant Cuyahoga County Child
Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA") moved to dismiss Blue’s case. As further explained
below. Blue's claims lack merit and are frivolous. Accordingly, his motion to reopen is
DENIED (ECF Doc. 4) and CSEA’s motion to dismiss is moot. ECF Doc. 6.
The Court also ORDERS that Mario D. Blue is ENJOINED from submitting any
additional filings in this case. The Clerk is directed to return, unfiled, any such filings from
Mario D. Blue. Mario D. Blue is also ENJOINED from filing any new lawsuits or other
documents in the Northern District of Ohio without first seeking and obtaining leave to do so.
EXHIBIT
1
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I. Background
Blue has filed numerous lawsuits' related to his obligation to pay child support. On
February 24, 2021, the Court dismissed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) both because it
appeared to be duplicative of Blue’s previous cases and because he had not paid the filing fee.
ECF Doc. 3. The Court noted that this was the fifth child support contest Blue had filed in this
jurisdiction alone. The Court also noted that in Blue v. Wendy R., No. 1:20 CV 134 (N.D. Ohio
May 4, 2020)(01iver, J.), the Court had already warned Blue that he would be denied the
privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis ifhe continued to file Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA") claims based on his child support obligations.
II. Motion to Reopen and Motion to Dismiss
On May 19, 2021, Blue paid the filing fee and filed a motion to reopen, but he did not
explain how the instant case differs from his previous filings or explain why his duplicative
FDCPA claim should be permitted to proceed. He simply moved "to have this case heard in this
Court with respect to the FDCPA (Fair Debt Collections Practices Act). Original complaint was
submitted and filed October 23rd, 2020 and Dismissal was rendered February 24th, 2021." ECF
Doc. 4.
On September 24, 2021, CSEA filed a motion to dismiss. ECF Doc. 6. CSEA argues
that Blue cannot bring a class action as a pro se litigant who is unlicensed to practice law. CSEA
also contends that Blue's claims lack merit because, as a matter of law. child support payments
are not "debts" under the FDCPA. Finally, CSEA points out that Blue's second cause of action
brought pursuant to Massachusetts Unfair Trade Practice Act, must be dismissed because Blue
1 CSEA lists fifteen different lawsuits in its motion to dismiss. ECF Doc. 6 at 3.
2
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lias not alleged that any actions occurred within Massachusetts. CSEA is correct on all fronts. If
the Court were to permit Blue to reopen this case, his claims would undoubtedly be dismissed.
III. Frequent Filing
Blue is a pro se litigant and his filings are entitled to an appropriate amount of leniency.
See Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 11 96, 1200 (6th Cir. 1990). However, "pro se filings do not
serve as an "impenetrable shield [from the application of Rule 11 ], for one acting pro se has no
license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already
overloaded court dockets.’" Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986)). A Court may impose pre
filing restrictions as a mechanism to stop the constant flow of meritless and repetitive complaints
being filed on the same or similar matters. Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., et al., 141 F.3d 264,
269 (6th Cir. 1998). A litigant's pro se status is no excuse for wasting the Court's limited
resources and depriving other litigants with meritorious claims of speedy resolutions of their
cases by the continual filing of frivolous lawsuits. See Stewart v. Fleet Financial, 229 F.3d 1154.
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28413(6th Cir.. 2000) (citing Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., 141 F.3d 264,
269 (6th Cir. 1998); Filipas v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145, 1146 (6th Cir. 1987).
Blue had already been warned by this Court that future claims related to his child support
obligations and the FDCPA would result in the loss of his ability to seek in forma pauperis
status. Blue v. Wendy R., No. 1:20 CV 134 (N.D. Ohio May 4, 2020)(01iver, J.). He was also
warned that such claims lacked merit. Id. Despite these warnings, he filed another lawsuit with
similar frivolous claims. And when the Court dismissed those claims, he filed a motion to
reopen with no supporting legal basis. For these reasons. Blue is ENJOINED from submitting
3
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any additional filings in this case, and the Clerk is directed to return, unfiled, any such motions
filed by Mario D. Blue.
Federal courts have both the inherent power and constitutional obligation to protect their
jurisdiction from conduct which impairs the ability to carry out Article 111 functions. Procup v.
Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069. 1073 (I 1th Cir. 1986). Moreover, this court has the responsibility to
prevent litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on judicial machinery needed by others. Id. To
achieve these ends, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has approved
enjoining vexatious and harassing litigants by requiring them to obtain leave of court before
submitting additional filings. Filipas, 835 F.2d at 1146. Mario D. Blue has filed a plethora of
frivolous lawsuits related to his child support obligations in both this and other jurisdictions. To
protect judicial resources from further encroachment, Mario D. Blue is hereby ENOINED from
filing any new lawsuits or other documents in the Northern District of Ohio without first seeking
and obtaining leave to do so.
IV. Conclusion
Mario D. Blue's motion to reopen is DENIED. ECF Doc. 4. Defendant’s motion to
dismiss is DENIED, as moot. ECF Doc. 6. Mario D. Blue is ENJOINED from submitting any
additional filings in this case. He is also ENJOINED from filing any new lawsuits or other
documents in the Northern District of Ohio without first seeking and obtaining leave to do so.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 29. 2021 s/Dan Aaron Polster
United States District Judge
4
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Preview
Motion No. 5132126 NAILAH K. BYRD CUYAHOGA COUNTY CLERK OF COURTS 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Court of Common Pleas MOTION TO DISMISS November 17,2023 16:27 By: MARKR. KOBERNA 0038985 Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 MARIO BLUE CV 23 985528 vs. Judge: DEENAR. CALABRESE CENTRAL CADILLAC Pages Filed: 15 Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528 / Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO MARIO BLUE, ) CASE NO. CV-23-985528 ) Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DEENA CALABRESE ) v. ) ) DEFENDANT GS CADILLAC LLC’s GS CADILLAC LLC d/b/a CENTRAL ) MOTION TO DISMISS CADILLAC, ) ) Defendant. ) Now comes Defendant GS Cadillac LLC d/b/a Central Cadillac ("Central” or “Defendant”) and, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), respectfolly requests that this Court dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff Mario Blue (“Blue” or "Plaintiff’) in the above-captioned matter for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This Motion to Dismiss ("Motion”) is supported by the attached Memorandum in Support. Date: November 17, 2023 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Mark R. Koberna____________ Mark R. Koberna (038985) Christopher S. Battles (0100538) SONKIN & KOBERNA, LLC 3401 Enterprise Parkway, Suite 400 Cleveland, Ohio 44122 Telephone: (216) 514-8300 Facsimile: (216) 514-4467 mkobema@sklawllc.com cbattles@sklawllc.com Counsel for Defendant GS Cadillac LLC d/b/a Central Cadillac Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528 / Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 1. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff's Complaint against Central is one of ten (10) separate pro se lawsuits he1 2 has filed in this Court in 2023 against various local and national businesses. Each of these lawsuits involves a similar fact pattern and allegations: First, Plaintiff mails the business an unsolicited document (typically a credit application or a "Notice of Dispute"), along with several fill-in-the- blank forms of his own design which purport to: (a) provide certain vague instructions as to how to handle or respond to the unsolicited document; and (b) create a durable financial power of attorney between Plaintiff and agent "Mario D. Blue." When the business rightfully ignores these bizarre documents. Plaintiff then mails a series of increasingly threatening notices, claiming that the recipient is in breach of an unspecified contract or has failed to perform certain “legal duties.” Plaintiff then files a lawsuit, alleging that his original unsolicited document is a “contract” and that the business is liable for its purported failure to respond to his written demands. Plaintiffs pattern of improper behavior and meritless litigation stretches back several years, and his allegations have already been considered and rejected multiple times by state and federal courts in Ohio. In fact, due to Plaintiff s history of "frivolous lawsuits" and "wasting the Court's limited resources,” he has been declared a vexatious litigant by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, and enjoined "from filing any newr lawsuits or other documents in [that court] without first seeking and obtaining leave to do so." Blue v. CSEA, No. 1:20-CV-02423-DAP (N.D.Ohio Sep. 29, 2021)? 1 As discussed in more detail below, it is unclear as to whether Plaintiff has filed suit in his matter as a pro se individual or as a fictitious entity named “MARIO BLUE.” In the interest of simplicity, and consistent with Plaintiffs request to be declared an indigent litigant for the purpose of his matter. Plaintiff will be referred to herein as “he,'him.” 2 A true and accurate copy of this Order, which is only available as a slip opinion, is attached hereto for the Court's convenience. Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528/ Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ Here, Plaintiff mailed an unsolicited "Credit Application” to Central, which the dealership never signed, agreed to, or performed—thus, no contract was created. Central did not fail to perform any required duties, and is not in breach or default of any agreement with Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state any viable claim against Central, and his Complaint should be dismissed by this Court. Alternatively, by identifying himself as an "Agent” filing suit on behalf of a fictitious entity known as "MARIO BLUE,’" Plaintiff has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and his Complaint should be dismissed or struck pursuant to R.C. 4705.01. IL FACTUAL BACKGROUND On approximately August 22, 2023, Plaintiff completed portions of a form "Credit Application.” ("Application”) which featured the branding of vehicle manufacturer Cadillac. (Complaint Ex. 1). In the Application. Plaintiff provided his address, Social Security number, driver's license number, and monthly income, stated that his occupation was "Beneficiary of a Trust,” and identified his employer as "Blue Legacy Trust.” Id. Plaintiff wrote in the margin of the Application that he was seeking financing for a "2023 Cadillac Escalade” in the amount of "$1 17,335.00,” but he did not complete Section B of the Application, which required information about the particular vehicle being financed. Id. That same day, Plaintiff completed a homemade fill-in-the-blank form entitled "Tender Instructions for Application” ("Instructions”), which he addressed to Central. (Complaint Ex. 2 p. 1). In the Instructions, Plaintiff identified himself as "Blue, Mario D. / the Agent, here on behalf of MARIO BLUE / the Principal,” and instructed Central to, with regard to the Application, “apply the Principal's balance to the Principal's account number: TBD, each and ever}' billing cycle moving forward from the receipt of this document.” Id. Plaintiff s Instructions did not explain the distinction between "Blue, Mario D.” and "MARIO BLUE,” nor did it identify the purported Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 I MOTION / CV 23 98552$/ Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ "balance" meant to be applied to the pm-ported "account.’' Id. However, Plaintiff further required Central "to respond in writing if these instructions can not be completed,” and stated that if he did not receive a response "within 5 (five) business days from the receipt of this document, * * * I shall assume these Instructions have been successfully performed." Id. Plaintiff provided the Application, Instructions, and several other documents to a "mailer / server" named Linda Means, who sent them to Central via USPS Certified Mail. (Id. p. 8). This mailing included a form entitled "Durable Financial Power of Attorney" ("Power of Attorney"), in which an individual or entity identified as "MARIO BLUE, the principal, of MARIO BLUE, State of Ohio," designated "Blue, Mario D., of MARIO BLUE, State of Ohio," as its legal and financial attorney-in-fact. (Id. pp. 3-7). Ms. Means signed a "Certificate of Service" confirming that Plaintiff s documents were mailed to Central on "the 22nd day of August, 2023," and had her signature notarized by Notary Public Michael D. Willis. (Id. pp. 8-9). Plaintiff alleges that the Application constitutes a "binding contract"3 between Central and himself, and that the Instructions created "legal duties" that Central was required to follow. (Complaint p. I).4 On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff completed another fill-in-the-blank form that he created entitled "Notice of Default—Opportunity to Cure," ("Cure Notice"), which he addressed to Central. (Complaint Ex. 3 p. 1). In the Cure Notice, Plaintiff—again, identifying himself as "Blue, Mario D. / the Agent"—accused Central of "failing] to perform your duties" as set forth in the Instructions, and stated that he was granting Central "an additional 5 (Five) business days from the receipt of this second notice to perform the duties you're required to do." Id. However, Plaintiff 3 Other than certain portions which are hand-written, the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint appear solely in uppercase letters. In the interest of clarity, all quotations from the Complaint will be written in typical type case. 4 As described in more detail below, there is no document attached to the Complaint which constitutes a legally enforceable contract between Plaintiff and Central. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to comply with Civ.R. 10(D), which requires that "[wjhen any claim or defense is founded on * * * [a] written instrument, a copy * * * must be attached to the pleading. Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528 / Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 I CLDLJ provided no further clarity in the Cure Notice regarding Central's so-called "duties" contained in the Instructions. Id. On September 9.2023. Plaintiff sent Central a third fill-in-the blank form entitled "Default Notice—Intent to Sue" ("Sue Notice"). (Complaint Ex. 4 p. 1). In the Sue Notice, Plaintiff again accused Central of "fail [ing] to perform your duties” as set forth in the Instructions, and stated that if Central did not perform as instructed, "a lawsuit shall be filed against Central Cadillac in the proper venue of jurisdiction in regards to this matter." Id. Plaintiff subsequently filed his Complaint in this matter on September 14, 2023—only twenty-three (23) days after initially mailing the Application to Central. That same day, he filed a second lawsuit, based on virtually identical facts and documents, in this Court against another Northeast Ohio Cadillac dealership. See Blue v. Crestmont Cadillac Corp., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-23-985436 (Sept. 14, 2023). III. ARGUMENT A. Legal Standard A motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint." Johnson v. Stachel, 2020- Ohio-3015, 154 N.E.3d 577, 19 (Sth Dist.). The complaint must "state[ a] cause of action cognizable in the forum," Univ, of Toledo v. Ohio State Emp. Rel. Bd., 2012-Ohio-2364, 971 N.E.2d 448, 8 (10th Dist.), and dismissal is appropriate "if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can provide no set of facts entitling the plaintiff to recover," Johnson 19. Although the court "must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party," NorthPoint Props. T Petticord, 179 Ohio App.3d 342, 2008-Ohio-5996, 901 N.E.2d 869, 11 (Sth Dist.), it may nonetheless grant a motion to Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 9855287 Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ dismiss where the contracts or documents "relied on expressly contradict the claim asserted in the complaint.” Keenan v. Adecco Empl. Servs., 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-06-10, 2006-Ohio-3633, 16 (July 17,2016). B. There is No Valid Contract Between Plaintiff and Central. Plaintiff s sole cognizable claim in this matter, as alleged in his Complaint, is that Central breached the Application, Instructions, and ancillary documents by failing to provide the motor vehicle Plaintiff requested or complying with the "legal duties” purportedly created by the Instructions. (Complaint pp. 1-2). However, Plaintiff has failed to properly allege, identify, or attach to his Complaint any legally valid contract which exists between Central and himself. Therefore, his claim is insufficient as a matter of law', and should be dismissed. It is well-settled that the "(ejssential elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for legal benefit and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of consideration.” Perlmiiter Printing Co. v. Slrome, Inc. 436 F.Supp. 409, 414 (N.D.Ohio 1976). An "express contract,” like the one alleged here, ‘'exists when the parties assent to the terms of the contract as expressed by an offer and acceptance, which may be embodied in the same document.” Zenfa Labs v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-691, 2003-Ohio-628, 50 (Feb. 11, 2003). Even if Plaintiffs Application were interpreted as an offer for a unilateral contract, "which invites acceptance by performance rather than by a reciprocal promise to perform,” acceptance does not occur until performance takes place. Mulvey v. Guideline Mat. Ins. Co., 2017-0hio-7902, 98 N.E.3d 926, 12-14(1 Oth Dist.). This is not the first time Plaintiff has attempted to establish a breach of contract claim under these facts—and this is not the first time this Court has considered and rejected such efforts. In Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 98552®/ Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 I CLDLJ Blue v. McGuire, Plaintiff sent certified letters to several employees of Cuyahoga County Job and Family Services, demanding proof that he had given consent for the Office of Child Support Services to collect money from him; when the employees did not respond to his letters, he filed a lawsuit against them. Sth Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108891,2020-Ohio-4292, 2, 9. This Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that: [T]here is no evidence that Blue and any of the defendants were parties to a contract. Initiating correspondence with a person or entity, by certified letter or other means, does not establish a valid contract. Further, even if Blue were able to establish that he and any of the defendants were parties to a binding contract, he is unable to establish that Defendants somehow breached this nonexistent contract. Therefore, the trial court appropriately granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. 9. See also Blue v. Murray, Sth Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108971, 2020-0hio-4218 (dismissing Plaintiff s complaint based on certified letter he alleged was a contract). Several other lawsuits Plaintiff has recently filed in Ohio federal court have similarly been dismissed as frivolous. See, e.g, Blue v. Ryan, 6th Cir. No. 19-4108,2020 U.S.App. LEXIS 17498 (June 3,2020), Blue v. U.S. Dep 'I of Treasury, N.D.Ohio No. 1T9-CV-1926, 2019 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 221603 (Dec. 27, 2019), Blue v. Wendy R., N.D.Ohio No. 1:20-CV-134, 2020 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 77729 (May 4, 2020). Flere, Plaintiff alleges that the unsolicited Application he mailed to Central constitutes the parties "entering] into a binding contract.” (Complaint p. 1). However, Plaintiff has not alleged that Central: (a) counter-signed the Application; (b) produced any document which constitutes acceptance of Plaintiffs offer; or (c) performed any term of the Application or Instructions. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege that there was any meeting of the minds (or communication at all) between Central and him regarding his request for a motor vehicle. This is crucial, given that the purpose of the Application was to obtain financing for a motor vehicle—yet there are no allegations or evidence that the parties agreed on several material terms of the transaction. Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528// Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 I CLDLJ including the specific vehicle being financed, the amount of Plaintiff s down payment, or the amount and schedule for Plaintiff s monthly payments. As Plaintiff presumably learned in McGuire, his unsolicited Application and Instructions did not establish any contract with Central. Further, he has made no allegations (nor could he) that Central responded to, performed, or even acknowledged any of the documents Plaintiff sent—or that Plaintiff offered or provided any consideration for the purported "legal duties" that he expected Central to fulfill. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of contract, and his Complaint should be dismissed. C. By Purporting to Represent the Entity "MARIO BLUE,” Mario D. Blue Has Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice ofLcnv. Alternatively, Plaintiff s Complaint should be dismissed or struck because he is a non attorney who has filed suit on behalf of an entity, in violation of R.C. 4705.01. Plaintiff signed his Complaint as "Blue, Mario D. / Agent for MARIO BLUE / Principal, without Recourse A.R.R.” (Complaint p. 2); this is identical to how Plaintiff has identified himself in the Instructions, Cure Notice, and Sue Notice. In fact. Plaintiff mailed to Central—and has attached to his Complaint— the Power of Attorney, which purports to designate "Blue, Mario D.” as the attorney-in-fact for "MARIO BLUE." To be clear, there is no registered business in Ohio called "MARIO BLUE." and it appears to be a fictitious name derived by simply writing Plaintiff s name in uppercase letters. However, if Plaintiff indeed intended to file this lawsuit as the agent for an entity known as "MARIO BLUE." as he represents in his Complaint and exhibits, he is improperly representing an entity and has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Under Ohio law, "[a] person who is not admitted to the practice of law' pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar engages in the unauthorized practice of law' when he or she provides legal services to another in this state." Disciplinary Counsel v. Kafele, Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 9855288 Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ 108 Ohio St.3d 283, 2006-0hio-904, 843 N.E.2d 169,«[ 14 (citing Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A) and R.C. 4705.01). Such "unauthorized practice occurs when a layperson renders legal services * * * for a corporate entity by attempting to manage legal actions and proceedings before courts of law," and "preparing legal papers to be filed in court on [the entity's] behalf." Id. ^[ 15. It is well-settled that a court may strike or dismiss "a complaint, or other pleading undertaken on behalf of a corporation by a non-attorney [as] a legal nullity." DePaolo Indus. Dev.. LLC v. Blair & Latell Co., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0006, 2014-Ohio-4317, 14 (Sept. 30, 2014); see also id. 13 ("The Ohio Supreme Court has long interpreted R.C. 4705.01 as prohibiting a corporation from maintaining an action through an officer who is not a licensed attorney.'’). Despite his inconsistent request to be declared an indigent litigant, Plaintiff deliberately filed his Complaint against Central not as a pro se individual, but as the "Agent” for a separate "Principal" entity known as "MARIO BLUE,” which has designated him as its attorney-in-fact through the Power of Attorney. However, Plaintiff is not a licensed attorney, and is therefore prohibited from initiating a lawsuit on behalf of a corporate entity under R.C. 4705.01 and Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A). Therefore, Plaintiff s Complaint should be dismissed or struck. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Central respectfully requests that Plaintiff s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Further, due to his history of frivolous litigation in this and other Ohio courts, he should be declared a "'vexatious litigator” and prohibited from initiating future legal proceedings in this Court without leave pursuant to R.C. 2323.52. Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528^ Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ Date: November 17, 2023 Respectfully submitted. /s/ Mark R. Koberna_________ Mark R. Kobema (0038985) Christopher S. Battles (0100538) SONKIN & KOBERNA, LLC 3401 Enterprise Parkway, Suite 400 Cleveland, Ohio 44122 Telephone: (216) 514-8300 Facsimile: (216) 514-4467 mkobema@skl awl 1c. com cbattles@sklawllc.com Counselfor Defendant GS Cadillac LLC d/b/a Central Cadillac Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528 ^Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Defendant Crestmont Cadillac Corporation's Motion to Dismiss was filed electronically on November 17, 2023. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s system. /s/ Mark R. Koberna________ . Mark R. Kobema (0038985) Counsel for Defendant Crestmont Cadillac Corporation Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 I MOTION / CV 23 985528 1 Confirmation Nbr- 3021370 1 CLDLJ Case: l:20-cv-02423-DAP Doc #: 7 Filed: 09/29/21 lof4. PagelD#:48 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION MARIO D. BLUE, et al.. ) Case No. 1:20 CV 2423 ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER ) CSEA, ) ) ORDER Defendant. ) ) On May 19, 2021, Plaintiff Mario Blue paid a filing fee and moved to reopen the captioned case. ECF Doc. 4. On September 24, 2021, Defendant Cuyahoga County Child Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA") moved to dismiss Blue’s case. As further explained below. Blue's claims lack merit and are frivolous. Accordingly, his motion to reopen is DENIED (ECF Doc. 4) and CSEA’s motion to dismiss is moot. ECF Doc. 6. The Court also ORDERS that Mario D. Blue is ENJOINED from submitting any additional filings in this case. The Clerk is directed to return, unfiled, any such filings from Mario D. Blue. Mario D. Blue is also ENJOINED from filing any new lawsuits or other documents in the Northern District of Ohio without first seeking and obtaining leave to do so. EXHIBIT 1 Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528 / Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ Case: l:20-cv-02423-DAP Doc #: 7 Filed: 09/29/21 2 of 4. PagelD#:49 I. Background Blue has filed numerous lawsuits' related to his obligation to pay child support. On February 24, 2021, the Court dismissed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) both because it appeared to be duplicative of Blue’s previous cases and because he had not paid the filing fee. ECF Doc. 3. The Court noted that this was the fifth child support contest Blue had filed in this jurisdiction alone. The Court also noted that in Blue v. Wendy R., No. 1:20 CV 134 (N.D. Ohio May 4, 2020)(01iver, J.), the Court had already warned Blue that he would be denied the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis ifhe continued to file Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") claims based on his child support obligations. II. Motion to Reopen and Motion to Dismiss On May 19, 2021, Blue paid the filing fee and filed a motion to reopen, but he did not explain how the instant case differs from his previous filings or explain why his duplicative FDCPA claim should be permitted to proceed. He simply moved "to have this case heard in this Court with respect to the FDCPA (Fair Debt Collections Practices Act). Original complaint was submitted and filed October 23rd, 2020 and Dismissal was rendered February 24th, 2021." ECF Doc. 4. On September 24, 2021, CSEA filed a motion to dismiss. ECF Doc. 6. CSEA argues that Blue cannot bring a class action as a pro se litigant who is unlicensed to practice law. CSEA also contends that Blue's claims lack merit because, as a matter of law. child support payments are not "debts" under the FDCPA. Finally, CSEA points out that Blue's second cause of action brought pursuant to Massachusetts Unfair Trade Practice Act, must be dismissed because Blue 1 CSEA lists fifteen different lawsuits in its motion to dismiss. ECF Doc. 6 at 3. 2 Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528 I Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 I CLDLJ Case: l:20-cv-02423-DAP Doc#: 7 Filed: 09/29/21 3 of 4. PagelD#:50 lias not alleged that any actions occurred within Massachusetts. CSEA is correct on all fronts. If the Court were to permit Blue to reopen this case, his claims would undoubtedly be dismissed. III. Frequent Filing Blue is a pro se litigant and his filings are entitled to an appropriate amount of leniency. See Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 11 96, 1200 (6th Cir. 1990). However, "pro se filings do not serve as an "impenetrable shield [from the application of Rule 11 ], for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.’" Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986)). A Court may impose pre filing restrictions as a mechanism to stop the constant flow of meritless and repetitive complaints being filed on the same or similar matters. Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., et al., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998). A litigant's pro se status is no excuse for wasting the Court's limited resources and depriving other litigants with meritorious claims of speedy resolutions of their cases by the continual filing of frivolous lawsuits. See Stewart v. Fleet Financial, 229 F.3d 1154. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28413(6th Cir.. 2000) (citing Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998); Filipas v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145, 1146 (6th Cir. 1987). Blue had already been warned by this Court that future claims related to his child support obligations and the FDCPA would result in the loss of his ability to seek in forma pauperis status. Blue v. Wendy R., No. 1:20 CV 134 (N.D. Ohio May 4, 2020)(01iver, J.). He was also warned that such claims lacked merit. Id. Despite these warnings, he filed another lawsuit with similar frivolous claims. And when the Court dismissed those claims, he filed a motion to reopen with no supporting legal basis. For these reasons. Blue is ENJOINED from submitting 3 Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 / MOTION / CV 23 985528 / Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 / CLDLJ Case: l:20-cv-02423-DAP Doc #: 7 Filed: 09/29/21 4 of 4. PagelD#:51 any additional filings in this case, and the Clerk is directed to return, unfiled, any such motions filed by Mario D. Blue. Federal courts have both the inherent power and constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs the ability to carry out Article 111 functions. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069. 1073 (I 1th Cir. 1986). Moreover, this court has the responsibility to prevent litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on judicial machinery needed by others. Id. To achieve these ends, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has approved enjoining vexatious and harassing litigants by requiring them to obtain leave of court before submitting additional filings. Filipas, 835 F.2d at 1146. Mario D. Blue has filed a plethora of frivolous lawsuits related to his child support obligations in both this and other jurisdictions. To protect judicial resources from further encroachment, Mario D. Blue is hereby ENOINED from filing any new lawsuits or other documents in the Northern District of Ohio without first seeking and obtaining leave to do so. IV. Conclusion Mario D. Blue's motion to reopen is DENIED. ECF Doc. 4. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED, as moot. ECF Doc. 6. Mario D. Blue is ENJOINED from submitting any additional filings in this case. He is also ENJOINED from filing any new lawsuits or other documents in the Northern District of Ohio without first seeking and obtaining leave to do so. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 29. 2021 s/Dan Aaron Polster United States District Judge 4 Electronically Filed 11/17/2023 16:27 I MOTION / CV 23 985528 / Confirmation Nbr. 3021370 I CLDLJ