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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
MIDWEST FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 23 CV 260
-Vs- Judge Page
G6 HOSPITALITY LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
DECISION AND ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This case is before the Court on the following motions: (1) Defendants G6 Hospitality,
LLC (G6H) and G6 Hospitality Franchising, LLC’s (G6HF) (together the “G6 Defendants”)
Motion to Dismiss, filed May 9, 2023; and (2) Defendant A.W.’s! Motion to Dismiss Midwest
Family Mutual Insurance Company’s (Midwest) Amended Complaint, filed on April 25, 2023.
The issues before the Court are whether: (1) Midwest has a duty to defend the Go
Defendants in the underlying case of A. W. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc. et al, .D. Ohio No. 2:21-cv-4934
(filed Oct. 2, 2021) (hereafter the “underlying case”); and (2) the indemnification portion of
Midwest’s claim may proceed when liability has not been determined in the underlying case.
For the reasons set forth in this decision, the Court denies the G6 Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and grants Defendant A.W.’s motion to dismiss.
I, FACTS
This case arises from A.W.’s second amended complaint, which contains allegations that
the G6 Defendants violated the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act codified by 18 U.S.C. §
‘ Due to the sensitive nature of the allegations in the underlying case, the
parties have made efforts to keep A.W.’s name/identity confidential.
1
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2255. (G6 Defendants’ Mot. Ex. 1, 4 116). Specifically, A.W. alleges that she was the victim of
sex trafficking from 1999 to 2019 at various hotels in the Columbus, Ohio area, including two
Motel 6 hotels that were party to franchise agreements with the G6 Defendants. (Amended
Complaint, J 5-7). A.W. alleges that the G6 Defendants violated a statutory obligation imposed
by the TVPRA not to benefit from or receive anything of financial value from a venture they knew
or should have known, to engage in conduct violative of the TVPRA. /d. at 6.
Motel 6 is the trade name for Hreet Hospitality LLC (Hreet), the insured under Midwest
policy number CPOH056011459 (the “policy”). (Amended Complaint Ex. A-B). That policy was
effective from April 12, 2017 to April 12, 2018 and from April 12, 2018 to April 12, 2019. Jd. The
policy lists G6F as an additional insured using the language, “Additional Insured — Grantor of
Franchise.” (Amended Complaint Ex. A, pg. 3-5 BP). It does not mention G6H. Jd.
After the G6 Defendants were added to the underlying case on February 14, 2023, Midwest
filed this action containing a solitary claim for declaratory judgment. Midwest seeks a declaration
that it has no duty to defend or to indemnify the G6 Defendants in the underlying case. Both A.W.
and the G6 Defendants have filed motions to dismiss.
IL. CIV.R. 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
Under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), “[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” Brown v. Levin,
10" Dist. Franklin No.11AP-349, 2012-Ohio-5768, 15. A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion allows the
court to consider only evidence or allegations within the complaint. State ex rel. Fuqua v.
Alexander, 79 Ohio St.3d 206, 207, 6800 N.E.2d 985 (1997).
In reviewing whether a motion to dismiss should be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6),
the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and it must appear beyond
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doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him/her to relief. Brown at 15. As long
as there is a set of facts consistent with plaintiff's complaint which would allow the plaintiff to
recover, the court may not grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss. State ex rel. Jones v. Hogan,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-319, 2021-Ohio-526, 17. “The court need not, however, accept as
true any unsupported and conclusory legal propositions advanced in the complaint.” /d.
II. A.W.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
A.W. argues that Midwest: (1) lacks standing to pursue its claims against her because A.W.
is not a necessary party to Midwest’s declaratory judgment claim; and (2) the portion of Midwest’s
declaratory judgment claim related to indemnification should be dismissed because it is not ripe
when there has been no judgment in the underlying case.
Midwest responds that its claims against A.W. are proper because she is an indispensable
party under Civ.R. 19 and because the Court cannot issue a declaratory judgment unless she is a
party to that judgment. Midwest further argues that because its duty to defend the G6 Defendants
is at issue, it can maintain its claim for indemnification.
Relevant to A.W.’s first argument, Civ.R. 19 states
A person * * * shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may (a) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (b) leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest,
or (3) he has an interest relating to the subject of the action as an
assignor, assignee, subrogor, or subrogee.
Parties who satisfy at least one of the three prongs in Civ.R. 19(A) must be joined. Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., \st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220535, 2023-Ohio-2565, {| 20. Additionally, R.C. 2721.12
requires that when declaratory relief is sought in any proceeding under this section, all persons
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who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties to
the action or proceeding. R.C. 2721.12(A). In Cool, the 10" District Court of Appeals applied the
“legally protectable interest” test to declaratory judgment actions
In a declaratory judgment action, only those persons who are legally
affected are proper parties to a lawsuit. A party is legally affected
by a cause of action if the party has a legal interest in rights that are
the subject matter of the cause of action. A legal interest is an
interest recognized by law and is legally protectable. A person may
have a practical interest in a subject matter for a variety of reasons,
but a person’s practical interest in the outcome of a legal dispute
does not necessarily require his or her inclusion in a declaratory
judgment action. The legally protectible interest standard applies to
a determination whether a party is necessary in a declaratory
judgment action or must be joined pursuant to Civ.R. 19(A).
(Internal Citations and Quotations Omitted) Cool v. Frenchko, 2022-Ohio-3747, 200 N.E. 3d 562,
4 32 (10th Dist.) (Affirming the trial court’s dismissal of declaratory judgment claims against
parties it deemed were not necessary.)
Midwest points out that several Ohio courts have held that an injured party is a necessary
party in a lawsuit by an insurer against its insured seeking a declaratory judgment on the duty to
defend. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Nickles Bakery, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 19390, 2003-Ohio-
47, § 21-23; Ind. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 165 Ohio App. 3d 812, 2006-Ohio-1264, 848 N.E.2d 889, {
16 (Tort claimant’s interest in the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage was sufficient to permit him to
intervene in a declaratory action involving the duty to defend.) In each of those cases, the
claimants either sought to intervene or objected to their dismissal from the declaratory judgment
case involving the insurer’s duty to defend. Murphy at J 3 (Tort claimant’s motion to intervene
was denied.); Cincinnati Ins. Co. at ¥ 2 (Claimants filed an appeal from their dismissal as parties
to the declaratory judgment case.).
Midwest also relies on several federal cases. In Zurich, the court stated, “[w]hen an insurer
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brings a declaratory judgment action against its insured, the underlying claimants are usually, but
not always, necessary parties to the insurance dispute.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Covil Corp., M.D.
North Carolina No. 1:18-CV-932, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117738, * 14. The Zurich court
identified three reasons for this general rule
First, courts presume that the insured defendant will not adequately
protect the injured party’s interests. Second, when the insurer seeks
a declaration about policy coverage, there is the potential to
eliminate a source of funds to compensate the injured party without
any input from the injured party. Third, if the injured party is not
joined, it will not be bound by the court’s declaration, thus causing
this same issue to be relitigated in federal court and thereby reducing
judicial efficiency
Id. at 14-15. Despite recognizing the presumption that a claimant is a necessary party, the Zurich
court determined that the claimant was not a necessary party because: (1) other parties in the case
shared interests with the non-joined claimant in maximizing insurance coverage; and (2) the non-
joined claimant’s absence did not practically impair its ability to protect any interest that it had in
the litigation. /d. at 15-19. Other district courts have recognized the distinction between a
claimant’s status as a necessary party when an insured brings a declaratory judgment claim against
its insurer on the duty to defend and vice-versa. In the former situation, the claimant is a necessary
party. Emplrs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Witham Sales & Serv., Inc., N.D. Indiana No. 2:08 cv 233, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109985, * 13-14 (Nov. 23, 2009) and Winklevoss Consultants v. Federal Ins.
Co., 174 F.R.D. 416, 418-419 (N_D. Ill.1997).
However, the circumstances of this case are more akin to Harleysville, where the Illinois
Southern District Court determined that tort claimants were not necessary parties to a declaratory
judgment action filed by the insurer against the insureds when the claimants asked to be dismissed
from the case. Harleysville Lake States Ins. Co. v. Palestine Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 3, S.D.
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Illinois No. 07-cv-720-JPG-DGW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34296, * 7-8. The Harleysville court
determined that a pool of money would be available to the claimants regardless of who prevails on
the declaratory judgment claim and that the claimants, by seeking dismissal from the case, waived
any right to object, or prejudice resulting from, their absence. /d. at 8-9.
Here, unlike in the Ohio cases cited by Midwest, A.W. is not asserting that she is a
necessary party to this case. Instead, her request to be relieved of the burden of having to
participate is like that in Harleysville, and she has indicated that “she disclaims any interest in the
result” ofthis case. (A.W. Reply, pg. 1). Despite this disclaimer, it is also not clear that A.W. has
any legally protectible interest in this case. She has not expressed concern that her potential
recovery in the underlying case will be diminished if Midwest is successful on its declaratory
judgment claim because the G6 Defendants are large, successful, corporate entities. She does not
claim any specific legally protectible interest. Even if she had any interest in this case, it appears
to be adequately protected by the G6 Defendants, who are seeking coverage and have also moved
to dismiss this case. Finally, there is also no indication that A.W. has any reason to relitigate
Midwest’s duty to defend the Go Defendants in another forum.
After reviewing the arguments and legal precedent presented by the parties, the Court finds
that A.W. is not a necessary party to this case for the purposes of Civ.R. 19 or R.C. 2721.12.
Therefore, her motion to dismiss is GRANTED
IV. G6 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
A. DUTY TO DEFEND
The G6 Defendants submit that Midwest’s complaint must be dismissed because its
complaint contains allegations that A.W.’s claims against them in the underlying case are
potentially or arguably covered by Midwest’s insurance policies. If true, the G6 Defendants argue
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that such allegations would trigger Midwest’s duty to defend and require dismissal of Midwest’s
complaint. Midwest responds that the Court should limit its review of the G6 Defendants’ motion
only to materials properly considered under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), and that after reviewing those
materials, it must determine that the complaint is sufficiently pled and dismissal is inappropriate.
The issuer of an insurance policy has a duty to defend its insured against an action when
the complaint contains an allegation of conduct that could arguably be considered covered by the
policy. City of Sharonville v. Am. Emplrs. Ins. Co., 109 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2006-Ohio-2180, 846
N.E.2d 833, § 16; Ohio Gov’t Risk Mgmt. Plan v. Harrison, 115 Ohio St. 3d 241, § 19, 2007-Ohio-
4948, 874 N.E.2d 1155, * 7, citing Willoughby Hills v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 177, 180,
459 N.E.2d 555 (1984). Additionally, “where a complaint alleges multiple claims against an
insured, the insurance company has a duty to defend against all claims based on the same
occurrence, even if it is contractually obligated to the insured for fewer than all the claims.”
Lexington Ins. Co. v. DunnWell, LLC, 2016-Ohio-5311, 69 N.E.3d 1066, 4 44 (9th Dist.), citing
Am. Chem. Soc’y v. Leadscope, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-305, 2005-Ohio-2557, § 8.
Only when there is no possibility of coverage under a policy based on the allegations in the
complaint will an insurer have no duty to defend the action. DunnWell, LLC at 45, citing Am.
Chem. Soc’y at { 8; See also Harrison at J 19 (“However, an insurer need not defend any action
or claims within the complaint when all the claims are clearly and indisputably outside the
contracted coverage.”) and Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
P.A,, 2013-Ohio-759, 988 N.E.2d 897, 9 (Ist Dist.).
To determine whether coverage exists under the policy for the G6 Defendants, the Court
must look to the plain language of the policies themselves. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vill. Cmtys.
Real Estate, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-35, 2014-Ohio-2916, J 13. Insurance policies are
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interpreted by the same rules of construction applicable to other contracts. Great Am. Ins. Co. v.
Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200353, 2022-Ohio-1160, § 20. When
interpreting a provision in an insurance policy, a court must look to the policy language and rely
on the plain and ordinary meaning of words used. Krewina v. United Speciality Ins. Co., _ Ohio
St. 3d _, 2023-Ohio-2343, § 23. The role ofthe court is to give effect to the intent of the parties’
agreement. Eye Specialists of Del. v. Harleysville Worchester Ins. Co., 10th Dist. Franklin No
21AP-90, 2022-Ohio-4531, § 12. “When the language of a written contract is clear, a court may
look no further than the writing itself to find the intent of the parties.” Krewina, 2023-Ohio-2343,
23. When words within an insurance contact are undefined, they must be given their plain and
ordinary meaning. Krewina, 2023-Ohio-2343, 25. Any ambiguity within an insurance contract
will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, unless doing so
would provide an unreasonable interpretation of the words of the policy. Eye Specialists of Del., J
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The first part of this analysis requires the Court to determine whether the G6 Defendants
are “insureds” under the policy. Harrod v. Travelers Prop. Cas., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-
1181, 2003-Ohio-7229, { 17-18, quoting Blankenship v. Travelers Ins. Co., 4th Dist. Pike No.
02CA693, 2003-Ohio-2592, § 18. The parties agree that GOHF is listed as an additional insured
under the policy. (Amended Complaint Ex. A, pg. 6).
As to G6H, the G6 Defendants argue that language included in Amendatory Endorsement
#1 in the second amended complaint in the underlying case and in Midwest’s amended complaint
allow the Court to conclude that G6H is an affiliate of G6HF, making it an additional insured. (G6
Defendants Mot., pg. 7-8: G6 Defendants’ Mot. Ex. 1, 417 FN 11: Amended Complaint Ex. 1, pg.
9: Amended Complaint, § 7). Specifically, Midwest’s complaint states
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As it pertains to Defendant G6 Hospitality Franchising, LLC,
Defendant A.W. alleges in her Second Amended Complaint that
Defendant G6 Hospitality, LLC “provides franchise opportunities
for its hotel and motel brands through G6 Hospitality Franchising,
LLC.” (See Complaint, 17). In her Second Amended Complaint,
Defendant A.W. goes on in a footnote to allege that “G6 Hospitality,
LLC in turn [sic] owns and controls G6 Hospitality Franchising,
LLC through a series of wholly owned financing subsidiaries.”
(First Amended Complaint, 7, quoting G6 Defendants’ Mot. Ex. 1,17 FN 11). The Court does
not interpret this portion of the amended complaint as an admission by Midwest that G6H is an
affiliate or subsidiary of GGHF. Though the Court must assume the truth of the pleadings when
deciding a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, all that is averred in Midwest’s amended complaint
is that A.W. pled certain facts in the underlying case. From the information presently available to
the Court, those averments are unproven. The Court also does not read the above quoted paragraph
to state that Midwest is adopting A.W.’s averment from the underlying complaint. Therefore, the
Court is not required to assume the truth of that averment. The Court further observes that to apply
the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard in the manner suggested by the G6 Defendants would lead to a harsh
result, especially when this information can easily be obtained through discovery and then applied
in summary judgment proceedings.
Accordingly, the Court finds that at this stage of the proceedings, G6H has not
demonstrated that there is an allegation of conduct that could arguably be considered covered by
the policy because it has not demonstrated that it is an “insured” under the policy. Therefore, the
G6 Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED as to GOH.
Next, the Court must determine whether G6HF’s alleged conduct in the underlying case is
arguably covered by the policy or whether those allegations could be construed to unambiguously
preclude any possibility of coverage. To that end, Midwest alleges that despite G6HF being listed
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as an additional insured under certain limited conditions, the allegations within the underlying
complaint are not covered either by the general liability provisions or the Additional Insured —
Grantor of Franchise endorsement (the “franchise endorsement”) within the policy. (First
Amended Complaint, { 11).
The parties dispute whether the franchise endorsement provides coverage only for claims
involving G6HF’s conduct in franchising to Hreet, or whether it provides coverage for the conduct
alleged in the underlying complaint. The conduct alleged in the underlying complaint includes:
(1) breaching a duty imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1595 by participating in, facilitating, harboring, and
providing A.W. for the purposes of commercial sex induced by force, fraud, or coercion; and (2)
by benefitting from conduct designed to perpetuate the continued violations of that duty. (A.W.
Second Amended Complaint, 72(G6 a-f), 117-118).
The franchise endorsement contains the following language
Section II- Liability is amended as follows:
A. The following language is added to Paragraph C. Who Is An
Insured
Any person(s) or organization(s) shown in the Schedule is also
an additional insured, but only with respect to their liability as a
grantor of a franchise to you.
(Emphasis Original) (First Amended Complaint Ex. 1, pg. 111). Midwest relies on this language
to argue that because the allegations in its and A.W.’s complaints do not implicate the specific
conduct of G6HF franchising to Hreet, the Court could conclude that the policy unambiguously
precludes coverage.
The parties seem to agree that there is a lack of precedent on this issue. Both rely on non-
binding authority. The G6 Defendants rely on Paternostro and Cumberland Farms, Inc. In
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Pasternostro, the Louisiana Eastern District Court held that the language of a franchise
endorsement almost identical to the one in the policy arguably provided coverage where the
underlying claims asserted the insured liability as a franchisor. Paternostro v. Choice Hotel Int'l
Servs. Corp., E.D. Lousiana No. 13-0662, Section “L” (5), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72483, * 32-
33. That case is distinguishable because there are no allegations within A.W.’s Second Amended
Complaint that assert a theory of liability against the G6 Defendants based on their status as a
franchisor to Hreet
In Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Tower Group, Inc., 137 A.D.3d 1068, 28 N.Y.S. 3d 119, *
1071 (2nd Div.), the court held that because the only possible liability of the insured was related
to a franchise agreement, allegations in the complaint for negligent ownership, operation, control,
and maintenance of the property at issue was sufficient to suggest a reasonable possibility of
coverage in the underlying action. /d. However, it is not clear whether A.W.’s claims against the
G6 Defendants in the underlying case could only be premised on the franchisor/franchisee
relationship between Hreet and G6HF. A.W.’s pleadings do not mention the franchise agreement.
Midwest relies on Tennessen, where the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that where a
policy only covers a party in its capacity as a franchisor, there was no coverage where the
complaint did not allege negligence in the granting of a franchise. Zennessen v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 600, 568 N.W.2d 37, * 6-7 (2nd Dist.); See also Soft Pretzel Franchise Sys.
vy. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., E.D. Pennsylvania No. 22-1277, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138601, * 6
(Holding that a franchise endorsement did not provide coverage where the allegations had nothing
to do with the insured’s granting of the franchise.)
After reviewing the authority provided by the parties, the Court is persuaded by the
authority relied upon by Midwest. That authority supports a finding, that at this stage of the
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proceedings, where the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party, that Midwest’s amended complaint establishes an unambiguous lack of coverage to
GOHF. See Ferron v. Dish Network, LLC, 195 Ohio App. 3d 686, 2011-Ohio-5235, 960 N.E.2d
705,416. Accordingly, the G6 Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is
DENIED as to its claim for declaratory judgment on Midwest’s duty to defend.
B. INDEMNIFICATION
The G6 Defendants argue that the portion of Midwest’s claim for declaratory judgment on
indemnification is not ripe because liability has not been determined in the underlying case. While
it is true that a decision on the duty to indemnify is premature until a final judgment is issued in
the underlying suit, the G6 Defendants do not provide any authority requiring the Court to dismiss
that portion of Midwest’s claim. Acuity v. Masters Pharm., Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190176,
2020-Ohio-3440, J] 53 (“Since we hold that Acuity has a duty to defend, a decision on its duty to
indemnify would be premature until a final judgment in the underlying suits.”), rev’d on other
grounds in Acuity v. Masters Pharm., Inc., 169 Ohio St. 3d 387, 2022-Ohio-3092, 205 N.E.3d 460
(Reversing the lower court’s decision finding a duty to defend.), citing Sherwin-Williams Co. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 813 F. Supp. 576, 590-591 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(Maintaining jurisdiction for resolving indemnification issues.) and Transamerica Ins. Co. v. SAD.
Mktg. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 49256, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 8036, * 14 (Deferring the issue
of indemnification until certain claimed losses have been established.).
Rather than dismiss the indemnification portion of Midwest’s claim, the Court will defer
it, and if necessary, the case can later be stayed until liability is determined in the underlying case
Accordingly, the G6 Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to this portion of Midwest’s claim for
declaratory judgment.
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V. CONCLUSION
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court orders: (1) A.W.’s motion to
dismiss is GRANTED; (2) the G6 Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Copies to all parties.
SIGNATURE PAGE ATTACHED
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Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
Date: 10-11-2023
Case Title: MIDWEST FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY -VS- G6
HOSPITALITY LLC ET AL
Case Number: 23CV000260
Type: ORDER
It Is So Ordered.
“
Chee
a)
/s/ Judge Jaiza Page
Electronically signed on 2023-Oct-11 page 14 of 14
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Court Disposition
Case Number: 23CV000260
Case Style: MIDWEST FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY -
VS- G6 HOSPITALITY LLC ET AL
Motion Tie Off Information:
1. Motion CMS Document Id: 23CV0002602023-04-2599980000
Document Title: 04-25-2023-MOTION TO DISMISS -
DEFENDANT: A W
Disposition: MOTION GRANTED
2. Motion CMS Document Id: 23CV0002602023-05-0999960000
Document Title: 05-09-2023-MOTION TO DISMISS -
DEFENDANT: G6 HOSPITALITY LLC
Disposition: MOTION DENIED
Preview
Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N60 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO MIDWEST FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiffs, Case No. 23 CV 260 -Vs- Judge Page G6 HOSPITALITY LLC, et al., Defendants. DECISION AND ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS This case is before the Court on the following motions: (1) Defendants G6 Hospitality, LLC (G6H) and G6 Hospitality Franchising, LLC’s (G6HF) (together the “G6 Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss, filed May 9, 2023; and (2) Defendant A.W.’s! Motion to Dismiss Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Company’s (Midwest) Amended Complaint, filed on April 25, 2023. The issues before the Court are whether: (1) Midwest has a duty to defend the Go Defendants in the underlying case of A. W. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc. et al, .D. Ohio No. 2:21-cv-4934 (filed Oct. 2, 2021) (hereafter the “underlying case”); and (2) the indemnification portion of Midwest’s claim may proceed when liability has not been determined in the underlying case. For the reasons set forth in this decision, the Court denies the G6 Defendants’ motion to dismiss and grants Defendant A.W.’s motion to dismiss. I, FACTS This case arises from A.W.’s second amended complaint, which contains allegations that the G6 Defendants violated the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act codified by 18 U.S.C. § ‘ Due to the sensitive nature of the allegations in the underlying case, the parties have made efforts to keep A.W.’s name/identity confidential. 1 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N61 2255. (G6 Defendants’ Mot. Ex. 1, 4 116). Specifically, A.W. alleges that she was the victim of sex trafficking from 1999 to 2019 at various hotels in the Columbus, Ohio area, including two Motel 6 hotels that were party to franchise agreements with the G6 Defendants. (Amended Complaint, J 5-7). A.W. alleges that the G6 Defendants violated a statutory obligation imposed by the TVPRA not to benefit from or receive anything of financial value from a venture they knew or should have known, to engage in conduct violative of the TVPRA. /d. at 6. Motel 6 is the trade name for Hreet Hospitality LLC (Hreet), the insured under Midwest policy number CPOH056011459 (the “policy”). (Amended Complaint Ex. A-B). That policy was effective from April 12, 2017 to April 12, 2018 and from April 12, 2018 to April 12, 2019. Jd. The policy lists G6F as an additional insured using the language, “Additional Insured — Grantor of Franchise.” (Amended Complaint Ex. A, pg. 3-5 BP). It does not mention G6H. Jd. After the G6 Defendants were added to the underlying case on February 14, 2023, Midwest filed this action containing a solitary claim for declaratory judgment. Midwest seeks a declaration that it has no duty to defend or to indemnify the G6 Defendants in the underlying case. Both A.W. and the G6 Defendants have filed motions to dismiss. IL. CIV.R. 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS Under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), “[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” Brown v. Levin, 10" Dist. Franklin No.11AP-349, 2012-Ohio-5768, 15. A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion allows the court to consider only evidence or allegations within the complaint. State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander, 79 Ohio St.3d 206, 207, 6800 N.E.2d 985 (1997). In reviewing whether a motion to dismiss should be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and it must appear beyond Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N62 doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him/her to relief. Brown at 15. As long as there is a set of facts consistent with plaintiff's complaint which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss. State ex rel. Jones v. Hogan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-319, 2021-Ohio-526, 17. “The court need not, however, accept as true any unsupported and conclusory legal propositions advanced in the complaint.” /d. II. A.W.’S MOTION TO DISMISS A.W. argues that Midwest: (1) lacks standing to pursue its claims against her because A.W. is not a necessary party to Midwest’s declaratory judgment claim; and (2) the portion of Midwest’s declaratory judgment claim related to indemnification should be dismissed because it is not ripe when there has been no judgment in the underlying case. Midwest responds that its claims against A.W. are proper because she is an indispensable party under Civ.R. 19 and because the Court cannot issue a declaratory judgment unless she is a party to that judgment. Midwest further argues that because its duty to defend the G6 Defendants is at issue, it can maintain its claim for indemnification. Relevant to A.W.’s first argument, Civ.R. 19 states A person * * * shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (a) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (b) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest, or (3) he has an interest relating to the subject of the action as an assignor, assignee, subrogor, or subrogee. Parties who satisfy at least one of the three prongs in Civ.R. 19(A) must be joined. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., \st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220535, 2023-Ohio-2565, {| 20. Additionally, R.C. 2721.12 requires that when declaratory relief is sought in any proceeding under this section, all persons Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N6é who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties to the action or proceeding. R.C. 2721.12(A). In Cool, the 10" District Court of Appeals applied the “legally protectable interest” test to declaratory judgment actions In a declaratory judgment action, only those persons who are legally affected are proper parties to a lawsuit. A party is legally affected by a cause of action if the party has a legal interest in rights that are the subject matter of the cause of action. A legal interest is an interest recognized by law and is legally protectable. A person may have a practical interest in a subject matter for a variety of reasons, but a person’s practical interest in the outcome of a legal dispute does not necessarily require his or her inclusion in a declaratory judgment action. The legally protectible interest standard applies to a determination whether a party is necessary in a declaratory judgment action or must be joined pursuant to Civ.R. 19(A). (Internal Citations and Quotations Omitted) Cool v. Frenchko, 2022-Ohio-3747, 200 N.E. 3d 562, 4 32 (10th Dist.) (Affirming the trial court’s dismissal of declaratory judgment claims against parties it deemed were not necessary.) Midwest points out that several Ohio courts have held that an injured party is a necessary party in a lawsuit by an insurer against its insured seeking a declaratory judgment on the duty to defend. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Nickles Bakery, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 19390, 2003-Ohio- 47, § 21-23; Ind. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 165 Ohio App. 3d 812, 2006-Ohio-1264, 848 N.E.2d 889, { 16 (Tort claimant’s interest in the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage was sufficient to permit him to intervene in a declaratory action involving the duty to defend.) In each of those cases, the claimants either sought to intervene or objected to their dismissal from the declaratory judgment case involving the insurer’s duty to defend. Murphy at J 3 (Tort claimant’s motion to intervene was denied.); Cincinnati Ins. Co. at ¥ 2 (Claimants filed an appeal from their dismissal as parties to the declaratory judgment case.). Midwest also relies on several federal cases. In Zurich, the court stated, “[w]hen an insurer Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N64 brings a declaratory judgment action against its insured, the underlying claimants are usually, but not always, necessary parties to the insurance dispute.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Covil Corp., M.D. North Carolina No. 1:18-CV-932, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117738, * 14. The Zurich court identified three reasons for this general rule First, courts presume that the insured defendant will not adequately protect the injured party’s interests. Second, when the insurer seeks a declaration about policy coverage, there is the potential to eliminate a source of funds to compensate the injured party without any input from the injured party. Third, if the injured party is not joined, it will not be bound by the court’s declaration, thus causing this same issue to be relitigated in federal court and thereby reducing judicial efficiency Id. at 14-15. Despite recognizing the presumption that a claimant is a necessary party, the Zurich court determined that the claimant was not a necessary party because: (1) other parties in the case shared interests with the non-joined claimant in maximizing insurance coverage; and (2) the non- joined claimant’s absence did not practically impair its ability to protect any interest that it had in the litigation. /d. at 15-19. Other district courts have recognized the distinction between a claimant’s status as a necessary party when an insured brings a declaratory judgment claim against its insurer on the duty to defend and vice-versa. In the former situation, the claimant is a necessary party. Emplrs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Witham Sales & Serv., Inc., N.D. Indiana No. 2:08 cv 233, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109985, * 13-14 (Nov. 23, 2009) and Winklevoss Consultants v. Federal Ins. Co., 174 F.R.D. 416, 418-419 (N_D. Ill.1997). However, the circumstances of this case are more akin to Harleysville, where the Illinois Southern District Court determined that tort claimants were not necessary parties to a declaratory judgment action filed by the insurer against the insureds when the claimants asked to be dismissed from the case. Harleysville Lake States Ins. Co. v. Palestine Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 3, S.D. Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N6 Illinois No. 07-cv-720-JPG-DGW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34296, * 7-8. The Harleysville court determined that a pool of money would be available to the claimants regardless of who prevails on the declaratory judgment claim and that the claimants, by seeking dismissal from the case, waived any right to object, or prejudice resulting from, their absence. /d. at 8-9. Here, unlike in the Ohio cases cited by Midwest, A.W. is not asserting that she is a necessary party to this case. Instead, her request to be relieved of the burden of having to participate is like that in Harleysville, and she has indicated that “she disclaims any interest in the result” ofthis case. (A.W. Reply, pg. 1). Despite this disclaimer, it is also not clear that A.W. has any legally protectible interest in this case. She has not expressed concern that her potential recovery in the underlying case will be diminished if Midwest is successful on its declaratory judgment claim because the G6 Defendants are large, successful, corporate entities. She does not claim any specific legally protectible interest. Even if she had any interest in this case, it appears to be adequately protected by the G6 Defendants, who are seeking coverage and have also moved to dismiss this case. Finally, there is also no indication that A.W. has any reason to relitigate Midwest’s duty to defend the Go Defendants in another forum. After reviewing the arguments and legal precedent presented by the parties, the Court finds that A.W. is not a necessary party to this case for the purposes of Civ.R. 19 or R.C. 2721.12. Therefore, her motion to dismiss is GRANTED IV. G6 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS A. DUTY TO DEFEND The G6 Defendants submit that Midwest’s complaint must be dismissed because its complaint contains allegations that A.W.’s claims against them in the underlying case are potentially or arguably covered by Midwest’s insurance policies. If true, the G6 Defendants argue Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N6é that such allegations would trigger Midwest’s duty to defend and require dismissal of Midwest’s complaint. Midwest responds that the Court should limit its review of the G6 Defendants’ motion only to materials properly considered under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), and that after reviewing those materials, it must determine that the complaint is sufficiently pled and dismissal is inappropriate. The issuer of an insurance policy has a duty to defend its insured against an action when the complaint contains an allegation of conduct that could arguably be considered covered by the policy. City of Sharonville v. Am. Emplrs. Ins. Co., 109 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2006-Ohio-2180, 846 N.E.2d 833, § 16; Ohio Gov’t Risk Mgmt. Plan v. Harrison, 115 Ohio St. 3d 241, § 19, 2007-Ohio- 4948, 874 N.E.2d 1155, * 7, citing Willoughby Hills v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 177, 180, 459 N.E.2d 555 (1984). Additionally, “where a complaint alleges multiple claims against an insured, the insurance company has a duty to defend against all claims based on the same occurrence, even if it is contractually obligated to the insured for fewer than all the claims.” Lexington Ins. Co. v. DunnWell, LLC, 2016-Ohio-5311, 69 N.E.3d 1066, 4 44 (9th Dist.), citing Am. Chem. Soc’y v. Leadscope, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-305, 2005-Ohio-2557, § 8. Only when there is no possibility of coverage under a policy based on the allegations in the complaint will an insurer have no duty to defend the action. DunnWell, LLC at 45, citing Am. Chem. Soc’y at { 8; See also Harrison at J 19 (“However, an insurer need not defend any action or claims within the complaint when all the claims are clearly and indisputably outside the contracted coverage.”) and Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A,, 2013-Ohio-759, 988 N.E.2d 897, 9 (Ist Dist.). To determine whether coverage exists under the policy for the G6 Defendants, the Court must look to the plain language of the policies themselves. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vill. Cmtys. Real Estate, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-35, 2014-Ohio-2916, J 13. Insurance policies are Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N67 interpreted by the same rules of construction applicable to other contracts. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200353, 2022-Ohio-1160, § 20. When interpreting a provision in an insurance policy, a court must look to the policy language and rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of words used. Krewina v. United Speciality Ins. Co., _ Ohio St. 3d _, 2023-Ohio-2343, § 23. The role ofthe court is to give effect to the intent of the parties’ agreement. Eye Specialists of Del. v. Harleysville Worchester Ins. Co., 10th Dist. Franklin No 21AP-90, 2022-Ohio-4531, § 12. “When the language of a written contract is clear, a court may look no further than the writing itself to find the intent of the parties.” Krewina, 2023-Ohio-2343, 23. When words within an insurance contact are undefined, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Krewina, 2023-Ohio-2343, 25. Any ambiguity within an insurance contract will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, unless doing so would provide an unreasonable interpretation of the words of the policy. Eye Specialists of Del., J 13 The first part of this analysis requires the Court to determine whether the G6 Defendants are “insureds” under the policy. Harrod v. Travelers Prop. Cas., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP- 1181, 2003-Ohio-7229, { 17-18, quoting Blankenship v. Travelers Ins. Co., 4th Dist. Pike No. 02CA693, 2003-Ohio-2592, § 18. The parties agree that GOHF is listed as an additional insured under the policy. (Amended Complaint Ex. A, pg. 6). As to G6H, the G6 Defendants argue that language included in Amendatory Endorsement #1 in the second amended complaint in the underlying case and in Midwest’s amended complaint allow the Court to conclude that G6H is an affiliate of G6HF, making it an additional insured. (G6 Defendants Mot., pg. 7-8: G6 Defendants’ Mot. Ex. 1, 417 FN 11: Amended Complaint Ex. 1, pg. 9: Amended Complaint, § 7). Specifically, Midwest’s complaint states Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N68 As it pertains to Defendant G6 Hospitality Franchising, LLC, Defendant A.W. alleges in her Second Amended Complaint that Defendant G6 Hospitality, LLC “provides franchise opportunities for its hotel and motel brands through G6 Hospitality Franchising, LLC.” (See Complaint, 17). In her Second Amended Complaint, Defendant A.W. goes on in a footnote to allege that “G6 Hospitality, LLC in turn [sic] owns and controls G6 Hospitality Franchising, LLC through a series of wholly owned financing subsidiaries.” (First Amended Complaint, 7, quoting G6 Defendants’ Mot. Ex. 1,17 FN 11). The Court does not interpret this portion of the amended complaint as an admission by Midwest that G6H is an affiliate or subsidiary of GGHF. Though the Court must assume the truth of the pleadings when deciding a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, all that is averred in Midwest’s amended complaint is that A.W. pled certain facts in the underlying case. From the information presently available to the Court, those averments are unproven. The Court also does not read the above quoted paragraph to state that Midwest is adopting A.W.’s averment from the underlying complaint. Therefore, the Court is not required to assume the truth of that averment. The Court further observes that to apply the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard in the manner suggested by the G6 Defendants would lead to a harsh result, especially when this information can easily be obtained through discovery and then applied in summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, the Court finds that at this stage of the proceedings, G6H has not demonstrated that there is an allegation of conduct that could arguably be considered covered by the policy because it has not demonstrated that it is an “insured” under the policy. Therefore, the G6 Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED as to GOH. Next, the Court must determine whether G6HF’s alleged conduct in the underlying case is arguably covered by the policy or whether those allegations could be construed to unambiguously preclude any possibility of coverage. To that end, Midwest alleges that despite G6HF being listed Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N6é as an additional insured under certain limited conditions, the allegations within the underlying complaint are not covered either by the general liability provisions or the Additional Insured — Grantor of Franchise endorsement (the “franchise endorsement”) within the policy. (First Amended Complaint, { 11). The parties dispute whether the franchise endorsement provides coverage only for claims involving G6HF’s conduct in franchising to Hreet, or whether it provides coverage for the conduct alleged in the underlying complaint. The conduct alleged in the underlying complaint includes: (1) breaching a duty imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1595 by participating in, facilitating, harboring, and providing A.W. for the purposes of commercial sex induced by force, fraud, or coercion; and (2) by benefitting from conduct designed to perpetuate the continued violations of that duty. (A.W. Second Amended Complaint, 72(G6 a-f), 117-118). The franchise endorsement contains the following language Section II- Liability is amended as follows: A. The following language is added to Paragraph C. Who Is An Insured Any person(s) or organization(s) shown in the Schedule is also an additional insured, but only with respect to their liability as a grantor of a franchise to you. (Emphasis Original) (First Amended Complaint Ex. 1, pg. 111). Midwest relies on this language to argue that because the allegations in its and A.W.’s complaints do not implicate the specific conduct of G6HF franchising to Hreet, the Court could conclude that the policy unambiguously precludes coverage. The parties seem to agree that there is a lack of precedent on this issue. Both rely on non- binding authority. The G6 Defendants rely on Paternostro and Cumberland Farms, Inc. In 10 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N70 Pasternostro, the Louisiana Eastern District Court held that the language of a franchise endorsement almost identical to the one in the policy arguably provided coverage where the underlying claims asserted the insured liability as a franchisor. Paternostro v. Choice Hotel Int'l Servs. Corp., E.D. Lousiana No. 13-0662, Section “L” (5), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72483, * 32- 33. That case is distinguishable because there are no allegations within A.W.’s Second Amended Complaint that assert a theory of liability against the G6 Defendants based on their status as a franchisor to Hreet In Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Tower Group, Inc., 137 A.D.3d 1068, 28 N.Y.S. 3d 119, * 1071 (2nd Div.), the court held that because the only possible liability of the insured was related to a franchise agreement, allegations in the complaint for negligent ownership, operation, control, and maintenance of the property at issue was sufficient to suggest a reasonable possibility of coverage in the underlying action. /d. However, it is not clear whether A.W.’s claims against the G6 Defendants in the underlying case could only be premised on the franchisor/franchisee relationship between Hreet and G6HF. A.W.’s pleadings do not mention the franchise agreement. Midwest relies on Tennessen, where the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that where a policy only covers a party in its capacity as a franchisor, there was no coverage where the complaint did not allege negligence in the granting of a franchise. Zennessen v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 600, 568 N.W.2d 37, * 6-7 (2nd Dist.); See also Soft Pretzel Franchise Sys. vy. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., E.D. Pennsylvania No. 22-1277, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138601, * 6 (Holding that a franchise endorsement did not provide coverage where the allegations had nothing to do with the insured’s granting of the franchise.) After reviewing the authority provided by the parties, the Court is persuaded by the authority relied upon by Midwest. That authority supports a finding, that at this stage of the 11 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N71 proceedings, where the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non- moving party, that Midwest’s amended complaint establishes an unambiguous lack of coverage to GOHF. See Ferron v. Dish Network, LLC, 195 Ohio App. 3d 686, 2011-Ohio-5235, 960 N.E.2d 705,416. Accordingly, the G6 Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is DENIED as to its claim for declaratory judgment on Midwest’s duty to defend. B. INDEMNIFICATION The G6 Defendants argue that the portion of Midwest’s claim for declaratory judgment on indemnification is not ripe because liability has not been determined in the underlying case. While it is true that a decision on the duty to indemnify is premature until a final judgment is issued in the underlying suit, the G6 Defendants do not provide any authority requiring the Court to dismiss that portion of Midwest’s claim. Acuity v. Masters Pharm., Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190176, 2020-Ohio-3440, J] 53 (“Since we hold that Acuity has a duty to defend, a decision on its duty to indemnify would be premature until a final judgment in the underlying suits.”), rev’d on other grounds in Acuity v. Masters Pharm., Inc., 169 Ohio St. 3d 387, 2022-Ohio-3092, 205 N.E.3d 460 (Reversing the lower court’s decision finding a duty to defend.), citing Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 813 F. Supp. 576, 590-591 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (Maintaining jurisdiction for resolving indemnification issues.) and Transamerica Ins. Co. v. SAD. Mktg. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 49256, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 8036, * 14 (Deferring the issue of indemnification until certain claimed losses have been established.). Rather than dismiss the indemnification portion of Midwest’s claim, the Court will defer it, and if necessary, the case can later be stayed until liability is determined in the underlying case Accordingly, the G6 Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to this portion of Midwest’s claim for declaratory judgment. 12 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N72 V. CONCLUSION After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court orders: (1) A.W.’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED; (2) the G6 Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED IT IS SO ORDERED. Copies to all parties. SIGNATURE PAGE ATTACHED 13 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N7 Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Date: 10-11-2023 Case Title: MIDWEST FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY -VS- G6 HOSPITALITY LLC ET AL Case Number: 23CV000260 Type: ORDER It Is So Ordered. “ Chee a) /s/ Judge Jaiza Page Electronically signed on 2023-Oct-11 page 14 of 14 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2023 Oct 11 2:41 PM-23CV000260 0G577 - N74 Court Disposition Case Number: 23CV000260 Case Style: MIDWEST FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY - VS- G6 HOSPITALITY LLC ET AL Motion Tie Off Information: 1. Motion CMS Document Id: 23CV0002602023-04-2599980000 Document Title: 04-25-2023-MOTION TO DISMISS - DEFENDANT: A W Disposition: MOTION GRANTED 2. Motion CMS Document Id: 23CV0002602023-05-0999960000 Document Title: 05-09-2023-MOTION TO DISMISS - DEFENDANT: G6 HOSPITALITY LLC Disposition: MOTION DENIED